1

CORRESPONDENCE

RELATIVE TO THE

AFFAIRS OF THE LEVANT.

PART II.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of Her Majesty, 1841.

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CORRESPONDENCE

RELATIVE TO

THE AFFAIRS OF THE LEVANT.

PART II.

No. 1.

Memorandum of a communication to be made to the French Ambassador in London, by Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
(*Communicated to M. Guizot, July* 17.)

Foreign Office, 15 *Juillet,* 1840.

LE Gouvernement Français a reçu dans tout le cours des négociations qui commençèrent l'automne de l'année passée, les preuves les plus réitérées, les plus manifestes, et les plus incontestables, non seulement du désir des Cours d'Autriche, de la Grande Bretagne, de Prusse, et de Russie, d'arriver à une entente avec le Gouvernement Français sur les arrangemens nécessaires pour effectuer la pacification du Levant, mais aussi de la grande importance que ces Cours n'ont jamais cessé d'attacher à l'effet moral que produiraient l'union et le concours des Cinq Puissances dans une affaire d'un intérêt si grave et si intimement liée au maintien de la paix Européenne. Les Quatre Cours ont vu avec le plus profond regret que tous leurs efforts pour atteindre leur but ont été infructueux; et malgré que, tout dernièrement, elles aient proposé à la France de s'associer avec elles pour faire exécuter un arrangement entre le Sultan et Méhémet Ali, fondé sur des idées qui avaient été émises vers la fin de l'année dernière par l'Ambassadeur de France à Londres, cependant le Gouvernement Français n'a pas cru pouvoir prendre part à cet arrangement, et a fait dépendre son concours avec les autres Puissances de conditions que ces Puissances ont jugées incompatibles avec le maintien de l'indépendance et de l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman, et avec le repos futur de l'Europe.

Dans cet Etat de choses les Quatre Cours n'avaient d'autre choix que d'abandonner aux chances de l'avenir les grandes affaires qu'elles avaient pris l'engagement d'arranger, et ainsi de constater leur impuissance, et de livrer la paix Européenne à des dangers toujours croissans; ou bien de prendre la résolution de marcher en avant sans la co-opération de la France, et d'amener au moyen de leurs efforts réunis une solution des complications du Levant, conforme aux engagemens que les Quatre Cours ont contractés envers le Sultan, et propre à assurer la Paix future.

Placées entre ces deux choix, et pénétrées de l'urgence d'une décision immédiate, et en rapport avec les graves intérêts qui s'y trouvent engagés, les Quatre Cours ont cru de leur devoir d'opter pour la dernière de ces deux alternatives; et elles viennent par conséquent de conclure avec le Sultan une Convention destinée à résoudre d'une manière satisfaisante les complications actuellement existantes dans le Levant.

Les Quatre Cours en signant cette Convention, n'ont pû ne pas sentir le plus vif regret de se trouver ainsi momentanément séparées de la France, dans une affaire essentiellement Européenne; mais ce regret se trouve diminué par

les déclarations réitérées que le Gouvernement Français leur a faites,—qu'il n'a rien à objecter aux arrangemens que les Quatre Puissances désirent faire accepter par Méhémet Ali, si Méhémet Ali y consent; que, dans aucun cas, la France ne s'opposera aux mesures que les Quatre Cours, de concert avec le Sultan, pourront juger nécessaires pour obtenir l'assentiment du Pacha d'Egypte; et que le seul motif qui a empêché la France de s'associer aux autres Puissances à cette occasion, dérive de considérations de divers genres qui rendraient impossible au Gouvernement Français de prendre part à des mesures coërçitives contre Méhémet Ali.

Les Quatre Cours donc entretiennent l'espoir fondé que leur séparation d'avec la France, à ce sujet, ne sera que de courte durée, et ne portera aucune atteinte aux relations de sincère amitié qu'elles désirent si vivement conserver avec la France; mais de plus, elles s'adressent avec instance au Gouvernement Français afin d'en obtenir du moins l'appui moral, malgré qu'elles ne peuvent en espérer une coopération matérielle.

L'influence du Gouvernement Français est puissante à Alexandrie: et les Quatre Cours ne pourraient-elles pas espérer, et même demander de l'amitié du Gouvernement Français, que cette influence s'exerce auprès de Méhémet Ali dans le but d'amener ce Pacha à donner son adhésion aux arrangemens qui lui vont être proposés par le Sultan ?

Si le Gouvernement Français pouvait de cette manière contribuer efficacement à mettre un terme aux complications du Levant, ce Gouvernement acquerrait un nouveau titre à la reconnaissance et à l'estime de tous les amis de la Paix.

(Translation.)

Memorandum of communication to be made to the French Ambassador in London, by Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
(*Communicated to M. Guizot, July* 17.)

Foreign Office, July 15, 1840.

THE French Government has received during the whole course of the negotiations which commenced in the autumn of last year, proofs, the most repeated, the most manifest, and the most incontestable, not only of the desire of the Courts of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, to come to an understanding with the French Government as to the arrangements necessary to effect the pacification of the Levant, but also of the great importance which those Courts have never ceased to attach to the moral effect which would be produced by the union and the concurrence of the Five Powers in an affair of such serious interest, and one so closely connected with the maintenance of the peace of Europe. The Four Courts have seen with the deepest regret that all their efforts to obtain their object have been fruitless; and notwithstanding that, very lately, they proposed to France to unite with them to carry into execution an arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, founded upon ideas which had been suggested towards the end of last year by the Ambassador of France in London, the French Government, nevertheless, thought it impossible for it to take a part in that arrangement, and made its concurrence with the other Powers to depend upon conditions which those Powers considered incompatible with the maintenance of the independence and of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and with the future repose of Europe.

In this state of things, the Four Powers had no other choice than to abandon to the chances of the future the great affairs which they had undertaken to settle, and thus demonstrate their weakness, and consign, the peace of Europe to continually increasing dangers; or otherwise to take the resolution of going on without the co-operation of France, and bring about by means of their united efforts a solution of the complications of the Levant, in conformity with the engagements which the Four Courts have contracted towards the Sultan, and calculated to ensure future peace.

Placed between this twofold choice, and impressed with the importance of an immediate decision, and one consistent with the serious interests which

are involved in it, the Four Courts have considered it their duty to choose the latter of these two alternatives; and consequently they have now concluded with the Sultan a Convention destined to solve in a satisfactory manner the complications at present existing in the Levant.

The Four Courts, on signing this Convention, could not but feel the liveliest regret at finding themselves thus momentarily separated from France, in an affair essentially European; but this regret is diminished by the repeated declarations which the French Government has made to them,—that it has no objection to offer to the arrangements which the Four Powers are desirous of making Mehemet Ali accept, if Mehemet Ali consents to them; that, in any case, France will not oppose herself to the measures which the Four Courts, in concert with the Sultan, shall deem necessary to obtain the assent of the Pasha of Egypt; and that the only motive which has prevented France from associating herself with the other Powers on this occasion, originates in considerations of various kinds, which would make it impossible for the French Government to take part in measures of coercion against Mehemet Ali.

The Four Courts entertain therefore the grounded hope that their separation from France on this matter will only be of short duration, and will in no wise impair the relations of sincere friendship which they so strongly desire to maintain with France; but, moreover, they urgently address themselves to the French Government in order to obtain from it moral support at least, notwithstanding that they cannot expect from it material co-operation.

The influence of the French Government is powerful at Alexandria; and might not the Four Courts expect, and even demand from the friendship of the French Government, that its influence should be exerted with Mehemet Ali, in order to bring that Pasha to accede to the arrangements which the Sultan is about to propose to him?

If the French Government could in this manner effectually contribute to put an end to the complications of the Levant, that Government would acquire a fresh title to the gratitude and the esteem of all the friends of peace.

No. 2.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, July* 16, 1840.

WITH reference to my despatch* of yesterday's date, I have to inform your Excellency that it is very desirable that no time should be lost by the Austrian Government in sending to their Admiral in the Mediterranean, orders to unite his squadron with the British squadron under the command of Sir Robert Stopford, in order that the two may co-operate in the manner, and for the purposes, specified in the Convention and Protocol of yesterday's date.

No. 3.

Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, July* 16, 1840.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith copies of a Convention for the Pacification of the Levant, and of a Separate Act thereunto annexed, and of two Protocols, all of which were yesterday signed by the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and the Porte. I inclose also a copy of a Memorandum which I have prepared for a communication to be made by me to M. Guizot, the French Ambassador at this Court, and which will be adopted by the Governments of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, as the guide for the language to be held by them to the Government of France.

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* Part I., p. 701.

I have to instruct you to consider this communication as confidential, until you hear from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople that the Turkish Envoy, referred to in the first paragraph of the Separate Act, is coming to Alexandria, or unless you find that the engagements entered into by the Allies are known.

Nevertheless, you are at liberty to use your discretion as to making known confidentially, either to your colleagues or to Mehemet Ali, the general fact that the Four Powers have entered into a Convention with the Sultan for the settlement of the differences between that Sovereign and Mehemet Ali, if you should be of opinion that such an intimation would usefully prepare Mehemet Ali for acquiescence.

If you should think it advisable to give any intimation to Mehemet Ali, you should not do so, except in concert with, and with the concurrence of, your colleagues of Austria, Prussia, and Russia; but in that case, you should suggest to Mehemet Ali, but not in such a manner as to give offence, that when Four Great Powers enter into such engagements with a Fifth, they must necessarily have made up their minds to carry fully into execution the stipulated arrangements: that no reasonable man can doubt that the Four Powers and the Sultan have the requisite means for accomplishing their object; and that, consequently, any attempt at resistance on the part of Mehemet Ali, could only be injurious to himself and his family.

You will treat the French Consul-General as the Agent of a Power which, for special reasons belonging to its domestic policy, has been unable to join the other Four Powers in the engagements made with the Sultan, but which is not hostile to the views of the Four Powers, and which has formally declared its intention to offer no opposition to the measures which the Four Powers may think it right to adopt.

No. 4.

Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, July* 18, 1840.

YOU will see by the inclosures in my despatch of the 16th instant, that Her Majesty's Government has entered into a Convention with Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Turkey, for the purpose of circumscribing the power of Mehemet Ali within limits compatible with the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire.

Mehemet Ali must necessarily feel, when he learns that fact, that successful resistance on his part is impossible; and that any attempt at it would only lead to his losing the advantages which the Sultan and his Allies are willing to offer.

The only chance of success which Mehemet Ali could have, would be from the assistance of France; but France will not help him. France would, indeed, oppose a hostile coalition of the Five Powers above-mentioned, if those Powers were to threaten to invade France, to insult her honour, or to attack her Possessions; but France will not go to war with the other Great Powers of Europe in order to help Mehemet Ali, nor has she the means of doing so.

France has, it is true, a fleet of fifteen sail of the line in the Mediterranean, and she might soon add three more to that number, but that is nearly the whole amount of her available fleet; and she could not send to sea a much greater force, if she were to go to war with the Four Powers. Great Britain, on the other hand, could, in case of war, send to sea a fleet which would sweep the Ocean.

France has now 60,000 men in Algeria, and in order to supply reinforcements to fill up casualties in that army, she must maintain a force at home specially as a reserve for her African troops. How, in this state of things, could France wantonly engage in war with the Great Military Powers of the Continent?

It is certain, therefore, that France will take no active part in favour of Mehemet Ali, and the French Government have repeatedly told us so.

You will see that orders have been given to the British fleet to act at once, by cutting off the communication between Syria and Egypt, and by helping the Syrians. If Mehemet Ali should complain of this, and of its being done without notice, you will remind him civilly, that we are the Allies of the Sultan, and have a right to help the faithful subjects of the Sultan in maintaining their allegiance, and to assist the Sultan against those of his subjects who are in revolt against him, as Mehemet Ali is; and that Mehemet Ali, not being an independent Sovereign with whom the Four Powers have any political relations, those Powers are not bound to give him any notice of their intended proceedings.

If Mehemet Ali should threaten to use any personal violence towards yourself, or towards the British subjects and property in Egypt, or to interrupt the passage of our Indian mails, either going or coming, you will request him seriously to consider whether he can have anything to gain by insulting and injuring a great and formidable Power like England, and in thus converting that which is now a measure of general European policy into a special and direct quarrel between him and Great Britain. It must be easy enough to see which of the two is likely to have the worst of it in such a collision.

The best course which Mehemet Ali can pursue, even if he means to resist instead of submitting, is to be as civil as he can to the Allied Powers, and not to compel them to resent insults offered to themselves, as well as to assist in maintaining the rights of the Sultan.

If you should find your personal situation unsuitable to the honour and dignity of your country, you will of course embark; but it is desirable that you should stay as long as you properly can do so, in order to be an organ of communication with the Pasha.

You will assure Mehemet Ali that the British Government is not guided, in the course which it is pursuing, by any ill-will to him, but solely by paramount considerations of European policy; and, indeed, the terms which are to be offered to him, are the best proof that we do not wish to destroy him, or to press upon him more heavily than is necessary for the accomplishment of the great political objects in view. But he should clearly comprehend that these offers are like the Sibylline books: and that the longer he holds off, the less he will ultimately get.

No. 5.

*Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Consul Werry.**

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 18, 1840.

I HAVE to acquaint you that engagements have been entered into between the Governments of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and the Porte, for the purpose of effecting a pacification of the Levant; and that in pursuance of those engagements, the naval forces of Great Britain and Austria will afford support and assistance to the Syrian subjects of the Porte, in their endeavours to relieve themselves from the rule of Mehemet Ali, in order to return to their allegiance to the Sultan.

Sir Robert Stopford has accordingly received orders from Her Majesty's Government, in pursuance of which Her Majesty's squadron will immediately appear on the coast of Syria: and I have to instruct you to place yourself in communication with Sir Robert Stopford, or the Commanding Officer of any of Her Majesty's ships in your neighbourhood, and to afford to them every information you can give them which may be useful to them for the service in which

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* The same despatch was addressed on the same day to Mr. Consul Moore and Mr. Pro-Consul Werry.

they are engaged; and you will, moreover, attend to any directions Sir Robert Stopford may, from time to time, find occasion to give to you.

You will cause it to be generally known, that Her Majesty and the Sovereigns of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, have entered into engagements with the Sultan to re-establish the dominion of His Highness in Syria; and you will facilitate, as far as you may be able to do so, any communication between the Syrians and Her Majesty's naval Commanders.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 6.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July* 17, 1840.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, that arrangements will be made for placing at Sir Robert Stopford's disposal, from Her Majesty's stores at Malta, 5,000 stand of arms, and a due proportion of ammunition; and that Sir Robert Stopford will be instructed to supply these arms and ammunition to the Syrians who are in resistance to the troops of Mehemet Ali, if he should find that such a supply would be useful towards obtaining the results contemplated by the Convention recently signed between the Four Powers and the Porte. Sir Robert Stopford will be instructed to furnish your Excellency with an account of the arms and ammunition which he may thus distribute, and of the parties to whom he may distribute them.

I have to instruct your Excellency to state to the Turkish Government, that Her Majesty's Government have taken this step without waiting for a previous engagement from the Turkish Government to repay the value of these arms and ammunition; but that Her Majesty's Government can have no doubt that the Porte will do so, when its present difficulties are over; and that the charge for these arms and ammunition will be at the rates which will hereafter be communicated to you.

Your Excellency will obtain from the Porte a written assurance of repayment.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 7.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July* 21, 1840.

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Consuls at Aleppo, Beyrout, and Damascus, conveying to them instructions for their conduct with reference to the engagements contracted between the Four Powers and the Porte in the Convention of July 15.

I have at the same time to acquaint your Excellency, that arrangements will be made for embarking on board the squadron under the orders of Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, a small detachment of Artillery, with a proportion of Sappers and Miners, and two or three officers of Engineers, to be employed on any service in which Sir Robert Stopford may require them to act in conjunction with the marines of his squadron.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 8.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received July* 19.)

My Lord, *Paris, July* 17, 1840.

I HAD a long conversation this morning on the subject of Eastern Affairs, with M. Thiers. He began by observing that he was aware that reports had reached your Lordship, of endeavours made by the French Government to annihilate the negotiations at London, by promoting a direct negotiation between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan. This, he said, he had never done; and that his instructions had been strictly confined to recommending to both parties peace and concessions. I asked him the object of M. Périer's mission to Egypt?

He said that M. Périer was sent to the Pasha to tell him that if he offered to restore the Turkish fleet, he must do so in a serious and *bonâ fide* manner; and that, at the least, he must concede Adana, the Holy Cities, and Candia to the Porte. "This," said M. Thiers, "I think we can get from Mehemet Ali, though with difficulty; and the language I hold to him in favour of submission, is as strong as it can be, without forfeiting that influence which I hope to make useful to the interests of peace. In short," said he, "to you I speak in his favour, but to himself I argue in favour of Turkey."

He then went over the question of what might be gained or lost by attempting to wrest Syria from the Viceroy; but as little was here said which your Lordship has not heard before, I do not repeat it. He continued, however, to observe, that he heard some project was being now canvassed in London between the Four Powers.

If, said he, England takes this course, it will certainly not be a case of immediate hostilities; but it is impossible to say what may ultimately occur: France must separate from England, and that with *éclat*. She must increase her Navy and Army; and a state of irritation will be produced, which, sooner or later, will end in one of those wars which convulse Europe.

He then read me a despatch which he had just received from Damascus, from which it would appear that the insurrection in Syria is put down.

In answer to his observations, I told him that it was too much the interest of both countries to maintain their present friendly relations, for me to believe that either would easily forego such an advantage; but calling to mind what had occurred last year, and the support of which the French Government had then, in conjunction with the other Governments, assured the Sultan, I could hardly conceive how it would now be possible for France to avoid doing something in favour of Turkey, if she were called upon by those by whom such promises had been volunteered, to fulfil them. That as to differences as to the extent of what should be done, there would always be differences between States the most amicably disposed towards each other; but that still, I was quite sure it would give the sincerest concern to Her Majesty's Government to find that, in this or any other matter, its views were at variance with those of France. I then asked him what he thought of the line of demarcation from Beyrout to Aleppo, spoken of last year by General Sébastiani? This he objected to; he did not seem willing, indeed, to admit that the Pasha should yield more than Adana, Candia, and the Holy Cities.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 9.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received July* 22.)

(Extract.) *Paris, July* 20, 1840.

I ASKED M. Thiers, this morning, whether the account given in my despatch of this day, with respect to the French fleet that has sailed for Tunis, was complete? M. Thiers replied, "This is not the time to ask or to give explanations: the alliance between England and France is at an end. M. Guizot has received the official intelligence, that an agreement has been come to by the

Four Powers, to which we have not even been asked to accede. This, however, does not much signify; it is merely an affair of form; it is of the *fond* of this matter that I complain more seriously. I cannot understand an alliance on small questions, and a difference on great ones. Should England separate from us on the Eastern Question, such a separation will be a general one. France will, as I have already said, isolate herself: she is confident in her strength, and the more so as the Government has on this subject the whole population of France behind it. Should an occasion, therefore, arise on which the dignity or the interests of my country call upon me to act, I will do so without fear and with decision. I regret it deeply; but I cannot but see in the state of affairs, as now announced to me, eventualities which may disturb the peace of Europe."

I said that, as I had no information upon the subject on which he was speaking, I could say nothing positive upon it. But I was quite sure that, apart from the policy which my Government might think it necessary to adopt, there was only one desire to communicate and to pursue that policy in the manner least likely to offend the dignity, and best calculated to conciliate the feelings, of the French Government; and that it was not for a great country like France to have the jealousy or susceptibility of a smaller Power; and I added, that I was, moreover, certain that M. Thiers' abilities would enable him to look beyond the present moment, and to perceive that, even if an important difference between the two countries should now unhappily arise, there were too many other circumstances, which time was constantly developing, to strengthen the connexion, for him to adopt any course which would change a temporary disagreement into a permanent disunion.

No. 10.

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 21, 1840.

WITH reference to that passage of the Memorandum delivered by me to M. Guizot on the 17th instant, of which a copy is herewith transmitted to you, in which mention is made of a plan founded upon ideas suggested by the French Ambassador at this Court, I have to state to you, for your information, that rather more than two months ago, Baron Neumann came to me and urged me to make, in concert with him, another attempt to persuade the Government of France to unite itself with the other Four Powers for carrying into execution some arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, compatible with the principles which Great Britain and Austria wish to maintain, and at the same time calculated to secure the continuance of peace in the Levant.

Baron Neumann observed, that as matters then stood, there was a wide difference between the plans recommended on these matters by England and by France respectively. The English Government, he said, wished to restrict Mehemet Ali to the hereditary Pashalic of Egypt. The French Government wished to give to Mehemet Ali the hereditary government of all Syria besides. Austria, he said, would be glad if she could in any way assist in bringing France and England to an agreement upon some middle term between these two extremes. The English Government had, indeed, at one time, proposed that there should be added to the Pashalic of Egypt, some of the lower part of Syria, bounded by a line drawn from Cape Carmel to the bottom of Lake Tiberias, and thence along the Jordan and the Dead Sea, to the end of the Gulf of Akaba; but upon France declining to assent to such an arrangement, it was withdrawn by England. Would it not be possible, Baron Neumann asked, for the English Government again to make such an offer, adding to it the fortress of Acre, and proposing that the boundary line should be drawn from the sea-coast, somewhere north of Acre, to the northern end of Lake Tiberias, and thence along the line above described; upon the understanding that this lower part of Syria should be held by Mehemet Ali only for his life, and not by hereditary tenure, because Austria never would consent to Mehemet Ali's holding any part whatever of Syria, by an hereditary tenure?

Baron Neumann said, that such an arrangement would be very like the one which Count Sébastiani had more than once proposed to him and to Baron

Brunnow, as well as to me; and that, consequently, there seemed to be a reasonable chance of its being agreed to by France. I said, that I would most willingly co-operate with him in making such a proposal to M. Guizot; because, however much I should regret that Mehemet Ali should retain possession of the fortress of Acre, nevertheless, if the Sultan should have occupation of Beyrout, and should thus have good means of communication by sea with the middle part of Syria, the occupation of the fortress of Acre might, perhaps, not afford Mehemet Ali any very formidable means of future aggression; and it might be worth while to make such a sacrifice in order to obtain unanimity among the Five Powers. Accordingly, Baron Neumann and I agreed that we should each make this proposal to M. Guizot. Baron Neumann made it the next day, and I the day after that.

M. Guizot heard my statement, and said he would report it to his Government, and ask for instructions, as he had none applicable to such a proposal. After a short time, Baron Brunnow, Baron Bülow, and Baron Neumann, spoke to me separately upon this matter, saying, that they had understood from M. Guizot, that the French Government had sent to Alexandria to consult Mehemet Ali upon this proposal before it could give an answer. They expressed extreme dissatisfaction at this; saying that it was by no means what any of them meant by being parties to the proposal made to M. Guizot. That they were ready and willing to negotiate with France, but that their instructions positively forbade them from negotiating with Mehemet Ali, or with any agent of his, because their Courts acknowledge him in no other capacity than that of subject to the Sultan, and in that character their Courts cannot negotiate with him. They said that this seemed to them to render any further negotiation with France on these matters impossible, because it turned out that it was not France, but Mehemet Ali, with whom the negotiation was to be carried on.

I told them, that M. Guizot had said nothing to me about a reference to Alexandria, and that I thought it would be best that no notice should be taken of what he had said on that subject to them. That the French Government was then much occupied with Parliamentary business, and might naturally enough require some time to consider and make up its mind on our proposal; and that we were not called upon to inquire what it did in the interval, or whom it might choose to consult. That if, by a communication with Alexandria, the French Government should be able to persuade Mehemet Ali to consent to our plan, so much the better; and if they failed and on that account refused to join us, we should only be where we were, with the advantage, however, of having made a very conciliatory proposal to France.

The three Ministers acquiesced; and I did not press M. Guizot for an answer, in order not to give him an opportunity of saying that he was waiting for a decision from Mehemet Ali; but, after a lapse of time sufficient to have enabled the French Government to have sent to Alexandria, and to have had a reply from thence, M. Guizot brought me a private letter from M. Thiers, from whence he read a passage stating, that the French Government was perfectly certain that Mehemet Ali would never agree to our proposal, nor, indeed, to any arrangement that did not leave him in occupation of the whole of Syria; that force would, therefore, be necessary to compel him to consent to our plan; that France could not be a party to coercive measures against Mehemet Ali; and, that, consequently, she could not unite herself with the other Three Powers to propose, and to carry into execution, the plan in question.

This answer proved, that it was impossible for the Four Powers any longer to entertain the slightest hope of co-operation in these matters from France; because, while on the one hand their policy is founded upon the principle of obtaining for the Sultan, in accordance with the engagement of the Collective Note, better terms than Mehemet Ali would be willing spontaneously to agree to, France has plainly avowed that her policy is founded upon the principle of requiring the Sultan to submit to such terms as Mehemet Ali may be willing spontaneously to accept.

But the question at issue had assumed also another character; for the question now was, whether France was or was not to become the dictator of Europe; whether the Four Powers should be free to follow their own views of their own common interests, by their own means; or whether they should be paralysed and spell-bound, not even by the veto of France, but merely by the want of her concurrence and co-operation.

It was obvious that if they thus yielded their own policy in passive submission to that of France, they would thereby have made a public and formal acknowledgment of the supremacy of France in European Affairs: and this must inevitably have led to very inconvenient consequences.

Among the results of such a course would certainly have been future disputes of a serious character with France; because it would have been impossible but that the French Government, elated by the submission of the Four Powers to its will, would have been led upon other questions to take steps and to hold language which other Powers would have felt themselves wholly unable to brook.

Her Majesty's Government, and the Plenipotentiaries of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, took all these matters into their serious and deliberate consideration, and the result was the decision announced in the Memorandum herewith inclosed.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 11.

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 22, 1840.

ON Friday last I read and gave to M. Guizot the Memorandum of which I have sent you a copy in my preceding despatch, adding to it some further expressions of the great regret felt by Her Majesty's Government at having been obliged to separate from France in the affairs of the Levant, and of our confident hope that our separation would not be long, and would in no degree impair the good understanding between the two countries.

I have since had another conversation with M. Guizot, and I give you, for your information, the general substance of both.

M. Guizot said that he would send the Memorandum on Saturday to his Government, and that he should of course delay making any reply to it until he should receive instructions from Paris. But he said there were three passages in it, upon which he wished at once to make remarks, because he did not admit the assertions contained or implied in those passages.

The first passage was that, in which I say that a plan of arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, which had lately been proposed to France, was founded upon ideas suggested by the French Ambassador in London; and M. Guizot said, that if that passage meant to imply that the French Government had authorized Count Sébastiani to propose the plan therein alluded to, and if, therefore, the Memorandum intended to charge the French Government with inconsistency, in having at one time proposed a particular plan, and in having at another time rejected it, he must at once deny the justice of such an imputation. He said, the plan in question was proposed by Count Sébastiani, in his individual capacity, without instructions or authority from the French Government, and that no trace of it could be found in the Records of the French Embassy.

The plan in question was that which in my despatch of the 28th September, 1839, I explained to you as having been proposed by Count Sébastiani; and it consisted in a proposal that Syria should be divided into two parts, by a line to be drawn east and west, somewhere about Beyrout and Damascus, and that the part of Syria north of that line should immediately be restored to the Sultan, and that the portion south of that line should be retained by Mehemet Ali, in addition to the Pashalic of Egypt.

I said, that I was ready to admit that Count Sébastiani had stated that he proposed that plan without any specific instructions; and I added, that when I made known to you that he had made such a proposal, you had informed me that it did not tally with the language and opinions of Marshal Soult, which were at variance with Count Sébastiani's plan.

But I showed M. Guizot my despatch of September last to you, in order to prove to him that the proposal was made in a more formal manner than merely as a scheme loosely thrown out by the Count in his individual capacity, inasmuch as Count Sébastiani had led me to infer, that if that plan were adopted by Her

Majesty's Government, France would co-operate in coercive measures to enforce it; and I pointed out to M. Guizot, how I had remarked that it was inconsistent in France to be willing to use coercive measures for carrying into effect an imperfect arrangement, and yet to decline to employ them to carry into effect a complete one; and how Count Sébastiani had stated in reply, that if the French Government could show to the Chambers and to the public, that it had made the best terms possible for Mehemet Ali, it would be able to justify its participation in coercive measures, in order to carry those terms into effect.

But I said, that Count Sébastiani had, at later periods, more than once, again pressed this scheme upon me, and that he had urged it upon Baron Brunnow, and also upon Baron Neumann, who did not arrive here till the latter part of December.

I said, that it is impossible to separate the individual and the public character of an Ambassador, in the manner implied by M. Guizot's argument, especially when that Ambassador is speaking to a Secretary of State in an official interview, and in a conversation arising upon despatches which that Ambassador comes to communicate from his Court. And I added, that as it is well known that Count Sébastiani was in direct and confidential communication with the King of the French, the mere absence of any trace of such a proposal in the Public Records of the Embassy, does not afford a conclusive proof that the Count had no authority for making the suggestion.

I contended, moreover, that the words of the Memorandum give a perfectly accurate description of the plan in question, by representing it as "an idea suggested by the French Ambassador at London." But of course it would be open to the French Government to make any disclaimer it might please to make as to the conclusions to be drawn from the facts stated in the Memorandum.

The next passage was that which states that the French Government had declared that certain considerations rendered it impossible for that Government to take part in coercive measures against Mehemet Ali.

M. Guizot said, the word "impossible" was much too strong. That he had never so used it, and he did not think the French Government could have done so: that France did not choose to co-operate in measures of coercion to compel Mehemet Ali to evacuate the whole of Syria. But there were other objects for which, and certain cases in which, she had never said that she would not join in coercion. That, for instance, she had always declared that she would join in coercion to defend Constantinople, and to prevent Ibrahim from crossing the Taurus.

I said, that for a long time past we certainly had understood from the language held by the French Government, not only to Her Majesty's Ambassador, but to the Ambassadors of other Powers, that in no case would, or could the French Government join in coercive measures to force Mehemet Ali to submit to any given arrangement; and that the fundamental principle of the French policy had therefore been, that France could be a party to no arrangement which Mehemet Ali would not agree to voluntarily, and without any coercion at all.

That, to employ force to defend Constantinople, and to prevent Ibrahim from crossing the Taurus, was quite a different thing, and bore upon a different question. That it has been the opinion of many, that France aims at dismembering the Turkish Empire, and at erecting a new and an Independent State, to consist of Egypt, Arabia, and Syria; but there is nothing inconsistent with that scheme in a declaration that France would not, for the present at least, permit the new Sovereign of that State to extend his territorial limits to the north of the Taurus. But, with respect to the readiness of France to join in coercive measures against Mehemet Ali, with reference to countries south of the Taurus, and at present occupied by him, I reminded M. Guizot, that not long ago I had stated to him that our conviction is, that if the arrangement demanded by Mehemet Ali, and supported by France, were to be carried into effect, and if Mehemet Ali were to be made hereditary Pasha of Egypt, and of the whole of Syria, the certain consequence would be, that in a short time he would throw off all semblance of vassalage, and would declare himself independent; and I had asked M. Guizot what France would do in that case, and whether she would then unite herself with the other Powers to compel Mehemet Ali to return to his allegiance; and I observed, that the only answer which M. Guizot had given me was, "alors comme alors," an answer which certainly was not calculated to encourage

the belief that even in the extreme case thus supposed by me, France would find it possible to join in coercive measures against Mehemet Ali.

In my second interview, I showed M. Guizot several passages in despatches from Earl Granville and from yourself, all tending to prove that the language held by the French Government for several months past had been, that it was impossible for any French Government to take part in coercive measures against Mehemet Ali. And I further observed, that the very ground upon which the French Government had declined the last proposal made to it by Baron Neumann and myself was, that Mehemet Ali would never willingly consent to any division whatever of Syria; and that, as France would not be a party to the employment of coercion against him, she could not join to press upon him an arrangement which she knew beforehand, he would not agree to without coercion.

The third passage was, that which says that the French Government had declared, that in no case would France oppose the measures which the Four Powers might think necessary for the execution of the arrangement which they considered essential for the future peace of the Levant. He said this assertion was much too general, and had never been made by France. That on the contrary, if out of the measures adopted by the Four Powers, events were to arise which would essentially change the relative strength of the Powers of Europe; if, for instance, a Russian army were to enter Asia Minor, and to remain for any length of time in occupation thereof; in any such case, France would consider herself free to take such course as her interests or her honour might require.

I said, that this was quite understood; and the passage of the Memorandum which he adverted to, related only to those immediate measures of coercion which had often been discussed between the Five Powers, and the particular object of which would be, to induce the Pasha to accept the reasonable offers of the Sultan, and thus to secure the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire.

I then again urged upon M. Guizot how desirable it would be that France should employ her influence with the Pasha, to persuade him at once to accept the liberal terms which were to be offered to him; and I said, that although France had been prevented by domestic considerations, from joining the other Four Powers, she might thus, by giving us her moral aid, contribute to the re-establishment of permanent peace in the Levant, as effectually as if she had been party to the Convention. I observed, that arguments of weight could not be wanting to be used with the Pasha; for that it might well be put to him, that when Four Great Powers, like England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, enter into engagements with a Fifth, like Turkey, they must necessarily have made up their minds to carry through, at all hazards, that which they have begun; and that the Pasha is too sagacious a man not to see, that he has no strength whatever which could enable him to stand against the Four Powers and the Sultan united.

M. Guizot then, after calculating that at least sixty days must elapse before an answer could be received here to the propositions which I explained to him were to be made by the Sultan to Mehemet Ali, asked me whether all measures of coercion would be delayed till then, or whether any such measures would be put in execution sooner?

I said, that in the present state of Syria it would be impossible for the Four Powers to wait for Mehemet Ali's reply; that large masses of the Sultan's subjects in Syria have risen against the tyranny of Mehemet Ali; and that it was impossible to abandon those unfortunate people, unaided, to be butchered by Ibrahim's troops; and that, consequently, assistance and protection would at once be afforded to the Syrians; and the French Government must not be surprised if, for that purpose, communication by sea were to be cut off between Syria and Egypt.

M. Guizot seemed unprepared for this statement, although having for some days before been aware that the Plenipotentiaries of the Four Powers were in close communication with the Plenipotentiary of the Porte, he must have anticipated that some engagements were about to be entered into between them. He said, that such a proceeding on the part of the Four Powers, would oblige France to be in force, in great force, in the Levant.

I said, that of course the French Government must judge for itself on that matter; but I trusted he would allow me to express a hope that the French force

would not be so placed as to render likely any collision between it and the British fleet. He said, of course care would be taken to guard against that. I then said, that I would beg further to hope that the French force would not be so placed as to encourage Mehemet Ali to resist; and M. Guizot equally assured me that the French Government could have no intention of doing anything of the kind.

M. Guizot said, that he much regretted that we had chosen so inopportune a moment to enter into our Convention, just at the time when Mehemet Ali and the Sultan were about to come to an amicable understanding by a direct negotiation between them. I said, that no accounts which we had lately received tended to show that any such direct arrangement was more likely than heretofore to be made; that, on the contrary, the Sultan still looked to the Powers who signed the Collective Note, for the fulfilment of the expectations of aid and support which that Note held out; and that only the other day the Turkish Ambassador, Chekib Effendi, had sent me a long Note, urging the same thing in the most pressing manner.

M. Guizot said, that it seemed to him a pity, and not worth while, that we should incur the risk of bringing on all the serious consequences which he foresaw as possible results of our Convention, merely for the sake of restoring to the Sultan three or four miserable Pashalics in Syria. I said, that in the first place I felt convinced that the dangers which he alluded to would certainly flow from the French plan, and would, in all probability, be averted by ours; but that, as to the value of Syria, I must observe, that its value may perhaps be measured by the tenacity with which Mehemet Ali clings to it; and that, if Syria were not, as we allege, a military position which forms the key of the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey, Mehemet Ali might, perhaps, have been as willing to give it up as he is to evacuate Arabia and Candia.

M. Guizot remarked, that false pride sometimes makes men cling to what they have, though it be of small value, or though its relinquishment would be for their good; and he instanced the case of Napoleon, who might have retained a large and powerful kingdom if he had accepted the offers of the Allies, but whose false pride would not allow him to give up his conquests. I said, that I could not admit the cases to be parallel, or that one was an example for the other; but that if it were so, the result of Napoleon's refusal might usefully be pointed out as a warning to Mehemet Ali.

M. Guizot said, in conclusion, that the British and French Governments unfortunately differ widely in opinion upon all these matters, and when differences of opinion upon future matters are thus irreconcileable, nothing but events can decide between the differing parties. That if events should prove that we are right, and if all these affairs shall be settled as we expect them to be, the French Government will be delighted to find its apprehensions unfounded. But that if, on the other hand, their view should turn out to be correct, and the future embarrassments and dangers which they foresee, should come to be realized, at least the responsibility of such a state of things will not rest with them. To this position, I, of course, entirely assented.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 12.

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 22, 1840.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 20th instant, in which you report that M. Thiers had stated to you that the alliance between England and France was at an end; and I have to express to you the entire approbation of Her Majesty's Government of the language you held on that occasion. I have, however, to instruct you, on any future occasion on which M. Thiers may make the same observation, to remark to M. Thiers, that it is not England that has separated from France, but France that has separated from England; that the views and policy of England on these Turkish Affairs have always been the same, and have never varied; that for a long time we thought

that France agreed with us; and that this opinion seemed to be borne out by the willingness of France to sign a Convention with England and Turkey in 1835, for the support of the Sultan against Mehemet Ali; and by the fact, that France was a party to the Collective Note of July, 1839.

If the French Government have since then changed their policy, or if in consequence of their not having at that time frankly explained their policy, we for a long while mistook it, the fault does not lie with the English Government; although the English Government must, in every case, equally regret that there should be any difference of opinion between France and England upon practical questions.

Her Majesty's Government, however, feel persuaded that whatever temporary disappointment or displeasure the conclusion of the Convention between the Four Powers and Turkey may excite in the minds of the French Ministers, calm reflection will lead those Ministers to the conviction, that there is nothing in the spirit or letter of that Convention which can be looked upon as hostile to France; and that, under the circumstances of the moment, the Four Powers could not do otherwise than conclude it.

With respect to M. Thiers' remark, that France was not even invited to accede to the Convention, I have to observe, that the Convention is only a formal record of the engagement of the Four Powers, to assist the Porte to carry certain arrangements into effect; that Her Majesty's Government have been vainly labouring for the last eight or ten months to persuade the French Government to concur in those arrangements; and that after the recent and final refusal of that Government to do so, it would surely have been worse than useless to ask France to retract her recent refusal, and to sign a Convention to carry into execution a plan, which she had, a fortnight before, positively declined to concur in.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 13.

Report from the Russian Consul-General at Alexandria.—(Communicated by Baron Brunnow, July 22, 1840.)

(Extract.) *Alexandrie, le 18 et 19 Juin*, 1840.

TOUS les rapports sur l'état actuel de la Syrie sont si effrayans et inspirent tant de terreur, que tout le monde pouvait s'attendre à l'éclat de la présente insurrection.

Emir Béchir demande du secours pour le peuple opprimé par les exactions de tout genre, mais cette demande est considérée comme faiblesse; et au lieu de satisfaire à la prière de l'ami, on détache dans le pays des Bédouins et des Albanais qui se livrent à des excès de tout genre, en détruisant les arbres fruitiers, en ruinant la culture de la terre, et des plantations de soie, et en entraînant de la manière la plus brutale tous les individus capable à porter les armes. Les vastes plaines et les vallées et de Bekaa et d'Esdraele sont depuis longtems sans bras pour les cultiver; il n'y a plus ni hommes ni bestiaux: tout a été éloigné, chassé et détruit. Les habitations paisibles des Maronites sont menacées du même sort; on demande d'abord des arrérages déjà acquittés, et puis les armes. Les Maronites s'opposèrent avec opiniâtreté à cette demande, et le Gouvernement déploya la rigueur accoutumée.

Voilà le commencement de la révolte des Maronites.

D'après d'autres nouvelles reçues par les commerçans d'ici, lesquelles cependant semblent exagérées, tous les peuples des montagnes de Gaza et d'Alep sont en pleine révolte; les insurgés ont occupé Beyrout et Tripoli.

Un voyageur Anglais, ancien ami de Méhémet Ali, lui écrit de Der-el-Kamar, que les choses en étaient venues au terme qu'on ne pouvait plus penser à les appaiser par la force des armes.

Méhémet Ali oppose à ces bruits une contradiction manifeste, en n'admettant que la révolte des Maronites, qui, selon lui, ne possèdent que 4,000 fusils; il ajoute, que les Druses et les Naplouses sont prêts à marcher contre eux; et

que Solyman Pacha se trouve avec cinq régimens d'Infanterie entre Saïda et Beyrout.

En attendant, Méhémet Ali ne laisse approcher personne du bateau à vapeur " le Nil," afin de ne rien faire transpirer de ces nouvelles, et fait tous les préparatifs d'attaque.

Si la révolte est de si peu de conséquence que veut le faire accroire Méhémet Ali, les moyens pour la supprimer sont exagérés. A quoi bon l'envoi de quinze frégates et vaisseaux de ligne avec 12,000 hommes, s'il ne s'agit que d'une échauffourée ?

Mais si l'accord des peuples montagnards s'est effectivement réalisé, cette force même ne terminera pas la révolte. Voilà ce que Méhémet Ali sent fort bien ; et c'est par cette raison qu'il cherche à composer avec les Maronites, par l'entremise d'Emir Béchir ; qu'il annonce par ses espions sa réconciliation avec le Sultan ; et pendant que ces généraux pressent les Maronites du côté de Saïda et Balakié, il leur montre au pied du Mont Liban une force telle qu'ils n'ont jamais vue du haut de leurs montagnes.

Deux vaisseaux de ligne, quatre frégates, et une corvette, ont quitté le port ce matin ; le reste suivra et sera sorti demain.

(Translation.)

Report from the Russian Consul-General at Alexandria.

Alexandria, June 18 *and* 19, 1840.

ALL the reports upon the actual state of Syria are so frightful, and inspire so much terror, that every body might have looked for the breaking out of the present insurrection.

Emir Bechir applies for assistance for the people, who are oppressed by all sorts of exactions, but this application is looked upon as weakness ; and instead of complying with the request of the friend, they disperse throughout the country Bedouins and Albanians, who give themselves up to all kinds of disorders, destroying the fruit trees, ruining the cultivation of the land and the plantations for silk, and carrying off in the most brutal manner all individuals capable of bearing arms. The extensive plains and valleys both of Bekaa and Esdralon have been for a length of time without hands to cultivate them ; there are no longer either men or beasts ; everything has been removed, driven away, or destroyed. The peaceable dwellings of the Maronites are threatened with the same fate ; in the first instance arrears already paid up, and then arms, are required of them. The Maronites resisted with stubbornness this demand, and the Government displayed its wonted rigour.

This is the origin of the revolt of the Maronites.

According to other accounts received by commercial people of this place, which however appear exaggerated, all the people of the mountains of Gaza and of Aleppo are in full revolt ; the insurgents have occupied Beyrout and Tripoli.

An English traveller, an old friend of Mehemet Ali, writes to him from Der-el-Kamar, that things were come to that pass that it could no longer be thought of quieting them by force of arms.

Mehemet Ali meets these reports by a positive contradiction, admitting merely the revolt of the Maronites, who, according to him, only possess 4,000 muskets ; he adds, that the Druses and Naplousians are ready to march against them ; and that Solyman Pasha is with five regiments of infantry between Saida and Beyrout.

Meanwhile, Mehemet Ali suffers no one to approach the steam-vessel, the " Nile," in order not to cause any of this news to transpire, and he makes all preparations for an attack.

If the revolt is of such little consequence as Mehemet Ali wishes to make it believed, the means for suppressing it are excessive. What is the good of sending fifteen frigates and line-of-battle ships with 12,000 men, if it is only a tumult ?

If the mountaineers are really united, even this force will not terminate the revolt. This is what Mehemet Ali is very well aware of ; and therefore it is that he seeks to make an arrangement with the Maronites by the intervention of the Emir Bechir ; that he announces by his spies his reconciliation with the

Sultan; and, whilst his Generals press the Maronites in the direction of Saida and Balakia, he shows them at the foot of Mount Lebanon a force such as they have never seen from the summit of their mountains.

Two sail of the line, four frigates, and one corvette left port this morning; the rest will follow, and will have gone out to-morrow.

Inclosure 1 in No. 13.

Report from the Russian Vice-Consul at Cairo.

(Extract.) *Cairo, le* 17 *Juin,* 1840.

IBRAHIM PACHA avait reçu l'ordre d'évacuer le Yémen, en y laissant seulement 11,000 hommes d'Albanais de garnisons, séparés en petits détachemens. Les Arabes Bédouins s'étant aperçu de pareil mouvement rétrograde, se sont révoltés; et les Albanais ont déclaré à Ibrahim Pacha qu'ils ne pouvaient faire face à la force supérieure. Sur cela ils eurent l'ordre de se concentrer avec le reste des troupes à Hodeïde, où un corps de 25,000 hommes de Bédouins parut aussitôt avec des intentions hostiles; cependant Ibrahim leur offrit 3,000 talléris pour détourner le danger, et ils acceptèrent la proposition de reculer. Arrivé à Muelch, Ibrahim Pacha reçut l'ordre de rebrousser chemin, sans qu'on sache jusqu'à présent la direction qu'il a prise ni la destination qu'il a reçue.

On assure que Kourchid Pacha est arrivé à Djidda où il s'arrête pour des affaires de comptabilité. Ahmed Pacha est placé toujours entre Mecque et Médine.

Les troupes irrégulières, au nombre d'environ 2,800 hommes, sont toutes embarquées d'après un ordre arrivé par le télégraphe.

D'après un rapport de l'Agent Anglais à Jaffa, du 12 Juin, Solyman Pacha, parti de St. Jean d'Acre, se trouve à Saïda avec deux régimens. Les rebelles ont dépouillé un courrier du Gouvernement, venant d'Ibrahim Pacha; ils se sont emparés d'un moulin appartenant au Gouvernement; ils ont assiégé Beyrout, Sour et Saïda; ils se battent et détruisent les quarantaines.

Les montagnards ont tué 150 Bédouins Hannadi; ils ont mis en fuite plusieurs soldats, en s'emparant de 150 fusils.

Le Gouvernement a ordonné de détruire à Jérusalem et à Naplouse, toutes les maisons qui pourraient servir de fortification aux rebelles; et ces ordres ont été exécutés. Il a défendu aussi tout transport de grains de Jaffa à Beyrout.

Sur la rade de Jaffa un corsaire inconnu a dépouillé un bâtiment arrivé de Damiette chargé de riz, en tuant l'équipage.

(Translation.)

Report from the Russian Vice-Consul at Cairo.

Cairo, June 17, 1840.

IBRAHIM PASHA had received orders to evacuate the Yemen, leaving there only 11,000 Albanians as garrison, divided into small detachments. The Bedouin Arabs having become aware of such a retrograde movement, revolted; and the Albanians declared to Ibrahim Pasha they could not face the superior force. Thereupon, they received orders to concentrate themselves with the rest of the troops at Hodeida, where a body of 25,000 Bedouins immediately made their appearance with hostile intentions: Ibrahim, however, offered them 3,000 dollars to avert the danger, and they accepted the proposal to withdraw. On arriving at Muelch, Ibrahim Pasha received orders to return, without its being known at present what direction he took, or to what quarter he has been appointed to proceed.

It is asserted, that Kourchid Pasha has arrived at Djidda, where he waits for matters of account. Ahmed Pasha continues stationed between Mecca and Medina.

The irregular troops, in number about 2,800 men, are all embarked in pursuance of an order which came by the telegraph.

According to a report of the 12th of June from the English Agent at Jaffa, Solyman Pasha, having left St. Jean d'Acre, is at Saida with two regiments. The rebels have plundered one of the Government couriers coming from Ibrahim Pasha; they have made themselves masters of a mill belonging to the Government; they have besieged Beyrout, Sour, and Saida; they are fighting and destroying the quarantines.

The mountaineers have killed 150 Bedouin Hannadis, have put to flight several soldiers, and got possession of 150 muskets.

The Government has ordered to be destroyed at Jerusalem and at Naplous all the houses which could serve as fortifications for the rebels; and these orders have been executed. It has also prohibited all transport of grain from Jaffa to Beyrout.

In Jaffa-roads an unknown pirate has plundered a vessel arriving from Damietta, laden with rice, and killed the crew.

No. 14.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 23.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, June 29, 1840.*

I HAVE received by the "Cyclops," a letter from Rear-Admiral Sir John Louis, which I now inclose. Sir John asks me, "if, in the event of his having to proceed to the coast of Syria, I should consider it necessary that any ships should be left at the Dardanelles?" I answered, that I did not see any danger whatever from any quarter excepting Mehemet Ali; and should he make any attempt to send his fleet here, Her Majesty's squadron, being off the coast of Syria, could counteract him; and if Ibrahim should advance with his troops to threaten the capital, the squadron could return here in time to protect it.

Inclosure in No. 14.

Rear-Admiral Sir John Louis to Viscount Ponsonby.

Her Majesty's Ship "Ganges,"
Besika Bay, June 22, 1840.

My Lord,

I HAVE received a letter from Colonel Hodges, which appears to me to be of such importance that I have thought it right to send your Lordship a copy of it by the "Cyclops."

I HAVE despatched the "Castor" frigate to Beyrout, with directions to Captain Collier to communicate with Her Majesty's Consul, and to afford protection to British subjects and commerce at that place. As it appears, however, by Colonel Hodges' letter, that Mehemet Ali was sending a naval force in two divisions to the coast of Syria, it would not, perhaps, be advisable to separate this squadron of six sail of the line, by sending any more ships; but to proceed, if necessary, with the whole force to the coast of Syria. I have despatched a steamer to Sir Robert Stopford, who has arrived at Malta, for instructions.

I had the honour to inform your Lordship, that I had received directions to station two or three sail of the line in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles. I shall feel very much obliged to your Lordship, if you will do me the honour to inform me, if, in the event of my having to proceed to the coast of Syria, your Lordship would consider it necessary that any ships should be left off the Dardanelles.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) J. LOUIS.

No. 15.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 23.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, June 29, 1840.*

IT is very necessary, in the actual crisis, that I should have correct intelligence from Syria, and I have thought it my duty to send there Mr. Wood, the Dragoman, who is personally acquainted with many of the chief personages in the Lebanon.

Mr. Wood went in the "Cyclops," and I have requested Sir John Louis to facilitate his arrival at his destination.

No. 16.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 23.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July 1, 1840.*

HAVING received from Rechid Pasha, in answer to my arguments in support of the policy of the Ottoman Ministers with regard to Mehemet Ali, a formal assurance, through the Dragoman, that the Sultan had declared he would not treat with the Pasha without the knowledge and concurrence of the Great Powers, I thought it would be right to give a more official character to the matter, and I sent an official Note, of which I inclose a copy.

I have this day heard from Rechid Pasha, who promises that the Porte will act faithfully in this affair.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 16.

Viscount Ponsonby to Rechid Pasha.

Therapia, June 28, 1840.

THE Undersigned, &c., &c., has always felt entire confidence in the good faith of the Sublime Porte in the performance of all its engagements; but being aware of the perseverance with which counsels are offered strenuously recommending the Sublime Porte to break its solemn engagement, made with the August Allies of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, not to make any arrangement with the Pasha of Egypt without the knowledge and concurrence of those Allies, the Undersigned thinks it proper to express, in the most formal manner, to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the extreme satisfaction with which the Undersigned has just received from his Excellency the assurance that His Imperial Majesty the Sultan has renewed his declaration of his adherence to the engagement not to make any arrangement with the aforesaid Pasha, without the concurrence of His Imperial Majesty's August Allies.

The Undersigned, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 17.

Memorandum given to Viscount Palmerston by M. Guizot, July 24, 1840.

LA France a toujours désiré, dans l'affaire d'Orient, marcher d'accord avec la Grande Bretagne, l'Autriche, la Prusse et la Russie. Elle n'a jamais été mue dans sa conduite que par l'intérêt de la Paix. Elle n'a jamais jugé les propositions qui lui ont été faites, que d'un point de vue général, et jamais du point de vue de son intérêt particulier; car aucune Puissance n'est plus désintéressée qu'elle en Orient.

Jugeant de ce point de vue, elle a considéré comme mal conçus tous les projets qui avaient pour but d'arracher à Méhémet Ali, par la force des armes, les portions de l'Empire Turc qu'il occupe actuellement. La France ne croit pas cela bon pour le Sultan, car on tendrait ainsi à lui donner ce qu'il ne pourrait ni administrer ni conserver. Elle ne le croit pas bon non plus pour la Turquie en général, et pour le maintien de l'équilibre Européen ; car, on affaiblirait, sans profit pour le Suzerain, un vassal qui pourrait aider puissamment à la commune défense de l'Empire.

Toutefois, ce n'est là qu'une question de système sur laquelle il peut exister beaucoup d'avis divers. Mais la France s'est surtout prononcée contre tout projet dont l'adoption devait entraîner l'emploi de la force, parcequ'elle ne voyait pas distinctement les moyens dont les Cinq Puissances pouvaient disposer. Ces moyens lui semblaient ou insuffisans, ou plus funestes que l'état de choses auquel on voulait porter remède.

Ce qu'elle pensait à ce sujet, la France le pense encore, et elle a quelques raisons de croire que cette opinion n'est pas exclusivement la sienne. Du reste, on ne lui a adressé, dans les dernières circonstances, aucune proposition positive sur laquelle elle eût à s'expliquer. Il ne faut donc pas imputer à des refus qu'elle n'a pas été en mesure de faire, la détermination que l'Angleterre lui communique, sans doute au nom des Quatre Puissances.

Mais au surplus, sans insister sur la question que pourrait faire naître cette manière de procéder à son égard, la France le déclare de nouveau ; elle considère comme peu réfléchie, comme peu prudente, une conduite qui consistera à prendre des résolutions sans moyen de les exécuter, ou à les exécuter par des moyens insuffisans ou dangereux.

L'insurrection de quelques populations du Liban est sans doute l'occasion qu'on a cru pouvoir saisir pour y trouver les moyens d'exécution qui jusques là ne s'étaient pas montrés. Est-ce un moyen bien avouable, et surtout bien utile à l'Empire Turc, d'agir ainsi contre le Vice-Roi ? On veut rétablir un peu d'ordre et d'obéissance dans toutes les parties de l'Empire, et on y fomente des insurrections ! On ajoute de nouveaux désordres à ce désordre déjà général que toutes les Puissances déplorent dans l'intérêt de la paix. Et ces populations, réussirait-on à les soumettre à la Porte après les avoir soulevées contre le Vice-Roi ?

Toutes ces questions, on ne les a certainement pas résolues. Mais si cette insurrection est comprimée, si le Vice-Roi est de nouveau possesseur assuré de la Syrie, s'il n'en est que plus irrité, plus difficile à persuader, et qu'il réponde aux sommations par des refus positifs, quels sont les moyens des Quatre Puissances ?

Assurément, après avoir employé une année à les chercher, on ne les aura pas découverts récemment ; et on aura créé, soi-même, un nouveau danger, le plus grave de tous. Le Vice-Roi, excité par les moyens employés contre lui, le Vice-Roi que la France avait contribué à retenir, peut passer le Taurus et menacer de nouveau Constantinople.

Que feront encore les Quatre Puissances dans ce cas ? Quelle sera la manière de pénétrer dans l'Empire pour y secourir le Sultan ? La France pense qu'on a préparé là, pour l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman et pour la paix générale, un danger plus grave que celui dont les menaçait l'ambition du Vice-Roi.

Si toutes ces éventualités, conséquence de la conduite qu'on va tenir, n'ont pas été prévues, alors les Quatre Puissances se seraient engagées dans une voie bien obscure et bien périlleuse. Si, au contraire, elles ont été prévues, et si les moyens d'y faire face sont arrêtés, alors les Quatre Puissances en doivent la connaissance à l'Europe, et surtout à la France qui s'est toujours associée au but commun, à la France dont encore aujourd'hui elles réclament le concours moral, dont elles invoquent l'influence à Alexandrie.

Le concours moral de la France dans une conduite commune était une obligation de sa part. Il n'en est plus une dans la nouvelle situation où semblent vouloir se placer les Puissances. La France ne peut plus être mue désormais que par ce qu'elle doit à la Paix, et ce qu'elle se doit à elle-même. La conduite qu'elle tiendra, dans les graves circonstances où les Quatre Puissances viennent de placer l'Europe, dépendra de la solution qui sera donnée à toutes les questions qu'elle vient d'indiquer. Elle aura toujours en vue la paix et le maintien de l'équilibre actuel entre les Etats de l'Europe. Tous ses moyens seront consacrés à ce double but.

(Translation.)

Memorandum given to Viscount Palmerston by M. Guizot, July 24, 1840.

FRANCE has always desired, in the affair of the East, to proceed in accordance with Great Britian, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. She has never been influenced in her conduct by any other interest than that of peace. She has never looked at the propositions which have been made to her, in any other than a general point of view, and never in that of her own individual interest; for no Power is more disinterested than herself in the East.

Looking in this point of view, she has considered all the projects to be badly devised which had for their object to wrest from Mehemet Ali, by force of arms, the portions of the Turkish Empire which he at present occupies. France does not think this advantageous for the Sultan, for the tendency of such a course would be to give him what he could neither administer nor preserve. Neither does she think it advantageous for Turkey in general, and for the maintenance of the balance of Power in Europe; for it would be to weaken, without benefit to the Sovereign, a vassal who might powerfully assist in the common defence of the Empire.

However, this is merely a question of system on which many different opinions may exist. But France has above all declared herself against any project, the adoption of which would necessarily involve the employment of force, because she did not distinctly see the means which the Five Powers could dispose of. Those means appeared to her to be either insufficient, or more fatal than the state of things which it was desired to remedy.

What France did think on this subject, she still thinks; and she has some reason to believe that this opinion is not exclusively her own. Besides, no positive proposal on which she might have to declare herself, has, in these last circumstances, been made to her. The determination, therefore, which England communicates to her, doubtless in the name of the Four Powers, must not be attributed to refusals which France has not been in a position to give.

But further, without insisting on the question which such a way of going on with respect to her might give rise to, France declares anew, she views as little considerate, as little prudent, a line of conduct which shall consist in taking resolutions without the means of executing them, or in executing them by insufficient or dangerous means.

The insurrection of some tribes of the Lebanon is doubtless the occasion which it has been thought possible to take advantage of, to find therein the means of execution, which up to that time had not revealed themselves. Is it a means to be quite avowed, and above all very beneficial to the Turkish Empire, to act in such a manner against the Viceroy? It is desired to re-establish a little order and obedience in all parts of the Empire, and insurrections are fomented in it. Fresh disorders are added to that disorder already general, which all the Powers deplore as affecting the interests of peace. And these tribes, would it be practicable to subject them to the Porte after having stirred them up against the Viceroy?

All these questions have assuredly not been solved. But if this insurrection is quelled, if the Viceroy is again assured in the possession of Syria, if he is only the more irritated by what has taken place, more difficult to persuade, and if he replies to the summons addressed to him, by positive refusals, what are the means of the Four Powers?

Surely, after having employed a year in seeking for them, they will not have just now discovered them; and a new danger, the most serious of all, will have been created by themselves. The Viceroy, roused by the means employed against him, the Viceroy, whom France had contributed to restrain, may pass the Taurus, and again menace Constantinople.

What then will the Four Powers do in that case? What will be the method of penetrating into the Empire, there to succour the Sultan. France conceives that a more serious danger has been thus prepared for the independence of the Ottoman Empire, and for the general peace, than that with which the ambition of the Viceroy threatened them.

If all these contingencies, as consequent on the line of conduct about to be pursued, have not been anticipated, then the Four Powers have entered upon a very obscure and very perilous course. If, on the contrary, they have been anti-

cipated, and if the means to meet them have been decided upon, then the Four Powers are bound to make them known to Europe, and especially to France, who has always associated herself to the common object—to France, whose moral concurrence they even now demand, whose influence at Alexandria they invoke.

The moral concurrence of France in a common course of conduct was obligatory upon her. It is no longer so in the new situation in which the Powers appear to be willing to place themselves. France, henceforth, cannot be influenced save by what she owes to peace, and by what she owes to herself. The conduct which she shall maintain, in the serious circumstances in which the Four Powers have just placed Europe, will depend upon the solution which shall be given to all the questions which she has pointed out. She will always keep in view peace, and the maintenance of the existing balance among the States of Europe. All her means will be devoted to this twofold object.

No. 18.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July* 24, 1840.

I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to urge the Turkish Government to send, without loss of time, to Syria, arms and ammunition for the use of the subjects of the Sultan who have risen against the authority of Mehemet Ali.

Your Excellency will also urge the Porte to send at once 5,000 or 6,000 men to Cyprus, or to the coast of Syria direct, in order to co-operate with the Syrian insurgents.

It will be desirable that the Turkish officer in command of such a detachment, if sent, should be instructed to put himself in communication with Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, and to be guided in his operations by the suggestions of that officer.

Your Excellency will, of course, communicate to Sir Robert Stopford any arrangements which the Porte may make in compliance with the recommendations which you are now instructed to offer to the Turkish Government.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 19.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, July* 24, 1840.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that copies of my* correspondence with Her Majesty's Minister at Paris, of which copies are inclosed in my despatch of yesterday to your Excellency, have been transmitted to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, in order that Sir Robert Stopford may see the tone adopted by the French Government with reference to the late transactions.

No. 20.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July* 24, 1840.

WITH reference to my despatch of July 17, I have to acquaint your Excellency, that arrangements have been made for placing a further supply of 5,000 stand of arms, with ammunition and lead in proportion, at the disposal of Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, to be distributed by him to the Syrians in the manner stated in my above-mentioned despatch.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

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* See Nos. 8, 9, 11, and 12.

No. 21.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July* 25, 1840.

I HAVE to observe to your Excellency, that it appears, from the contents of the paper communicated to me yesterday by the French Ambassador, and of which a copy is inclosed to your Excellency, that although the French Government professes to feel hurt that the Convention of the 15th instant was concluded between the Four Powers and the Porte, without any previous invitation to France to be a party thereto, yet there seems to be no intention on the part of France to oppose by force the measures which the Allies have resolved to execute, in order to accomplish the objects of that Convention; and there is, therefore, no likelihood that those friendly relations which at present subsist between the Four Powers and France, will be interrupted by the operations which Sir Robert Stopford has been instructed to undertake.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 22.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 24.)

My Lord, *Vienna, July* 14, 1840.

I HAVE read to Prince Metternich your Lordship's despatch* of May 20, containing observations upon his plan of pacification between the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt.

He objects to the term "plan" as applied to the exposition he has made of his ideas upon the subject. He regards that which in London has been called a plan, as no more than the commencement of an investigation; and states his purpose to have been to lay a basis of discussion between the Four Powers, by which it might eventually be matured into a plan in which they could concur.

After this preliminary observation, the Prince admitted the justice of the rest of your Lordship's remarks, saying, he was well aware that the difficulties which should be put off now would recur at no distant period, but that it would be well they should do so under circumstances giving a right to appeal to the Powers, in consequence of the violation of engagements taken with their cognizance and assent, though not under their guarantee, to which he is decidedly averse. In proposing no more for the moment, he had yielded to his sense of the difficulties of the situation, but if your Lordship is prepared with any feasible plan in which the Four Powers can concur, he is ready to adopt it in preference to his own ideas, and will engage this Government to take a share in its execution.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 23.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 25.)

(Extract.) *Vienna, July* 17, 1840.

THE intelligence brought by Baron Neumann's courier, of the 9th instant, has been received by Prince Metternich with much satisfaction. A special messenger will depart to-night with orders to Admiral Bandeira to join the British fleet with his squadron, and act under the orders of the English Admiral. The same messenger will take your Lordship's despatches to Lord Ponsonby.

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* Part I., page 656.

Prince Metternich fully approves your Lordship's recommendation to the Turkish Government to send a corps of troops to Cyprus to be ready to act as occasion may require.

No. 24.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 25.)

My Lord, *Vienna, July 18, 1840.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a despatch which, at Prince Metternich's request, I have addressed to Lord Ponsonby.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Inclosure in No. 24.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Vienna, July 18, 1840.*

AT Prince Metternich's request I have the honour to inform your Lordship, that he writes to Baron Stürmer, recommending to him to impress upon all his communications with the Porte relative to the Turco-Egyptian Affair, the character of emanating from the Four Powers, and not that of springing from Austria alone. He hopes your Lordship will feel yourself at liberty to adopt the same course; and as it seems to be in accordance with what is passing in London, I feel no difficulty in transmitting the expression of the Prince's wishes to your Lordship.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 25.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 26.)

My Lord, *Paris, July 24, 1840.*

THE Messenger Holmes delivered to me this morning your Lordship's despatches to the 22nd instant.

With reference to my despatch of the 17th instant, and to what I there said respecting the Syrian insurrection, I wish to observe, that, although M. Thiers stated that the information which I then quoted as having been received from Damascus, and which spoke of the insurrection as nearly quelled, is the last which has reached him from that quarter, I have reason to believe that intelligence of a different character has arrived from Smyrna, and that the movement in question appears to have assumed a serious character.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 26.

Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 27.)

(Extract.) *Berlin, July 22, 1840.*

I RECEIVED, by the courier, your Lordship's despatches to the 14th; and last night I received, by a Russian courier, your Lordship's despatch of the 15th instant, containing copies of a Convention for the pacification of the

Levant. I immediately called on Baron Werther, who had received the same by the same courier, as well as a copy of the Memorandum sent to the French Government.

No. 27.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July* 27, 1840.

WITH reference to that part of my despatch of the 24th instant, by which your Excellency is instructed to urge the Porte to send a body of troops to Cyprus, or direct to the coast of Syria, I have to instruct your Excellency further to urge the Porte, in the event of its agreeing to the above suggestion, to order the Turkish Officer who may be sent in command of such force, to be entirely and in every respect guided by the advice and opinion of Colonel Sir Charles Smith, of the Royal Engineers, who is appointed to command the British Artillery and Engineers embarked on board Sir Robert Stopford's squadron. The Turkish Officer should be enjoined to take no step whatever without Sir Charles Smith's approval and sanction; and to do everything that Sir Charles Smith recommends.

Your Excellency will apprise Sir Robert Stopford and Sir Charles Smith of the orders to this effect which may be given to the Turkish Commander.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 28.

Mr. Russian Consul Basily to M. de Bouteneff.—(Communicated by Baron Brunnow, July 23.)

M. l'Envoyé, *Beyrout, le* $\frac{30\text{ Mai}}{11\text{ Juin}}$, 1840.

UNE vaste insurrection vient d'éclater dans le Liban. Elle a été provoquée par l'ordre d'Ibrahim Pacha de désarmer les Maronites, nonobstant les remontrances itératives du Prince Emir Béchir, qui prévoyait les conséquences d'une mesure aussi hasardeuse qu'intempestive. Dans les circonstances actuelles, au milieu des armemens de Méhémet Ali et de la conscription générale qui s'opère en Egypte, les belliqueuses tribus de la montagne devaient voir dans l'obstination du Gouvernement à se saisir de leurs armes un projet de conscription militaire. Il y a trois ans, après le désarmement des montagnards, effectué avec autant de ruse que de bonheur par Ibrahim Pacha, 7,000 fusils furent distribués aux Maronites, afin d'obtenir leur coopération dans l'affaire du Haouran. Ces mêmes armes, le Gouvernement vient de les exiger impérativement; il est à présumer qu'Ibrahim Pacha, encouragé par le succès, réclamerait pour le service militaire les mêmes hommes qui en avaient été porteurs.

Le $\frac{17}{29}$ Mai, la ville de Beyrout venait d'être entourée d'un cordon sanitaire, motivé par la peste de Damas. Les montagnards n'ont vu dans cette mesure oppressive qu'un commencement des représailles pour leur opposition au désarmement, d'autant plus que la peste n'avait pas encore pénétré dans le Liban. Réunis au nombre de quelques milliers d'individus dans les environs de la ville, ils rompirent le cordon, désarmèrent les soldats tombés en leur pouvoir, et dévalisèrent les courriers du Gouvernement. Deux jours après, le Gouvernement de Beyrout communiqua par une circulaire adressée aux divers Consulats de cette ville, un ordre de Solyman Pacha, portant que les habitans de la montagne en général s'étant mis en révolte, l'exportation des comestibles était défendue sous peine de couler à fond les bâtimens qui la tenteraient sur les divers points de la côte. Cette décision connue, dès le lendemain la ville fut bloquée par les montagnards; plusieurs attaques obstinées furent dirigées contre le poste fortifié de la quarantaine, qui ne doit jusqu'à ce jour son salut qu'au courage de cinquante Albanais à la solde de Méhémet Ali, qui repoussèrent à plusieurs reprises les montagnards, car les troupes régulières ne se hasardent guère en-dehors

des murs ; et la canonnade journalière des châteaux de la ville et des bâtimens de guerre en station sur notre rade, ne fait aucun mal aux insurgés, favorisés par les accidens du terrain.

Tripoli, Saïda, et les autres villes du littoral du Mont Liban, sont dans le même état ; et cette levée de boucliers parait d'autant plus formidable que les montagnards s'abstiennent jusqu'à ce jour de tout acte de brigandage, se bornant à attaquer tout ce qui tient au Gouvernement, sans faire le moindre mal aux habitans.

Ils ont adressé il y a quelques jours une circulaire aux Consuls, protestant de leur intention de respecter les Européens, et assurant libre passage aux provisions qui seraient munies d'un teskéré du Consulat : car malgré l'abondance de blé dans la ville, la cherté est devenue déjà excessive, vu l'impossibilité de communiquer avec les campagnes environnantes qui approvisionnent notre marché, et vu le grand nombre de familles qui se sont réfugiées dans la ville. Ils ont même restitué au Consulat Britannique les groupes d'une poste Anglaise de Damas, qui avait été dévalisée par méprise avec celles du Gouvernement. J'ai vu dans mes promenades aux environs de la ville, plusieurs centaines de ces hommes ; ils m'ont paru très-déterminés et très-calmes, tandis que les batteries de la ville canonnaient leurs compagnons sur d'autres points. D'ailleurs, ce n'est qu'un début ; une fois que le Gouvernement se trouverait à même de tenter une expédition dans la montagne, nous devons nous attendre à toutes les horreurs d'une guerre civile, sur un théâtre vaste et défavorable surtout au rétablissement de l'ordre et de la sécurité publique. Déjà les Albanais du Gouvernement se livrent au pillage dans les campagnes, et attaquent à main armée les Européens mêmes dans leurs promenades.

Solyman Pacha est également bloqué à Saïda ; et des détachemens envoyés par ce général pour conduire en ville des convois de vivres, ont été battus à plusieurs reprises. Solyman Pacha d'une part, et Chérif Pacha de Damas de l'autre, ne cessent de se concerter avec le grand Prince de la montagne, Emir Béchir, sur les moyens propres à pacifier le pays. Ce Prince, ainsi que plusieurs membres de sa famille, protestent toujours de leur dévouement à Méhémet Ali. La conduite équivoque d'Emir Béchir contribue jusqu'à présent à le rendre suspect au Gouvernement, et il risque de perdre toute son autorité dans le Liban. D'autres princes font cause commune avec les insurgés ; toutefois, il n'y a pas jusqu'à ce jour de chef de l'insurrection, et toutes les décisions sont prises par délibérations communes et publiques. Ils ont déjà expédié plusieurs courriers au Haouran, à Naplouse, dans le Hébron, au-delà du Jourdain ; en un mot, sur tous les points connus pour les dispositions hostiles des habitans contre le Gouvernement Egyptien, et capable de prendre les armes.

Le Pacha de Damas a assuré le Consul de France dans cette ville, qu'on ne s'est montré nulle part disposé à participer à la révolte, et que les insurgés mêmes ne demandent que l'amnistie pour rentrer dans l'obéissance. Mais il est certain que des troubles ont déjà éclaté au Haouran. Ibrahim Pacha doit craindre en outre les peuplades de la Mésopotamie qui paraissaient disposés, il y a quelque tems, à envoyer contre lui une armée de 20,000 hommes. Comme la jonction des montagnards du Liban à Ibrahim Pacha en 1832 a entraîné la soumission de toute la Syrie, de même aujourd'hui leur révolte pourrait en expulser à tout jamais les Egyptiens, à moins qu'elle ne soit immédiatement appaisée par des concessions et des garanties pour l'avenir. Jusqu'à présent, les insurgés ne paraissent pas avoir un but déterminé dans leur soulèvement, malgré la formalité qu'ils ont observée, suivant les usages de la montagne, par un serment solemnel d'union et de dévouement à la cause commune, jusqu'à l'expulsion des Egyptiens.

Ibrahim Pacha est déjà averti des événemens de la montagne ; il vient de confirmer la défense de l'exportation de comestibles. J'apprends également, qu'un bateau à vapeur est arrivé hier à Saïda avec des dépêches très-importantes de Méhémet Ali pour Solyman Pacha et l'Emir Béchir. Nous sommes fondés à espérer que ce n'est qu'un message pacifique, à juger de ce qu'un des fils de l'Emir Béchir a porté immédiatement aux insurgés des paroles de paix, en les engageant de quitter les environs de Beyrout. Loin d'y paraître disposés, ces hommes n'en sont devenus que plus audacieux. Dans la soirée d'hier ils se sont avancés jusque sous les murailles de la ville, ont impulsé et provoqué les sentinelles du haut des remparts, et ne cessent pas de menacer la ville d'un assaut.

Ils sont formidables par leur nombre et leur courage, et les nombreux partisans qu'ils ont dans la ville même, tandis que les troupes du Gouvernement paraissent intimidées. Toutefois, il est peu probable qu'ils tentent un coup de main contre une ville entourée de murailles garnies de quelques pièces de canons, et dominée par des châteaux inexpugnables.

Un bâtiment de guerre Français vient d'arriver dans ce moment même, appelé par le Consul de France pour la sécurité du commerce.

Agréez, &c.,
(Signé) BASILY

(Translation.)

Mr. Russian Consul Basily to M. de Bouténeff.

M. l'Envoyé, *Beyrout,* $\frac{\text{May } 30}{\text{June } 11}$, 1840.

A GREAT insurrection has just broken out in the Lebanon. It has been occasioned by Ibrahim Pasha's order to disarm the Maronites, notwithstanding the repeated remonstrances of the Prince Emir Bechir, who foresaw the consequences of a measure as hazardous as it was unseasonable. Under existing circumstances, in the midst of the armaments of Mehemet Ali, and of the general conscription which is being carried on in Egypt, the warlike tribes of the mountain must have seen, in the perseverance of the Government to gain possession of their arms, a plan of military conscription. Three years ago, after the disarming of the mountaineers which was effected by Ibrahim Pasha, with as much cunning as good luck, 7000 muskets were distributed among the Maronites in order to obtain their co-operation in the affair of the Haouran. The Government has just now imperatively demanded these same arms; it is to be presumed that Ibrahim Pasha, encouraged by success, would require for military service the same persons who had borne them.

On the $\frac{17}{29}$th May, the city of Beyrout was encircled by a sanatory cordon, on account of the plague at Damascus. The mountaineers only saw in this oppressive proceeding a commencement of reprisals for their opposition to the disarmament, the more so as the plague had not yet penetrated into the Lebanon. Having assembled to the number of several thousand persons in the neighbourhood of the city, they broke the cordon, disarmed the soldiers who fell into their power, and plundered the Government couriers. Two days afterwards the Government of Beyrout communicated by a circular to the different Consulates of that city, an order from Solyman Pasha, purporting that the inhabitants of the mountain in general having placed themselves in a state of revolt, the export of provisions was prohibited, under penalty of the vessels being sunk which might attempt it on different points of the coast. This decision being known, the city was, on the morrow, blockaded by the mountaineers; several obstinate attacks were made on the fortified post of the quarantine, which is indebted for its safety, up to this day, solely to the courage of fifty Albanian soldiers in the pay of Mehemet Ali, who drove back the mountaineers several times, for the regular troops scarcely risk themselves outside the walls; and the daily cannonade of the forts of the city and of the vessels of war in our roadstead, does no injury to the insurgents, who are favoured by the character of the ground.

Tripoli, Saida, and the other cities on the sea-coast of Mount Lebanon, are in the same state; and this rising appears so much the more formidable since the mountaineers abstain up to this day from every act of robbery, confining themselves to attacking what belongs to the Government, without doing the least injury to the inhabitants.

They addressed a few days ago a circular to the Consuls, protesting their intention to respect Europeans, and guaranteeing free passage for provisions which might be furnished with a Teskereh from a Consulate; for notwithstanding the abundance of corn in the city, it has already become exceedingly dear, in consequence of the impossibility of communicating with the neighbouring country by which our market is provisioned, and in consequence of the great number of families which have taken refuge in the city. They have even restored to the British Consulate the money belonging to an English courier from Damascus who had been plundered by mistake with those of the Government. I have seen, in my walks in the neighbourhood of the city, several hundreds of these men; they ap-

peared to me very determined and very calm, whilst the batteries of the town cannonaded their companions on other points. Besides, this is only a beginning: when once the Government shall find itself able to attempt an expedition into the mountain, we must look for all the horrors of a civil war on a vast theatre, and one especially unfavourable for the restoration of order and of public security. The Albanians in the service of the Government already give themselves up to pillage in the open country, and attack with arms in their hands even Europeans in their walks.

Solyman Pasha is equally shut up in Saida; and detachments sent by that General to bring into the town convoys of provisions, have been repeatedly beaten. Solyman Pasha, on the one hand, and Cherif Pasha of Damascus, on the other, do not cease to concert with the great Prince of the mountain, Emir Bechir, upon the means calculated to pacify the country. That Prince, as well as many members of his family, continue to protest their devotion to Mehemet Ali. The equivocal conduct of the Emir Bechir contributes at present to render him an object of suspicion to the Government, and he risks losing all his authority in the Lebanon. Other Princes make common cause with the insurgents; however, up to the present time there has been no chief of the insurrection, and all decisions are taken by common and public deliberation. They have already sent several messengers to the Haouran, to Naplouse, to the country about Mount Hebron, and beyond the Jordan; in a word, in every direction known for the hostile disposition of the inhabitants against the Egyptian Government, and capable of taking up arms.

The Pasha of Damascus has assured the Consul of France in that city that no disposition has been shown in any quarter to take part in the revolt, and that the insurgents themselves only ask for an amnesty in order to return to their obedience. But it is certain that troubles have already broken out in the Haouran. Ibrahim Pasha must moreover be afraid of the tribes of Mesopotamia, who appeared inclined a short time ago to send against him an army of 20,000 men. As the junction of the mountaineers of the Lebanon with Ibrahim Pasha in 1832 occasioned the submission of the whole of Syria, in the same manner at the present time their revolt might expel the Egyptians from it for ever, unless it should be immediately appeased by concessions and by guarantees for the future. Up to this time the insurgents do not appear to have any definite object in their insurrection, notwithstanding the formality which they observed, according to the customs of the mountain, by taking a solemn oath of union and devotion to the common cause until the expulsion of the Egyptians.

Ibrahim Pasha is already apprized of what has taken place in the mountain; he has just confirmed the prohibition to export provisions: I likewise learn that a steam-vessel arrived yesterday at Saida with very important despatches from Mehemet Ali for Solyman Pasha and the Emir Bechir. We are justified in hoping that it is merely a pacific message, to judge from one of the sons of the Emir Bechir having immediately carried to the insurgents words of peace, exhorting them to quit the neighbourhood of Beyrout. Far from appearing disposed to do so, these men were only rendered thereby more daring. Yesterday evening they advanced up to the walls of the city, drove in and irritated the sentinels on the top of the ramparts; and they cease not to threaten the town with an assault.

They are formidable from their numbers and their courage, and the numerous partisans which they have in the city itself, whilst the troops of the Government appear intimidated. However it is little probable that they should attempt a sudden attack against a city surrounded by walls provided with some pieces of cannon, and commanded by impregnable forts.

A French vessel of war has this instant arrived, summoned by the Consul of France for the protection of commerce.

Receive, &c.,
(Signed) BASILY.

No. 29.

Mr. Consul Werry to John Bidwell, Esq.—(*Received July* 29.)

(Extract.) *Damascus, June* 22, 1840.

THE Government seems to be drawing from Egypt the chief military force to be employed against the mountaineers, but I don't think Ibrahim Pasha can eventually maintain his position on the northern frontier at Marash and Orfa. In every point of view it appears to me a most favourable opportunity for Great Britain and the Foreign Powers to oblige Mehemet Ali to come to a settlement with the Sultan respecting this country. We are here in the midst of danger, trouble, and difficulty, and there is no knowing from one hour to another what may happen. As yet, things are tolerably quiet, but the population generally is rife for revolt, and would seize eagerly an opportunity to act against the Government.

No. 30.

Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received July* 29.)

My Lord, *Beyrout, June* 24, 1841.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 29th ultimo*, I have the honour to acquaint your Lordship that the revolt of Lebanon, then deemed probable, has now become a certainty.

On the 1st instant, Solyman Pasha officially notified to the authorities here, the insurrection of the mountains of the Druses; and an embargo was, in consequence, laid upon all vessels laden with grain for the ports of Djebel, Djoun, and Batroun.

The first manifestation of the revolt was an attack by the insurgents upon the sentinels at the different quarantine stations, the arrest of the Government couriers, and the occupation of the roads and defiles leading to all the principal towns.

These measures were immediately followed by the congregation of considerable bands of armed mountaineers at different points close to this town, which has been twice assailed, whilst repeated attacks have been made upon the Lazaretto, with a view to get possession of the arms there. In each of these affairs, the troops have suffered severely in killed and wounded; the insurgents, on the other hand, have only had a few slightly wounded.

A pine grove, about half an hour distant from Beyrout, is the centre of operations of the insurgent party. The camp consists of about 5,000 men at present, but on a signal, three times that number would muster in a very short space of time.

The Emir Bechir has in vain attempted, by offers of concession to the insurgents, namely, permission to retain their arms and a general amnesty, to induce them to disband and return to their homes.

On the arrival of the "Nile" steam-frigate from Alexandria, on the 9th instant, with conciliatory propositions to the heads of the revolt from the Viceroy, a General Council of Emirs and Sheiks was convoked to take these propositions into consideration. They were rejected, and a Memorial was drawn up, translation of which I have the honour to inclose, detailing the grievances of the inhabitants of Lebanon, setting forth their demands, and requiring as a pledge for their fulfilment, the intervention of the agents of Great Britain and France. A proclamation calling the people to arms, was at the same time issued, and expedited by couriers to all parts of Syria. This document I have also the honour to transmit.

Notwithstanding the arrival here of the Egyptian Vice-Admiral with six frigates and 7,000 troops, to be followed by a larger force, the appearance at Beyrout of Solyman Pasha to take the command, the menaces of extermination published by Ibrahim Pasha in a firman, of which I beg

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* Part I, page 670.

leave to inclose a translation, the insurgents remain unshaken, full of enthusiasm, and impatient to try the issue of a general engagement.

By skirmishings, and petty attacks, they have from day to day excited the Nizams, with a view to draw them out of the town ; and have even had the hardihood to come to the very gates of the city, which they struck with their muskets and dared the soldiers to meet them in the open field, upbraiding them with cowardice. Even the women and children are animated with the same spirit.

The insurgents are not a mere armed mob, as they have been termed by some, but a well-organized body. Strict discipline and due subordination are maintained—even the services of religion are publicly performed at the camp ; couriers appointed, and outposts established, which extend to a few minutes' walk of this city.

The consular post from Damascus is regularly stopped at the camp, and as regularly released on my intimating to the Chiefs, that there are no letters conveyed thereby for this Government.

Considerable alarm exists at Beyrout in the present state of things, though, hitherto, every courtesy and attention has been shown to Europeans by the insurgents. I, nevertheless, thought it proper to apprize Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, under date of the 1st instant, of the aspect of affairs in Syria, and stated that I considered it highly desirable that a British man-of-war should be stationed here for the protection of national interests, which might be endangered should the Egyptian forces sustain a defeat. In such an event there is reason to fear, so hostile are the sentiments of the Syrians to this Government, that an attack might be made upon the troops in the town, and general anarchy, if not massacre, be the consequence.

I have hitherto received no answer from Admiral Stopford. The French and Austrians have each a corvette in the roads, and so great was the alarm generally, two nights ago, that the Austrian Commander offered to receive on board his vessel the consular corps for safety. This proposal I did not think proper to accept, but remained in the town.

The Emir Bechir hitherto appears firm in his allegiance to the Viceroy, but he is unsupported, and at this moment almost a prisoner, being under close observation of the opposite party. The insurgents lately replied to an intimation from the Emir that he would again send his sons to agree on terms of conciliation, that they would be received with musket balls if such were their errand.

Several influential Emirs and Sheiks (three of them relatives of the Emir Bechir) openly support the insurrection, and more, if not all, secretly favour it.

The hatred of Christian and Druse to the Egyptian yoke, seems unextinguishable. All they ask is arms and ammunition, which if thrown upon the coast, the whole of Syria would unquestionably rise, and the country be swept of every vestige of their present rulers.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) N. MOORE.

June 25.

Solyman Pasha has signified to the insurgents, that if they do not submit he will lay waste the whole of Lebanon. And at this moment the Egyptian ships of war are firing upon the villages on the skirts of the mountain. The insurgents remain unshaken.

To-day eight Egyptian men-of-war are arrived.

Arms have already been landed on the coast from a Greek vessel, and to-day we hear that at Cyprus two vessels freighted with ammunition, are ready to sail for Syria. Egyptian cruizers are stationed to intercept them.

P.S.—It is currently circulated here, that orders have been issued by the Viceroy to the troops, according to which the old men who may be taken prisoners in the war, are destined for the galleys, the youths for the conscription, and that all will be lawful prize which falls into the soldiers' hands. If true, and the intention be to intimidate the insurgents, the reverse will be the effect, and war to the knife may be anticipated.

N. M.

Inclosure 1 in No. 30.

Letter from the Inhabitants of Mount Lebanon to the Emir Amin.

(Traduction.) 11 Rébi-Akhir, 1256 / 11 Juin, 1840.

VOUS n'ignorez pas ainsi que le Prince Emir Béchir les tyrannies souffertes par les habitans du Mont Liban, les vexations et les impôts qui les oppriment. Depuis que le Gouvernement de Son Altesse Méhémet Ali est établi dans ce pays, les habitans du Liban furent les premiers à se soumettre, et ils sont allés avec son armée à la guerre de Damas et à la rencontre des troupes à Hama et à Tripoli; et lorsque l'insurrection a éclaté à Saffet, Naplous, Nassirié, et chez les Mutualis, les habitans de la montagne sont allés avec son Excellence Emir Béchir; ils les ont battus et soumis au Gouvernement du Pacha, ce qui a fait augmenter leur espoir d'être libres des vexations; mais pour les recompenser de ce qu'ils lui ont soumis les endroits précités, il leur a demandé leurs armes, et ensuite des soldats, ce qui leur a causé des dommages que l'oreille se boucherait pour ne pas entendre, puisqu'on prenait leurs femmes, on les châtiait de différentes manières, et on les suspendait sur les arbres. Ensuite il leur a imposé le Firdé, et on devait payer ce droit même pour ceux qui mourraient ou qui étaient tués dans la guerre pour ce Gouvernement; et lorsqu'on a découvert la mine de charbon de terre dans la montagne, on a préscrit à un montagnard de l'exploiter et de fournir les ustensiles nécessaires sans être payés, et on a envoyé des gens pour inspecter ces travaux; on payait les ouvriers et les mulets pour le transport du charbon à Beyrout, mais c'était peu de chose, et nous fumes obligés de supporter le restant du payement à nos fraix, et de fournir des poutres et des sacs pour cette mine, et ils ne nous payèrent que le quart du prix, mais les frais de transport des villages jusqu'à la mine ne nous furent pas payés. Si nous voulons entrer dans les détails de toutes ces vexations, ce serait trop long, et nous ne comptons pas les coups de bâton et déshonneurs qu'on nous a fait comme à des fellahs Egyptiens; nous ne fesons pas même mention des dépenses que nous avons faites pour les Emirs et pour les Boulouk-Bachis; et depuis qu'on a commencé l'établissement de la quarantaine jusqu'à présent, on a obligé les montagnards de fournir de la chaux, et en y fixant un minime prix, et de la transporter gratis sur leurs bêtes de somme. De nouvelles contributions ont frappé les moulins. Les maçons ont été envoyés par force à Koulek-Boghaz, à St. Jean d'Acre, et à la quarantaine, et ils n'eurent que le quart du payement usité: et l'obligation des travaux a augmenté dans les villes, dans les campagnes, et dans tous les endroits où nous allons, ce qui a réduit dans une misère extrême plusieurs familles de la montagne, et nous a ruiné aussi, car nous n'avons plus ni argent, ni enfans, ni bestiaux, vu que nos enfans sont pris pour le Nizam, nos récoltes ne suffisent pas à tant de demandes, nos bestiaux de toute sorte sont dans une angarie continuelle (de manière que plusieurs ont précipité d'une grande hauteur leurs mulets et leurs chameaux, d'autres les ont vendus à un vil prix), et nous nous sommes employés pour servir la mine et les soldats. Il y a quelque tems aussi lorsque la guerre et la tyrannie est tombée sur nos frères les habitans du Haouran, lesquels sont de notre propre nation, le Gouvernement nous a donné des armes, et nous a envoyés pour les battre, ce que nous avons fait deux années consécutives, et plusieurs d'entre nous sont morts soit de la fatigue du voyage soit en guerre, et cela nous a couté, entre les dépenses et les dommages, environ 2,000 bourses. Enfin, puisque nos biens sont perdus, nos enfans ne sont plus, et puisque nous avons perdu notre liberté, ne possédant plus rien du nôtre, et enfin étant extrêmement consternés, nous avons dû nous révolter pour nous débarrasser de la tyrannie et réclamer notre tranquillité et notre liberté. Or, si les autorités se tournent vers Dieu (la justice) et levent la tyrannie de nous, nous sommes prêts à nous soumettre et à obéir à leurs ordres, puisque notre insurrection n'a pas le but de former une autorité, mais uniquement de nous livrer de cette insupportable tyrannie, vû que nous ne pouvons plus payer qu'un Miri sur nos biens et un Ginalé. Si, donc, notre prière vient d'être acceptée, et si les tyrannies précitées

sont levées de nous comme nous le désirons, voici ce que nous prions Son Altesse le Vice-Roi de faire; de prendre de nous un Miri et un Ginalé, et de lever de nous toute tyrannie et angarie, et de faire cela par le moyen des Agens d'Angleterre et de France, et par les moyens de leurs Consuls dans ces pays, afin que si ces traités ne sont pas exécutés fidèlement, nous puissions en réclamer auprès d'eux. Nous restons donc dans les endroits où nos sommes, en attendant la réponse, et si elle est favorable, chacun retournera chez lui; autrement nous sommes prêts à mourir plutôt que de rester dans l'état présent. Nous avons dit notre état, et que les autorités ordonnent.

Signé par les habitans de la Montagne en général.

(Translation.

Letter from the Inhabitants of Mount Lebanon to the Emir Amin.

Rebi-Akhir 11, 1256 / June 11, 1840.

YOU, as well as the Prince Emir Bechir, are not ignorant of the tyranny suffered by the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon, the vexations and the taxes by which they are oppressed. From the time that the Government of His Highness Mehemet Ali was established in this country, the inhabitants of Lebanon were the first to submit, and they went with his army to the war of Damascus and to the conflict of the troops at Hama and at Tripoli; and when the insurrection broke out at Saffet, Naplous, Nassirié, and among the Mutualis, the inhabitants of the mountain went with his Excellency Emir Bechir; they fought them, and subjected them to the Government of the Pasha, whereby their hope of being free from vexation was increased; but as a recompense for their having subjected to him the aforesaid places, he demanded their arms, and afterwards soldiers of them, which caused them mischief which the ear would close itself not to hear; since their women were taken from them, they were chastized in different ways, and they were hung on the trees. Thereupon the Ferdeh was levied on them, and they were compelled to pay that duty for those even who died or who were killed in the war for this Government; and when the coal-mine was discovered in the mountain, a mountaineer was enjoined to work it, and to furnish the requisite utensils without payment, and persons were sent to inspect these works; the workmen and the mules were paid for transporting the coal to Beyrout, but that was a trifle, and we were obliged to support the rest of the payment at our own cost, and to furnish the beams and the sacks for this mine, and they only paid us the fourth part of the price, but the expences of transport from the villages to the mine were not paid us. If we should enter into the details of all these vexations, it would be too long; and we do not reckon the blows and the indignities which they have inflicted upon us as upon Egyptian Fellahs; we do not even make mention of the expences which we have incurred for the Emirs and the Bouluk Bachis; and from the time that the establishment of the quarantine was commenced up to the present, the mountaineers were obliged to supply lime, and fixing thereupon the lowest price, to convey it without remuneration on their beasts of burthen. New contributions were levied on the mills. The masons were forcibly sent to Koulek Boghas, St. Jean d'Acre, and the quarantine, and only received the fourth part of the ordinary wages; and forced labour has increased in the towns, in the country, and everywhere we go, which has reduced many families of the mountain to extreme misery, and has ruined us also; for we no longer have any money, children, or cattle, seeing that our children are taken for the regular army, our harvests are not sufficient for so many demands, our cattle of every kind are in continual requisition (so that many persons have thrown down from a great height their mules, and their camels, others have sold them at a low price), and we employ ourselves in attendance upon the mine and upon the soldiers. Some time ago also, when the war and tyranny fell upon our brethren the inhabitants of the Haouran, who are of our own

nation, the Government gave us arms, and sent us to fight them, which we did for two years consecutively, and many amongst us died either from the fatigue of the journey, or in war, and that cost us, in expences and in losses, about 2,000 purses. Lastly, since our property is lost, our children dead, and since we have lost our liberty, no longer possessing anything of our own, and being moreover greatly dismayed, we have been obliged to revolt, in order to rid ourselves of the tyranny, and to insist upon our tranquillity and our liberty. Wherefore, if the authorities turn towards God (justice) and take away the tyranny from amongst us, we are ready to submit ourselves, and to be obedient to their orders, since our insurrection has not for its object to constitute an authority, but merely to relieve ourselves from this intolerable tyranny, seeing that we can no longer pay upon our property more than one Miri and one Ginalé. If, then, our prayer has been accepted, and if the aforesaid tyrannies are taken off as we desire, this is what we intreat His Highness the Viceroy to do: to take from us one Miri and one Ginalé, and to remove from us all tyranny and requisition, and to do this by means of the Agents of England and of France, and through their Consuls in this country; in order that if these compacts are not faithfully executed, we may have recourse to those persons. We abide, then, in the places where we are, waiting for the answer, and if it is favourable, every one will return to his home; otherwise we are ready to die, rather than remain in the present state. We have told our condition, and let the Authorities give orders.

Signed by the inhabitants of the mountain in general.

Inclosure 2 in No. 30.

Proclamation of the Insurgents of Mount Lebanon, sent by Express to their Compatriots.

Amis de la Patrie!

AUCUN de vous n'ignore les injustices commises par le Gouvernement Egyptien, les contributions exorbitantes, les avanies et servitudes dont la Syrie entière est écrasée, et qui ont causé la ruine d'un grand nombre des familles. Les habitans du Liban supportèrent avec résignation les excès d'une autorité tyrannique malgré leur caractère d'indépendance bien connu, par respect pour son Excellence l'Emir Béchir Cheabi, et espérant, au moins, que cette longanimité leur vaudrait la conservation de leur honneur, de leur liberté, et de leur existence.

Si nous n'avons pas pris les armes plus-tôt pour nous délivrer d'un pouvoir oppresseur, c'est que nous mettions toute notre confiance dans la bienveillante et patriotique intervention de notre Prince l'Emir Béchir, qui aurait obtenu un répit à nos peines; mais malheureusement, ce Gouvernement, toujours coupable et inique, ne fut pas reconnaissant envers notre Prince du service qu'il lui avait rendu en nous appaisant; il le menaça, et le maltraita d'une manière humiliante à Tarsous, comme vous le savez tous, quand de nouveau il voulut s'interposer en notre faveur. Depuis ce tems, il commença une tactique fatale à notre pays, en nous désunissant par les mensonges et les promesses fallacieuses; il demanda nos armes, et les enleva, d'abord aux départemens les plus faibles, et ainsi de suite à nous tous; il employa le même systême de tromperie pour les conscriptions, et réussit de cette manière à rendre un grand nombre de nos frères en esclavage. Son joug leur devint tellement insupportable que tous ne virent que la mort pour réfuge; ils se soulevèrent donc, et pour les soumettre un grand nombre de Nizams périt dans cette guerre impie: que les mânes de nos frères morts pour la liberté reposent en paix! Leur courage a égalé celui des Français, qui, menaçés d'anéantissement s'ils ne se rendaient, ont préféré mourir; ils se révoltèrent et tuèrent 150,000 hommes. Ceci, nos frères, est un fait historique qui ne doit pas vous surprendre: nos compatriotes, qui combattèrent dans le Haouran, étaient en très petit nombre, et comme

vous le savez, avec bien moins de moyens ils surent surpasser les Français.

Puisque les mêmes exigences pèsent sur nous, qu'on nous demande nos armes, celles que le Gouvernement nous avait données, puisque l'expérience, qui est le meilleur des maîtres, nous apprend que la conscription sera la conséquence de notre faiblesse, nous ne devons plus attendre d'autres preuves du sort qui nous menace; et puisque la mort frappe aussi bien ceux qui l'attendent lachement chez eux, que ceux qui se soulèvent et veulent secouer le joug oppresseur, n'hésitons pas, unissons-nous avec sympathie, soulevons-nous sans peur; la tyrannie qui nous menace jusqu'à nos derniers instans va détruire notre patrie; n'est-elle pas assez flagrante? Sachons bien d'avance, que le tardif repentir ne nous sauvera pas si jamais, ce qu'à Dieu ne plaise, nous nous séparons, ou si nous balançons un instant à mettre nos efforts en commun pour réconquérir notre liberté.

Pour agir avec la dignité et la force qu'une circonstance aussi solennelle exige, et pour mettre dans notre décision la sagesse et la pondération d'un peuple libre, il faut une réunion des hommes les plus marquans et les plus éclairés parmi nous; cette réunion sera composée de cinq Chefs élus à la majorité dans chaque district, et ils formeront entr'eux tous ou en partie un Conseil érigé dans un lieu convenable pour obtenir une parfaite organisation. Dix milles de nos braves seront choisis pour opposer aux machinations et à tous mouvemens attentatoires à notre liberté; que les contributions et capitations que le Gouvernement allait prélever pour payer ceux d'entre nous qui auraient été enrôlés, si nous ne nous étions soulevés, soient affectés à l'approvisionnement de nos 10,000 hommes, qui suivront courageusement l'exemple des Machabés, dont un seul combattait contre dix, car la cause de la justice est invincible. Les relations des membres de notre Conseil entr'eux devront être permanentes, afin que nous soyons à même de pourvoir promptement à la défense de nos compatriotes en danger, de nous soustraire à la servitude, à l'injustice, et déjouer toutes les combinaisons astucieuses d'un pouvoir odieux qui ne nous désunira jamais. Les Grecs nous ont déjà donné l'exemple, ils ont obtenu leur liberté (c'est de Dieu qu'ils la tiennent). Les habitans de Deir-el-Kamr ont été les premiers à s'armer pour notre juste et sainte cause : que partout leur patriotique appel soit entendu! Quant à nous, notre résolution est inébranlable, nous avons juré de recouvrer notre indépendance où de mourir.

(Translation.)

Proclamation of the Insurgents of Mount Lebanon, sent by express to their Compatriots.

Friends of the Country!

NONE of you are ignorant of the injustice committed by the Egyptian Government, of the exorbitant contributions, the exactions and servitude by which the whole of Syria is crushed, and which have occasioned the ruin of a great number of families. The inhabitants of the Lebanon bore with resignation the excesses of a tyrannical authority notwithstanding their well-known character for independence, out of respect for his Excellency the Emir Bechir Sheaby, and hoping, at least, that this their patience would ensure the preservation of their honour, of their liberty, and of their existence.

If we have not sooner taken up arms to free ourselves from an oppressive power, it is, that we placed our entire reliance on the benevolent and patriotic intervention of our Prince the Emir Bechir, who

might have obtained for us a respite from our troubles; but, unhappily, this Government, always culpable and unjust, was not grateful to our Prince for the service which he had performed in pacifying us; it threatened him, and ill-treated him in a degrading manner at Tarsus, as you all know, when he wished anew to interpose in our behalf. From that period, it commenced a policy fatal to our country, by dividing us by lies and fallacious promises; it demanded our arms, and wrested them first from the weakest districts, and in the same manner afterwards, from us all; it employed the same system of trickery with regard to the conscriptions, and succeeded in this manner in reducing a great number of our brethren to slavery. Its yoke would have become so intolerable, that all only looked to death as their refuge: they rose up then in insurrection, and in order to reduce them to subjection, a great number of regular troops perished in this unhallowed warfare: may the shades of our brethren who died for liberty, rest in peace! Their courage equalled that of the French, who, threatened with destruction if they did not surrender, preferred death; they revolted, and slew 150,000 men. This, brethren, is an historical fact which must not surprize you; our countrymen, who fought in the Haouran, were few in number, and, as you know, with much fewer means they surpassed the French.

Since the same exactions oppress us, since they demand our arms, those arms which the Government gave us; since experience, which is the best master, teaches us that the conscription will be the consequence of our weakness; we should no longer wait for additional proofs of the fate which threatens us; and since death equally strikes those who cowardly wait for it at home, as those who rouse themselves and desire to shake off the yoke of the oppressor, let us not hesitate, let us unite with sympathy, let us rouse ourselves without fear; the tyranny which menaces us up to our last moments, would destroy our country: is it not sufficiently flagrant? Let us know beforehand, that tardy repentance will not save us, if ever, which God forbid, we separate ourselves, or if we hesitate a moment to exert ourselves in common to reconquer our liberties.

In order that we may act with the dignity and with the force which so solemn a circumstance requires, and in order to evince in our decision the wisdom and the deliberation of a free people, an Assembly of the most distinguished and enlightened men among us is requisite; this Assembly shall consist of five Chiefs chosen by the majority in each district, and they shall form among themselves, all or in part, a Council established in a suitable locality for obtaining a perfect organization. Ten thousand of our warriors shall be chosen to oppose the machinations and all proceedings affecting our liberty: let the contributions and the taxes which the Government would have levied for the payment of those among us who would have been enrolled, if we had not revolted, be applied to provisioning our 10,000 men, who shall boldly follow the example of the Maccabees, one of whom fought against ten; for the cause of justice is invincible. The relations of the members of our Council among themselves should be permanent, in order that we may be able promptly to provide for the defence of our countrymen who are in danger, to relieve ourselves from slavery, injustice, and to defeat all the crafty combinations of an odious authority which shall never disunite us. The Greeks have already set us the example, they have obtained their liberty, (it is of God that they hold it). The inhabitants of Der-el-Kamar have been the first to arm themselves for our just and holy cause; may their patriotic appeal be everywhere heard! As for us, our resolution is not to be shaken; we have sworn to recover our independence, or to die.

Inclosure 3 in No. 30.

Firman addressed by Ibrahim Pasha to the Inhabitants of Mount Lebanon.

(Traduction.)

6 Rébi-Akker, 1256
6 Juin, 1840

NOUS déclarons par le présent firman notre volonté aux habitans du Liban, Chrétiens et Druses.

Depuis quelques jours et aujourd'hui même me sont parvenus divers rapports au sujet de votre refus de consigner les armes qui avaient été laissées provisoirement entre vos mains, et dont la réquisition vous a portés à des actes d'insubordination aux volontés supérieures: Ainsi, tous vos sentimens se sont mis en évidence, et sachez tous à qui je m'adresse en général, que je comprends vos intentions et la manière dont vous vous êtes conduits dans cette révolte extraordinaire, et je ne puis attribuer votre conduite qu'à deux motifs; ou des malveillans vous ont fait croire qu'il sera ordonnée une conscription parmi vous, et ont séduit par cette perfide insinuation votre fierté et votre courage, abusant de votre simplicité; ou bien c'est une de votre part, à laquelle vous vous portez sans aucun motif. Dans le premier cas, si l'on a suscité parmi vous la crainte de conscription dans la montagne, il ne faut nullement y ajouter foi, et je jure par la chère tête de mon Père le Vice-Roi et la mienne, que ce n'est pas notre désir de faire aucune levée forcée dans la montagne, et nous n'aurions pas même cette idée pour aucune autre partie de la Syrie en général. Nous vous répétons positivement que nous n'en ferons rien. Je vous ai déjà notifié d'être tranquilles dans vos maisons, et n'avoir point de pareilles idées; revenez donc de vos frayeurs et de vos inquiétudes, et ne cherchez pas à ruiner la montagne et à verser votre sang. Mais dans le cas que votre révolte proviendrait d'une trahison spontanée et vaine, nous avons déjà envoyé quinze régimens d'infanterie outre la cavalerie et l'artillerie, pour détruire vos personnes et ruiner vos habitations complètement. Après que vous aurez connaissance de notre présent firman, vous obéirez, en rentrant dans la soumission, en rejetant de votre tête vos intentions corrompues, vous vous trouverez en sûreté sauvés et joyeux d'avoir racheté vos âmes et vos propriétés; mais si vous persistez dans vos coupables intentions, l'armée victorieuse expédiée avec l'aide de Dieu détruira votre parti, comme vous l'avez mérité. Pensez bien et refléchissez sur vos intérêts, et en choisissant la soumission soyez obéissant à votre Prince, afin que ce dernier prévient MM. les Chefs de l'armée de ne pas s'avancer, et par là vous ne serez pas exposés aux dangers. Nous désirons par le présent vous faire comprendre la vérité, pour que vous puissez choisir ce qui vous convient le mieux, et prendre une bonne résolution; mais gardez-vous bien de ne pas obéir et rentrer dans la soumission, car le tardif repentir ne vous sauvera pas.

(Translation.)

Firman addressed by Ibrahim Pasha to the Inhabitants of Mount Lebanon.

Rebi-Akhir 6, 1256
June 6, 1840

WE declare by the present firman our will to the inhabitants of Lebanon, Christians, and Druses.

For some days, and even at the present time, different reports have reached me respecting your refusal to deliver up the arms which had been provisionally left in your hands, and the demand for which had led you to commit acts of insubordination to my superior will. Thus, all your sentiments have been made manifest, and know ye all to whom I

address myself in general, that I understand your purpose, and the manner in which you have conducted yourselves in this extraordinary revolt, and I can only attribute your conduct to two motives: either evil-disposed persons have made you believe that a conscription will be ordered among you, and by this perfidious insinuation have seduced your pride and your courage, abusing your simplicity; or otherwise it is a revolt of your own, to which you betake yourselves without any cause. In the first case, if the apprehension of a conscription in the mountain has been stirred up among you, you should by no means give credit to it; and I swear by the dear head of my father the Viceroy and by my own, that we do not desire to make any forced levy in the mountains, and we should not even entertain that notion with respect to any other part of Syria in general. We positively assure you that we shall do nothing of the sort. I have already signified to you that you should remain quiet in your houses, and not entertain such notions: recover then from your alarm and from your uneasiness, and do not seek to ruin the mountain and to shed your blood. But in case your revolt should originate in spontaneous and foolish treachery, we have already sent fifteen regiments of infantry, besides cavalry and artillery, to destroy you, and to ruin your habitations altogether. After you shall have been made acquainted with our present firman, you will obey by returning to submission; by throwing out of your heads your corrupt intentions, you will find yourselves in security, safe, and happy at having redeemed your lives and properties; but if you persist in your culpable intentions, the victorious army sent forth with the aid of God, will destroy your party, as you have deserved. Consider well, and reflect upon your interests, and by choosing submission, be obedient to your Prince, in order that the latter may apprize the Commanders of the army not to advance, and thereby you will not be exposed to danger. We desire by the present firman to make you understand the truth, in order that you may choose what best suits you, and adopt a good resolution; but take you care to obey and to return to submission, for tardy repentance will not save you.

No. 31.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received July* 29.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, July* 5, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to submit for your Lordship's consideration the expediency of stationing in this port one or more of Her Majesty's ships of war for the protection of British subjects and property endangered by the popular excitement resulting from the present insurrection in Syria.

As it is probable that his Highness the Viceroy may proceed to the theatre of the pending struggle, and as it appears to me most important to follow closely any such movement of his Highness, perhaps your Lordship will be pleased to second the above object, by causing the necessary orders to be given to any naval force despatched to Alexandria.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 32.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 29.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, July 5, 1840.*

I HAD, this morning, the honour of an interview with his Highness Mehemet Ali Pasha.

The news the Viceroy has lately received, both from Constantinople and from Syria, has been of the most unfavourable character. In the latter country, the existence of the Egyptian power becomes every day more critical and precarious.

Hitherto, I had never seen Mehemet Ali otherwise than collected and full of determination. He appeared now to have lost his former equanimity. His excitement amounted at moments to something akin to trepidation: his feverish and restless starts bore token to his uneasy frame of mind.

The last accounts from Beyrout, of the 1st of July, assert that a general action would inevitably take place in a few days, between the Egyptian forces and the insurgents. The fate of such a battle will perhaps decide that of Syria.

Should the result prove adverse to the Pasha, I think it probable that his Highness will immediately proceed to the theatre of the present struggle.

Various expressions of Mehemet Ali, in our conversation of this morning, have convinced me, that he entertains fears of a British squadron appearing against him on the coast of Syria. Indeed, if the Pasha is to be coerced to the acceptance of certain terms, the present must be considered a favourable opportunity. In venturing such an opinion, I only contemplate the condition and policy of the countries where I am acting officially, since Her Majesty's Government alone can properly estimate the intricate interests, the views, and the dispositions of other Cabinets parties to this complicated question.

I must not omit to notice that his Highness Mehemet Ali spoke this morning in a manner which leaves me little doubt that he will not accomplish his former professions as to the surrender of the Turkish fleet. He now seeks, by equivocation, to evade that meaning which every Agent of the Five Great Powers had affixed to his recent declarations.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 33.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 30.)

(Extract.) *Paris, July 27, 1840.*

I CALLED on M. Thiers yesterday, chiefly for the sake of ascertaining the truth as to the various reports abroad respecting the Affairs of Spain, and the manner in which the French Government viewed them; and I also expected, a variety of councils having recently taken place with regard to the Affairs of the East, that in the course of our conversation I might be enabled by M. Thiers to inform your Lordship of the present disposition of the French Government.

An observation that, when M. de la Redorte had started, he had received instructions to hold himself in constant communication with Mr. Aston, and to act in concert with him, but that now France stood alone, led us necessarily to the recent Convention, which M. Thiers said fell upon him directly after he had been successful in terminating our differences with Naples.

I replied to this observation, that I had been especially instructed to thank him, which I had done, and begged to do again, for the skill with which he had managed the negotiation in question, and for the friendly feeling he had manifested throughout it; and that he would be under a most erroneous impression, if he thought that Her Majesty's Government were not fully sensible of his services in that instance, and did not set a high value on his opinions and co-operation in all

matters; but as there might be certain cases where France could not act otherwise than she did, so there might also be cases where the English Government had, as it were, a course prescribed to it; and that I could not help thinking that he laid too great a stress on a partial act, and attributed to it too many general consequences.

"How can I lay too great a stress on what has occurred?" said he, "England, separating from us, allies herself with Russia, by a Treaty from which we are excluded. It has not been thought worth while to ask us whether we would join in that Treaty or not. Do you know the spirit of France? Do you know what it is? And what is my situation? I, who have been the partisan of the English alliance, and who, for the last five months, have done everything in my power, by acting in the most cordial and open manner, to maintain it? And for what do you break this alliance? A few strips of land, more or less, to the Pasha of Egypt? or have you any more serious object? Do you wish anything in that quarter of the world for yourselves?"

I said, that I was sure that if he took a calm view of all the circumstances of the case, they would not appear to him in the light in which he now viewed them. Had the British Government ever said one thing, and did they now do another? I could tell him all the circumstances of the case. When the rupture between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan took place last year, both Governments were acting together; both Governments held the same language here, and even their Ambassadors signed the same document at Constantinople; and what was the substance of that language as carried out in that document?—the language of support to the Sultan. In conformity with this language, we had also framed instructions to our Admiral in the Mediterranean; and so much did we think the views of England and France coincided, that those instructions were sent here to be shown to the French Government, and on being approved of, to be sent on.

The French Government had objected to part of the said instructions, and, consequently, they had been altered. But how objected? Merely as to their details, and not as to their general spirit; and I could especially speak on this subject, since I had begged Marshal Soult, on the first interview I ever had with him, to be perfectly explicit with the British Government, and to say precisely and without disguise, what his real feelings were with respect to Eastern Affairs, as the best means of preventing or checking in time any differences; and to this the Marshal replied, that the real feelings of his Government were what he had stated them,—for the Sultan, and against Mehemet Ali; and that when I called attention to the Note which had just then been delivered to the Porte, and said, that I supposed then I might take that Note as indicative of the general spirit of the French Government, he replied in the affirmative.

The language of the French Ambassador in London was also hostile to Mehemet Ali, and when differences arose between the two Governments, as to the extent of territory within which it would be advisable to confine the Pasha, he (that Ambassador) had proposed of his own accord a middle term.

Under such circumstances, was it not natural for our Government to enter into communication with the other Powers of Europe, to state to them its ideas, and to discuss measures for the support of the Sultan, without imagining that they were thereby separating themselves from France? And when, at last, these Powers called on England to carry out her views, and Turkey also called on her to fulfil her promises, and France at the same time said decidedly she could take no part in any measures against Mehemet Ali, could we at once turn round to the other Governments, and excuse ourselves also by saying we had been mistaken in the ideas we had all along entertained? Could a great Government do this with a proper sense of its own dignity? But still it might yield something of its opinions; it might and ought to do all it could to prevent a separation between itself and a friendly Power: and what had the British Government done? Adopted, at the suggestion of a mediating Power (Austria), the very views proposed by the French Ambassador, as the means of reconciling the differences between France and England. Undoubtedly, it might still be impossible for France to accede to these views, and her Ambassador might have spoken beyond his instructions; but still I could not help thinking that M. Thiers would see that the course pursued had not been an unfriendly one, and that the separation now existing had rather proceeded from France than England.

That with regard to asking France to join the present Treaty, I understood

that the basis of it had been some time since proposed to M. Guizot, that M. Guizot had referred the same to his Government, and that after a long period, in which it was generally understood that Mehemet Ali had been himself consulted upon it, he (M. Thiers) had told M. Guizot that the Pasha would never yield to such conditions, and that, consequently, France could not join in enforcing them. It might, therefore, be thought superfluous after this, to ask the French Government formally to consent to what it had just declared, through its Ambassador, it could not consent to, but that no disrespect, I well knew, was intended by this.

M. Thiers said, "It is a mere form, and I lay no stress upon it beyond that of the form's sake."

I then continued to say, that personally to him our Government could only feel particularly anxious to be on good terms; that when he said we quarrelled for a few strips of land, more or less, to the Pasha, might not the same thing be retorted, and might I not say that he quarrelled with us for these paltry reasons; and in regard to any idea of conquest on our part in that quarter of the world, I was quite certain that it had never entered the brain of any statesman; that a great people was always suspected of ambition; and that in France some people might imagine that we coveted certain possessions, as in England it was thought that France coveted others, but that these were chimeras.

M. Thiers replied, that the cases were not the same: that he was ambitious, that he respected Ministers who were ambitious for their country; but that ambition should have reasonable bounds; that France might be ambitious in other parts of Africa, but that as to Egypt it was out of the question; whereas England might have points to desire in Syria for the sake of the communication with the East Indies; and that therefore the suspicions of the French people, though possibly erroneous, were more justifiable. "Besides," said he, "the Government in England is not forced by public opinion to take part against the Pasha, whereas there is only one opinion in France in his favour, and consequently, I have not the same option as you have. However, the thing is done, the alliance with England is broken up; it is impossible to foresee the consequences, but we must meet them, be they what they may; we are embarking in a voyage with the horizon clouded by storms, and it is impossible for any man to see when or how they will burst."

I replied, that I could not help hoping that he viewed things too gloomily; that, undoubtedly, it was at the discretion of one great nation to consider its alliance broken with another; and it was also evident that that nation, equally confident in its own strength, would not, however desirous of keeping the friendship hitherto subsisting uninterrupted, force its good-will upon a Power which rejected it; but that individuals might indulge their views and feelings, and that attached as I was to the alliance with France, and looking coolly at what had now occurred, I could not see the elements of confusion which he descried.

That we were going to attack no Power bordering on France, or with which France was in alliance; nor to engage in any long and desperate warfare which was almost certain to extend throughout the world: that we were going, in the name of a Sovereign whom we had engaged to assist, to summon a man, great and powerful, and possessing, doubtless, considerable abilities, but a man born a subject, and even in a low situation of life, to consent to be a prince with Egypt for his province, and St. Jean d'Acre for its defence: that this man had no connexion with France, which, on the contrary, had declared for the Sovereign in question, and had only refused to join in furnishing those means of coercion which were to be employed: that the theatre of dispute was remote from France, and from what might be considered especially French interests: and that so far from the struggle seeming likely to be long, and thereby involving distant considerations, it appeared almost certain, if we viewed the relative strength of the two parties, to be speedily terminated. Consequently, I could hardly see how any grave consequences were likely to result: that I admitted the feeling of irritation which seemed to be produced in France, to be in itself a great calamity; but that I hoped that that also would disappear when it was calmly considered that there had been many occasions on which France and England had hitherto differed, but that England had never allowed such differences to interfere with her general relations of friendship. "What!" said M. Thiers, "I defy you to name one." "That," I said, "is not difficult; for instance, Buenos Ayres. Your blockade there has been very detrimental to our interests, has excited a great

feeling in our country; but we have considered it always as an isolated fact, and have not made it the centre from which every other feeling was to part."

"We had a right to blockade Buenos Ayres," said M. Thiers; "Granted," I replied: "so have we to blockade Syria; but I speak of a fact at variance with our interests; and besides, while you formerly declared yourselves the partisans of the Sultan, we never declared ourselves the enemies of Rosas; so that our case would be stronger than yours. Then there was Spain; now all the eyes of Europe were at one moment fixed on Spain; it was the theatre to which Cabinets brought their policy in order to display the principles which guided them. Here France differed from England; you lamented it, I know; but still there was a great and marked difference on Spanish affairs; yet we did not consider our alliance broken in consequence thereof, nor was it so." "Certainly," said M. Thiers, "I thought the French Government wrong with respect to Spain; but, after all, you had nothing to complain of on that subject, since you had already refused to interfere when we would have consented to it." This, I said, only proved that there had been constant differences on particular subjects, without such differences interfering with our general friendly relations.

He said that he always wished to give facts their due weight, but that public opinion was likely to be deeply excited; that the Government of France must satisfy the people that in its isolated position it was still strong enough to protect the honour and interests of the country; that, consequently, measures of that kind (meaning armaments, I presume,) would be necessary. That they were inevitable, and never without danger; but that it was impossible to foresee what might happen, and therefore useless to speculate upon it.

I said, there was one short road to a conclusion of this whole affair, namely, the acceptance by Mehemet Ali of the conditions that would be proposed to him. This would make all things easy, and be, since what was past was irremediable, the best solution of present difficulties. He said, he wished, for his part, that Mehemet Ali would accept such conditions; but that there was no chance of it; that it was true his (M. Thiers') accounts from Syria might be more favourable to the Pasha than the truth, or that our accounts might be less so; it was impossible to say which; but that his own opinion was, that Mehemet Ali would triumph over the insurgents, and would not submit to the propositions intended to be made to him; that he hoped, however, he would not cross the Taurus, as, if he did, affairs would indeed wear a serious aspect.

I have thought your Lordship would be desirous to know all that takes place at this moment, and have, therefore, though at some length, endeavoured to give the substance of this conversation as accurately as possible.

No. 34.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received July* 30.)

My Lord, *Paris, July* 27, 1840.

I HAVE reason to believe that the Egyptian Convoy, having landed its troops, quitted the Syrian coast on the 4th, and that Captain Napier arrived there on the 7th.

The forces of Mehemet Ali, collected round the district of Mount Lebanon, are said to be between 20,000 and 30,000 men.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 35.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received July* 30.)

(Extract.) *Paris, July* 27, 1840.

THE state of public feeling in this capital is one of considerable agitation, the more so, as the facts of the case are perverted; and it is generally believed, or made to appear, that the Four Great Powers signed a Treaty against France, which revives the bitter recollections of 1814—1815.

The Government has canvassed a variety of plans for taking what would be considered an imposing attitude, and at one time had the idea, which I understand is now abandoned, of drawing up and promulgating a kind of Programme, declaring under what circumstance France would consider it necessary to have recourse to arms. I believe, moreover, that M. Thiers has held rather strong language, as to what it might become his duty to advise; and has talked in certain cases of resigning, unless his wishes were complied with. His organs of the press have also adopted the most decided tone, demanded an increase of the naval and military force, and that orders should be given to Admiral Lalande to return, or to act. The *Constitutionnel* of this morning says, " L'assistance de la France dans aucun cas ne peut manquer au Vice-Roi." [The assistance of France can in no case fail the Viceroy.]

It is possible that a great deal of the existing excitement is of a mere temporary nature, and founded upon an erroneous supposition of facts; and that also some attempt may be made to create alarm both in Austria and England. It is certain, however, that considerable armaments will take place; and will be consented to as a dangerous, but necessary, means of preserving peace, by satisfying the people with the dignity and security of their position. It is certain also, that the Government, foiled in its recent system of policy, will seek, by some course pleasing to the national vanity, to regain the credit it has lost; and in the mean time, as the Cabinet imagines that the Four Powers have been very much induced to adopt their present decisive measures from the assurances frequently given, that France would not interfere with them, a different language will, in all probability, be held, and threats, if only indistinctly, made, as to the course which events might induce this Government to pursue.

My idea of the real state of things is this:—That the armaments once made, the Government will rest the quiet spectator of events, giving all the encouragement that it can give, without open assistance, to the Pasha. If he does not yield (and France will not counsel him to yield) to our remonstrances, and our efforts against his power in Syria fail, then the French Government will come forward and offer its assistance for settling the Eastern Question.

Should Mehemet Ali, on the contrary, seem likely to be overcome without aid, but capable of being maintained with it, and there is time, this fact being ascertained, to afford such aid, in that case, as Mehemet's defeat and fall would be the fall of the present Cabinet, they would probably tender their resignations, or require the King to sanction active co-operation in the Pasha's favour.

Much will depend upon disabusing the public mind as to the real nature of the recent Convention, and of the acts which preceded it; and I am convinced that if the Memorandum, as it now stands, were published, more especially with the papers necessary for its explanation, it would have a most salutary effect. To the Ministry it may be the same thing whether the Convention is against France, or against Mehemet Ali: but to the country the difference is immense; and it would be most important, were it possible, to show that we are not entering into a confederacy for the purpose of humbling the French, but that the French have desisted from entering into a Convention which they were pressed to enter into, merely because they thought that the object it had in view would not be effected by it.

Could this be clearly known, much discontent doubtless would still prevail; but a great part of the present excitement would subside, and without that

excitement the various interests connected with the maintenance of tranquillity, would make themselves heard, and put a check upon the desires of the more warlike and reckless portion of the community.

No. 36.

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 31, 1840.

YOUR despatches to the 27th instant, have been received and laid before the Queen.

Her Majesty's Government highly approve of the language which you have held in your conversation with M. Thiers, as reported in your despatch of the 27th instant.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 37.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 31.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 8, 1840.

I INCLOSE copies of the communications made by the Austrian Consul-General at Alexandria to the Internuncio, and which his Excellency has been so good as to permit me to make use of.

From other intelligence as well as the above-mentioned, it is evident that the situation of Mehemet Ali is full of peril. The French, with perfect knowledge of all the facts contained in the inclosed papers, urged the Ottoman Ministers, on the 4th instant, to make an arrangement with Mehemet Ali, without the concurrence of Her Majesty's Government, &c.

I will not, by this occasion, report the arguments made use of by the French. I will send a messenger in three or four days.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 37.

M. de Laurin to the Baron de Stürmer.

Alexandrie, le 18 *Juin,* 1840.

LA détermination de Méhémet Ali de restituer la flotte Ottomane, est attribuée par lui-même exclusivement à l'éloignement de Hosreff Pacha, et beaucoup de gens semblent y ajouter foi. Mais tout fait croire au contraire qu'il faut en chercher le vrai motif dans les inquiétudes que lui donnent les troubles de la Syrie; le besoin qu'il a de faire sa paix avec le Sultan; la gêne que lui fait éprouver le séjour prolongé de cette flotte à Alexandrie; et les charges qu'elle lui impose.

Il est remarquable que, malgré cette détermination, les vaisseaux Ottomans

qui ne font pas partie de l'expédition de la Syrie continuent jusqu'à ce moment à rester à l'ancre, et qu'on ne fait rien pour les mettre en état de retourner à Constantinople ; agrès, artillerie, munitions, biscuits, &c., tout est dans les magasins du Pacha, et a besoin d'être réparé ou complété pour pouvoir être employé.

Les rapports sur l'état de la Syrie font frémir. L'Emir Béchir demande qu'on vienne au secours d'un peuple accablé par les impôts, la corvée, les fournitures en nature et en numéraire ; mais cette demande est taxée de faiblesse, et, au lieu d'y satisfaire, on répand dans le pays des Albanais et des Bédouins, qui coupent les arbres fruitiers ; qui détruisent les établissemens où se cultivent les vers à soie ; qui mettent le feu aux moissons ; et qui enlèvent d'une manière brutale tous ceux qui sont en état de porter les armes. Ce serait s'exposer à être taxé d'exageration que de citer une à une les scènes atroces de ce genre qui ne cessant de se commettre. Les vastes plaines de la Cœlo-Syrie, les vallons de Bekaa, et d'Esdralon, sont depuis longtems sans bras pour les cultiver; hommes et bestiaux ont disparu, et les fermes sont désertes. On venait maintenant de menacer du même sort les habitations paisables des Maronites. On leur demanda des arrérages dont on leur avait fait don et qui avait été rayés des registres des receveurs ; et lorsque au lieu d'argent les malheureux habitans essayèrent de faire valoir leurs droits, on voulut qu'ils livrassent leurs armes. Il s'en suivit alors de la part des Maroniies, une résistance opiniâtre, et de la part du Government cette dureté qu'il est habitué à employer en pareil cas. Tel a été l'origine de la révolte des Maronites.

Des lettres de commerce arrivées hier par " le Nil," donnent sur les progrès de cette révolte des nouvelles évidemment exagérées. D'après elles, toutes les peuplades des montagnes depuis Gaza jusqu'à Alep, seraient en insurrection ; Beyrout et Tripoli occupés par les insurgés ; et Solyman Pacha serait tombé entre leurs mains. Un voyageur Anglais qui connait Méhémet Ali d'ancienne date, lui écrit de Der-el-Kamar, que les choses sont venues si loin qu'on ne pouvait plus songer à appaiser la révolte les armes à la main.

Méhémet Ali dément de la manière la plus formelle tous ces bruits. Selon lui, les Maronites seraient seuls en insurrection, et ne posséderaient que 4,000 fusils ; les Drouses et Naplousiens seraient prêts à marcher contre eux ; et Solyman Pacha se trouverait avec cinq régimens d'Infanterie et un régiment de Cavalerie entre Saïda et Beyrout. Néanmoins, Méhémet Ali ne permet à personne de communiquer avec la frégate à vapeur " le Nil," afin que ceux qui sont arrivés hier sur ce bâtiment ne puissent donner des lumières sur le véritable état de choses en Syrie ; et les mesures les plus rigoureuses sont mises à exécution pour attaquer les insurgés.

Si l'insurrection est réellement aussi insignifiante que Méhémet Ali le dit, les moyens pour l'étouffer sont exagérés ; car à quoi bon envoyer quinze frégates et deux vaisseaux de ligne avec environ 12,000 hommes de troupes de débarquement, pour réprimer un simple échauffourée. Mais si la ligue appelé " l'Accord de la Montagne," s'est effectuée réellement, ces forces mêmes ne suffiront pas pour mettre de sitôt un terme à cet état de choses. Voilà ce que Méhémet Ali voit clairement, et voilà pourquoi il cherche à appaiser la haine des Maronites par l'entremise de l'Emir Béchir, en faisant répandre en même tems par ses espions, qu'il s'est réconcilié avec le Sultan ; et pendant que sés généraux marchent sur eux de Saïda et de Lattakié, il leur montre au pied du Liban une force réglée et prête à entrer en lice, comme ils n'en ont jamais vue encore des sommets de leurs montagnes. En attendant, il cherche à maintenir en bonne humeur l'escadre Ottomane qui est restée en Egypte, en lui annonçant qu'il est prêt à la laisser retourner dans le Bosphore sans condition, d'après le bon plaisir du Sultan.

Deux vaisseaux de ligne, quatre frégates, et une corvette, ont quitté ce matin le port d'Alexandrie ; les autres suivront demain.

Les troupes Constantinopolitaines ont dû prendre le costume Egyptien, et changer leurs armes contre des armes Egyptiennes. Vingt mille charges de canons ont été embarquées sur chaque bâtiment.

(Translation.)

M. de Laurin to the Baron de Stürmer.

Alexandria, June 18, 1840.

THE determination of Mehemet Ali to restore the Ottoman fleet, is attributed by himself exclusively to the removal of Hosrew Pasha; and many people seem to believe it. But every thing tends, on the contrary, to the belief that the real motive for it must be sought in the uneasiness which the troubles in Syria occasion to him; the necessity under which he finds himself of making his peace with the Sultan; the annoyance which the prolonged stay of that fleet in Alexandria inflicts upon him; and the expence which it entails upon him.

It is remarkable that, notwithstanding this determination, the Ottoman vessels, which do not form a part of the expedition to Syria, continue up to this time at anchor, and nothing is done to place them in a state to return to Constantinople; rigging, guns, stores, biscuit, &c., every thing is in the Pasha's storehouses, and must be repaired or completed in order to be made use of.

The reports on the state of Syria are terrible. The Emir Bechir requires assistance for a people oppressed by taxes, forced labour, contributions in kind and in money; but this requisition is attributed to weakness; and instead of complying with it, they disperse throughout the country Albanians and Bedouins, who cut down the fruit trees; destroy the establishments where the silk worms are cultivated; set fire to the crops; and carry off in a brutal manner all those who are capable of bearing arms. A detailed account of the atrocious scenes of this kind, which are committed without ceasing, would be open to an imputation of being exaggerated. The vast plains of Cœlo-Syria, the valleys of Peka and of Esdralon, are for a long time without hands to cultivate them; men and beasts have disappeared, and the farms are deserted. They had just threatened, with the same fate, the peaceable dwellings of the Maronites. They required of them the arrears of which they had made them a present, and which had been erased from the registers of the receivers; and when, instead of giving money, the unfortunate inhabitants attempted to plead their rights, they desired that they should deliver up their arms. The consequence was, an obstinate resistance on the part of the Maronites, and on the part of the Government that harshness which it is wont to employ in a like case. Such was the origin of the revolt of the Maronites.

Commercial letters which arrived yesterday by the "Nile," give accounts respecting the progress of this revolt, which are evidently exaggerated. According to them, the mountain tribes from Gaza to Aleppo were all in insurrection; Beyrout and Tripoli occupied by the insurgents; and Solyman Pasha fallen into their hands. An English traveller, who knows Mehemet Ali for a length of time, writes to him from Der-el Kamar, that matters have proceeded so far that it is impossible to think of pacifying the revolt by force.

Mehemet Ali contradicts all these reports in the most formal manner. According to him the Maronites alone are in insurrection, and do not possess more than 4,000 muskets; the Druses and Naplousians are ready to march against them; and Solyman Pasha is between Saida and Beyrout with five regiments of infantry and one regiment of cavalry. Nevertheless, Mehemet Ali does not allow any one to communicate with the steam frigate the "Nile," in order that those who arrived yesterday on board that vessel may give no information as to the true state of affairs in Syria; and the most rigorous measures are put in execution, in order to attack the insurgents.

If the insurrection is really as insignificant as Mehemet Ali says, the means to quell it are excessive; for what is the good of sending fifteen frigates and two ships of the line with about 12,000 troops, in order to check a mere tumult? But if the League, called "the Union of the Mountain," be really formed, even these forces will not suffice speedily to put an end to this state of things. This is what Mehemet Ali clearly sees, and hence it is that he seeks to propitiate the animosity of the Maronites by the intervention of the Emir Bechir, spreading abroad at the same time, by means of his spies, that he is reconciled with the Sultan; and whilst his generals march upon them from Saida and Latakia, he displays before them, at the foot of the Lebanon, a regular force ready to fight, such as

they have never yet seen from the tops of their mountains. Meanwhile, he seeks to keep the Ottoman squadron, which has remained in Egypt, in good humour, by declaring to it that he is ready to allow it to return to the Bosphorus unconditionally, according to the good pleasure of the Sultan.

Two ships of the line, four frigates, and one corvette, left the port of Alexandria this morning: the others will follow to-morrow.

The troops from Constantinople have been under the necessity of assuming the Egyptian dress, and of exchanging their arms for those of Egypt. Twenty thousand rounds of gun ammunition have been embarked on board each vessel.

Inclosure 2 in No. 37.

M. de Laurin to the Baron de Stürmer.

(Extract.) *Alexandrie, le* 23 *Juin,* 1840.

ME référant au rapport que j'ai eu l'honneur d'adresser à votre Excellence, le 6 Octobre dernier, sur les démarches faites par le Gouvernement Anglais pour obtenir de Méhémet Ali l'évacuation de la province du Yémen, je me vois aujourd'hui dans le cas de vous soumettre ci-jointe la traduction d'une lettre de M. Issa, notre Agent à Khéné, dont il plaira à votre Excellence d'apprendre que la dite évacuation vient d'être effectuée.

(Translation.)

M. de Laurin to the Baron de Stürmer.

(Extract.) *Alexandria, June* 23, 1840.

REFERRING to the report which I had the honour to address to your Excellency on the 6th of last October, upon the steps taken by the English Government to obtain from Mehemet Ali the evacuation of the Province of the Yemen, I am now enabled to lay before you the annexed translation of a letter from M. Issa, our agent at Khéné, from which your Excellency will be pleased to learn that the said evacuation has been effected.

Inclosure 3 in No. 37.

The Austrian Agent at Khené to M. de Laurin.

(Traduzione.)

OGGI ho ricevuto lettera dal Agente Francese in Kosseir, Signor Elias, in data 10 corriente, (9 Giugno,) colla quale mi fa' conoscere che tutti i soldati i quali si trovavano nel Yemen sono arrivati in Geddà colle loro armi e bagaglio, e non hanno lasciato nel Yemen altro che Ibraïm Pasciá, che si aspettava fra giorni ni Gedda.

Ahmed Pasciá e arrivato dall' Assir in Mecca, e fece subito chiamare a sé il Scerif Ben Ou, che si trovava in Jambo.

Al suo arrivo in Mecca, Ahmed Pasciá avendo trovato diversi bastimenti carichi partiti, e che partivano per Suez, spedi ordini colla posta onde detti bastimenti con truppe si trattenghino a Jambo sino a nuovi ordini per indi proseguire per Suez o trattinersi in Gedda.

Simili ordini furono emanati anche alle barche che si trovavano a Gedda.

(Translation.)

TO-DAY I received a letter from the French agent at Kosseir, dated 10th instant, (June,) informing me that all the troops who were in the Yemen have arrived at Gedda with their arms and baggage. Ibrahim Pasha alone remained there, and he was expected to arrive at Gedda some days ago.

Ahmed Pasha has arrived at Mecca from Assir, and immediately sent for the Sheriff Ben Ou, who was at Yambo.

On Ahmed Pasha's arrival at Mecca, a number of ships under cargo had already left, and several were under weigh for Suez; and he sent orders down by the post, for the said ships with troops to be detained at Yambo until further orders for continuing on their voyage to Suez, or waiting at Gedda.

Similar orders had been sent with regard to the boats at Gedda.

Inclosure 4 in No. 37.

M. de Laurin to the Baron de Stürmer.

Monsieur le Baron, *Alexandrie, le 26 Juin,* 1840.

MES rapports du 9, 15, et 18 du courant, par lesquels j'ai eu l'honneur de vous soumettre tous les renseignemens que j'ai pu me procurer sur l'expédition que Méhémet Ali organise pour soumettre les insurgés du Mont Liban, doivent avoir mis votre Excellence à même d'en juger le but et l'étendue.

Je dois ajouter, que depuis le 20 du courant, cette expédition a été accrue de plusieurs vaisseaux et frégates Egyptiens et Ottomans. Les troupes d'embarcation ont reçu également un surcroit de presque 5,000 hommes.

De sorte qu'il y a désormais, 2 vaisseaux Egyptiens, 5 frégates ditto, 2 corvettes ditto, 3 bricks ditto, 11 frégates Ottomanes, 1 corvette ditto, 7 transports, qui sont sortis; 3 vaisseaux Egyptiens apparcillent en ce moment-ci, et mettront immédiatement à la voile avec 3,000 Arnauts qu'on leur a placés à bord hier soir.

Méhémet Ali prétend que la révolte en question a été encouragée par quelques étrangers; que les Consuls de Beyrout y ont pris part; et que des négocians Anglais ont fourni des armes et des munitions aux insurgés. En conséquence, le 21 du courant, il s'est adressé à moi et à mes collègues de France, d'Angleterre, et de Sardaigne, pour nous engager à ordonner à nos Consuls de Beyrout, Saïda, Tripoli, et Damas, de défendre à leurs administrés tout commerce avec les insurgés, et de suspendre toutes relations avec eux, jusqu'à la pacification des contrées révoltées. Hosreff Effendi, son Interprète, qui avait été chargé de nous en parler, ajoutait qu'une proclamation de la part de Son Altesse serait faite par Abbas Pacha, commandant l'expédition, à son arrivée au lieu de destination.

Ayant écrit aux Chefs des Consulats Impériaux susdits, de régler leur conduite d'après le sens de la proclamation, je me crus en droit d'en demander connaissance. Hosreff Effendi me dit qu'une traduction me serait envoyée. Mais voyant passer trois jours sans que cette pièce me soit parvenue, je me rendis moi-même au Palais avant-hier vers dix heures du matin pour la reclamer. Méhémet Ali me dit qu'il n'y aura point de proclamation; qu'ayant déjà sommé les insurgés par les agens de l'Emir Béchir et par le Patriarche de Damas, il n'est pas de sa dignité de parlementer avec eux, et de leur faire des propositions; qu'Abbas Pacha commencera les hostilités aussitôt qu'il aura débarqué ses troupes; que Solyman Pacha marchera sur eux avec deux régimens par les défilés qui de Saïda conduisent à Der-el-Kamar; Osman Pacha et Hamza Bey avec cinq régimens détachés de l'armée d'Ibrahim Pacha, de Balbec, par les montagnes de Gebl-Ainate et Zahlé; et Abbas Pacha, avec les 15,000 hommes composant l'expédition mise sous ses ordres, attaquera les positions sur les pentes des montagnes qui aboutissent à Saïda, Beyrout, et Tripoli. Les opérations de ces trois divisions ont pour but Der-el-Kamar, chef lieu des Maronites, situé tout près de Bet-el-dyn, résidence de l'Emir Béchir.

Méhémet Ali suppose que les insurgés, cernés ainsi de toute part, ne pour-

ront pas échapper à leur sort. Les Drouses et les Naplousiens étant leurs ennemis naturels, ils ne demandent pas mieux que de reprendre sur eux l'ancienne supériorité dont lui (Méhémet Ali) les avait affranchis dernièrement, en leur donnant des armes, au grand étonnement des Drouses et des Musulmans, qui ne voulaient jamais accepter cette émancipation que comme une violation de leurs droits bien fondés.

Ce langage me fit entrevoir tout le danger que courent les Chrétiens du Mont Liban; un décret d'extermination totale de cette nation patriarcale ne pourrait être conçu dans des termes plus précis. J'en ai été profondément ému, et ne pouvais pas m'empêcher d'articuler quelques mots d'intercession pour nos co-religionaires, d'autant plus que c'est la première fois qu'ils se trouvent en opposition avec le Gouvernement; qu'ils n'ont rien fait qui mérite une mesure si sévère; qu'ils pourraient bien être séduits par les mal-intentionnés; qu'il ne faut pas confondre le coupable avec l'innocent; que d'après ce que dit Son Altesse elle-même, le nombre des insurgés n'est que de 2,000 à 3,000, tandis que les Maronites, industrieux et paisibles, forment une population de 180,000 âmes; que ce serait contre l'usage de la guerre que d'assaillir toutes les demeures dont sont remplies les collines du Mont Liban, sans sommer au préalable les habitans à se soumettre au Gouvernement; que voyant déployées tant de forces contr'eux, ils n'hésiteront point de rendre les armes qu'ils ont refusées après une première et simple demande; et que, après tout cela, ce ne devrait être que les mutins que la rigueur des loix de guerre pourrait atteindre.

A toutes ces observations le Pacha me répondit comme suit:—"Un malentendu est la cause de cette insurrection. Formant le Rétif en Egypte, j'avais," dit-il, "besoin des armes qui ont été déposées à St. Jean d'Acre. J'en écrivis à mon fils, et celui-ci, se souvenant que j'avais envoyé, il y a un an, quelques milliers d'armes à feu, dérivant des dépôts de St. Jean d'Acre, aux Maronites, crut devoir les leur redemander. C'est donc une erreur; mon intention n'était pas de désarmer les Chrétiens; mais ils n'ont pas voulu écouter les explications de mes Envoyés et de l'Emir Béchir; c'est leur faute. Maintenant ils menacent les villes; ils écrivent partout des lettres pour se faire un parti plus fort. Mais je ne les crains pas; ils auront bientôt motif de se repentir de leur orgueil et de leur ingratitude."

"D'après tout cela," lui disai-je, "il serait à désirer que votre Altesse usa de la clémence; comme Chrétien, j'ose l'en supplier; je suis sûr que mes collègues ne manqueront pas de vous adresser la même prière. Il parait que ce ne sont que des égarés et en petit nombre; il n'y a pas eu d'excès; les soldats tombés en leur pouvoir ont été désarmés et renvoyés sans qu'aucun mal leur arriva; peut-être les intentions de votre Altesse ne leur ont pas été clairement exposées. Je sais qu'ils supposaient qu'il s'agissait de leur imposer de nouveaux impôts, et de faire une levée d'hommes; et que, forts des promesses faites à Hasbeyé, ils ont cru devoir repousser ces prétentions comme contraires à ce pacte."

"Non, non," répondit-il, "les Maronites n'ont pas été compris dans cet arrangement—il regardait ceux du Haouran—et nommément, les habitans du Ledja."

"Mais votre Altesse a de fait traité les Maronites sur le même pied que les Ledjois; et elle s'en louait beaucoup il n'y a pas longtems; et j'espère que deux mots paternels, prononcés avant le commencement des hostilités, au nom de votre Altesse, suffiront pour les désarmer et les faire rentrer dans leur devoir, J'espère même que le grand nombre de troupes que votre Altesse réunit à présent autour du Liban a plus pour but d'imposer aux insurgés que de les écraser."

"Non," dit-il, "j'ai dit à Abbas Pacha de faire ce qui sera convenable avec les premiers villages qu'il trouvera sur son chemin; et que si les habitans des autres lui viennent au-devant, il doit leur pardonner."

J'ai été très-content de ces derniers mots; je crus avoir obtenu un peu de ce que je voulais,—de la modération,—et je m'en congédiais. Alors il me dit que, "cette expédition fera beaucoup de bruit en Europe, que chacun l'interprètera à sa manière, mais moi je me soucie fort peu de ce qu'on en dira. Je suis accoutumé de faire mes affaires selon mes inspirations, et j'y ai trouvé toujours mon compte. J'ai vécu ainsi, et ainsi je mourrai; on me pardonnera cela si l'on voudra."

L'Interprète ne m'a pas rendu cette dernière phrase, mais M. Babich, notre

premier interprète, quoiqu'un peu éloigné du coin dans lequel j'étais tout seul avec Méhémet Ali, m'assure qu'ils ont été dits par Son Altesse, quoique sans la vivacité avec laquelle il lance ordinairement de pareils propos.

Quoiqu'il en soit, je sais bien que Méhémet Ali n'osera pas braver l'opinion de la Chrétienté. L'extermination des Maronites mettrait ses amis d'Europe dans une fausse position ; ils ne sauraient soutenir sa cause plus longtems, et il en a un grand besoin, quoiqu'il feigne le contraire. Il a trop de bon sens pour ne pas sentir ces vérités. J'ose donc espérer que les mesures de coërcition ne seront pas aussi brutalement mises à exécution qu'elles ont été conçues. Ce qui affaiblit un peu mes espérances, c'est l'homme qui est chargé du commandement de cette expédition ; c'est Abbas Pacha, ennemi des Chrétiens, dont le caractère féroce, inexorable, est un mauvais présage de ce qui doit arriver dans la suite.

Il vient de s'embarquer à bord du bateau à vapeur " le Nil," avec neuf chefs Albanais, et partira à l'instant pour sa destination. Les 3,200 soldats de la même race ont été placés à bord de deux vaisseaux Egyptiens et d'une frégate Ottomane.

On suppose que le tout sera réuni à Beyrout et Tripoli vers le 30 du courant, et que le débarquement n'aura pas lieu avant le 3 Juillet prochain.

A présent, l'Egypte est entièrement dégarnie de troupes régulières. Il n'y a qu'un régiment de Cavalerie et quelques canons qui soient disponibles. Les trois régimens du Rétif du Caire et de Rosette, qui ont été embarqués pour la Syrie, ne présentaient qu'un effectif de 2,700 hommes, et encore c'étaient des semi-invalides, pères de famille, artistes, marchands, &c.

Méhémet Ali fait par cette expédition bien plus preuve de son aveugle confiance en sa fortune que de sa prévoyance et élévation. Un ennemi hardi n'aurait qu'à faire une apparition, soit ici, soit sur les côtes de la Syrie, et l'œuvre de sa vie s'écroulerait sous ses yeux. L'opinion est, à l'exception des Européens à sa solde, généralement reçue, que dans un tel cas la Syrie se souleverait comme un homme, et que l'Egypte ne pourrait fournir ni hommes ni argent pour éloigner un désastre de l'Armée d'Ibrahim.

Il y a une opinion qui mérite d'être mentionnée dans ce rapport, c'est que Méhémet Ali pourrait imaginer d'imposer par cet étalage de ses forces aux Puissances Chrétiennes, faisant voir qu'après tout ce qu'on a dit de l'épuisement de ses ressources, il a pû envoyer d'ici 15,000 hommes pour la Syrie.

Les deux régimens du Rétif d'Alexandrie ont prêté avant-hier serment de fidélité à Méhémet Ali, selon un vieux cérémonial. Ils auraient dû être de 7,000 hommes ; à la revue qui a eu lieu à la dite occasion, ils n'ont présenté qu'un effectif de 3,000 hommes tout au plus.

Agréez, &c.,
(Signé) A. LAURIN.

(Translation.)

M. de Laurin to the Baron de Stürmer.

M. le Baron, *Alexandria, June* 26, 1840.

MY reports of the 9th, 15th, and 18th instant, by which I have had the honour to lay before you all the information which I have been able to obtain as to the expedition which Mehemet Ali is organizing for the reduction of the insurgents of Mount Lebanon, will have enabled your Excellency to judge of its object and extent.

I must add that since the 20th instant, that expedition has been augmented by several Turkish and Egyptian ships of the line and frigates. The troops embarked have also been increased by nearly 5,000 men.

So that two Egyptian ships of the line, five frigates, two corvettes, three brigs, eleven Turkish frigates, one corvette, seven transports, are already gone out ; three Egyptian ships of the line are now getting under weigh, and will sail immediately with 3,000 Albanians who were embarked yesterday evening.

Mehemet Ali pretends that the revolt in question has been encouraged by some foreigners ; that the Consuls at Beyrout have taken part in it ; and that English merchants have supplied arms and ammunition to the insurgents.

Accordingly, on the 21st instant, he applied to me and to my colleagues of France, England, and Sardinia, to induceus to order our Consuls at Beyrout, Saida, Tripoli, and Damascus, to forbid the persons under their authority from trading with the insurgents, and to suspend all intercourse with them until the pacification of the revolted countries. Hosrew Effendi, his interpreter, who had been commissioned to speak to us on this subject, added that a proclamation would be issued on the part of His Highness by Abbas Pasha, the commander of the expedition, on his arrival at the place of destination.

Having written to the Chiefs of the aforesaid Imperial Consulates, to regulate their conduct in conformity with the Proclamation, I thought myself entitled to demand to be made acquainted with it. Hosrew Effendi told me that a translation should be sent to me. But seeing three days elapse without this document reaching me, I went myself to the Palace the day before yesterday, about ten o'clock in the morning, to demand it. Mehemet Ali told me that there will be no proclamation; that having already summoned the insurgents by the Agent of the Emir Bechir and by the Patriarch of Damascus, it is inconsistent with his dignity to parley with them, and to make proposals to them: that Abbas Pasha will commence hostilities as soon as he shall have disembarked his troops; that Solyman Pasha with two regiments will march upon them by the defiles which lead from Saida to Der-el-Kamar; Osman Pasha and Hamza Bey with five regiments detached from the army of Ibrahim Pasha, from Balbeck, by the mountains of Gebl-Ainate and Zahlé; and Abbas Pasha, with 15,000 men composing the expedition placed under his orders, will attack the positions on the slopes of the mountains coming down upon Saida, Beyrout, and Tripoli. The object of these three operations is Der-El-Kamar, the chief place of the Maronites, situated close to Bet-el-dyn, the residence of the Emir Bechir.

Mehemet Ali imagines that the insurgents, thus surrounded on all sides, will not be able to escape their fate. The Druses and Naplousians being their natural enemies, require nothing better than to resume the ancient superiority over them, from which he (Mehemet Ali) had recently enfranchised them, by giving them arms, to the great astonishment of the Druses and Mussulmans, who were never disposed to consider this emancipation otherwise than as a violation of their well-founded rights.

This language has caused me to perceive all the danger which the Christians of Mount Lebanon incur; a decree for a total extermination of this patriarchal nation could not be couched in more precise terms. I have been deeply affected by it, and I could not prevent myself from uttering some words of intercession for our co-religionists, especially as it is the first time that they are opposed to the Government; as they have done nothing which deserves such severe treatment; as they might very well have been seduced by evil-intentioned persons; as it is not right to confound the guilty with the innocent; as, according to what His Highness himself says, the number of the insurgents is only from 2,000 to 3,000, whilst the Maronites, industrious and peaceable, form a population of 180,000 souls; as it would be contrary to the usages of war to attack all the dwellings with which the hills of Mount Lebanon are covered, without in the first instance summoning the inhabitants to submit themselves to the Government; as they will not hesitate, when they see so great a force arrayed against them, to give up the arms which they have refused to a first and simple demand for them; and as, after all, the mutineers ought alone to be exposed to the rigour of the laws of war.

To all these observations the Pasha replied as follows:—"A misunderstanding is the cause of this insurrection. On forming the militia in Egypt, I had," he said, "occasion for the arms which have been deposited in St. Jean d'Acre. I wrote about them to my son, and he, recollecting that a year ago I had sent some thousand muskets, drawn from the stores of St. Jean d'Acre, to the Maronites, thought fit to demand them back again. It is therefore a mistake; my intention was not to disarm the Christians; but they have not chosen to listen to the explanations of my Envoys and of the Emir Bechir: it is their fault. At present they threaten the towns; they write letters in all directions to make for themselves a stronger party. But I do not fear them; they will soon have reason to repent of their pride and of their ingratitude."

"According to all this," I said to him, "it would be desirable that Your Highness should employ clemency; as a Christian I venture to request it of you; I am sure that my colleagues will not fail to address to you the same

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entreaty. It appears that they are only mistaken men, and in small number; there have been no excesses; the soldiers who have fallen into their power have been disarmed and dismissed without any harm happening to them; perhaps Your Highness's intentions have not been clearly explained to them. I know that they imagined that there was a question of laying fresh taxes upon them, and of raising men; and that, relying on the promises made at Hasbeya, they have considered it their duty to repel those pretensions, as being contrary to that agreement."

"No, no," replied he, "the Maronites were not comprized in that arrangement, it concerned those of the Haouran, and specifically the inhabitants of the Ledgea."

"But Your Highness has in fact treated the Maronites on the same footing with the Ledgeans; and you plumed yourself much, a short time ago, on having done so; and I hope that two paternal words, uttered before the commencement of hostilities, will suffice to disarm them, and to cause them to return to their duty. I hope even that the great number of troops whom Your Highness is at present collecting round the Lebanon, is designed rather to awe the insurgents, than to crush them."

"No," said he, "I have told Abbas Pasha to do what shall be fitting with the first villages which he shall find on his road; and if the inhabitants of the others come out to meet him, he will pardon them."

I was very well satisfied with these last words; I conceived that I had obtained a portion of what I wished,—of moderation,—and I took my leave of him. Thereupon he said to me, "that this expedition will make a great noise in Europe; that every one will interpret it after his own fashion, but as for me I care very little what shall be said of it. I am accustomed to transact my own business according to my own notions, and I have always found my advantage in doing so. Thus have I lived, and thus will I die; they will forgive my acting so if they will."

The interpreter did not translate to me this last expression, but M. Babich, our first interpreter, although at a little distance from the corner in which I was alone with Mehemet Ali, assures me that they were spoken by His Highness, although without the quickness with which he ordinarily throws out such observations.

Be that as it may, I am well aware that Mehemet Ali will not dare to brave the opinion of Christendom. The extermination of the Maronites would place his friends in Europe in a false position; they could no longer maintain his cause, and he has great need of them, although he pretends the contrary. He has too much good sense not to be aware of these truths. I venture therefore to hope that these measures of coercion will not be executed in as brutal a manner as they have been devised. What a little weakens my hopes, is the man who is entrusted with the command of this expedition; it is Abbas Pasha, an enemy of the Christians, whose savage, inexorable character, is a bad augury for what will ultimately happen.

He has just embarked on board the steam-vessel, the "Nile," with nine Albanian Chieftains, and he will immediately set out for his destination. The 3,200 soldiers of the same race have been embarked on board two Egyptian ships of the line, and one Turkish frigate.

It is supposed that the whole will be assembled at Beyrout and Tripoli about the 30th instant, and that the disembarkation will not take place before the 3rd of July next.

At present Egypt is entirely denuded of regular troops. There are only one regiment of cavalry and some guns available. The three regiments of the militia of Cairo and Rosetta, which have been embarked for Syria, consisted only of 2,700 effective men, and some even of those were half-invalids, fathers of families, artisans, merchants, &c.

Mehemet Ali in this expedition evinces much more his blind confidence in his luck, than his foresight and ability. A daring enemy would only have to appear either here, or on the coast of Syria, and the work of his life would crumble away before his eyes. Excepting among the Europeans in his pay, the opinion is generally received, that in such a case Syria would rise as one man, and that Egypt could not supply either men or money to ward off a disaster from the army of Ibrahim.

There is an opinion which deserves to be noticed in this report, that Mehemet

Ali might imagine by this display of his forces that he should impose upon the Christian Powers, by showing that after all that has been said of the exhaustion of his resources, he has been able to send from hence 15,000 men to Syria.

The day before yesterday the two regiments of the militia of Alexandria took the oath of fidelity to Mehemet Ali, according to an ancient ceremonial. They ought to have consisted of 7,000 men: at the review which took place on the abovementioned occasion, they did not comprize at the outside 3,000 effective men.

Receive, &c.,

(Signed) A. LAURIN.

No. 38.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 1.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 12, 1840.

HIS Excellency Rechid Pasha informed me this day that Sami Bey has brought 1,000,000 of Turkish piastres as a present for the new-born daughter of the Sultan; that he also brought letters for the Validé Sultana and for some of the Ministers; and that in these letters Mehemet Ali confined himself to new protestations of fidelity and devotion to the Sultan; that it was only last night Sami Bey, in a conversation at which Ahmed Fethi Pasha was present, said, "Mehemet Ali intends to restore the Ottoman Fleet; but he desires to send it to Constantinople under the command of Ahmed Fevzi Pasha (the late Capudan Pasha) or under Said Bey." To this Rechid Pasha replied, "Ahmed Pasha has been guilty of treason of the deepest dye, and the Sublime Porte will never consent to his return to Constantinople; and as for the restoration of the fleet, it is a natural thing: Mehemet Ali himself has always spoken of restoring it to its legitimate master, and its restitution is considered by the Sublime Porte as a secondary affair."

Sami Bey said that the Ex-Grand Vizier Hosrew had often written to Mehemet Ali to demand the fleet. Rechid answered that it was true, but that it was at first, and when the death of Mahmoud and the affair of Nezib had thrown the Porte into consternation. Rechid then asked, "Where is the fleet?" to which Sami Bey replied that he did not know.

Sami then said, "May there not be means for an arrangement between us, and why does not the Porte give a plan for it?" Rechid said, "The Porte has no arrangement to propose. The Sultan, a few days after he mounted the throne, offered to grant Mehemet Ali the hereditary government of Egypt, and the Porte has nothing to add. If Mehemet Ali has reasonable propositions to make, let him make them; and if we find them acceptable, we will consult the Five Powers thereon, for the Great Powers having offered us their mediation, we accepted it; and we are bound to do nothing without their concurrence and consent. Sami Bey rejoined, that it was the Sublime Porte that had demanded the mediation; and he asked, "How can the Porte fail to see that the Great Powers regard only their own proper interests? how can it be believed that they incur such expense solely for the interest of the Porte?"

Rechid denied that it was solely for the interest of the Porte; and asserted, that the Great Powers acted in support of their own interests, which demanded the preservation of the independence of the Porte, and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire; adding, that the cost the Great Powers now incurred was trifling compared with the immense expence, and the evils they would have to endure, if an European war should break out; and that it was the Five Powers who proposed the mediation, which was acceded to with pleasure by the Porte.

Sami observed that there had also been a question about the restoration of Adana and Candia, which ought to facilitate an arrangement.

Rechid replied, "Adana and Candia are countries where the Arabian language is not spoken, and you insist upon keeping all those countries where that language is spoken, which is to aim at the establishment of an Arab empire; that is chimerical. The Sublime Porte will wait with confidence the solution of the question by the Great Powers." Sami Bey asserted that the Great Powers were far from being agreed on the question.

The same arguments having been repeated again and again by both parties,

Sami Bey said that Mehemet Ali would restore the fleet, but he did not say when.

It is plain that Mehemet Ali has only repeated his old set phrases and promises, which are too glaringly insincere and false to deceive anybody; and it is to be presumed he relies for what success he hopes for, upon the secret practices he may have with those who are imagined to have power over the Sultan's mind. I think he will fail; I do not believe the Sultan will act in opposition to the opinion of his Ministers; and I think they are firm, because I am sure it is their interest to be so.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 39.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 2.)

Therapia, July 14, 1840.

I INCLOSE a letter from Mr. Wood, dated Beyrout, July 3; I also inclose a letter to me from Mr. Consul Moore, of July 3, which I think to be worthy of your perusal.

Yours, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 39.

Mr. Wood to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Harbour of Beyrout, July* 3, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship of our arrival off the port of Beyrout this morning. I have not been able yet to land, or to hold any direct communication with the shore; nevertheless, I see encamped about 15,000 Egyptian troops on the sea-coast, protected by fifteen Egyptian ships-of-war of different sizes. It appears (and the Arabs assure me of it), that the insurgents are in possession of the country in numbers sufficient to deter the Egyptians from attempting any movement against them. The work of destruction is, however, commenced; the houses and the plantations of the peasants about the town are in flames, and the whole plain is enveloped in smoke.

Her Majesty's frigate the "Castor" is at anchor here; but on account of the murder of an attendant of Count Lémont, under British protection, Captain Collier has interdicted all communication with the shore until the murderer, an Egyptian sailor, be brought to trial, and satisfaction obtained. In consequence of another affair, the French Consul has struck his flag, and has placed the French residents under the protection of the Sardinian Consulate.

I hear also that some of the Egyptian men-of-war here belong to the Turkish fleet, and that the commanders of four of them, who attempted to sheer off in their way to this place, were strangled at night, and thrown overboard, the Egyptians being afraid to hang them publicly.

An Egyptian man-of-war is also cruizing off the coast, and a transport is just arrived with troops. Still, it appears that the insurgents are no way intimidated, and are sufficiently strong to keep at bay the whole Egyptian force commanded by Abbas Pasha, a man of no great energy or talents, seconded, it is said, by Solyman Pasha.

Sir John Louis intends sending two ships of the line here; it is not improbable therefore that the Turkish ships of war, that have been forced to co-operate with the Egyptian fleet against the insurgents, may be induced to run under the stern of our ships, and place themselves under their protection. Perhaps the presence

of the Admiral would be the means of preventing the Turkish ships from ever returning to Alexandria again.

I presume that Mr. Consul Moore will transmit to your Lordship in detail, by the same conveyance, every circumstance connected with the insurrection, my arrival only this moment rendering it impossible for me to transmit any accurate information to your Lordship about it. Though I cannot say anything positive with regard to my proceedings, yet I have decided to avoid, if possible, landing at Beyrout, where I should be exposed to receive indignities, and perhaps be prevented quitting the town hereafter under some frivolous pretence or other. I shall therefore beg Captain Collier to receive me on board for a night or two, when I hope to obtain sufficient information to enable me to forward the object of my visit to those parts,—that of acquiring information respecting the insurrection, &c., &c., without exposing my life to no purpose.

Should my two Syrian friends intend taking Cyprus in their way hither, I should advise them to call at the British Consulate, where, perhaps, they may find letters that may be useful to them. Captain Austin proceeds to Alexandria, and will return to take my letters for your Lordship.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) RICHARD WOOD.

P.S.—I understand that the Druses are armed with only sticks and stones, and that the Egyptians will endeavour to come to terms with them, seeing their incompetency to subdue them. It is also said that the Egyptian squadron is preparing to quit this port for Alexandria.

Inclosure 2 in No. 39.

Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Beyrout, July* 3, 1840.

I HAVE barely time to transmit your Lordship to-day by the "Seri Pervas," copy of my despatch to Viscount Palmerston of the 24th ultimo, and to inclose a letter received yesterday from Damascus.

Every day the troops march from the town to support the Albanians in their attacks upon the insurgents close to us, and as regularly come back repulsed.

Beyrout being placed "en état de siège" by Solyman Pasha, it is impossible to obtain any correct accounts for the moment from the insurgent camp.

My post cawass from Damascus, saw at Merge, on the other side of Lebanon, under Osman Pasha's command, about 5,000 men, composed of Infantry, Artillery, and a small body of Cavalry.

We have accounts of two engagements near Zahlé, betwixt the insurgents and Osman Pasha; according to these, in the first, Osman Pasha was defeated; in the second, he claims the advantage; but this news comes through Solyman Pasha.

My post cawass also saw in the insurgent camp five Egyptian deserters, who requested him to take charge of letters for their comrades here; afraid to refuse, he consented, but before he arrived in the town, he threw the letters into the hedge by the road-side.

From Tripoli 100 soldiers, with their chief, lately deserted, and were all well received at the insurgent camp.

M. Bourrée, the French Consul at Beyrout, struck his flag on the 27th ultimo, in consequence of not being able to obtain satisfaction for an attempt at assassination on a French subject the day before.

Two days after, a native in the employ of the Vicomte de Lémont, who was placed at his own special request by the French Consul under British protection, (the rest of the French subjects, from political motives, having been put under that of Sardinia by M. Bourrée), was murdered in open day, near his master's house, by a Turkish sailor (a petty officer).

I immediately demanded of Solyman Pasha the execution of the assassin,

whom I succeeded in arresting by the aid of my cawasses, supported by a body of soldiers given on my demand.

Solyman Pasha admits the justice of my demand for the immediate public execution of the assassin in my presence, but begs me to defer it, on account of the spirit of revolt which exists both in the fleet and Turkish army here.

Time does not admit, my Lord, of my going into the details of this atrocious murder, but my discussions with Solyman Pasha on the subject were of the most serious kind, proceeding to the length of my calling round me four armed cawasses for my personal protection, and that of the Vicomte de Lémont, who claimed it on the murder of his servant.

I was at the time of the discussion in the open square before the Governor's Seraï, and surrounded by more than a thousand troops; and a personal quarrel betwixt Solyman Pasha and M. de Lémont was prevented by my throwing myself betwixt them, and telling his Excellency he must strike his antagonist through my body. The General immediately grew calm upon this, and, to do him justice, aided me to the utmost of his power in arresting the murderer; on this taking place, I obtained Solyman Pasha's word of honour for his execution in my presence the next day.

Abbas Pasha is here with fourteen sail of Turkish and Egyptian ships (one two-decker Turkish, eight frigates Turkish). In all, we have about 13,000 men —Egyptians, Turks, and Albanians—in the town and lazaretto. On their way from Egypt to Beyrout, a part of the crew of the Turkish ship, No. 8, tried to steer for Constantinople, but were overpowered. The men were tried for the attempt by a Council of War, and condemned to death; but owing to the spirit of revolt alluded to, they dare not execute them openly; three were privately drowned two nights ago.

My discussion for the open execution of the murderer of the British-protected still goes on with Solyman Pasha, who conjures me, in the most humble terms, not to press him on this point, and declares that the safety of the Europeans generally depends on my deferring the execution.

Captain Collier, who arrived here yesterday with her Majesty's ship "Castor," supports my demand; but considering the grave reasons alleged by Solyman Pasha, I shall content myself with his written engagement to hold the murderer subject to my demand for instant execution.

Another attempt at assassination by an Albanian on the Dragoman of the Greek Consul has this morning been made; the man is under arrest.

The Emir Bechir still clings to the Viceroy apparently, but his influence seems null.

It is said that three Sheiks, Farri, Francis, and Mahmoud, have made overtures of conciliation, on the promise of an annual pension to each, of 30,000 piastres, and for their partisans the retention of their arms, and exemption from the conscription.

Her Majesty's steam-vessel "Cyclops" has just come in whilst I am writing, but the commander has not yet called.

Houssein Pasha, the commander of the Turkish forces here, is suspected of playing a double game. It is to be remarked that both the assassins are Turks, and both the victims Frenchmen; his design may be suspected to be to embroil Mehemet Ali with France. Add to the above circumstances Houssein Pasha's insolent demeanour to the French Consul when satisfaction was demanded, and the surmise acquires at least probability. Houssein Pasha entered into no examination, but contented himself with insinuating that M. Renaud (the party assaulted) might have inflicted the wounds himself to produce an effect.

I beg leave to inclose the correspondence relative to M. de Lémont's claiming British protection, with copies of my demand to Solyman Pasha.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) N. MOORE.

No. 40.

Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow.—(*Communicated by Baron Brunnow, August* 4.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersbourg, ce* $\frac{13}{25}$ *Juillet,* 1840.

JE ne vous expédierai de courrier, que lorsque j'aurai reçu le vôtre. Je calcule qu'il pourra être ici ce soir ou demain. En attendant, je n'ai pas voulu différer d'un instant à vous faire connaître l'approbation dont Sa Majesté l'Empereur a daigné honorer les derniers actes de votre importante négociation. Je vous adresse donc à ce sujet deux dépêches par la poste du Pyroscaphe. J'ai beaucoup craint, que tandisque vous arrêtiez à Londres avec Lord Palmerston des déterminations si énergiques et si honorables pour l'intervention des Quatre Puissances, un arrangement direct entre la Porte et Méhémet Ali ne vînt à être conclu à Constantinople, et à jeter une nouvelle confusion dans l'affaire. Heureusement il n'en est rien, comme vous le verrez par la dépêche que j'ai reçue cette nuit de Titoff. D'autre part, l'insurrection en Syrie devient tous les jours plus sérieuse. J'ai reçu des dépêches d'Alexandrie, du $\frac{25\text{ Juin}}{7\text{ Juillet}}$, et des rapports intéressans de notre Consul Basily à Beyrout. Dans l'un de ces derniers je trouve le passage ci-joint. Médem pense que cette insurrection prendra un caractère plus sérieux que toutes les précédentes, et s'appuie sur l'opinion de Solyman Pacha, qui a exprimé plus d'une fois la crainte que la Syrie ne soit perdue à jamais pour Méhémet Ali, en disant ouvertement qu'il désirait voir cette belle conquête dans le fond de la mer. Pourvu que maintenant la flotte Anglaise apparaisse bientôt sur les côtes de la Syrie, et nous pourrons nous flatter que notre but sera atteint avec moins de dangers que nous le l'avions d'abord pensé.

(Translation.)

Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow.

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, July* $\frac{13}{25}$, 1840.

I WILL not send you a messenger, until I shall have received yours. I calculate that he will possibly arrive here this evening or to-morrow. Meanwhile, I have not wished to delay an instant to communicate to you the approbation with which His Majesty the Emperor has been pleased to honour the last acts of your important negotiation. I write you, therefore, by the post of the steam-boat two despatches on that subject. I have been very fearful, lest while you were taking in London, in concert with Lord Palmerston, such energetic and honourable resolutions for the intervention of the Four Powers, a direct arrangement between the Porte and Mehemet Ali should be concluded at Constantinople, and thus produce fresh confusion in the business. Fortunately there is nothing of the kind, as you will see by the despatch which I received last night from M. Titow. On the other hand, the insurrection in Syria becomes every day more serious. I have received despatches from Alexandria, of the $\frac{25\text{ June}}{7\text{ July}}$, and interesting reports from our Consul Basily at Beyrout. In one of the last I find the annexed passage. Medem thinks that this insurrection will assume a more serious character than all the preceding ones, and he goes upon the opinion of Solyman Pasha, who has more than once expressed his fear lest Syria should be lost for ever to Mehemet Ali, saying openly that he wished to see that fine conquest at the bottom of the sea. Provided the English fleet should shortly appear on the coasts of Syria, we shall be able to flatter ourselves that our object will be attained with less danger than we had at first imagined.

Inclosure 1 in No. 40.

M. de Titoff to Count Nesselrode.

M. le Comte, *Constantinople, le* $\frac{2}{14}$ *Juillet,* 1840.

PAR son expédition du 18 Juin, M. de Bouteneff a déjà rendu compte à votre Excellence des premières explications obtenues auprès de Réchid Pacha, sur l'arrivée de Sami Bey à Constantinople, et sur la manière dont la Porte se proposait d'accueillir les ouvertures éventuelles de ce délégué. Sorti de quarantaine le 24 du mois écoulé, il ne tarda pas à se présenter chez le Grand Vizir et chez quelques uns des principaux dignitaires Ottomans; et il eut avec le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères deux conférences successives, sur le contenu desquelles ce dernier vient de nous offrir les notions qui, en résumé, portent ce qui suit:—

Réchid Pacha s'attacha tout d'abord à recevoir Sami Bey avec beaucoup de politesse et de prévenance. Celui-ci à son tour prodigua de vives protestations sur les sentimens fidèles et dévoués dont Méhémet Ali est animé envers le Sultan. Il déclara que le Pacha était décidé à restituer la flotte sans y rattacher la moindre condition; qu'il désirait uniquement connaître si une pareille marque de ses dispositions loyales, serait favorablement appréciée par Sa Hautesse; et sur qui elle daignerait fixer son choix pour ramener ici l'escadre? Sami Bey ajouta, que Méhémet Ali avait à juste titre hésité à commettre cette tâche à l'ancien Capitan Pacha, mais qu'il ne pourrait que se féliciter si on l'autorisait à la confier par exemple à Saïd Bey, l'un des fils cadets du Pacha d'Egypte.

Le Ministre Ottoman répondit, qu'à l'exception de l'Ex-Grand Amiral, flétri par sa conduite passée, tous les choix pour le commandement de la flotte qu'il s'agissait de ramener, dépendraient de Méhémet Ali, et seraient également bien vus par le Sultan; que cette restitution constituerait sans doute un gage, et pour ainsi dire, un prélude des louables dispositions du Pacha; mais que c'était là une question secondaire comparativement à celles qu'il restait à régler pour opérer un rapprochement réel.

Sami Bey ayant annoncé qu'il n'était chargé d'articuler aucune proposition, mais que son devoir serait d'entendre celles que ferait la Porte, Réchid Pacha fit observer que déjà depuis longtems Méhémet Ali connaissait la résolution de Sa Hautesse de lui accorder l'hérédité de l'Egypte, s'il abandonnait immédiatement la Syrie avec les autres provinces. Sans établir de controverse sur cet objet, le délégué de Méhémet Ali exposa sous une forme pour ainsi dire historique, les sacrifices que la Syrie avait coûtés au Pacha, et les difficultés que la Porte avait éprouvées de tout tems à tirer un parti réel de cette possession; il ajouta, que pour sa personne, s'il s'agissait uniquement des défilés du Taurus et d'Adana, il concevrait encore jusqu'à un certain point, les avantages qui pourraient en faire souhaiter le recouvrement. Puis, sans s'appésantir sur cet article, ni faire aucune mention de Candie, il exprima combien Méhémet Ali était d'avance disposé à se montrer coulant sur l'augmentation du tribut, et finit par dire, qu'au milieu des dispositions favorables qui semblaient animer les deux parties, une entente définitive et amicale ne serait probablement pas difficile, si la Porte, pour échanger ses idées avec celles de Méhémet Ali, se décidait à nommer un Commissaire de confiance qui pût se rendre simultanément avec lui à Alexandrie.

Cette insinuation fut péremptoirement repoussée par Réchid Pacha: il déclara à Sami Bey, que Sa Hautesse ayant déjà résolu de ne point procéder sans le concours efficace que lui avaient assuré les Grandes Puissances, l'envoi d'un intermédiaire à Alexandrie ne saurait plus être ni convenable ni opportun. Sami Bey s'étendit longuement sur la lenteur des Cours Européennes dans cette affaire; sur leur peu de sincérité réelle envers la Porte; sur les intérêts divers qui les divisaient ensemble; s'attachant à vouloir démontrer par cet exposé combien il serait préférable de régler par une entente isolée entre Musulmans, une cause qui concernait exclusivement les intérêts les plus chers de l'Islâmisme.

Sans contester les points des divergences partielles qui pouvaient exister entre les Cabinets, Réchid Pacha objecta que néanmoins leurs vues étaient

absolument identiques en ce qui concernait le maintien de l'indépendance, de l'intégrité réelle de l'Empire, et de la dignité du trône de Sa Hautesse, qui, persuadée nommément de l'intérêt loyal et sincère que lui vouait l'Empereur Notre Auguste Maître, avait tout lieu de placer une confiance non moins intime dans les dispositions inaltérables de l'Autriche et de l'Angleterre.

Le Commissaire Egyptien, en s'abstenant d'aborder une discussion plus détaillée, se résuma en exprimant l'espoir que son envoi dans cette capitale laisserait en tout état de cause une impression favorable dans l'esprit de Sa Hautesse et de ses Ministres ; il chercha à prouver que l'hésitation de Méhémet Ali sur les questions territoriales ne provenait d'aucune méfiance de sa part envers les dispositions de la Porte, et qu'elle avait sa source uniquement dans une sollicitude toute naturelle pour l'avenir de ses enfans ; il s'engagea à rendre compte à Alexandrie de tous les pourparlers qui venaient d'être échangés, et annonça, que devant partir prochainement pour l'Egypte, il pourrait encore peut-être revenir ici à la suite de Saïd Bey.

En effet, la frégate à vapeur Egyptienne "le Nil," venait d'arriver le 30 du mois écoulé pour être ici à sa disposition et servir à son retour. Par cette occasion, Sami Bey prétendit avoir reçu des notions indirectes sur quelques succès décisifs remportés contre les insurgés de la Syrie. Il affecta en général de traiter cette révolte avec beaucoup de légèreté, contrairement aux nouvelles que possédait la Porte, et qui se trouvent pleinement confirmées par les rapports tous récens des Consulats étrangers ainsi que votre Excellence pourra en juger par ceux qu'elle reçoit du Comte Médem simultanément avec mon expédition de ce jour. Interpellé par Réchid Pacha, dans le cours de l'entretien, sur le lieu où se trouvait présentement la flotte Turque, Sami Bey ne put maîtriser son embarras, et ne trouva moyen d'en sortir qu'en affirmant qu'il l'avait laissée dans le port d'Alexandrie, mais que les dispositions ultérieures à cet égard lui étaient absolument inconnues.

Tel est le résumé des notions communiquées à notre premier Drogman, sur les résolutions notifiées à Sami Bey et sur le langage tenu de sa part. Il parait s'accorder entièrement avec le récit que le Comte Médem fait des instructions dont il a été muni par le Pacha d'Egypte. Ce délégué doit passer quelques jours à Constantinople ; il n'a pas encore consigné les cadeaux dont il est chargé, et il a la promesse d'obtenir avant son départ une audience auprès de Sa Hautesse. Ce n'est qu'après l'accomplissement de toutes ces formalités que nous pourrons apprendre au juste, s'il se réserve de mettre à profit la fin de son séjour à Constantinople pour avancer quelques nouvelles offres, et si la Porte de son côté demeurera fidèle jusqu'au bout à ses résolutions actuelles.

Nous n'avons pû, en attendant, qu'applaudir aux réponses données par l'organe de Réchid Pacha, et que féliciter la Porte sur sa persévérance à ne point se départir du systême de s'en remettre à la bienveillante coopération des Grandes Puissances, pour amener une solution analogue à ses vœux comme à ses intérêts légitimes.

En terminant sa conversation à cet égard avec le Prince Hantchéri, laquelle a eu lieu hier, le Ministre, après l'avoir prié de m'annoncer qu'il en avait fait des communications semblables à Lord Ponsonby et au Baron Stürmer, demanda si notre interprète n'avait pas à lui suggérer quelques avis personnels sur le parti que la Porte, dans l'intérêt de sa cause, pourrait tirer de la conjoncture du moment ? Le Prince Hantchéri répondit avec infiniment d'à propos, qu'il ne voyait pour sa part absolument rien à ajouter, ni à changer, à une marche aussi prudente et sage ; et que la seule manière d'utiliser davantage l'incident actuel, consisterait peut-être à communiquer sans retard à Chékib Effendi, les détails relatifs à la mission de Sami Bey et à l'accueil qui vient de lui être fait, en invitant l'Ambassadeur de Sa Hautesse à faire valoir aux yeux des Représentans réunis à Londres, la conduite ferme et correcte du Gouvernement Turc dans cette nouvelle circonstance, comme un motif de plus pour hâter le résultat des délibérations qui forment à si juste titre l'objet de la plus vive attente de la Porte.

A la suite de l'arrivée du pyroscaphe Anglais ré-expédié d'ici à Smyrne par Lord Ponsonby, deux vaisseaux de guerre et un bateau à vapeur Britanniques se sont détachés de l'escadre de l'Amiral Louis pour faire apparition sur les côtes de la Syrie sous les ordres du Capitaine Napier, le plus ancien des Commandans de ces armemens. M. de Pontois a expédié de son côté en observation

pour les parages de Beyrout, le brick Français "l'Argus," qui, jusqu'ici stationné devant Thérapia, venait d'être relevé par la "Comète," navire de la même portée.

Je suis, &c.,
(Signé) TITOFF.

(Translation.)

M. de Titow to Count Nesselrode.

M. le Comte, *Constantinople, July* $\frac{2}{14}$, 1840.

BY his despatch of the 18th of June, M. de Bouteneff has already given your Excellency an account of the first explanations obtained from Rechid Pasha, respecting the arrival of Sami Bey at Constantinople, and the manner in which the Porte proposed to receive the eventual proposals of that Agent. On coming out of quarantine, on the 24th of last month, he lost no time in presenting himself to the Grand Vizier and some of the principal Turkish Dignitaries; and he had two successive conferences with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, of the purport of which the latter has given us the particulars, which, in substance, amount to what follows.

Rechid Pasha, at the outset, took pains to receive Sami Bey with much politeness and courtesy. The latter in his turn was profuse in strong protestations as to the sentiments of fidelity and devotion with which Mehemet Ali is animated towards the Sultan. He declared that the Pasha was resolved to restore the fleet without attaching to that act the slightest condition: that he merely desired to know whether such an indication of his loyal feelings, would be favourably appreciated by His Highness, and whom His Highness would be pleased to fix upon to bring the squadron back hither? Sami Bey added, that Mehemet Ali had with good reason hesitated to entrust this duty to the late Capudan Pasha, but that he could not but be gratified if he was authorized to entrust it, for example, to Said Bey, one of the younger sons of the Pasha of Egypt.

The Turkish Minister replied that, with the exception of the late High Admiral, disgraced by his past conduct, the choice of any person soever for the command of the fleet, which it was proposed to bring back, depended on Mehemet Ali, and would be equally well viewed by the Sultan; that such restitution would doubtless constitute a pledge, and, so to say, a prelude to the laudable dispositions of the Pasha; but that was merely a secondary question in comparison with that which remained to be settled in order to effect a real reconciliation.

Sami Bey having stated that he was not commissioned to make any proposal, but that it would be his duty to listen to those which might be made by the Porte, Rechid Pasha observed that already for a length of time Mehemet Ali knew His Highness's determination to grant to him the inheritance of Egypt, if he immediately abandoned Syria with the other provinces. Without entering into any discussion on this point, Mehemet Ali's agent detailed, as it were in an historical manner, the sacrifices which Syria had cost the Pasha, and the difficulties which the Porte had experienced at all times in deriving a real benefit from the possession of it; he added that, for himself, if it was merely a question of the defiles of the Taurus and of Adana, he might still understand, up to a certain point, the advantages which might make the recovery of them desirable. Then, without dwelling on this topic, or making any mention of Candia, he said how much Mehemet Ali was predisposed to be easy respecting the augmentation of the tribute; and he ended by saying, that in the midst of the favourable dispositions by which the two parties appeared to be animated, a definitive and amicable understanding would probably not be difficult, if the Porte, in order to interchange its notions with those of Mehemet Ali, should determine upon naming a confidential Commissioner who might proceed together with himself to Alexandria.

This suggestion was peremptorily rejected by Rechid Pasha: he declared to Sami Bey that His Highness, having already resolved not to go on without the effectual concurrence of which the Great Powers had given him the assurance, the mission of a negotiation to Alexandria, could no longer be either fitting or

seasonable. Sami Bey dwelt at length on the slowness of the European Courts in this business; on the little sincerity which they really felt towards the Porte; on the different interests by which they were divided among themselves; endeavouring, as it were, to show by this account how much more preferable it would be to settle by a separate understanding among Mussulmans, a matter which exclusively concerned the dearest interests of Islamism.

Without disputing on the points of partial differences which might exist between the Cabinets, Rechid Pasha observed, that nevertheless their views were absolutely identic as to what concerned the maintenance of the independence, of the real integrity of the Empire, and of the dignity of the throne of His Highness, who, convinced specifically of the faithful and sincere interest which the Emperor our august Master entertained for him, had every reason to place a reliance no less sure on the unalterable dispositions of Austria and of England.

The Egyptian Commissioner, refraining from entering into a more detailed discussion, summed up by expressing his hope that his mission to this capital would, in any state of the matter, leave a favourable impression on the mind of His Highness and of his Ministers. He sought to prove that the hesitation of Mehemet Ali on the territorial questions did not originate in any mistrust on his part as to the disposition of the Porte, and that it had its source only in a very natural solicitude for the future position of his children; he undertook to give an account at Alexandria of all the discussions which had taken place, and he stated, that being about to set out shortly for Egypt, it was possible that he might still return hither in the suite of Said Bey.

In fact, the Egyptian steam frigate, the "Nile," arrived here on the 30th of last month, to be at his disposal for his return. By this opportunity, Sami Bey pretended to have received indirect intelligence of some decisive successes obtained over the insurgents of Syria. He affected in general to treat this revolt with much levity, contrary to the information which the Porte possessed, and which is fully confirmed by very recent reports from the foreign Consulates, as your Excellency will be able to judge from those which you receive from Count Medem, at the same time with my despatch of this day. On being questioned by Rechid Pasha, in the course of the conversation, as to the place where the Turkish fleet at present was, Sami Bey could not control his embarrassment, and found no other way of escaping from it but by asserting that he had left it in the harbour of Alexandria, but that the subsequent arrangements with respect to it were altogether unknown to him.

Such is the substance of the information communicated to our first Dragoman, as to the decision notified to Sami Bey, and as to the language held by him. It appears to agree entirely with the account which Count Medem gives of the instructions with which he was furnished by the Pasha of Egypt. This Agent is to pass some days at Constantinople; he has not yet delivered the presents of which he is the bearer, and he has the promise of obtaining an audience of His Highness before his departure. It is only after all these formalities shall have been accomplished that we shall be able rightly to learn whether he contemplates taking advantage of the latter part of his stay at Constantinople to bring forward some fresh offers; and if the Porte, on its part, will remain to the last faithful to its present determinations.

Meanwhile, we cannot but have commended the answers given through Rechid Pasha, and have congratulated the Porte on its persisting in not deviating from the system of relying upon the friendly co-operation of the Great Powers for bringing about a solution in conformity with its wishes as well as with its legitimate interests.

On concluding his conversation on this subject with Prince Hantchéri, which took place yesterday, the Minister, after having requested him to inform me that he had made similar communications respecting it to Lord Ponsonby, and to Baron Stürmer, asked if our interpreter had not some personal suggestions to offer to him, as to the advantage which the Porte, with a view to its own interest, might derive from the present posture of affairs. Prince Hantchéri replied very much to the purpose, that for his part he absolutely did not see anything to be added to, or to be changed in, a course so prudent and so wise; and that the sole way of turning to greater account the present incident, might perhaps consist in communicating without delay to Chekib Effendi the details relative to the mission of Sami Bey, and to the reception which had been given to him, with instructions to His Highness's Ambassador to call the attention of the Representatives assem-

bled in London, to the firm and correct conduct of the Turkish Government in this new circumstance, as an additional motive for hastening the result of the deliberations which so justly form the object of the liveliest expectation on the part of the Porte.

After the arrival of the English steam-vessel despatched from hence to Smyrna by Lord Ponsonby, two British ships of war, and one steam-vessel, were detached from the squadron of Admiral Sir John Louis, to make their appearance on the coast of Syria, under the orders of Captain Napier, the senior officer of those vessels. M. de Pontois, on his part, has sent to keep watch in the neighbourhood of Beyrout the French brig the "Argus," which having hitherto been stationed before Therapia, had just been relieved by the "Comète," a vessel of the same class.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) TITOW.

Inclosure 2 in No. 40.

Extract of Report from the Russian Consul at Beyrout.

TOUS les yeux sont tournés du côté de l'Europe, et toutes les espérances reposent sur l'intervention des Grandes Puissances. Il n'y a aucun doute qu'à la première démonstration des Puissances contre Méhémet Ali, toute la Syrie se souleverait contre le régime Egyptien; et des Turcs même, des employés du Gouvernement, m'ont fait cette observation confidentielle à Jaffa.

(Translation.)

Extract of Report from the Russian Consul at Beyrout.

THE eyes of all are turned towards Europe, and the hopes of all rest upon the intervention of the Great Powers. There is no doubt that at the first demonstration of the Powers against Mehemet Ali, the whole of Syria would rise up against the Egyptian rule; and even Turks in the employment of the Government, made this observation to me confidentially at Jaffa.

No. 41.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 3.)

My Lord, *Paris, August 1, 1840.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship the "Moniteur" of this day, containing two Royal Ordinances calling into activity the soldiers of the class of the years 1836 and 1839, who have not yet been called into active service.

The same "Moniteur" also states that a Royal Ordinance, dated the 29th of July, has been issued, opening a credit necessary for the augmentation of the marine by ten thousand sailors, five ships of the line, thirteen frigates, and nine steam-vessels.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 41.

Ordonnances du Roi.

LOUIS-PHILIPPE, Roi des Français,
A tous présens et à venir, salut.

Vu la loi du 8 Mai, 1837, qui a autorisé la levée de 80,000 hommes sur la classe de 1836; vu notre ordonnance, en date du 13 Mars, 1838, par laquelle

10,000 hommes ont déjà été appelés à l'activité sur la seconde portion de la dite classe ; vu nos ordonnances des 3 Avril et 22 Juin, 1840, par lesquelles les contingens des classes de 1838 et 1837 ont également été mis en activité en totalité ; sur le rapport de notre Ministre Secrétaire-d'état de la Guerre, nous avons ordonné et ordonnons ce qui suit :—

Art. 1. Les jeunes soldats qui sont encore disponibles sur la seconde portion du contingent de la classe de 1836 sont appelés à l'activité.

Art. 2. Notre Ministre Secrétaire-d'état de la Guerre est chargé de l'exécution de la présente ordonnance.

Au palais des Tuileries, le 29 Juillet, 1840.

LOUIS PHILIPPE.

Par le Roi :

Le Ministre Secrétaire-d'état de la Guerre,

CUBIERES.

LOUIS PHILIPPE, Roi des Français,

A tous présens et à venir, salut.

Vu la loi du 19 Avril, 1840, qui a fixé à 80,000 hommes le contingent de la classe de 1839 ; vu l'art. 4 de la loi précitée qui autorise la levée de ces 80,000 hommes ; vu notre ordonnance, en date du 16 Mai, 1840, d'après laquelle les listes du contingent de la dite classe doivent être closes le 9 Août prochain ; sur le rapport de notre Ministre Secrétaire-d'état de la Guerre nous avons ordonné et ordonnons ce qui suit :—

Art. 1. Tous les jeunes soldats disponibles de la classe de 1839, sont appéles à l'activité, à partir du 9 Août, 1840.

Art. 2. Notre Ministre Secrétaire-d'état de la Guerre est chargé de l'exécution de la présente ordonnance,

Au palais des Tuileries, le 29 Juillet, 1840.

LOUIS PHILIPPE,

Par le Roi :

Le Ministre Secrétaire-d'état de la Guerre,

CUBIERES.

(Translation.)

Ordinances of the King.

LOUIS PHILIPPE, King of the French,

To all present and to come, greeting.

Considering the law of the 8th of May, 1837, which authorised the levy of 80,000 men upon the class of 1836 ; considering our ordinance, dated the 13th March, 1838, by which 10,000 men were already called into active service upon the second portion of the said class ; considering our ordinances of the 3rd April and 22nd June, 1840, by which the contingents of the classes of 1838 and 1837 were, all of them, equally brought into active service ; upon the report of our Minister, Secretary of State for the War Department, we have decreed and do decree what follows :—

Art. 1st. The young soldiers who are still disposable upon the second portion of the contingent of the class of 1836, are called into active service.

Art. 2nd. Our Minister, Secretary of State for the War Department, is charged with the execution of the present ordinance.

Palace of the Tuileries, July 29, 1840.

LOUIS PHILIPPE.

By the King :

The Minister Secretary of State for the War Department,

CUBIERES.

LOUIS PHILIPPE, King of the French,

To all present and to come, greeting.

Considering the law of the 19th April, 1840, which fixed the contingent of the class of 1839 at 80,000 men; considering the 4th Article of the above-mentioned law which authorises the levy of those 80,000 men; considering our ordinance, dated the 16th May, 1840, according to which the lists of the contingent of the said class must be closed on the 9th of August next; upon the report of our Minister, Secretary of State for the War Department, we have decreed and do decree what follows:—

Art. 1st. All the disposable young soldiers of the class of 1839, are al cled into active service from the 9th of August, 1840.

Art. 2. Our Minister, Secretary of State for the War Department, is charged with the execution of the present ordinance.

Palace of the Tuileries, July 29, 1840.

LOUIS PHILIPPE.

By the King:
The Minister Secretary of State
for the War Department,
CUBIERES.

Inclosure 2 in No. 41.

Ordonnance du Roi.

UNE ordonnance royale, en date du 29 Juillet, ouvre les crédits necessaires pour augmenter l'effectif de la marine de dix mille matelots, de cinq vaisseaux de ligne, de treize frégates, et de neuf bâtimens à vapeur.

(Translation.)

Ordinance of the King.

A ROYAL Ordinance, dated the 29th July, gives the credit necessary for increasing the effective force of the navy by 10,000 seamen, five vessels of the line, thirteen frigates, and nine steam-vessels.

No. 42.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 4, 1840.

YOUR Excellency's despatch of the 1st of August, inclosing the "Moniteur" of that day with the ordinances for raising an additional number of troops and seamen, has been received at this office.

This measure, wholly uncalled for as it is, by any proceeding on the part of the Four Powers, and utterly unnecessary to repel any threatened or imaginable attack upon France, can only be looked upon as a menace, and therefore as a gratuitous affront offered to the Four Powers by France.

But Her Majesty's Government do not intend to take any notice of it in any way whatever; and they do not mean either to ask the French Government for any explanation as to the purposes for which the additional five sail of the line are to be commissioned, and the 10,000 seamen are to be raised; nor to apply to Parliament for any further naval means, or for any vote of credit.

To do either the one or the other, would be to give to this strange proceeding of the French Government an importance which it does not deserve. Her Majesty's Government will pursue their own course without regard to these armaments of France, and will act just as if nothing of the kind had happened.

The British fleet in the Mediterranean will be quite strong enough to do everything which it can be required to do in pursuance of the engagements of the Treaty of the 15th of July. The force of that fleet will also be abundantly sufficient to secure it against molestation or insult from any squadron which the French may think proper to send to the Levant; and if any proceeding of the French squadron should bring on a collision, which Her Majesty's Government trust the French Government will have the prudence and wisdom to avoid, Her Majesty's Government have no fear as to the result.

But it certainly must strike every impartial observer, that if France means to preserve peace, this armament, which is only a display of irritation, cannot tend to inspire that mutual cordiality which belongs to peace; and that, on the other hand, if the French Government mean to go to war, this armament affords an inadequate measure of the resources with which they are prepared for entering upon the contest.

Her Majesty's Government, however, entertain the most confident hope and belief that the French Government mean to preserve peace, notwithstanding those hostile demonstrations; but if it were otherwise, it is always in the power of the Crown to assemble Parliament in a fortnight, in order to ask from it the means which may be necessary in any case for protecting the interests and for upholding the honour of the country.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 43.

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bloomfield.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 4, 1840.

I HAVE to instruct you to express to Count Nesselrode, the great satisfaction with which Her Majesty's Government have learnt that his Excellency fully approves, and that the Emperor will immediately ratify the Convention and arrangements, concluded at London on the 15th of July. Her Majesty's Government have also learnt to-day, that the Emperor of Austria is equally satisfied and equally determined to ratify; and the Prussian Government has announced its intention of following the example of the other Two Courts.

This is the more satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government, because it is obvious that the extreme violence of the French papers, and the ordinances recently published in the "Moniteur," were intended, not only to alarm the commercial interest in this country, and through their means to act upon Her Majesty's Government, but also to prevent, if possible, the Governments of Austria and Prussia from ratifying the Convention of the 15th July; and it is gratifying to find that neither of these objects have been attained.

With respect to the French ordinance for the equipment of five additional sail of the line, Her Majesty's Government do not intend to notice it in any manner, either by asking for explanation from the French Government, or by applying to Parliament for any further naval means in consequence thereof.

The British fleet in the Mediterranean will shortly consist of fifteen sail of the line, with frigates, and several strongly armed steamers. That force is quite sufficient for all the purposes for which its action can be required, in execution of the Convention of July; and it is strong enough to be secure from insult or molestation from the French fleet, even if there existed, which Her Majesty's Government are perfectly sure there does not, the slightest intention on the part of the Government of France to offer to the British fleet molestation or insult.

You will urge Count Nesselrode to send off the ratification of the Treaty as soon as it is possible to do so; because the knowledge that the Russian ratification was gone, would induce the French Government to endeavour to reconcile itself to that, which it would then consider an irreversible fact.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

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* A similar despatch was addressed, on the same day, to Lord Beauvale and Lord William Russell.

No. 44.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 4, 1840.

I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to say to Prince Metternich, that Her Majesty's Government feel very deeply the great compliment which has been paid to Great Britain, by placing, not only an Austrian squadron, but also an Austrian Archduke, under the command of Sir Robert Stopford.

But this arrangement has even a greater value in the eyes of Her Majesty's Government, as a political manifestation, and as an evidence to all the world, of the cordial union of Great Britain and Austria, in the important undertaking, in which, in conjunction with their other Allies, those Two Powers have embarked; and the presence of the young Archduke in the combined fleet, will of itself be as valuable as a large naval reinforcement.

It is moreover gratifying to the British Government, that the son of an illustrious Commander, whose name will stand prominent among those of the great captains of his age, should, in early life, afford to the British naval service, an opportunity of becoming personally acquainted with his distinguished qualities, and of esteeming him as he deserves.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 45.

Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 4.)

(Extract.) *Berlin, July* 29, 1840.

THE Prussian Government was fully impressed with the necessity of checking the career of Mehemet Ali. His dictatorial tone, his insolent language to the Five Powers, his reliance on French Journalists, his obvious intention to destroy the Porte, all bearing on the general policy of Europe, and menacing to disturb the quiescent state of things in Germany, caused uneasiness here.

No. 46.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 5.)

(Extract.) *Paris, August* 3, 1840.

THE French Government complain much of the secrecy which has been observed towards M. Guizot during the negotiation of the Treaty; and attribute the excitement which has arisen in France very much to the notion, that the French Government has been duped, and the nation treated with disregard. I have tried to satisfy them that it was far from your Lordship's intention to show any disrespect to the Government, or any disregard of France, in not communicating to M. Guizot the Treaty until it had been signed. Declarations, I have said, had been repeatedly and recently made by the French Government, that it could not co-operate in measures for compelling Mehemet Ali to consent to the arrangement which the other Four Great Powers deemed indispensable for the security and independence of the Turkish Empire; and to have communicated the Treaty previously to its signature, might have been considered as implying an expectation offensive to France, that the union of the Four Powers would operate a change in the views and intentions of the French Government which their arguments had failed to effect.

I have been reminded that ever since the King has been upon the throne, the policy of his Government has been most pacific, and that his efforts have always been directed to restrain the warlike impetuosity of the French people; but a Government of France which, in these times, should set itself in opposition to the current of popular feeling, when it became strong and general, would

have little chance of maintaining itself; whatever may be its wishes, it must give way to public opinion.

I have said in reply, that to this motive I attribute the publication of the ordinances for the augmentation of the army and navy, being unwilling to believe that the French Government have really the intention of going to war with all the Powers of Europe, for the sake of maintaining Mehemet Ali's dominion in the northern district of Syria. At the same time that the motive which I assign for this display of military and naval preparation, is not disclaimed, it is said, that the isolated position of France, consequent upon the alliance lately formed between England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, necessitates a military and naval establishment in France larger than was required when the alliance existed between France and England; but I may be assured of the earnest wish to maintain peace.

In regard to Syria, great doubts have been expressed of the success of the insurrection against Mehemet Ali, and fears are entertained that it may end in the massacre and extermination of the Christian population, who have for so many ages contrived to exist in these mountains, notwithstanding the arbitrary and persecuting dominion of the Mahommedans.

No. 47.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 5.)

My Lord, *Paris, August* 3, 1840.

I TRANSMITTED to your Lordship, by the post of Saturday, the "Moniteur," containing two Royal Ordinances for the levy of an additional number of troops, and the notification of another ordinance which had been signed by the King for the augmentation of the navy.

The first two ordinances will probably be executed, and will give to the army an addition of nearly 100,000 men. The ordinance for the augmentation of the navy will not be so easily carried into effect. I am informed, that the Government have not the means of equipping and manning ten additional sail of the line, and thirteen frigates, and nine steamers, or even any number at all approaching to that amount; and it is only with the view to public effect, and to give popularity to the Government, that this ordinance has been published.

Admiral Duperré was sent for to Paris, for the purpose of offering to him the chief command of all the naval forces of France in the Mediterranean: but he has returned to his house in the country at some distance from Paris; and the tone of his conversation, I am told, has led those with whom he has conversed, to think that he considers his appointment as merely nominal.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 48.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 5.)

My Lord, *Paris, August* 3, 1840.

I HAD an interview on Saturday with the President of the Council. Our conversation related solely to the affairs of the East, and to the Convention lately signed by your Lordshp with the Representatives of Austria, Prussia, and Russia.

M. Thiers began by saying, that after all the obloquy he had incurred n advocating so strongly an intimate alliance between the French and British Governments, and after he had shown his disposition to act in entire concert with the English Government on all questions in which the interests of both countries were concerned, he could not but feel much mortified and hurt at the secrecy with which your Lordship had carried on a negotiation for an alliance with the other Powers of the Continent, to the exclusion of France; that his own personal feelings, however, were of little consequence; but the affront

given to France, by the manner in which the English Government had separated itself from France, and contracted an alliance with other European Powers, was of far more serious importance. He said, that the whole French nation felt sensibly the affront; and that no Minister of France, be he who he might, could do otherwise than place the country in a position which would enable it to assert its dignity and its influence in the affairs of Europe.

I answered, that I was surprised that the conduct of Her Majesty's Government could have been so much misunderstood in France, and still more so, that he should have received the communication made by your Lordship to M. Guizot, as if it had apprized the French Government, that an alliance had been formed by England with the other European Powers against France, when, in fact, the object of the Treaty referred to in the communication, was merely to carry into effect certain conditions of peace between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, which the French Government had never stated were in themselves objectionable, but to the enforcing of which they had repeatedly declined to be a party.

The English Government, I said, had never ceased to declare its opinion that the possession of all the Pashalics of Syria by Mehemet Ali was incompatible with the safety and independence of the Turkish Empire; it had laboured to engage the French Government to co-operate in measures calculated to obtain the restoration of a part of it, if not the whole, to the Sultan. The answer given to our representations on this Question was, that the French Government had no expectation that the Pasha of Egypt would make the required concession; that the French Government could not join in hostile measures against the Pasha; and that they doubted the efficacy of any means that could be adopted by England and the other Powers, to compel the Egyptians to evacuate Syria; but it never had been intimated by the French Government, that the adoption of measures of coercion by the other Powers would be resented by France. Desirous, therefore, as I had always been, for the alliance between England and France; and considering that alliance as the best security for the general peace of Europe, I could not but express both surprise and regret at the misinterpretation which had been given of the intentions of the English Government, and the consequent excitement raised in France. I trusted, however, that nothing would arise which could render doubtful the continuance of peace between the two countries; and I added, that I should be happy always to avail myself of any circumstances which might occur, to re-establish the former friendly footing and intimate relations which were mutually advantageous to both nations.

M. Thiers, upon my referring to the affairs of Spain, showed no inclination to enter into any discussion respecting them, saying, that all interest in European affairs was now centered in the Eastern Question.

My conversation with M. Thiers, of which it is unnecessary to give your Lordship any further details, led me to the conclusion, that it is the intention of the French Government to assume an imposing attitude; to wait for events; and, according to the nature of these, to determine its future policy.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 49.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 5.)

My Lord, *Paris, August 3, 1840.*

I INCLOSE the "Moniteur" of this morning, containing two telegraphic despatches from Marseilles, announcing that steam vessels had arrived at Malta, on the 28th ultimo, from Beyrout, bringing intelligence that the insurrection in Syria was at an end.

Count Walewski has been sent on a mission to Alexandria. I have been assured, but I cannot answer for the truth of the information, that he is instructed to use every endeavour to prevent the advance of the Egyptian Army into Asia Minor.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 50.

Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 6.)

(Extract.) *Damascus, June* 23, 1840.

I HAD the honour of addressing your Lordship my last despatch under the 23rd ultimo.

Your Lordship will have observed from my despatch of May 22,* the discontent which existed in the Emir Bechir's territories, and the measures preparing to resist the plans of the Egyptian Government, and the causes which occasioned the same, described to your Lordship in my despatches of February 20, and March 23.† Before that despatch can have reached your Lordship's hands, the insurrection will have been announced to your Lordship from another source. I abstain from entering into particulars respecting the events which have taken place in the mountains, all of which will have been narrated by Mr. Consul Moore, who is nearer the scene of action.

The Egyptian Government has, I hear, attempted to retrace its steps, by abandoning the false and injudicious measures it had undertaken towards the population of Mount Lebanon, by offers of concession and conciliation; whether it has partially succeeded, or wholly failed in such negotiation through the Emir Bechir, or whether the Prince, his sons and adherents, are faithful towards the Egyptian Government, or are overtly or tacitly participators in the insurrection, is not correctly known. I hear the Prince professes to be faithful to the Pasha; should, however, this be true, his influence in his favour seems, hitherto, to have been partial, or unavailing. It is reported, that the Prince's son, the Emir Halil, has an understanding with the insurgents, which neutralizes the Emir Bechir's influence; there is reason to think, they are all agreed together.

By the advices hitherto received from the mountains, it would appear, that the plans of the mountaineers are on a large scale, the vicinity of Sidon, Beyrout, and Tripoli, being occupied by them; and it would seem from the overt acts of insurrection which have been committed, that no successful result has been obtained by the Egyptian Government. It however continues to give out hopes of pacification, and that the Emir Bechir has succeeded in tranquillizing the population of his immediate district of Der-el-Kamar. It is reported that the elders of Hasbeya and Rasheya, who went to Bleddin to the Emir Bechir, to meet the Druse Emir Saadin, and his brother Emir Ahmid, of the Shaab family of the Emir Bechir, to welcome them to the command of the above towns, have been placed under arrest by the Prince, fearing the revolt of those places: this is indicative of the Prince being faithful to the Egyptian Government. It appears that the population of Mitten and Kesrouan have refused the terms offered by the Egyptian Government, through the Emir Bechir's intervention: the former is now acting against Beyrout, and the latter on the Bekaa.

The events which have occurred on this side of Mount Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon connected with this revolt, are principally the successful interception, by a body of insurgents composed of Christians, Druses, and Mutualis, in a ravin beyond Zibdani, of a convoy of provisions sent from hence to the depôt at Balbec, under the escort of a squadron of regular calvalry, in which the Government lost 200 camels laden, and the regulars had seven men killed, with some wounded and missing. A regiment of Cavalry is stationed at Balbec.

The Druse Emir Mahomed Shehab, of the same origin and family as the Emir Bechir, who held a command in the Egyptian army, and was on leave of absence at Hasbeya, and was frequently summoned to join his regiment, has taken refuge in the Ledgea. He is now at the head of a marauding party of about 200 men. The Snutt Arabs are also committing depredations in the direction of the south of this district. The Mutuali insurgent, Emir Mahomed, is also at the head of a force employed on the same predatory service to the north of this city; and both these bodies of marauders inflict considerable mischief on the villages and surrounding country.

Considerable excitement and anxiety exists in this city; but, for the present, it is tranquil, and the immediate adjacent country is tolerably quiet. But there is no knowing from one moment to another what may take place, as we are sur-

† See Part I., page 669.

† See Part I., pages 617, 652.

rounded by insurrectionary elements. Should the efforts of the Government fail to produce a pacification, and the military measures concerting to act against the insurgents, be unsuccessful in the first attack, it will be a signal for revolt at Agloun, Haouran, and Naplouse, and the whole country on the Balbec road, northwards, including the desert line. The discontented spirits in all directions, are waiting to see the issue of the first Egyptian attack on the Mount Lebanon insurgents. But, until the Egyptian military force is thus deeply compromised, there enters a feeling of jealousy on the part of the Mussulman population, towards the Christian mountaineers and to the Christians generally, which precludes or delays immediate cordial co-operation, distinct from the wary judgment which guides them in not exposing themselves but on sure ground.

The military measures which the Egyptian Government is preparing against the insurgents, seem to be on a large scale. Five regiments of Infantry are announced to have left Aleppo on that service, besides a large body of Albanians from the Adana district; three regiments from Acre and a reinforcement from Egypt, are to form part of the army. I hear the mountains are to be penetrated simultaneously at four different points. The Government here is occupied in preparing provisions, and a strong force of irregular Cavalry, with some regular, has been sent to open and clear the road to Balbec, where the regiment of Cavalry stationed, does not find itself quite at ease to protect the depôt forming there.

I have just learnt that the insurgents from Zahlé amount to about 5,000, under the command of Emir Mahmoud, son of Prince Halil. The Emir Bechir's warlike son took possession of Balbec on the 20th, and the Egyptian depôt of provisions; and it is said, arms and ammunition have fallen into their hands, all of which they are now removing to Zahlé. The Egyptian regular Cavalry stationed at Balbec, has fallen back on Homs. It is said the Infantry arrived at that place from Aleppo, has been ordered to advance on Balbec; but, unless they take provisious with them, they will be much straightened, and cannot, I presume, maintain themselves at that point. It is reported, that the Prince Halil is at the head of a large force of insurgents, blockading Beyrout; should this be correct, no doubt can be now entertained that the adherents of the Emir Bechir have an understanding with the mountaineers, if not the Prince himself.

No. 51.

Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 6.)

My Lord, *Beyrout, July* 21, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that the combined Egyptian, Turkish and Albanian forces marched from Beyrout on the 13th instant, against the insurgents of Mount Lebanon.

During the encampment of these troops in the neighbourhood of Beyrout, from the time of their landing from the Turkish fleet, their principal occupation was destruction and devastation; burning the mulberry plantations (the chief riches of the country), pillaging churches, and driving off the cattle of the peaceable inhabitants.

Their march up Lebanon was traced from Beyrout by smoking villages and convents, whilst the Albanians committed acts the most revolting and atrocious, and even murdered the Maronite clergy who fell in their way.

Captain Napier, of Her Majesty's ship "Powerful," addressed a letter of remonstrance to Abbas Pasha on the subject, expressive of his horror of such proceedings; and I cannot but think a good effect has been produced, as we have since not witnessed a recurrence of similar acts.

The insurrection has in this neighbourhood been quelled for the present; and the inhabitants of a number of villages have surrendered their arms to the Emir Bechir.

From Tripoli, however, we have accounts of two days ago, which state that 4,000 insurgents surround that town, who keep the inhabitants in a constant state of alarm, and about 1,500 men, in detached bodies, occupy the fastnesses of Lebanon in this vicinity.

The Emir Haidar, one of the most influential of the insurgent leaders, lies

in concealment a few hours from hence, waiting more favourable circumstances for throwing off the Egyptian yoke.

To the want of a leader, and of consequent unity of action, may in part be attributed the sudden breaking up of the insurrection, but bribery of the Sheiks has mainly contributed to it. Another cause is, the too great confidence in, and respect for their chief, by the mountaineers; had less of this feeling existed, they might have secured the person of the Emir Bechir, before he declared against them, as he has been several times in their power since the breaking out of the revolt.

The spirit of hatred to the Egyptian Government is undiminished; and were a Turkish force, however small, to appear, and supplies of ammunition furnished, Lebanon would be again in arms.

The subjugation of the insurgents still on foot, will be a work both of time and difficulty.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) N. MOORE.

P.S.—The Turco-Egyptian Army is now at Hamana, about eight hours distant, on the Damascus road.

No. 52.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 9.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, July* 7, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that I have this morning seen Mehemet Ali. His Highness seemed mortified and amazed at hearing that Admiral Sir John Louis had despatched two line-of-battle ships to the Syrian coast. He said, "Then I shall send four." I told him that this naval force was intended for the protection of British interests; to which he replied, "Your small frigate, already there, is more than sufficient for that purpose; but," continued the Pasha, "all will soon be settled, for I have ordered Solyman Pasha to attack the insurgents with his whole force, this day or to-morrow, and that will put an end to the affair."

I then remarked to the Pasha, that various rumours were afloat, as to his having changed his intentions in regard to sending back the Turkish squadron to Constantinople. He replied, "I gave you my word that I would do so; I now repeat to you, that so soon as the Sublime Porte shall ask of me to send back the squadron, it will be despatched under the orders either of my son Said Bey, or of Mustapha Pasha. I shall fulfil this promise, whether my differences with the Porte are arranged or not: but if we do not settle our dispute, I tell you plainly, that I shall retain possession of Orfa and Marash."

His Highness at the same time informed me, that all the Turkish ships employed in the late naval expedition, having disembarked the troops they had on board, are now on their return to this port. The Egyptian vessels, he said, would remain on the Syrian coast.

I must not omit to inform your Lordship, that the Pasha, in speaking of certain discussions which had arisen between Mr. Moore, our Consul at Beyrout, and his Excellency Solyman Pasha, respecting the punishment of a Turk who had assassinated an Arab under British protection, now assured me that he had himself given the proper orders, and that by this time the culprit must have been executed at Beyrout.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 53.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 6.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, July* 16, 1840.

YESTERDAY morning a French steam-vessel reached Alexandria from Toulon, having on board M. Auguste Périer, charged with a special mission from the French Government to his Highness the Viceroy. He had left Paris on the evening of the 2d instant, at which time another Agent was simultaneously despatched to Constantinople.

M. Périer has already had two secret interviews with Mehemet Ali, but their object has not at all transpired. The French steam-packet, which should quit Alexandria early to-morrow morning, has been ordered by the Consul-General of France to defer her departure for at least six hours.

At about 10 o'clock A.M. of yesterday, the Egyptian steam-vessel "Generoso" entered the harbour from Beyrout; she brought news that the Syrian insurrection has been quelled. This was speedily communicated to the Consuls-General by a despatch from his Excellency Boghos Bey, containing the printed paper which I herewith inclose. Letters both from Captain Napier and the British Consul at Beyrout mention the prevalent report that the mountaineers have submitted.

In the evening of yesterday, the whole of the Turkish ships lately employed in Syria were seen returning to this port, in which they safely anchored this morning.

I am informed that when Captain Napier received orders to proceed from Vourla Bay to Beyrout, Admiral Lalande immediately despatched a steam-ship to the latter port, with information to the Egyptian Admiral, and a recommendation to hasten his return to Alexandria.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

Inclosure in No. 53.

Mehemet Ali to Boghos Bey.

15 *Djemez-el-Ewel,* 1256.

LE Bateau en fer "Boulaq," venant de Syrie, m'apporte des dépêches de leurs Excellences Abbas Pacha, Emir Béchir, et Osman Pacha, qui m'annoncent que le 10 du mois courant, Osman Pacha ayant levé son camp, marcha vers la montagne, où il ne tarda pas à rencontrer les insurgés qui semblaient le défier. Peu d'instans ont suffi pour les mettre complètement en déroute; les troupes victorieuses les ont poursuivis pendant six heures et ne se sont arrêtées qu'au village de Bévariche, pour y passer la nuit. Les habitans des villages du district de Mitn sont accourus pour demander quartier et livrer leurs armes; de tous les points les montagnards viennent en foule se soumettre et faire la remise de leurs armes.

Son Excellence Emir Béchir ajoute de plus dans sa dépêche, que les habitans de Deir-el-Kamar se sont soumis de la même manière que les précédens montagnards, et qu'à leur exemple les insurgés qui se trouvaient aux environs de Saïda se sont empressés de remettre aussi leurs armes et d'implorer leur pardon.

Je vous autorise à faire connaître officiellement à MM. les Consuls-Généraux, nos amis, que ces troubles peuvent être considérés comme entièrement dissipés.

(Translation.)

Mehemet Ali to Boghos Bey.

Djemez-el-Ewel 15, 1256.

THE iron steam-boat "Boulaq," coming from Syria, brings me despatches from their Excellencies Abbas Pasha, the Emir Bechir, and Osman Pasha, which

inform me that, on the 10th instant, Osman Pasha, having broken up his camp, marched towards the mountain, where he presently fell in with the insurgents, who appeared to defy him. A few moments were sufficient to rout them completely; the victorious troops pursued them during six hours, and only stopped at the village of Bévariche, to pass the night there. The inhabitants of the villages of the district of Mitn flocked to him to demand quarter and give up their arms; from all points the mountaineers come in crowds to make their submission, and to deliver up their arms.

His Excellency the Emir Bechir adds, moreover, in his despatch, that the inhabitants of Der-el-Kamar submitted in the same manner as the previous mountaineers, and that from their example the insurgents who were in the neighbourhood of Saida, hastened also to give up their arms, and to implore pardon.

I authorise you to apprise officially our friends the Consuls-General, that these troubles may be considered as entirely dissipated.

No. 54.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 6.)

(Extract.) *Alexandria, July 23, 1840.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that the Egyptian steamer "Nile" returned at 7 o'clock this morning from Constantinople, having on board Sami Bey, late Special Envoy to the Sublime Porte. He was immediately received in quarantine precaution by Mehemet Ali, with whom he remained alone about three hours. The interview took place at the Pasha's bath; and on the return of his Highness to his palace, he made no mention or allusion to his conversation with Sami Bey. The persons about the Viceroy, however, whisper that the mission to Constantinople has entirely failed, and, to use their own words, that Sami Bey has returned as he went.

I am this moment informed, that four line-of-battle ships, of which two are Egyptian and two Turkish, have received orders to prepare for sea, and are supposed to be destined for the coast of Syria.

Little has transpired as to the negotiations of M. Périer, of whose presence here I informed your Lordship in my despatch of the 16th instant.

M. Périer, however, took an opportunity yesterday evening to inform me, that the news of the Pasha having proposed to yield the Turkish fleet has produced a strong sensation at Paris; and that the Government, believing that the Pasha had become less inflexible in his policy, had sent him to Egypt, in order to use his efforts towards bringing his Highness to reason, by representing to him that the Five Great Powers are now united in their determinations as to the Egyptian Question, and prepared to employ force, if reason and persuasion shall prove unavailing.

The communications I now transmit from the British Consuls at Beyrout and at Damascus, will inform your Lordship of the latest events connected with the abortive insurrection in Syria. On this subject, I have little to add, except the following passage extracted from a letter of Captain Napier, dated Beyrout, July 15.

He writes, "The Pasha's troops marched out yesterday morning, and, although they met with no resistance, they set the whole country in a blaze, convents and all. I wrote a very strong letter to the Egyptian Admiral, which I begged him to communicate to Abbas Pasha.

"Mr. Wood was sent here by Lord Ponsonby, and he came off a few days ago, bringing petitions from the poor mountaineers to the Sultan and the French and English Ambassadors. He landed again early this morning, and brings off news that the insurgents are divided among themselves; have been abused by many of their Chiefs; are badly armed; and, by all I can collect, unless they are succoured with aid and ammunition, the insurrection will be put down very shortly, and then will finish all hope of Syria being released from the power of Mehemet Ali, by the efforts of the inhabitants themselves.

I beg leave to inclose copies of the letter to which Captain Napier alludes in the above extracts, and of the reply made by his Excellency Solyman Pasha.

Captain Napier also informs me of the fact, that the Emir Halil, son of the Emir Bechir, has abandoned the insurrection, with which he had taken part, and that he has resumed his allegiance to Mehemet Ali.

P.S.—I have this moment obtained the particulars of the naval force mentioned in the first portion of this despatch.

It is to be composed of the

Egyptian line-of-battle ship	No. 9.	Halep - -	100 Guns.
Ditto.	No. 12.	Beny Scuef -	102 ,,
Turkish line-of-battle ship	No. 9.	Bergy Zaffar	70 ,,
Ditto.	No. 7.	Tesleriffie -	96 ,,

Which force, it is said, I do not know how truly, is intended to bring back the troops under the command of Abbas Pasha in Syria, which formed the expedition lately sent from this port.

Inclosure 1 in No. 54.

Captain Napier to the Rear-Admiral commanding the Egyptian Squadron at Beyrout.

Her Majesty's ship "Powerful,"
Sir, *Beyrout, July* 14, 1840.

I OBSERVE with pain and regret, that a general conflagration began in the mountains a few hours after the march of the troops from this place. Without at all entering into the question of whether the inhabitants at Lebanon are right or wrong in rising in favour of the Sultan, I do not conceive that the Generals of the Pasha of Egypt can be justified in carrying on the war against them, in the barbarous manner I see is now in operation.

I write to you, Sir, as an Egyptian Admiral, and the officer holding the highest office now in Beyrout, to request you will immediately communicate to His Highness Abbas Pasha, the horror I feel at witnessing such acts of useless barbarity, which must lead to the destruction of thousands of women and children, who can take no part in the insurrection.

His Highness Abbas Pasha may rest assured that the Five Great Powers of Europe, who are now treating the Eastern Question, will not view with pleasure the manner he has adopted of putting an end to the insurrection.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) CHARLES NAPIER,
Captain.

Inclosure 2 in No. 54.

Solyman Pasha to Captain Napier.

THE paper which has been sent to us in English, with its Arabic translation, from the senior officer, Captain Napier, commanding the English vessels in the port of Beyrout, has reached us; from its Arabic translation we have understood its meaning.

On our arrival at the place called Ain-el-Hajmigé, we there found 100 or 200 insurgents, not originally from this place, but from Balbec, and from the part inhabited by Mutualis, who had come since the insurrection of this mountain which has since submitted; they therefore, knowing themselves guilty, and feeling the hand of punishment, in order to stir up the inhabitants, set fire to the different villages, saying, "Why have you submitted, and have given up your arms? We, therefore, choose to serve you in this manner," and to which the Christians of the mountains can attest and affirm.

The above-mentioned insurgents, being at a place called Mulay, opposite the camp, some Albanians were sent against them, and drove them away after a fight, when, on pursuing them, the aforesaid insurgents, according to their promise, burnt the villages which they met with in their flight, and so gained the

heights of the mountains; even two of these individuals were caught and brought in armed, but no injury was done them, and they were allowed to go, after being furnished with a teskareh for their safe conduct.

The villages of Haded, Babda, Soäfet, and other large villages like them, besides others near them, which are under us, have asked for security (Iman), which has been granted them; and they have submitted peaceably, and have given up their arms. Nothing has been done to them, only at the expulsion of the above-mentioned insurgents, they took from them their arms, &c. The cavalry of Kabal being, like us, troops, they know very well the laws of war, and therefore those who are led astray must expect to be killed, destroyed, &c., which they deserve, as they are not children; still quarter (security) is given them, as they may have been misled by the insurgents; even those who are found wounded after battle, are not destroyed. But if his Excellency the above-mentioned senior officer, intends making any observations with regard to the movements or actions of the camp, then it does not appertain to us to answer; we cannot naturally but follow the instructions of our Master his Highness the Viceroy.

In consequence, all such answers can be given only by His Highness the Viceroy, our Master, and the Consuls-General residing in Alexandria, who alone are competent to do it, and which we beg to notify to your Excellency.

(Signed) SOLYMAN PASHA.

No. 55.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 6.)

(Extract.) *Alexandria, July* 24, 1840.

I INCLOSE a letter I lately received from Mr. Wood.

Inclosure in No. 55.

Mr. Wood to Colonel Hodges.

Her Majesty's ship "Cyclops,"

(Extract.) *Beyrout, July* 3, 1840.

I HAVE been directed by his Excellency Lord Ponsonby to proceed to Syria on a special commission, and have reached this port to-day, on board Her Majesty's ship "Cyclops."

No. 56.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 9.)

My Lord, *Paris, August* 7, 1840.

THE King and the Royal Family left St. Cloud on Wednesday evening for the Château d'Eu.

Having heard that the President of the Council intended to follow His Majesty to that residence last night, and to be absent from Paris for some days, I went yesterday to the Foreign Office to see his Excellency before his departure.

I told him that I had not paid him this visit for the purpose of making any communication from my Government, for my messenger from London had arrived that morning, and had brought me no instructions (though I owned to him I expected them) to make any observations on the Ordinances which had appeared in the "Moniteur" of Saturday last, and which, unfortunately, having the appearance of menace, might naturally have provoked a demand for explanation. I observed, that the moderation and calmness of my Government were also shown by its not having called upon Parliament for a vote of credit for the

augmentation of our naval force, notwithstanding the official announcement of the military and naval armaments of France.

I trusted that this moderation and this confidence in the continuance of peace would calm the public mind in France, which had been so unnecessarily excited; and that the press—at least that part of it which was under Ministerial influence—would not continue its invectives against England; and that the two countries would not be stimulated into war by the violence of newspapers, when there existed no real ground of quarrel between them.

M. Thiers assured me that he had endeavoured to restrain the violence of the press, and particularly the personal attacks on your Lordship; but the writers in these papers (*bons citoyens*, he called them) felt strongly the affront that had been offered to France by her exclusion from the position of influence she had a right to occupy in the affairs of Europe; and the giving vent to these feelings could not be prevented.

M. Thiers then adverted to the suppression of the insurrection in Syria, which insurrection he was persuaded had accelerated, if not caused, the conclusion of the Treaty between the Four Powers. He had never the slightest doubt of its suppression, and he could not but be surprised at measures having been taken on the expectation of its succeeding.

With respect to the conditions of peace between the Porte and Mehemet Ali, he said, if the Pasha chose to accept the conditions of peace proposed to him by the Porte at the instigation of the Four Powers, France would not oppose his acceptance of them. But he thought that Mehemet Ali would not consent to evacuate Syria, and the less so, as he understood that the proposition was accompanied by the degrading notification that only ten days would be allowed to him to give an answer to it.

M. Thiers then added, that though France would not oppose any arrangement to which Mehemet Ali chose to consent, France would not suffer conditions to be imposed upon him by force without her intervention. I observed to M. Thiers, that if France had no objection to the conditions, but only to the imposition of them by force, that I had no doubt (the influence of France being so irresistible at Alexandria, under the present circumstances) that if France advised the Pasha to accept those conditions, he would yield to that advice. He answered, that I was mistaken in this supposition: Mehemet Ali was a man, like Napoleon, who would risk "le tout pour le tout;" and that he had only that day had a letter from M. Eugène Périer, now at Alexandria, who wrote, "C'est un homme de bronze." Upon my asking whether he expected that Mehemet Ali would order the army of Ibrahim to march upon Constantinople, he answered, "we are too much interested in preventing it, not to use our utmost efforts to deter him from it."

M. Thiers said he should not return to Paris till Monday evening or Tuesday, and that he expected to meet M. Guizot at the Château d'Eu.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 57.

Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 10.)

(Extract.) *Beyrout, July* 8, 1840.

TWENTY-FOUR signatures of Emirs and Sheiks are affixed to the declaration of deposition from his authority, of the Emir Bechir, and I expect to hear of its being carried into effect immediately, if even his death be not decided upon. Four of his grandsons are hostages at Beyrout. They are favourable to the revolt.

Hitherto, every attempt of the troops to penetrate into Lebanon has failed. That mountain may be compared to a vast natural citadel, filled as it is with a warlike population, and its defiles and entrances susceptible of strong and easy defence.

The Turkish force, landed from the fleet, consists of about 4,800 men. They also are disaffected and ready to revolt. They repeatedly refused to march against the insurgents, alleging that they were sent

merely to garrison the towns; and it was only on the departure of the fleet that Solyman Pasha ventured to order them out, as previously the combined Turkish force outnumbered the Egyptians.

No. 58.

Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 10.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, July* 30, 1840.

YOUR Lordship's despatch, inclosing copies of the Convention for the pacification of the Levant, reached me on Monday last at Krasnoé-Selo, where I had been invited by the Emperor to assist at the manœuvres.

The Russian Government is much gratified at the conclusion of this Convention, and feels entire confidence in the success of the proposed arrangements.

No. 59.

Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 10.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, August* 1, 1840.

YOUR Lordship's despatches to the 21st of July, were delivered to me on the 29th instant, by the messenger Waring.

I saw Count Nesselrode yesterday. His Excellency expressed much satisfaction at the late news from London; and upon my asking what accounts had arrived from Syria, his Excellency said that the insurrection would greatly facilitate the arrangements necessary for carrying the proposals of the Four Powers into effect.

He told me that two divisions, of 15,000 men each, stationed in the Crimea, would be held in readiness to embark, if necessary, for the defence of Constantinople; but he was desirous that the contingency requiring the active co-operation of Russia in the field, might not arise.

No. 60.

Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 10.)

(Extract.) *Berlin, August* 5, 1840.

I DO not remember any event to have occurred since I have been at Berlin, which has given so much satisfaction as the signature of the Convention by England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia. No doubt the satisfaction would have been greater, had the Government of France thought fit not to have separated their policy from that of the Four Powers; but the determination of the French Government to adhere to a line chalked out for themselves made every one see, that concession to their dictation would submit the Continent, not to the will of the French Government, but to the capricious will of the French press; for in this case, the press of France has made the Government bow to its decision. Such a state of things would not long have been bearable. Every one capable of forming a political opinion, sees that the success of the views of the Four Powers will secure to Europe many years of peace, whilst submission to the views of France would place it on a foundation of sand.

Yesterday the telegraph announced the intention of the French Government to call out 150,000 men, and to arm and man several ships of war. I saw Baron Werther after he received the news; he told me that he regarded the measure as wise, from its tendency to calm the French, who would probably be as well satisfied with the display of force as with action, but that it caused no apprehension to the Prussian Government.

Count Bresson has held to me moderate and reasonable language. The Ministers of the minor States are unanimous in their approbation of the Convention. The ratification of the Convention will be sent to England to-day.

No. 61.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 13.)

My Lord, *Paris, August* 10, 1840.

I AM confined to my room by indisposition, but M. Thiers paid me this day a visit upon his return to Paris from the Château d'Eu, and I had some conversation with him relative to the present state of the Eastern Question. His tone was more calm and moderate than when he last conversed on this subject, and he was much pleased with the conciliatory language towards France, of your Lordship's speech in the House of Commons last week upon the Convention of the 15th of July. He was not, however, he said, without anxiety lest events might arise which would disappoint his wishes for the preservation of peace; but means, he thought, might be devised for averting a misunderstanding.

Upon my asking him what were the means to which he alluded, and saying to him, that I was sure any suggestion he might make for the attainment of that object, which was consistent with the honour and dignity of England, would be favourably listened to by my Government, he answered, that he could say nothing to me, the Ambassador of England, which would not be considered as official; and intimated, that the French Government could not, under the present circumstances, make any suggestion; and he then went on to say that much would depend, in the first place, on the manner in which Mehemet Ali received the propositions of the Four Powers: and secondly, on the proceeding subsequently adopted by them, in the case (which he thought almost certain) of their rejection by the Pasha. He thought it not improbable that the intervention of France might be asked for by Mehemet Ali, but expressed doubts whether the French Government would acquiesce in that demand; and whether the dignity and interest of France would not be better consulted by waiting in observance of what was going on, than by entering into any negotiation relative to the conditions of peace between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan.

M. Thiers told me that the strictest orders had been given to the French Admirals on the Levant station, to regulate the movements of the ships under their command, so as to avoid all collision with the British naval force, and he hoped that analogous instructions had been given to the British Commanders. But, added he, if a blockade of Egypt and Syria be instituted, our commercial ships may not consider that according to the Maritime Law of Nations, such blockade is legal; he remembered that during the late civil war in Spain, there was a question of blockading the ports occupied by the troops of Don Carlos, and that the law authorities of England had decided that the English Government had not the right to blockade them.

If American merchantmen, or French merchantmen, bound to a port of which the Sultan is Sovereign, were captured, their owners would apply to their respective Governments for redress, and he knew not how those Governments could refuse compliance with such application.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 62.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 13.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, July* 26, 1840.

SINCE I last had the honour of addressing your Lordship, in my despatch of the 23rd instant, respecting the mission of M. Périer, I have acquired information, that his negotiations with His Highness the Viceroy have entirely failed.

I am assured that the propositions and advice tendered to the Pasha by M. Périer, on the part of the French Government, were repulsed with something resembling anger. They are said to have been no sooner made, than distinctly rejected by His Highness. M. Périer will return to Toulon to-morrow, and having no other present means of transmitting this communication to your Lordship, I avail myself of the kind offer of this gentleman to take charge of it.

The fact of the inflexible determination of Mehemet Ali, has been confirmed in a subsequent conversation with the British Consul in this port, to whom he said, "England will not have me as the friend of the Porte, then she shall have me as its rebel. Henceforth I will not pay to the Sultan one para of tribute, nor will I yield one foot of territory."

I do confess, that the stand now taken by Mehemet Ali and his language baffle my comprehension. The Pasha is not a heated enthusiast, of light actions and empty words; nearly half a century of successful fortunes have been the fruits less of hazard than of uncommon prudence. Yet this bearding of all Europe, supposes either blind and uncalculating insanity, or a firm reliance on some means of safety, some element of defence, invisible to the generality of men. From Europe, Mehemet Ali can have no right to expect support; neither can he deem his own force competent to so unequal a struggle; and, indeed, he does not put it forward prominently as any assurance for his success.

Mehemet Ali is an aged man, but he is full of life, vigour, and intellect. I have before given my opinion to your Lordship, that I believe him capable, if pushed to the last extremity, of adopting some resolution at once desperate and formidable. I become more and more impressed with the belief, that the Viceroy feels his strength to consist not in his fleets and his armies, but in his power of doing mischief, of creating, as a last resource, some general conflagration, and producing confusion, whence might spring new interests, new combinations, and new chances in his favour.

It is far less likely, that he looks forward to any serious differences between the Great Powers, than that he contemplates the decomposition of the Turkish Empire. Repeatedly he has asserted, that he is able at any time to revolutionize the dominions of the Sultan. Whether his boast be true or false, I know not. That his agents are widely disseminated through European Turkey; that his partisans are numerous; that his reputation is high; that several districts of the Empire have lately evinced symptoms of feverish action; that the majority of the population is Christian; are facts generally notorious.

These may have had a great effect in nourishing the exaggerated pretensions of the Viceroy, and perhaps have become the origin of those incendiary projects which he may seek to oppose to measures of coercion.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 63.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 13.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, July* 27, 1840.

IN the evening of yesterday, I received information, through the Prussian Consul-General, of a conversation that had passed between Count Medem and the Pasha, relative to his late offer to restore the Turkish fleet to the Sublime Porte.

Mehemet Ali is stated to have expressed himself in angry terms, at the refusal of Rechid Pasha to allow Ahmed Pasha to return in command of the fleet to the Bosphorus. The Pasha then, in plain and distinct terms, told the Russian Consul-General, that his offer to the Porte had been, to restore the ships, men, and officers, one and all, without distinction as to rank or person; that since the Porte had objected to receive the Capudan Pasha, he conceived himself free to rescind his offer; and that it now remained for him to consider whether he should carry his intentions into effect. But, he added, in any case, the fleet shall remain here for some time longer.

Count Medem remonstrated with the Pasha upon this change of his inten-

tions, and said, that he conceived he had not the power to retract his offer, having officially and unsolicited communicated to the Representatives of the Five Great Powers his determination to restore the Turkish squadron, unconditionally, to the Porte. To which the Pasha replied, "The Porte declares her hands to be tied; that she is no longer a free and independent State; that her powers and interests are confided to the Great European States; why, therefore, should I restore the fleet to them? By doing so I would only furnish weapons to be used hereafter against myself." Count Medem assured him, that unless he fulfilled his promise, and immediately sent back the fleet to Constantinople, no reliance could be placed upon either his last or future promises. Mehemet Ali then said, "I do not say that I shall not return the squadron, nor do I say that I will; I shall think over the matter."

This circumstance will convince your Lordship of the want of good faith in Mehemet Ali; and I trust that it will awaken a conviction in all the Great European Powers, of the necessity of promptly coming to such a decision as to convince the Pasha of Egypt, that their will and interests are not to be treated with the derision and contempt with which all previous communications have been received by him.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 64.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 14.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 19, 1840.

REAR-ADMIRAL SIR JOHN LOUIS arrived here last night in the "Hydra" steamer. His object is to see this place, and he will leave it in a few days.

Sami Bey, the Emissary sent here by Mehemet Ali, has sailed this day in the "Nile" Egyptian steamer.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 65.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 14.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, July* 22, 1840.

ON the 18th, the French Ambassador reiterated his efforts to persuade the Turkish Government to come to an immediate arrangement with Mehemet Ali, saying, that the mission of Sami Bey was an act of submission made by Mehemet Ali, and that the Pasha would immediately restore the Ottoman fleet; that despatches had arrived direct from France in a steamer, in eleven days, urging the immediate arrangement; and that another steamer had taken M. Eugène Périer to Alexandria to engage Mehemet Ali, to make some abatement in his demands, which he, (the Ambassador,) hoped might be obtained, &c.

To this pressing application the Turkish Government replied, that the mission of Sami Bey was not an act of submission; that the Ottoman fleet being the property of the Sultan must be restored, sooner or later, to its lawful owner; and that the Sublime Porte would not deviate from the policy it had adopted, nor act without the concurrence of the August Allies; that if Mehemet Ali made propositions to the Porte they should be taken into consideration, and if they appeared reasonable, the Porte would then send them to its Allies, and consult with them thereupon, &c. Having positive knowledge of the foregoing, I sent an instruction to the Dragoman to be delivered to Rechid Pasha, as follows:—

"You will offer my best compliments to his Excellency, and my congratulations upon the display of firmness and sound policy, so conspicuous in his conduct in the whole of the arduous affair of Egypt.

"I should have deeply lamented any concession to the Pasha of Egypt; I know that persons the best qualified to judge of his secret purposes are convinced,

that it was not his intention to restore the Ottoman fleet; and I believe, that if now it be his intention to do so, he is acted upon by the dangers in which he finds himself, and which force him to seek his advantage in the act which it is asserted he will perform.

"I concur in the views of the Turkish Government respecting the fleet, that it must be restored sooner or later; and I entertain a strong opinion that it is not impossible but the return of the fleet at this moment, under the conditions which were annexed to it by Mehemet Ali, might be highly mischievous to the Sublime Porte: Mehemet Ali proposed to send the fleet back, under the command of his son, Said Bey. Mehemet Ali has placed a large number of his own men in the fleet, and it may be, that he will place more of them in it whenever he shall send it back. If, by such management, Mehemet Ali can obtain the real controul over the fleet, which is not only possible, but easy, that fleet, when it shall arrive here, will be the master of the Dardanelles and of the capital; and, acting in unison with the partisans of Mehemet Ali, will render the Divan a cypher, and His Imperial Majesty the Sultan will be compelled to move only in the manner in which Mehemet Ali shall order his creatures to direct. I have, in pursuance of my duty, written to Her Majesty's Admiral at Vourla, to explain to him the view I have of this matter.

"I will take this opportunity to offer an observation for his Excellency's consideration. The main, indeed the only, argument of the supporters of the cause of Mehemet Ali against that of the Sultan, rests upon the magnitude of the Pasha's power, and the difficulty, or, as they state it, the impossibility of compelling him to return to his duty, and to restore the provinces he has taken by force from his Sovereign. This argument has already received a signal contradiction from the events in Syria; but, supposing it to be uncontradicted, and that it could still be said of Mehemet Ali, that he is too powerful to be coerced, must it not follow that he will be more difficult to be coerced, after he shall have been established as the legitimate ruler of the territories he demands? If the Powers of Europe have now hesitated to employ force against him, will they be more ready to employ it when he is stronger? And if Mehemet Ali should violate the new engagements which it is proposed should be made, as he has violated those that ought to have bound him hitherto, will the Powers, in that case, be more likely to act against him? or will they not be much more likely to listen to the arguments the French have used on the present occasion, and which will apply much more forcibly to the new state of things? It appears to me that this observation affords good reasons why the Sublime Porte should continue to refuse to violate its agreement with its August Allies, and to listen to the counsels of the French Ambassador.

"When the situation of Mehemet Ali is examined it will be seen, that he is almost under the necessity of making new conquests. Egypt is nearly exhausted, and Syria also; the population of the countries under his rule has been diminished one-half, and what remains of it consists of old men and children for the most part. The system of the Pasha lays waste every thing; it is essentially the destroyer of the sources of strength and wealth, and seems to produce only licentious armed plunderers for the profit of their Chief. Mehemet cannot long exist without new countries to despoil; he has already turned his eyes to the Pashalic of Bagdad and other parts; and if he should seize upon them, who will resist him, after he shall have been placed in that situation of power by which he will become the rival of the Sultan under the flimsy disguise of vassalage? I have shown, that the European Powers would have stronger reasons then, than are now advanced for their present conduct, to induce them to abstain from interference; and it is too probable, that the subjects of the Sultan might be dazzled by the successes of Mehemet Ali, and incline rather to submission to his will, than to resistance of his power.

"These are only a portion of the evils that I apprehend from the counsels of the French and the supporters of Mehemet Ali. There are many others of serious magnitude which I will not describe; but who can imagine that internal peace, the obedience of the people, the execution of the laws, or the reform of abuses, can be in existence in the Ottoman Empire, when its finest provinces are in the hands of a rival family whose interest it must always be, to keep up disorder, that there may not grow up a strength sufficiently great to place those new dignities and territories in danger? It would appear, that the crown of the

Ottoman family is put in peril whenever Mehemet Ali shall be recognized as the lawful proprietor of the government of any portion of Syria."

I hope that, in holding this language, I have been speaking in exact conformity with your Lordship's views.

No. 66.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 14, 1840.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the language which, as reported in your despatch of July 22, you have held to Rechid Pasha, with the view of confirming the Turkish Government in its determination not to make a separate arrangement with Mehemet Ali.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 67.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 14, 1840.

YOUR Excellency's despatches to the 10th of August have been laid before the Queen.

I have to express to your Excellency the sincere gratification which Her Majesty's Government derive from learning that the tone of M. Thiers has become more calm and temperate, and more in accordance with those friendly relations which it is so much the wish of Her Majesty's Government to see maintained between the two countries; and nothing certainly shall be wanting on the part of Her Majesty's Government which can be deemed compatible with the interests, the honour, and the engagements of Great Britain, to encourage and increase the return of friendly feeling on the part of France.

Her Majesty's Government have learnt, with especial satisfaction, that orders have been sent to the French fleet in the Mediterranean to avoid all collision with the British naval force; because Her Majesty's Government have not been without apprehension that some indiscreet act on the part of the naval officer commanding the French fleet might bring on events which both countries would have reason to deplore, but for which, in such a case, the French Government alone would be responsible.

Your Excellency may assure M. Thiers, that the British squadron will studiously avoid anything which may be calculated to bring on unprovoked collision with the French ships; but the British Admiral has orders which he must execute; and of course he cannot permit himself to be thwarted or obstructed by any foreign force in the execution of those orders.

Your Excellency may, however, inform M. Thiers, that he is perfectly correct in his supposition as to the manner in which Her Majesty's Government understand the Law of Nations as applicable to Blockade; and the Four Powers who have signed the Convention of the 15th of July, stand in this respect, with regard to the Sultan, just in the same relation in which France, England, and Portugal, stood to Spain, by virtue of the Quadruple Alliance. The Four Powers cannot be at war with Mehemet Ali, any more than the three could be at war with Don Carlos, because no Power can be at war with the subject of another State; and as a commercial blockade is a purely belligerent right, the Four Powers cannot exercise that right of blockade against Mehemet Ali. But a Sovereign may lawfully interdict communication with any part of his territory which is in rebellion against his authority, and may prevent supplies of all kinds from being furnished, either by sea or land, to such of his subjects as may be in revolt against his authority, and therefore the Sultan might, with respect to Syria and Egypt, take measures which his Allies would not be entitled themselves to take.

With respect to the notion that Mehemet Ali might ask for the intervention of France, it is needless for me to point out to your Excellency that, in the situation in which these affairs now stand, it would be impossible for the Five Powers to accept the interposition of France between them and Mehemet Ali.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 68.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 19.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 1, 1840.*

I INCLOSE a Report from Mr. Wood, dated 22nd July. I presume your Lordship will have received from Mr. Consul Moore, his Reports upon the subjects of affairs in his Consulate. I nevertheless send what he has written to me.

Mr. Wood says, that very slight assistance and encouragement from the Porte would have secured the defeat of the Egyptians.

I have also the honour to forward copy of a Petition to His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, from the Syrians, which is signed by several Chiefs.

I likewise inclose copy of a Petition to Her Majesty's Ambassador, from the Syrians, signed by the Chiefs.

I inclose also copy of a Petition to the French Ambassador, from the Syrians, signed by the Chiefs; and a Report from Mr. Consul Werry at Damascus, bearing upon the affair of the insurrection.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 68.

Mr. Wood to Viscount Ponsonby.

Her Majesty's Ship "Powerful,"
My Lord, *Beyrout, July 22, 1840.*

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that on the 5th instant an action took place at Saida between the insurgents and the Egyptians. The former were about 1,500 in number, and the latter amounted to nearly 6,000. Notwithstanding this disparity of numbers, the insurgents drove the Egyptians into the town with a loss of 105 men killed. I hear, however, from good authority, that the number of muskets that were found missing, was 300. The Druses lost thirteen men in all.

On the 4th instant, the Egyptian forces collected at Beyrout, amounting to above 12,000 men, composed of Egyptians, Turks, and Albanians, and commanded by Solyman Pasha and Abbas Pasha, ascended the mountains, and have reached the town of Hammana, where they expected to have formed a junction with Osman Pasha, who has a division of 5,000 men under him, encamped at Merge, on the plains of the Bekaa.

The success of the Egyptians on this point is chiefly owing to the assistance of Emir Halil, one of Emir Bechir's sons, who joined Abbas Pasha with about 800 of his retinue, on the evening previous to his march. The mountaineers were taken by surprise, and abandoned three of their villages on the approach of the enemy, who burnt and destroyed them, as also the palaces of two princes, and two convents, namely, Der Kala and Mar Roccos, the monks of which latter place were steeped in oil by the Albanians and burnt alive. I will abstain from enumerating the other enormities committed by this licentious soldiery.

The day after this event, I was informed by Sheik Salik, of the family of Habëish, the promoters and supporters of the insurrection, that Abbas Pasha, after reaching the summit of the first range of Lebanon, divided his troops into two divisions, one of which he directed to penetrate to Selima, the residence of

Emir Haidar, taking in its way the village of Brumana, but that the Druses forced it back on the first column that had taken the road to Hammana.

He also informed me, that a body of 2,000 men from the camp of the insurgents on the mountains of Tripoli, were on their march to join the Druses under Emir Ali, in order to attack Osman Pasha, and destroy that corps of the Egyptian troops before it could be reinforced.

Emir Hangiar, Prince of Balbec, Chief of the Mutualis, has abandoned lately the service of the Viceroy, to which he had been forced, and has joined the insurgents. I understood from Sheik Salik, that Emir Hangiar has about 3,000 armed followers that are to join the insurgents of the mountains of Beshairi, above Tripoli. The Mutualis possess also some Cavalry.

On the 12th instant, a collision took place between the insurgents and the garrison of Tripoli. The insurgents, as usual, got some advantage over the Egyptians, who have taken shelter under the guns of the castle.

The mountaineers on this point are rather numerous, holding one of the strongest positions in Mount Lebanon, are better organized, have the nephew of Emir Bechir to direct their movements, and have erected magazines. It is said they possess 4,000 stand of arms, which are always kept at the camp; but they are greatly in want of ammunition.

It was reported yesterday, that the Egyptian troops in the mountains were to return to Beyrout, as the insurgents had laid down their arms; and this morning, in order to ascertain the real state of things, Captain Napier and myself ran down the coast in the "Cyclops" steamer. I landed at Zouk and Djebail, where I learnt that Emir Halil was at the village of Gazir, with only 200 followers, endeavouring to persuade the insurgents to deliver up their arms, otherwise, they would expose themselves to have their houses burnt, and their families molested by the Albanians; and that while some of them had submitted, others again had entirely abandoned their villages and had gone to join their countrymen in the Haouran, to defy again the power of Mehemet Ali.

The reports in circulation are so contradictory, and the insurgents are so little united among themselves, that it is very difficult at this moment to come to any just conclusion on the state of the insurrection; but I believe it to have lost much of its importance since the Emir Bechir has openly joined the Egyptians to suppress it. Nevertheless, were any Europeans to assist them with a few thousand muskets and ammunition, the whole of Syria would be instantaneously in arms again; and I cannot help believing, that if the Emir Bechir permitted the insurrection to gain strength for six weeks, before he interfered, it was in the hope that some European Power would have come forward to support it, but that finding no one disposed to extend to these poor mountaineers a helping hand, the expedition sent against them from Egypt allowed him to vacillate no longer, but obliged him to join it in order to save himself and family.

The Syrians have desired me to transmit their Memorials to His Highness the Sultan, and to your Lordship, which I have the honour to do herewith, as also a copy of the one addressed to M. de Pontois, together with their translations.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) RICHARD WOOD.

P S.—The immediate departure of the steamer "Cyclops," leaves me no time to send a translation of the Memorial to the Sultan.

Inclosure 2 in No. 68.

Translation of a Petition (in Copy) from the Nations and Inhabitants of Mount Lebanon and Syria, to Sultan Abdul Medjid of Constantinople.

A Petition.

WE humbly supplicate, at the threshold of the Divan of the Mighty Sovereign, the Benevolent and Just, the Venerated Authority and Daring Lion, the Lord of the Sword and of the Pen—(viz. of Death and Mercy)—the Shadow

of God over the Earth, our Honoured Sultan, Abdul Medjid Khan, may God perpetuate the days of his flourishing Reign for ever and ever, Amen.

That the frightful tyranny and the horrible oppression and cruelty under which Mehemet Ali Pasha has belaboured us—(he who pretends to be as one of your Majesty's slaves, but who, in fact, has dared to be treacherous to your Most Illustrious and Venerated defunct Father, of blessed memory, and whose abode now may be Paradise)—have compelled us to throw ourselves at the feet of your Imperial Throne, which is adorned with the rays of Justice and Mercy,—spreading our supplicating arms towards your Majesty's Paternal and Sublime Clemency, that you may be pleased to turn your eye towards our protection and safety,—knowing as we do how vast and extensive the Equity of your Majesty's Government, which is so renowned throughout the world,—and how immense and unlimited your Majesty's Mercy and Clemency; wherefore our hearts burn with the fire of the desire of attaining that happiness also, which is enjoyed by all those fortunate beings who are your subjects. What crime have we committed to cause your Majesty's resplendent face to be turned away from us, and thereby we should be left to be thrashed under the edges of an unbearable tyranny and of an unsupportable iniquity and oppression, while our fathers and forefathers, ever since a period of four hundred years, have continually enjoyed the happiness and comfort of the protection of your Majesty's Imperial Standard? We are their sons, and prepared to follow their steps, that we may inherit the same happiness which they enjoyed for so many centuries, to the great glory of your Majesty's Imperial Dynasty.

We therefore pray and supplicate your Paternal Benignity and Clemency not to abandon us, and to let it be said that a vast and numerous population has been left to be immolated as a sacrifice to the selfish ambition and sordid avarice of a single man, a tyrant, totally void of feeling and humanity, who not only proved himself ungrateful to, and forgetful of, your Majesty's great bounty to him, but dared, most perfidiously, to turn his sword towards your Sacred Person. Seeing ourselves thus placed in this most wretched and miserable condition, bordering on the last degree of our total ruin and annihilation, we have got up and raised your Majesty's mighty Standard in defence of the legitimate and lawful rights of your Imperial Sovereignty over us, for which we shall continue to fight to the last breath of our existence; and therefore we trust to the Divine aid of the Almighty, and in your Majesty's assistance, to overpower that common Enemy of yours and ours, and to drive him away from your Dominions.

Hence, we again supplicate and implore the Throne of your Majesty's Universal Mercy and Clemency, to turn your Royal Face towards us with your mighty aid and assistance,—especially, our said Enemy having stopped all the roads against us by land and also by sea, and thereby prevents us receiving any supply of the necessary warlike stores we are in need of; and as we have no fleet to oppose his, we most earnestly entreat your Majesty to afford us the needful recourse for the opening of the roads, &c.; otherwise, we shall be, God forbid, unavoidably placed in a most distressing state, and in imminent ruin. But no, never will your Majesty's Imperial and Paternal Mercy and Benevolence allow such a disastrous calamity to befal us! And we pray the Almighty God to preserve your Sacred Person, and to perpetuate the days of your Glorious Reign with happiness and victory.

Signed and Sealed by your Majesty's Slaves.

(No Date.)

THE NATION OF MUTUALI.
THE NATION OF DRUSE.
THE CHRISTIAN NATION.
FARIS HONEISH.
FRANCIS EL-HAZEN, *Seraskier.*
HAIDAR KAYED BEY.
YOUSSUF SHEHAB, and
FARIS SHEHAB.

Inclosure 3 in No. 68.

Letter addressed by the Inhabitants of Mount Lebanon to His Excellency the British Ambassador.

(Translation.)

After the usual Compliments,

THE humanity which so eminently distinguishes all the acts of the British Government,—the readiness with which it steps forward to the assistance of the oppressed,—the anxiety that it displays to make the people of the East share in the benefits enjoyed by that portion of their fellow-creatures that are blessed with happier Governments,—embolden the Syrians to appeal to England for her mediation to rescue them from the destruction with which Mehemet Ali threatens them now.

Since the invasion of Syria by Mehemet Ali, he has trampled us under foot by an oppression which knows no bounds, and by a tyranny the most atrocious and cruel.

For the last eight years, we have acceded to all his demands, and because he has left us nothing more to give him, he menaces us with extermination; nor will his unbounded rapacity be satisfied until he drinks the very blood of our children, and satiates the licentiousness of his soldiers with the honour of our families. Driven to despair, we have taken up arms for the defence of our lives, and to guard our dwellings from fire and ourselves from the sword with which he threatens to erase us from among nations.

Abandoned by the world, we implore the protection of Great Britain. In the humanity of her Government, and in the generosity of one of the greatest and most powerful of nations, rest all our hopes in this cruel crisis. All that we demand is, to be allowed to return to our legitimate Sovereign Abdul Medjid,—a natural desire coming from loyal subjects. Why should two millions and a-half of His Highness' subjects be sacrificed to the personal ambition of one man, who, himself, forgetful of the benefits conferred upon him, has turned his sword against the bosom of his own Sovereign?

We have but one prayer—we seek but to be allowed to enjoy, in common with the rest of His Highness' subjects, the rights and privileges secured to them by the Hatti Sheriff; and it is in this hope that we submit our petition to your Excellency, praying that you will be pleased to lay it before the "Divan" of Great Britain, the Ally of our August Master Abdul Medjid, with a request that we may be honoured with speedy glad tidings, before we are utterly destroyed by the Governor of Egypt.

May the Almighty prolong the days of your Excellency with happiness to the end of time.

(Signed) (L.S.) PRINCE FARIS SHEHAB.
(L.S.) EMIR HAIDAR.
(L.S.) SHEIK FARIS HABEISH.
(L.S.) PRINCE YOUSUF SHEHAB.
(L.S.) SHEIK FRANCIS EL-HAZEN, *Seraskier.*
THE MARONITE NATION.
THE DRUSE NATION.
THE MUTUALIS.

Inclosure 4 in No. 68.

Letter addressed by the Inhabitants of Mount Lebanon to His Excellency the French Ambassador.

(Literal Translation from the Arabic.)

After the usual Compliments,

THE painful news that have reached us by the newspapers, have struck a terrible blow to Syria,—they have torn the hearts of men, women, and children, now menaced to be exterminated by Mehemet Ali, to whom France has deigned

to grant her powerful protection. Can she be possibly ignorant of the evils this man has made us suffer since fortune has made him master of Syria? They are innumerable. Suffice it to say, that the most distressing vexations, and the most cruel oppression, have driven us to despair, and have renewed in us the ardent desire of returning to the paternal government of our August Sovereign, Abdul Medjid. Is not this a legitimate desire from a loyal people? France, a nation so great, so magnanimous, that has extended liberty everywhere, that has for ages spilt so much blood to establish it in her own Government, refuses us to-day her powerful influence to obtain the enjoyment of the same good!

The French press says, "that France will not admit of any arrangement that has for basis the restitution of Syria to its legitimate Sovereign." Can it be so? the Syrians cannot believe it! The French nation, so generous, so civilized, cannot desire to see us crushed by a systematic oppression which alone distinguishes the Egyptian Government from others.

We wish but to be allowed to return to the protection of our legitimate Sovereign, whom we have not ceased to obey for the last four hundred years. We demand but to participate in the privileges and rights of the Hatti Sheriff which our gracious Sovereign has granted to all his faithful subjects, without exception, without distinction. We appeal to the justice of the French Government,—we supplicate the French nation at large, to assist us to obtain our demand. The most atrocious tyranny has compelled us to take up arms for the defence of our lives and the honour of our families, from the brutality of the Egyptian soldiery, or to bury ourselves in the ruins of our country. Our cause is a just one; and as such, we sincerely trust that the French Government will not abandon us in a moment so dangerous.

It is with this hope we submit to your Excellency this, our prayer, begging that you will be pleased to lay it at the feet of the throne of your August Master, the Ally of our gracious Sovereign, Abdul Medjid.

(Signed) (L.S.) PRINCE FARIS SHEHAB.
(L.S.) PRINCE YOUSUF SHEHAB.
(L.S.) EMIR HAIDAR.
(L.S.) SHEIK FRANCIS EL-HAZEN, *Seraskier*.
(L.S.) SHEIK FARIS HABEISH.

THE MARONITE
THE DRUSE
THE MUTUALI
} NATIONS.

Inclosure 5 in No. 68.

Mr. Cansul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) *Damascus, July* 20, 1840.

BY all the advices received here from Mount Lebanon, in the district of Der-el-Kamar and Mitten, the insurrection is terminated, or nearly so. The forces under Osman Pasha, which advanced from Zahlé along the Bekaa, to Hamana, and Kaffer Saloman, put him in immediate communication with the Emir Bechir, who it appears had a force of mountain partisans acting in his views, which neutralized the movements of the other revolted Emirs and insurgents. I hear that the troops under Osman Pasha pillaged and committed great barbarities on the villages of Furzool, Ber-el-Elias, Hamana, and some other places, on their march in the Bekaa to the foot of Mount Lebanon. It is stated that some part of the population has surrendered their arms; and the advices of the Emir Bechir to his Excellency Sheriff Pasha state the insurrection to be finished in that direction.

Mr. Consul Moore will inform your Excellency of the events passing in his immediate vicinity, and whether or no the insurrection is in the ascendant or on the decline; or whether some negotiations for conditions are pending; but on the best information I can obtain, the insurgents have wholly disappeared on the direct road between this city and Beyrout.

The country to the north and south of this district is at present quiet, and in this city everything is equally so. There have been rejoicings and salutes fired four times a-day, of twenty-one guns each, for the birth of the Sultan's daughter.

By my latest advices from Aleppo, Ibrahim Pasha remained encamped at Ain-el-Jossef, a few hours distant from Marash. He had but few forces with him. Those at Orfa, on the east of the Euphrates, both regulars and irregulars, continued in that district without any alteration.

The insurgent Mutuali, Emir Mahomed Harfoursh, is just come into town to make his submission, on pardon, to the Government.

Inclosure 6 in No. 68.

Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Ponsonby.

[The same as No. 51, page 68.]

No. 69.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston—(*Received August* 19.)

My Lord, *Töplitz, August* 13, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship copy of a letter which I addressed to Prince Metternich, requesting that orders might be sent to the Austrian Consul at Alexandria, to conform his conduct to that of Colonel Hodges, in case the latter should feel himself called upon, under your Lordship's orders, to quit Egypt.

The inclosed extract of a letter from the Prince contains his answer, which is favourable.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 69.

Lord Beauvale to Prince Metternich.

Mon Prince, *Töplitz, July* 31, 1840.

YOUR Highness will see, by the inclosed extract from an instruction to Colonel Hodges, that in a certain specified case he is authorized to embark. It is highly to be desired that the language and conduct of the Consuls of the Four Powers in Egypt should be identic; and, having little doubt of your concurrence in the propriety of that which is hereby enjoined to the British Consul, I venture to suggest to you the expediency of furnishing the Austrian one with a similar instruction.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 69.

Prince Metternich to Lord Beauvale.

(Extract.)

L'INTERNONCE a reçu l'ordre de s'entendre avec ses trois Collègues à Constantinople pour des directions uniformes à transmettre aux Consuls en Egypte. Les instructions auront, il n'est point permis d'en douter, répondu à cette intimation.

(Translation.)

Prince Metternich to Lord Beauvale.

THE Internuncio has received orders to come to an understanding with his three Colleagues at Constantinople, with respect to the uniform directions to be sent to the Consuls in Egypt. The instructions, it is not to be doubted, will have corresponded with this intimation.

No. 70.

Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 20.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August* 7, 1840.

COUNT NESSELRODE informed me this morning, that although the French Government naturally felt annoyance at the conclusion of the Convention of the 15th of July, and though M. Thiers had at first appeared disposed to adopt a hostile tone, nevertheless his accounts from Paris were satisfactory. Count Nesselrode read me Baron Brunnow's and Count Pahlen's last despatches, and they completely agree with the intelligence contained in Mr. Bulwer's despatches of the 17th and 20th of July. Count Pahlen remarks on the silence observed towards him by M. Thiers, with whom he had had late conversations, in which no allusion whatever was made to the Question that now agitates the Cabinets of the Great Powers.

Count Pahlen reports, that Russia is held up at Paris as the originator of this conspiracy against France, as it is there called; that Russia has to bear the greatest share of the odium cast on the Allies; and that he finds that the best line of conduct for him to pursue, is to keep, as far as possible, aloof from all discussion on the Question.

Count Nesselrode told me that he had otherwise nothing to communicate, but that all the necessary steps to carry out the stipulations of the Convention were taken, and that he should send a messenger to London to-morrow with the ratifications.

Upon my inquiring as to the troops in readiness to be sent from the Crimea, his Excellency said that he believed 20,000 infantry might be immediately embarked, but he still hoped that the contingency requiring the appearance of this force before Constantinople, would not occur. The French Ambassador received a messenger on the 5th instant; he has not, however, made any communication to the Russian Government, nor has Count Nesselrode seen him for some time.

To judge from the language held to me yesterday by M. de Barante, the French Government must have considerably modified its tone since it first became acquainted with the Convention of the 15th of July.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) J. A. D. BLOOMFIELD.

No. 71.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 23.)

(Extract.) *Paris, August* 21, 1840.

THE journals having generally stated that M. de St. Aulaire had been sent to his post for the purpose of obtaining the consent of Prince Metternich to a plan which would constitute France mediator in the Eastern Question, and that he had completely failed in his object, some of the newspapers have declared, that M. de St. Aulaire was never sent on any such mission, and therefore has not failed in the execution of it. I have heard, however, from good authority, that the instructions of M. de St. Aulaire tended to the object supposed; and that after his interview with Prince Metternich, he wrote word "qu'il en était profondément affligé."

No. 72.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 23.)

My Lord, *Paris, August 21, 1840.*

A VARIETY of reports having been prevalent yesterday, and a considerable fall in the funds having taken place, I called this morning on M. Thiers, to inquire from him whether he was acquainted with any cause for the alarm? He told me, that he was not; but he mentioned, in the course of conversation, that he understood that an English military force had been sent from Gibraltar to some destination not known.

As I was unacquainted with the circumstance, except through the newspapers, I could give him no answer thereupon; but added, that I had also heard that a French expedition of some kind was preparing. M. Thiers replied, that there was no truth in this rumour; that as much as the other Powers did, France would do; but that she would certainly not be the first to commence any measures calculated to lead to general hostilities.

The tone, indeed, of M. Thiers and his friends, I should say, is at this moment much more moderate than formerly; and the reaction to be expected in the country, and more especially amongst the capitalists, has in a certain degree taken place. But, in the mean time, the preparations for reinforcing the Marine are pursued with vigour; the order has been given for the purchase of 25,000 horses; and the belief in a war, though perhaps not the wish for it, gains ground.

Various plans have, I fancy, been brought before the Cabinet; among which I should be inclined to place the seizure of some position in the Mediterranean, which would be justified to us in the same manner as the recent armaments, viz., as a means of preventing more direct measures of a warlike nature, by satisfying the honour and *amour-propre* of the French nation, and which would be presented to that nation, of course, in a different manner.

But nothing, as far as I can learn, has been decided upon; and a sort of general disposition to await the issue of events, has succeeded to the recent wish for some violent and decided course of conduct. An effort to come to an accommodation would perhaps be made if any opportunity occurred; or, on the other hand, any circumstance tending greatly to inflame the state of opinion, might bring things to a crisis, and lead M. Thiers to risk everything on some warlike proposition.

At the present moment the French Government seems to me, like the public generally, agitated and uncertain, open to any resolution which a chance might suggest, and certainly labouring under considerable apprehensions as to its own responsibility, and to the general prospect of affairs, which, owing to M. de St. Aulaire's reports, seem more gloomy, and less capable of a solution favourable to its own views, than it thought them before.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 73.

Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 24.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, August 11, 1840.*

YOUR Lordship's despatches to the 31st of July, by the "Sirius" steamer, were delivered to me yesterday.

I saw Count Nesselrode in the evening. He read me his last despatches from Paris, which were chiefly occupied with an account of the sudden departure of M. de St. Aulaire for Vienna, and the attempts which were making by the French Government to prevent the ratification of the Convention.

His Excellency showed me also his accounts from Alexandria. They confirm the report of the suppression of the insurrection in Syria, and state that

the communications made by M. Périer to Mehemet Ali, are calculated to raise the Pasha's hopes of obtaining support from France, in the event of coercive measures being adopted against him.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) J. A. D. BLOOMFIELD.

No. 74.

Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 24.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, August 15, 1840.*

YOUR Lordship's despatches to the 4th of August, were delivered to me on the 12th instant by the Messenger Waring.

I have communicated to Count Nesselrode the substance of your despatch of that date, and before this despatch reaches London your Lordship will probably have heard from Baron Brunnow, of the arrival of the ratification of the Convention of the 15th July.

There was no necessity for urging Count Nesselrode to avoid delay, for not a moment was lost in preparing the ratifications.

The vain efforts of the French Government to dissuade the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin from ratifying the Convention, are known here; and the dignified conduct of Her Majesty's Government in neither demanding explanations from that of France, on the late ordinances for increasing the army and navy, nor asking supplies from Parliament, are appreciated by the Imperial Cabinet.

His Imperial Majesty's satisfaction at the ability displayed during the late negotiations at London has been publicly acknowledged, by conferring fresh decorations on Baron Brunnow. Count Nesselrode has read me his last despatches from London. They contain an account of a conversation with your Lordship, which is related with great clearness; and all Baron Brunnow's late reports are extremely satisfactory to the Imperial Government.

No. 75.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 27.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, August 6, 1840.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 16th of July, together with its inclosures.

Under all the circumstances, I think it most prudent to adopt entire reserve until that arrival at Alexandria which your Lordship announces.

Great agitation prevails in the public mind at Alexandria. Mehemet Ali remains inflexible; arms and warlike stores are continually forwarded from the Arsenal at Cairo. The forts of the coast are being completed in guns, powder, and munitions. Such activity is used, that the whole of last night was occupied in this precautionary operation.

Ibrahim Pasha the younger has returned from Arabia, and has reached Cairo; he will probably be followed by the troops he lately commanded. It was yesterday reported that he had been ordered to proceed to Syria. To-day it is pretended that he is not to remove from Cairo; I shall, of course, watch carefully the movements of his division.

Mehemet Ali has lately told the Russian Consul-General, very distinctly, that he will not yield the Turkish fleet; he added, that he is ready to meet any measure of coercion, by ordering his son to march instantly on the capital.

It is only by some very rapid and vigorous blow that this question can be speedily and successfully settled. Distant dangers will neither excite the fears, nor induce the submission of Mehemet Ali.

Syria is pacified for the moment. Mr. Consul Moore tells me that about 4,000 stand of arms have been given up to the Egyptians; he also informs me

that six Emirs and fifty-five Sheiks of the late insurgents are prisoners, and are about to be punished.

Reports of an action near Tripoli are entirely without foundation; but Commodore Napier writes, that Syria is in a very unsettled condition.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 76.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 27.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 5, 1840.*

HAVING well considered the matter, I yesterday morning recommended to my Colleagues to communicate to the French Ambassador the fact of the signature of the Convention between Her Majesty and the Four Great Powers. My Colleagues approved of it, and desired me to carry it into effect; and I wrote the letter that evening of which I have now the honour to inclose a copy.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 76.

Viscount Ponsonby to M. de Pontois.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, *Therapia, August 5, 1840.*

OUR Colleagues of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, and myself, are anxious to manifest our respect for your Excellency's person, and the high value at which we estimate the relations of friendship by which our several countries are happily united at this moment, and we hope that your Excellency will accept as the evidence of the sentiments here expressed a communication which, in the name of our Colleagues, I have the honour to lay before you.

Your Excellency is acquainted with the ardent wishes of the Governments of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, to devise measures in concert with the Government of France for the pacification of the Levant, by the united efforts of the Five Powers; and your Excellency knows that the Government of France has not thought itself at liberty to concur in opinion with the other Great Powers, friends of France, upon that point.

This is the subject of the communication I am charged to make to your Excellency, and to acquaint you that the Courts of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, have signed a Convention with the Sultan, for the purpose of securing the future peace of Turkey.

The Four Courts, we are convinced, in making this Convention, have felt the greatest regret to find themselves acting in an affair of European interest, without the warm concurrence of France; but that regret, it is evident, must be diminished by the consideration, that the co-operation of the French Government has been denied, in consequence of motives which induce the French Government to abstain from taking part in measures of coercion against Mehemet Ali, but not from the desire or intention of the French Government to oppose the measures which the Four Courts, in concert with the Sultan, might judge to be necessary in order to obtain the compliance of the Pasha of Egypt. It is to be presumed, therefore, that the Four Courts must entertain the hope, founded upon the known friendly feelings of France, and upon the evident interest of all, that the separation which has taken place will be of short duration, and that the powerful influence of the French Government at Alexandria will be exerted to persuade Mehemet Ali to submit to the arrangements which the Sultan will propose.

Having thus, in compliance with the wish of our Colleagues, made the foregoing communication, mainly for the purpose of manifesting our esteem and regard for your Excellency's person, I have nothing more to say, than to assure your Excellency of my highest consideration.

(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 77.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 27.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, August 5*, 1840.

I BEG your Lordship to pardon me, if I do not send you a detailed account of proceedings here; for, in truth, I have not had time to do more than was necessary for me to do to forward the measures that have been resolved upon, and which will be immediately put in action.

The greatest promptitude appears to me to be necessary, to facilitate the accomplishment of the objects in view, without the effusion of blood; and this, I think, may very probably be accomplished by what has been done, for I expect that the Syrians will rise nearly as one man, when they hear that they are to receive aid; and I hope the Egyptian army itself, or at least many of the followers of Mehemet Ali, will abandon his fortunes, when they see that there is an irresistible strength opposed to him.

On the 3rd, in the morning, I received your Lordship's instructions of July 15; Baron Stürmer also received Prince Metternich's instructions, containing reports from London of the 16th July.

I proposed to our Colleagues of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, to visit Rechid Pasha; and his Excellency having been made acquainted with the Convention, and being ourselves agreed, we waited upon him in the early part of the night. It was there settled what should be done, in the following order:—

A formal Note, to be written by the Sublime Porte, confirming the adhesion of the Sultan to the Convention: the choice of an Envoy to Mehemet Ali, Rifat Bey, a good man, who will leave this on the 7th in the morning in a steamer, and go direct to Sir Robert Stopford, to whom I have written to notify the fact:

A frigate and a corvette, with 8,000 muskets on board, and the necessary ammunition, which are to set off on the 7th instant: three other vessels, one being, I believe, of the line, which are to take 5,000 or 6,000 men on board, to be landed in Cyprus, and orders to the Governor of that island to deliver to the order of Admiral Stopford, as much ammunition as may be found in the stores there.

It has been since determined by the Sublime Porte, that the Grand Vizier shall write a letter to the Emir Bechir, setting forth what has taken place; and also, that the "Article Séparé" shall be translated into Arabic, and circulated as widely as possible amongst the population of Syria.

Rechid Pasha proposes to name the Pashas who are to have the government of the countries to be taken from Mehemet and Ibrahim Pashas.

If the measures taken here are followed up actively elsewhere, and without delay, I anticipate the happiest results.

In obedience to your instructions*, I send Mr. Alison to Egypt with Rifat Bey.

I again beg to be excused for the hurried report I send home. I propose to despatch the Messenger Wright on Saturday, after Rifat Bey and the vessels shall have actually left this place for their destination.

I have given ample instructions to Mr. Wood, by letters sent to Admiral Stopford to be forwarded, and also instructions to Mr. Consul Moore. I hardly have a doubt that the Emir Bechir will abandon the Egyptians the moment he knows how matters are; and on this point your Lordship will be informed of the grounds I rest on, by the letters I will send on Saturday. I beg to call to your Lordship's favourable notice the good conduct of Mr. Wood. He has encountered also no small personal danger.

P.S.—At the moment of closing this despatch, I received the Official Note inclosed, being the ratification of the Convention by the Sultan in the manne therein described, and for the reason stated for its adoption.

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* Part I., page 701.

Inclosure in No. 77.

Rechid Pasha to Viscount Ponsonby.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Sublime Porte, le 5 Août*, 1840.

JE me suis empressé de mettre sous les yeux de Sa Hautesse la Convention conclue et signée à Londres le 15 Juillet dernier, entre la Sublime Porte d'une part, et les Cours de la Grande Bretagne, d'Autriche, de Prusse, et de Russie, de l'autre, pour la pacification du Levant, ainsi que l'Acte Séparé et les deux Protocoles qui y sont annexés.

Par suite d'une indisposition du messager porteur des originaux de ces différens documens, Sa Hautesse se trouvant, à son grand regret, dans l'impossibilité de remplir dès aujourd'hui les formalités voulues pour leur ratification, mais désirant en même tems constater un moment plus tôt sa complète adhésion aux dispositions qui en forment l'objet, elle a daigné m'ordonner de notifier à votre Excellence, qu'elle accepte et ratifie, sans la moindre réserve, dans leur ensemble comme dans leur détail, tous les Actes sus-mentionnés, et qu'elle est prête à concourir dès ce jour à l'exécution des mesures arrêtées dans ces mêmes Actes par la Conférence de Londres, ainsi qu'à celles que vous, M. l'Ambassadeur, et MM. vos Collègues, seriez dans le cas de lui proposer pour atteindre le but commun.

Je suis heureux de pouvoir annoncer en même tems à votre Excellence, que Sa Hautesse, en m'ordonnant de lui faire la présente communication, me charge de lui exprimer aussi la vive reconnaissance que lui fait éprouver l'éclatant témoignage d'amitié et d'intérêt que viennent de lui donner ses Augustes Alliés, dont la bienveillante co-opération en cette circonstance est un gage assuré du retour de l'ordre et de la tranquillité dans le Levant.

Recevez, &c.,
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères,
(Signé) RECHID.

(Translation.)

Rechid Pasha to Viscount Ponsonby.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Sublime Porte, August 5*, 1840.

I HASTENED to submit to His Highness the Convention for the pacification of the Levant, concluded and signed at London on the 15th of July last, between the Sublime Porte, on one part, and the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia, on the other, as likewise the Separate Act and the two Protocols which are thereunto annexed.

In consequence of the indisposition of the messenger who is the bearer of the originals of these different documents, His Highness, being, to his great regret, unable at present to perform the formal acts requisite for their ratification, but being desirous at the same time to record without loss of time his entire adhesion to the arrangements which are the objects of them, has been pleased to order me to acquaint your Excellency that he accepts and ratifies without the slightest reserve, all the above-mentioned Acts, in their whole as well as in their details, and that he is ready from the present time to concur in the execution of the measures settled by the Conference of London in these same Acts, as well as in those which you, M. l'Ambassadeur, and your colleagues, might see occasion to propose to him for the attainment of the common object.

I am happy to be able to announce to your Excellency at the same time, that His Highness, in ordering me to make to you the present communication, enjoins me to express to you also the lively gratitude which he feels for the striking testimony of friendship and interest which has just been given to him by his august Allies, whose friendly co-operation in this matter is an assured pledge for the return of good order and of tranquillity in the Levant.

Receive, &c.,
The Minister for Foreign Affairs,
(Signed) RECHID.

No. 78.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 30.)

My Lord, *Paris, August* 28, 1840.

IN a conversation I had yesterday with M. Thiers, I thought I perceived a strong desire to arrive at some arrangement, by which France could be admitted into the Treaty between the Four Powers; which he coupled, however, by stating, that he would make no sort of propositions; and added, that though there was every desire in his mind for peace, there were things (what those things were he did not state) which, sooner than submit to, he would set fire to the four corners of the world; and that he was certain he could carry the French nation with him. An expression which convinced me, that he was in a struggle of some kind upon the subject.

The "Constitutionnel" also of this morning, M. Thiers' paper, speaks in the strongest terms as to the new offence which would be given to France, were measures to be adopted in the East for carrying out the Treaty, previous to its ratification. Other circumstances, also, have come to my knowledge, which induce me to believe, that the President of the Council has held higher language in the Cabinet than some of his Colleagues. My idea indeed still continues, that, events taking their course, the time will probable come, when M. Thiers will propose some plan of action, or his resignation; but, in the mean time, a peace party is certainly growing up; and I understand, this being the season when the "Conseils Généraux" assemble, that some pains will be taken to ascertain the general state of feeling amongst the influential classes in the provinces. The Journals, however, still hold warlike language, such as is always sure to excite the feelings of the people of this country.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 79.

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 31, 1840.

WITH reference to the conversation which you have had with M. Thiers, as reported in your despatch of August 21, I have to acquaint you, that there is no foundation for the report which you mention of an expedition from Gibraltar; but if there were, provided the destination of such expedition were in conformity with the engagements of the Treaty of July, it is not easy to see upon what ground France could take umbrage at it. On the other hand, however, a French expedition to seize, without provocation, some portion of the Sultan's territory, be it Candia or any other place, would be an act of wanton hostility against the Sultan, totally unjustifiable, and very serious in its character and possible results.

No Power has the slightest intention or thought of attacking France; but then France cannot expect that other Powers should see with indifference a wanton attack made by her upon a State which has given her no offence, and which she would select as an object of attack, merely because she supposes it weak, and incapable of repelling or resenting an outrage.

I am, &c.,

Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 80.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 31.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, August* 8, 1840.

THE Ottoman steamer "Tahri Bahri," left Constantinople on the 7th instant, at one o'clock, having on board Rifat Bey, bearer of a summons to Mehemet Ali, in pursuance of the Acte Séparé of July 15, 1840.

I directed Mr. Alison to accompany Rifat Bey.

No. 81.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 31.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, August* 8, 1840.

I THOUGHT it would be consistent with the desire your Lordship has to keep upon good terms with the French Government, to make the Ambassador acquainted with the fact of the signature of the Convention of the 15th of July. I therefore proposed to my Colleagues to make the communication, and they assented; but desired me to be their organ. I wrote in consequence the letter which I inclose, to which I received the reply also inclosed.

Inclosure 1 in No. 81.

Viscount Ponsonby to M. de Pontois.

[See Inclosure in No. 76, p. 90.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 81.

M. de Pontois to Viscount Ponsonby.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Thérapia, ce* 6 *Août*, 1840.

J'AI reçu la lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire hier pour me faire connaître qu'une Convention a été signée entre les Cours d'Autriche, de la Grande Bretagne, de Prusse, et de Russie, d'une part, et la Sublime Porte de l'autre, relativement aux Affaires d'Orient.

En vous priant d'agréer, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, et de faire agréer à MM. les Représentans des Cours d'Autriche, de Prusse, et de Russie, mes remercimens de cette communication,

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,
(Signé) ED. DE PONTOIS.

(Translation.)

M. de Pontois to Viscount Ponsonby.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Therapia, August* 6, 1840.

I HAVE received the letter which your Excellency did me the honour yesterday to write to me, to inform me that a Convention relative to the affairs of the East, had been signed between the Courts of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia, on the one part, and the Sublime Porte on the other.

In requesting you, M. l'Ambassadeur, to accept, and to cause to be accepted by the Representatives of the Courts of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, my thanks for this communication,

I have the honour to be, &c.,
(Signed) ED. DE PONTOIS.

No. 82.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 31.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 9, 1840.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy of the instructions I forwarded to Colonel Hodges by Mr. Alison.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 82.

Viscount Ponsonby to Colonel Hodges.

Sir, *Therapia, August 6, 1840.*

A CONVENTION has been concluded at London, on the 15th July last, between the Courts of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, on the one part, and the Sublime Porte on the other, for the pacification of the Levant.

You are in possession of copies of that Convention, and of the three pieces which are annexed thereto, namely, an Acte Séparé and two Protocols, all bearing the same date.

You will therein see, that several measures have been determined upon by the Powers, for the purpose of bringing Mehemet Ali to accept the arrangement that has been made, which will be notified to the Pasha by the Sublime Porte in form of a direct summons.

The Ottoman Government has named the Councillor of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rifat Bey, to be the bearer of the summons, which is founded, in all points, upon the Acte Séparé mentioned above.

Rifat Bey is to leave this to-morrow in one of the steamers of the Government, to proceed to Alexandria. He has orders to communicate with you and with your Colleagues of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, respecting all that concerns the accomplishment of his mission. You will, therefore, have the goodness to assist him by your most frank and zealous co-operation in the sense of the resolutions of the Conference at London, to determine Mehemet Ali to accept the arrangement proposed to him.

You will also consult with the British and Austrian Admirals upon the measures to be taken for the restoration of the Ottoman fleet, &c.

I have only further to recommend, in the most especial manner, that you will not neglect to employ every means to inform the people of Syria, as soon as possible, of the contents of the Acte Séparé, to the end that they may therein find motives for consolation and encouragement.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 83.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 31.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 9, 1840.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship copies of the letters I received from Mr. Consul Moore and Mr. Dragoman Wood, and also I inclose my instructions to those gentlemen.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 83.

Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) *Beyrout, July 25, 1840.*

LEBANON is a sleeping volcano, and its oppressed and exasperated inhabitants are only waiting a favourable moment to try once more the fortune of arms.

I have had with me two Sheiks who had entreated an interview for the purpose of expressing their sentiments and those of their countrymen. They seemed determined to address a Memorial through your Excellency to the British Government, stating their wrongs, and imploring its intervention.

But arms and ammunition and a nucleus, however small, are necessary to the success of the insurgents—with these Syria is free. It was more than I could calmly bear to see the tears on the cheeks of these venerable men, whilst in accents of despair they begged me to support their prayers for relief, and that the ships might not leave this place.

Abbas Pasha is at the Emir Bechir's residence, and the Emir Halil continues the work of disarmament; fugitives, however, daily leave the villages to gain the fastnesses of Lebanon. The idea of Mehemet Ali holding Syria otherwise than by an overwhelming military force is out of the question: he is abhorred, and never will be endured.

Near Tripoli there is still an insurgent force of from 4,000 to 5,000 men; they have cut off the water from that town, and lately defeated, with considerable loss, the troops who had made a sortie against them. They also got possession of a good supply of arms.

The "Edinburgh" is gone down to Tripoli, taking the passenger who came down by the "Cyclops."

The Albanians were last night embarked from this port for Tripoli to act against the insurgents.

Six insurgent Emirs who surrendered themselves to the Emir Bechir in this neighbourhood, are to be sent to Alexandria.

The disarmament in this vicinity goes on, but many fugitives escape to the fastnesses and to the camp near Tripoli.

Inclosure 2 in No. 83.

Mr. Wood to Viscount Ponsonby.

Her Majesty's Ship "Powerful,"
(Extract.) *Beyrout, July 24, 1840.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter of the 15th instant. Affairs have altered very little since I had the honour of writing to your Lordship under date the 22nd instant. The state of the insurrection has undergone no material change; and though I feel anxious to mention a few things that have occurred here, yet I think it of more importance to avail myself of the immediate departure of the "Edinburgh" for Tripoli, to

visit that part of Syria, where, from late intelligence, I believe an action took place between the insurgents and the Egyptians on the 20th instant, when the latter were defeated.

This goes far to prove what I had the honour to state to your Lordship relative to the strength and organization of the insurgents in the north. Here they are disarming the mountaineers, but slowly, as almost all have retired to their fastnesses. The Egyptian troops have not returned, which tends to show the difficulties they have to encounter in the execution of the service for which they first went to the mountains.

The Druses are in a most desperate state; they implore daily our assistance, and promise that if we give them the means, they will rise to a man. All they want is ammunition and arms: they possessed but very few at the commencement of the insurrection, and I believe the Egyptians have not been able to collect many of them. There was never, perhaps, a more favourable moment for separating Syria from Egypt, and carrying through Lord Palmerston's policy with regard to Mehemet Ali, and that without much sacrifice on our part. I am explaining to the Syrians the wishes and policy of Great Britain, &c., and the success that will necessarily attend its accomplishment, if they assist us in it by remaining firm and united among themselves. All this they understand perfectly well, but ask always for indirect assistance from us, otherwise they say they must be finally crushed.

The insurgents complain of the indifference of the Sublime Porte, and accuse it even of ingratitude. They say that the Porte could have devised the means of rendering them material assistance, either by sending them a Vizier to lead them; a Firman to some of their chief princes; or by sending ammunition and arms, &c. I have been endeavouring to exonerate the Porte; but what will mere words do, when so many strong facts may be brought forward to contradict them? They complain that the Governor of Cyprus has interdicted the merchants from sending over either corn, arms, or ammunition. All these circumstances are very discouraging, and they are fully aware of their forlorn and abandoned condition. It is a great pity, indeed, that so much apathy should have been shown by the Porte at a moment so favourable to its interests. The Syrians seem to feel this.

I feel positive that had the expedition been prevented from landing, Syria would have been free at this moment. I need not add, my Lord, that I will spare no exertions to follow up your Lordship's views, notwithstanding the difficulties with which I am surrounded, as also the difficulties of my position; for the arguments I may use with the Syrians may be very proper, but they wish to see them seconded by facts, which is a very natural feeling. I am anxious, indeed, to hear what assistance the Porte is likely to give them, and still more to be made acquainted with the intentions of Her Majesty's Government.

Inclosure 3 in No. 83.

Viscount Ponsonby to Mr. Consul Moore.

Sir, *Therapia, August* 4, 1840.

HER Majesty's Government, in conjunction with the Governments of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, have determined and agreed to succour the Syrians, who will receive support immediately from them and the Sublime Porte, in such manner as those Powers may judge it proper to give it, provided the Syrians return fairly to the allegiance they owe to the Sultan, and reject the yoke of Mehemet Ali. You will take care to address this to the inhabitants of Lebanon and Syria Proper. I do not authorize you to do so to the inhabitants of Palestine, because I am not acquainted with the facts that may take place with relation to that country; but you will not say one word about Palestine, either one way or the other.

If the troops serving the Pasha will return to their proper obedience to the Sultan, they will be rewarded as well as pardoned, the same as the Ottoman sailors and others. The Sublime Porte will send arms and ammunition to Syria, &c., as soon as possible; those who are wise will take the side of the Sultan, and those who are foolish may continue to depend upon a Pasha of Egypt in defiance of the Great Powers. You will state these things to whomever you please, but

you will not do it in a formal manner, nor in writing, because the Sublime Porte will send its own proclamation, and this is intended to prepare people to receive it. You must not act officially, but you have my authority for making the facts known.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 4 in No. 83.

Viscount Ponsonby to Mr. Wood.

(Extract.) *Therapia, August* 4, 1840.

I HAVE received your letter, and am glad you are going on to Tripoli. I hope you will receive this without delay. I send it to the Admiral to be forwarded to you instanter. I direct you to declare in my name loudly to whoever chooses to hear you, that I am authorized to acquaint the Syrians that the British Government, in unison with the Governments of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, will protect the Syrians who shall return to the direct obedience of the Sultan; that the British fleet is ordered to succour the Syrians; and the Sublime Porte will send arms and ammunition; that if the troops now acting under the orders of the Pasha of Egypt will return to their duty to the Sultan, they will be pardoned and rewarded by the Sultan; that the same will be done for the sailors on board the fleet in the possession of Mehemet Ali. Measures are taking to cut off the communication by sea between Alexandria and Syria; and other measures for the protection and support of the Syrians are preparing as fast as possible. Tell the Emir Bechir that he had best make haste to return to the Sultan, or he will have to abide the consequences of having opposed himself to the united force of the Sultan, England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia; and he will merit his fate if he does not at once abandon the Pasha.

You must take care not to speak of Palestine, because I am not certain what may be done about that country.

No. 84.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 31.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, August* 9, 1840.

I INCLOSE Mehemet Ali's letter to the Grand Vizier, of the 1st instant.

Inclosure in No. 84.

Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier Raouf Pasha.—August 1, 1840.

(Traduction.)

TOUT le monde connait la haine mortelle que Son Altesse Hosrew Pacha me portait.

Ayant, cependant, à cœur le bien et le salut de la religion de la Sublime Porte, et de la nation orthodoxe Musulmane, je n'ai pas manqué, comme votre Altesse sait, de faire, de tems à autre, sous le Viziriat de Hosrew, des protestations de dévouement, et de prier que l'on s'entendît pour fermer la plaie qui saigne.

Quoiqu'il en soit, pensant qu'une fois Hosrew déposé, tous les Ministres, d'accord entr'eux, et dépouillés de toute haine, ne s'occuperaient que du bien de la religion et de notre Sublime Porte, j'ai voulu faire preuve de mes intentions loyales; et à cette fin, j'ai envoyé à votre Altesse Sami Bey, pour qu'il présentât à Sa Majesté Impériale mes félicitations sur la naissance d'une Princesse, et qu'il vous complimentât sur votre avènement au poste de Grand Vizir.

Sami Bey n'avait pas de mission spéciale de parler d'affaires; mais comme

il est bien avant dans ma confidence, et qu'il connait bien mes affaires, il était autorisé, pour le cas qu'on voulût lui faire des questions, à dire ce qu'il savait et de ma position et de mon langage.

Sami Bey de retour ici, m'a informé de l'entretien qu'il avait eu dans quelques endroits, d'où il conste qu'il n'a été consenti à aucun accord. Mais Sami Bey m'a rapporté aussi l'accueil extrêmement flatteur qu'il a reçu et les honneurs dont il a été l'objet de la part de Sa Majesté Impériale ; aussi m'empressai-je de saisir l'occasion d'un bâtiment à vapeur Français qui était sur le point de partir d'ici, pour adresser séparément à la très-illustre et très-vertueuse Validé Sultane, ainsi qu'à votre Altesse, deux lettres de remercimens.

En conséquence de cette heureuse harmonie, j'ai voulu prouver par des faits la fidélité que je professe ; et le parti de rendre la Flotte Impériale était pris lorsqu'on a entendu parler de la solution de la question dans la Conférence de Londres ; et l'on a acquis la certitude que la solution a eu lieu d'une manière contraire aux intérêts de toute la nation Mahométane. J'ai, en conséquence, remis mes affaires entre les mains de la Providence Divine pour tous les cas ; et j'ai entrepris en y employant tout mon zèle et toute mon activité, de mettre les pays qui font partie des Etats de Sa Hautesse, et qui se trouvent placés sous mon autorité, ainsi que les populations, à l'abri d'un coup de main de la part de l'ennemi de notre foi ; et je mets tous mes soins à faire faire les fortifications nécessaires sur les côtes de l'Egypte et de la Syrie, conformément à mon premier plan.

J'ai aussi expédié en toute hâte une personne dans le Hedjaz, avec ordre de ramener toutes les troupes régulières qui s'y trouvent ; et afin que pendant leur absence la tranquillité et la sûreté des deux Villes Saintes ne soient compromises, j'ai donné à l'Emir de la Mecque, Méhémed Ben Aou, le commandement d'un corps suffisant de troupes irrégulières qui se trouve là ; mesure propre, pour à présent, à y maintenir le bon ordre autant qu'il est possible.

Je soupire jour et nuit en réfléchissant sur les dangers auxquels les Etats Musulmans vont être exposés ; sur les désordres qui vont survenir (Dieu nous en préserve !) parmi les populations. Une considération cependant me console : c'est que le Très-Haut, l'Etre plein de miséricorde qui a conservé cette bienheureuse nation pendant mille deux cent et tant d'années, daignera jusqu'à la fin la rendre victorieuse et triomphante.

J'ai considéré comme un devoir que de représenter à votre Altesse cet état de choses ; mais je jure sur mon Dieu, que l'idée de faire une menace ne m'est point passée par la tête.

Que ces représentations soient mises sous les yeux des Ministres Etrangers, ou qu'elles soient lues parmi la nation Musulmane, je n'ai là-dessus aucun égard, et je n'en suis pas intimidé.

Votre Altesse informée de ce qui a été dit plus haut, donnera les ordres qu'il lui appartient de donner.

(L.S.) MEHEMET ALI.

Le 3 *Djémazi-ul-Akhir*, 1256.

(Translation.)

Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier Raouf Pasha.—August 1, 1840.

ALL the world knows the mortal hatred which His Highness Hosrew Pasha entertained towards me.

Nevertheless, having at heart the prosperity and the safety of the religion of the Sublime Porte, and of the orthodox Mussulman nation, I have not failed, as your Excellency knows, from time to time, under the Viziriat of Hosrew, to make protestations of my devotion, and to entreat that an understanding might be come to, to heal the bleeding wound.

Be that as it may, imagining that Hosrew once deposed, all the Ministers, agreeing among themselves, and free from all animosity, would only occupy themselves with what was for the advantage of religion and of our Sublime Porte, I was desirous of testifying my loyal intentions, and for this purpose I sent to your Highness Sami Bey, in order that he should offer to His Imperial Majesty my congratulations on the birth of a Princess, and that he should compliment you on your attainment to the post of Grand Vizier.

Sami Bey was not specially commissioned to speak on business; but as he

is much in my confidence, and is well acquainted with my affairs, he was authorized, in case it should be desired to put questions to him, to say what he knew of my position and of my language. Sami Bey, on his return here, informed me of the conversations which he had in different quarters, from whence it is clear that no agreement has been come to. But Sami Bey also reported to me the extremely favourable reception which he met with, and the honours of which he was the object, on the part of His Imperial Majesty; wherefore I eagerly seized the opportunity of a French steam-vessel which was on the point of going from hence, to address two letters of thanks separately to the most illustrious and most virtuous Validé Sultana, as well as to your Highness.

In consequence of this fortunate harmony, I have been desirous of proving by my actions the fidelity which I profess; and the measure of restoring the Imperial fleet was adopted, when there was a talk of the solution of the question in the Conference of London; and it has been ascertained that such solution has taken place in a manner at variance with the interests of the whole Mahometan nation. In consequence, I have given up my affairs to Divine Providence in all contingencies; and I have undertaken, by employing all my zeal and all my activity, to place the countries, which form a portion of the dominions of His Highness, and which, as well as their population, are under my controul, in security from a sudden attack on the part of the enemy of our faith, and I employ all my care in causing the necessary fortifications to be made on the coasts of Egypt and of Syria, in conformity with my first plan.

I have also sent in all haste a person to the Hedjaz, with orders to bring back all the regular troops which are there; and in order that during their absence the tranquillity and safety of the two Holy Cities should not be compromised, I have given to Mehemed Ben Aou, the Emir of Mecca, the command of a sufficient body of irregular troops who are there; a measure calculated for the present to preserve good order there as far as possible.

I sigh day and night, while reflecting on the dangers to which the Mussulman States are about to be exposed; upon the disorders which (God preserve us from them!) are about to arise among the people. One consideration, however, consoles me: it is that the Most High, the Being full of mercy who has preserved this most happy nation during twelve hundred and odd years, will be pleased to render it victorious and triumphant even unto the end.

I have deemed it a duty to represent to your Highness this state of things; but I swear by my God, that the idea of menace has not entered my head.

Whether these representations be communicated to the Foreign Ministers, or whether they be read among the Mussulman nation, I care not, and I am not alarmed at it.

Your Highness being informed of what has been said above, will give the orders which it appertains to you to give.

(Sealed) MEHEMET ALI.

Djemazi-ul-Akhir 3, 1256.

No. 85.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 31.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 9, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you, that I have received officially from the Sublime Porte, notification of the departure, yesterday, of an Ottoman frigate, and a corvette, with arms and ammunition destined for the Syrian insurgents against Mehemet Ali. These ships are under the command of Mustapha Effendi, an officer who, during some years, was serving in British ships of war, and is esteemed to be a good sailor. He will give the arms and ammunition to the insurgents, when and where Admiral Stopford shall direct.

Three other ships are prepared to transport troops to Syria; but they must wait till transports are hired to convey the number of men destined for that service. They will also be directed to seek Sir Robert Stopford, and will proceed by his orders to Cyprus.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 86.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 31, 1840.

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your Excellency's despatches to the 9th of August.

With reference to your despatch of the 5th of August, I have to acquaint your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government approve the communication which you made to the French Ambassador, as stated in that despatch, respecting the signature of the Convention of the 15th of July.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 87.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 31, 1840.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government approve the measures which you took, as reported in your despatch of August 5, on receiving my instructions respecting the Convention of the 15th of July.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 88.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, August* 31, 1840.

HER Majesty's Government are glad to find, that the Porte is taking active measures to carry into execution the arrangements of the Convention of the 15th of July. Your Excellency will impress in the strongest manner upon the Turkish Ministers, that the success or failure of that Convention will depend upon their own energy or inertness.

Naval operations will, undoubtedly, do much towards compelling Mehemet Ali to abandon Syria; and whatever can be effected by naval means will be accomplished by Great Britain; but the process so performed would be long; and in order to bring matters to an early and decisive termination, some considerable pressure must be applied to Mehemet Ali by land.

Turkey is the Power that must find and furnish the means for producing that pressure; and this does not appear very difficult to be done, because Turkish troops, protected by a British squadron, and directed in their movements by the advice of British officers, could not fail to produce important and decisive results.

No. 89.

Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 31.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, August* 21, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 7th of August and its inclosure.

I saw Count Nesselrode yesterday. His Excellency told me that reports had reached him from Alexandria, stating that when Mehemet

Ali was informed of the negotiation of the Convention of July 15, he at once declared that he should order Ibrahim Pasha to march on Constantinople; and that, in consequence of this intelligence, Baron Lieven, an Officer of Engineers, who was employed on a similar service in 1833, has been despatched from hence, with some others, to Constantinople, to make arrangements for the possible appearance of the Russian force, and to get some fieldworks thrown up to protect the arrival of the first division.

He further informed me that they had calculated that Ibrahim Pasha would require six weeks to march from his present position to Constantinople; and upon my inquiring the total amount of the Russian force destined for this expedition, Count Nesselrode said that it would consist of 20,000 infantry, 800 cavalry (Cossacks), and seventy-two pieces of field artillery.

No. 90.

Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received August* 31.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, August* 22, 1840.

A MESSENGER from Paris arrived at the French Embassy early this week.

M. de Barante called on me yesterday and told me that he had not received any official instructions as to the language he was to hold at the present moment, but that he had been informed by M. Thiers, that he was to remain passive and await events.

After some conversation upon the general bearing of the Turco-Egyptian Question, M. de Barante said that he had heard that a Russian force was preparing to be sent to Constantinople. I said, only in the event of Ibrahim Pasha threatening an attack on the Turkish capital,—a contingency which we hoped would not arise; but that, at all events, the military movement of which he spoke, would not offer the slightest danger to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. M. de Barante replied, he hoped not; but he thought it dangerous in another point of view, as giving a fresh impulse to public feeling in France, which it would be almost impossible for his Government to withstand; and that he considered such a step fraught with the most serious consequences, and likely to put in jeopardy the peace of Europe.

No. 91.

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 31, 1840.

VARIOUS circumstances have prevented me from sooner transmitting to you, and through you to the French Government, some observations which Her Majesty's Government is desirous of making upon the Memorandum delivered to me on the 24th of July by the French Ambassador at this Court, in reply to the Memorandum which I had delivered to his Excellency on the 17th of that month; but I now proceed to do so.

Her Majesty's Government observed, with great satisfaction, the friendly tone of the French Memorandum, and the assurances which it contains, of the earnest desire of France to maintain peace, and to uphold the balance of power in Europe. The Memorandum of the 17th of July was conceived in a spirit of equal friendliness towards France; and Her Majesty's Government is as anxious as that of France can be, to preserve the peace of Europe, and to prevent any derangement of the existing balance of power.

Her Majesty's Government also saw with much pleasure the declara-

tions which the French Memorandum contains, that France wishes to act in concert with the other Four Powers in regard to the affairs of the Levant; that she has never been actuated in these matters by any other motive than a desire to preserve peace; and that in the judgment she has formed upon the propositions which have been made to her, she has never been influenced by any selfish interests of her own, being, in fact, as disinterested as any other Power can be, in the affairs of the Levant.

The sentiments of Her Majesty's Government upon these points are in all respects similar to, and corresponding with, those of the Government of France. For, in the first place, in the whole course of the negotiations which have been going on upon these matters during more than twelve months, it has invariably been the anxious desire of the British Government that a concert should be established between the Five Powers, and that all the Five should agree in a common course of conduct; and Her Majesty's Government feels that it can refer for proofs of this desire to the various propositions which from time to time have been made to the Government of France, and which are alluded to in the French Memorandum; and, in the next place, Her Majesty's Government can safely affirm that no Power in Europe can be less influenced than Great Britain is, by any selfish views, or by any desire or expectation of exclusive advantage to arise to herself out of the settlement of the affairs of the Levant; for, on the contrary, the interest of Great Britain in those affairs is identified with that of Europe at large, and lies in the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, as a security for the preservation of peace, and as an essential element in the general balance of power.

In these principles, the French Government has declared its full concurrence; and it has stated that concurrence upon many occasions, but especially in Marshal Soult's despatch of the 17th of July, 1839, which was communicated officially to the Four Powers; in the Collective Note of the 27th of July, 1839; and in the speech of the King of the French to his Chambers, in December, 1839.

In these documents, the French Government declared its determination to maintain the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire under its present dynasty, as an essential element of the balance of power, and as a security for the preservation of peace; and it also asserted in Marshal Soult's despatch, its resolution to oppose, by all its means of *action* and influence, every combination which might be hostile to the maintenance of that integrity and independence.

The Governments of Great Britain and of France are, therefore, perfectly agreed as to the objects at which their policy in regard to the affairs of the Levant ought to aim, and as to the fundamental principles by which that policy ought to be guided; and the only difference which exists between the Two Governments, is a difference of opinion as to what means are best calculated to attain the common end,—a point upon which, as the French Memorandum observes, various opinions may naturally be expected to exist.

Upon this point, there has, indeed, arisen a considerable difference of opinion between the Two Governments; a difference which seems to have become wider and more confirmed in proportion as the Two Governments have more fully explained their respective views; and which, for the present, has prevented the Two Governments from co-operating together for the attainment of their common object.

On the one hand, Her Majesty's Government has all along declared the opinion, that it would be impossible to maintain the integrity of the Turkish Empire, and to uphold the independence of the Sultan's Throne, if Mehemet Ali were to be left in the occupation of Syria. Her Majesty's Government has stated that it considers Syria to be the military key of Asiatic Turkey; and that, if Mehemet Ali were to continue to occupy that Province, in addition to Egypt, he would be able, at all times, to menace Bagdad to the South, Diarbekir and Erzeroum to the East, and Koniah, and Brussa, and Constantinople to the north; that the same spirit of ambition which has led Mehemet Ali on former occasions to revolt against his Sovereign, would soon prompt him again to take up arms for further

encroachment; and that, for this purpose, he would always keep a large army on foot. That the Sultan, on the other hand, must see the danger by which he would constantly be threatened, and must be obliged also to remain armed. That thus the Sultan and Mehemet Ali would continue to maintain large armies to watch each other; that collision must inevitably arise out of mutual suspicion and alarm, even if there were no intentional aggression on either side; that any such collision would necessarily lead to foreign interference in the interior of the Turkish Empire; and that such interference so occasioned, would produce the most serious differences between the Powers of Europe.

But her Majesty's Government has pointed out a danger still greater than this, as a probable, if not certain, consequence of the continued occupation of Syria by Mehemet Ali; and that is, that the Pasha, confiding in his military strength, and tired of his political condition of subject, should execute the intention which he frankly informed the Powers of Europe, two years ago, he would never abandon, and should declare himself independent. Such a declaration, on his part, would be an undeniable dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire; and yet that dismemberment might happen under circumstances which would render it more difficult for the Powers of Europe to co-operate together, in order to compel the Pasha to retract such a declaration, than it is for them now to combine, in order to force him to evacuate Syria.

Her Majesty's Government, therefore, has invariably contended that all those Powers who wish to preserve the integrity of the Turkish Empire, and to uphold the independence of the Sultan's Throne, ought to unite to assist the Sultan in re-establishing his direct authority in Syria.

The French Government, on the other hand, has argued that Mehemet Ali, if once secured in the permanent occupation of Egypt and Syria, would remain the faithful subject, and would become the firmest support of the Sultan; that the Sultan could not govern Syria, if he got it back again; and that the military and financial resources of that province would be more available for the Sultan's defence, when in the hands of Mehemet Ali, than if they were restored to the hands of the Sultan himself; that implicit reliance might be placed upon Mehemet Ali's abjurations of any further ambitious views, and in his protestations of devoted fidelity to his Sovereign; that the Pasha is an old man, and that at his death, in spite of any hereditary grant made to his family, the whole of his acquired power would revert to the Sultan, because all possessions in Mahometan countries, be their nominal tenure what it may, are practically nothing more than lifeholds.

The French Government moreover contended that Mehemet Ali would never of his own accord consent to evacuate Syria; and that the only means which the Powers of Europe could employ to compel him, would be, either naval operations, which would be insufficient, or land operations, which would be dangerous; that naval operations would not expel the Egyptians from Syria, and would only provoke Mehemet Ali to make an attack upon Constantinople; and that the measures which must be resorted to in such a case to defend the Capital, but still more any land operations by troops of the Allied Powers to expel Mehemet's army from Syria, would be more fatal to the independence of the Turkish Empire, than could be the state of things which such proceedings might be intended to remedy.

To this Her Majesty's Government replied, that no reliance could be placed on Mehemet Ali's present protestations; that ambition is insatiable, and only increases by success; and that to give Mehemet Ali the power to encroach, and still to leave within his reach objects to covet, would be to sow the certain seeds of future collisions; that Syria is not further from Constantinople than many well-administered provinces of other empires are from the capital, and might be governed from Constantinople, as easily as from Alexandria; and that it is impossible that the resources of that province could be as useful to the Sultan, when in the hands of a Chief who might at any time turn those resources against the Sultan, as they would be, if in the hands and at the disposal and command of the Sultan himself; that Ibrahim, having an army under his orders, has means to secure his own succession, at Mehemet Ali's death, to any authority

which Mehemet might die possessed of; and that it would not be fitting for the Great Powers to advise the Sultan to make an ostensible arrangement with Mehemet Ali, with a secret and reserved intention of breaking that arrangement on the very first occasion on which it might become applicable to events.

The French Government, however, still retained its opinion, and declined to be a party to any arrangement which included the employment of coercive measures against Mehemet Ali.

But the French Memorandum states that, "in the last circumstances "no positive proposition has been made to France, upon which she was "called upon to explain herself; and that, consequently, the determination "which England communicated to her in the Memorandum of the 17th of "July, no doubt in the name of the Four Powers, must not be imputed "to refusals which France has not made." This passage renders it necessary for me shortly to recapitulate to you the general course of the negotiation.

The original opinion entertained by Her Majesty's Government, and which was made known in June, 1839, to the other Four Powers, France included, was, that the only arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali which could ensure permanent peace in the Levant, would be that which should confine Mehemet Ali's delegated authority to Egypt alone, and should re-establish the direct authority of the Sultan in the whole of Syria, as well as in Candia and the Holy Cities; thus interposing the Desert between the Sultan's direct authority and the province to be administered by the Pasha; and Her Majesty's Government proposed that, as a compensation for the evacuation of Syria, Mehemet Ali should receive the assurance that his male descendants should succeed him as Governors of Egypt under the Sultan.

To this proposal the French Government objected, saying, that such an arrangement would undoubtedly be the best, if there were the means to carry it into effect: but that Mehemet Ali would resist it; and that any measures of force which the Allies might employ to compel him to yield, would produce consequences which would be more dangerous to the peace of Europe, and to the independence of the Porte, than the present state of things between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali could be. But though the French Government thus declined to agree to the British plan, yet for a considerable time afterwards, it had no plan of its own to propose.

However, in September, 1839, Count Sébastiani, the French Ambassador at the Court of London, proposed that a line should be drawn East and West, from the sea somewhere near Beyrout, to the Desert near Damascus, and that all to the South of that line should be administered by Mehemet Ali, and all to the North of that line, by the direct authority of the Sultan; and the French Ambassador gave Her Majesty's Government to understand, that if such an arrangement were agreed to by all the Five Powers, France would, in case of need, unite with the other Four in the employment of coercive measures to compel Mehemet Ali to submit to it.

But I pointed out to Count Sébastiani, that such an arrangement would be liable, though in a somewhat less degree, to all the objections which apply to the present relative position of the Two Parties, and therefore could not be agreed to by Her Majesty's Government; and I observed, that it appeared to be inconsistent that France should be willing to employ coercive measures against Mehemet Ali to compel him to subscribe to this arrangement, which would evidently be incomplete and insufficient for its professed purpose, and yet that France should refuse to employ coercive measures to compel Mehemet Ali to consent to the arrangement proposed by Her Majesty's Government, which even France herself admitted, would, if carried into execution, be complete and effectual for its purpose.

To this Count Sébastiani replied, that the objection felt by the French Government to employ coercive measures against Mehemet Ali, was founded upon domestic considerations; and that those objections would be removed if the French Government were able to show to the public and to the Chambers, that it had procured for Mehemet Ali the best

terms which could be obtained for him, and that he had refused to accept those terms.

This suggestion not having been adopted by Her Majesty's Government, the French Government, on the 27th of September, 1839, communicated officially its own plan, which was, that Mehemet Ali should be made hereditary Governor of Egypt, and of the whole of Syria, and Governor for life of Candia, giving up nothing but Arabia, and the district of Adana. The French Government, however, did not say that it knew that Mehemet Ali would consent even to this arrangement; nor did it declare that, if he should refuse to accept it, France would join in coercive measures to compel him to do so.

To this plan of course Her Majesty's Government could not consent, because it would be even more objectionable than the present state of things; inasmuch as by giving Mehemet Ali a legal and hereditary title to a third of the Ottoman Empire, which he now only occupies by force, it would at once be a virtual, and would at no distant time lead to a real dismemberment of that Empire. But Her Majesty's Government, in order to prove its anxious desire to come to an understanding with France on these matters, stated, that it would waive its well-founded objection to any extension of Mehemet Ali's authority beyond Egypt, and would join with the French Government in recommending to the Sultan to give to Mehemet Ali, in addition to the Pashalic of Egypt, the administration of the lower part of Syria, bounded to the North by a line drawn from Cape Carmel to the Southern end of Lake Tiberias, and to the Eastward by the Jordan, the Western shore of the Dead Sea, and by a line from thence down to the Gulf of Akaba; provided that France would engage to co-operate with the Four Powers in coercive measures, if Mehemet Ali should refuse this offer.

This proposal, however, was declined by the French Government, and that Government now declared that it could not possibly co-operate in any coercive measures against Mehemet Ali, and could not therefore be a party to any arrangement to which Mehemet Ali should not spontaneously consent.

During the time that this discussion had been going on with France, a separate negotiation had been carried on between Great Britain and Russia, with every detail and step of which, however, the French Government was regularly made acquainted. The negotiation with France was suspended for a time in the early part of this year, first by an expected, and afterwards by an actual, change of Ministry in France. But in the beginning of May, the Baron de Neumann and myself determined, on the part of our respective Governments, to make one more attempt to bring France to an agreement with the other Four Powers; and we resolved to submit to the French Government, through M. Guizot, another proposition for an arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali.

One objection which had been urged by the French Government to the last British proposal was, that, although it would give Mehemet Ali the strong defensive position extending from Mount Carmel to Mount Tabor, it would deprive him of the fortress of Acre. In order, therefore, to meet this objection, Baron de Neumann and myself proposed to M. Guizot, that the Northern Boundary of that part of Syria which should be administered by the Pasha, should be drawn from Cape Nakhora to the Northern end of Lake Tiberias, so as to include within its limits the Fortress of Acre; and that the Eastern Boundary should run down along the Western bank of Lake Tiberias; and thence, as before proposed, to the Gulf of Akaba. But we said, that the Government of this lower part of Syria could only be given to Mehemet Ali for his life; and that neither England, nor Austria, could consent to recommend the grant of hereditary tenure to Mehemet Ali in regard to any part whatever of Syria; and I stated, moreover, to M. Guizot, that this proposal was the utmost extent to which we could go in the way of concession, in order to obtain the co-operation of France; and that it was therefore our last offer.

The Baron Neumann and myself made this communication to M. Guizot separately; Baron de Neumann on one day, and I upon the next.

M. Guizot told me he would report to his Government the proposition I had made, and the statements with which I had accompanied it, and would let me know their reply whenever he should receive it.

Soon afterwards, the Plenipotentiaries of Austria, Prussia, and Russia stated to me, that they had reason to believe that the French Government, instead of deciding upon this proposal themselves, had transmitted it to Alexandria for the decision of Mehemet Ali. That this was placing the Four Powers in negotiation, not with France, but with Mehemet Ali. That, besides the delay which would be thereby occasioned, this was what their respective Courts neither intended to do, nor could consent to do; and that the French Government had thus placed the Plenipotentiaries in a very embarrassing situation. I replied, that I agreed with them in all their objections to the step which they believed the French Government to have taken; but, that M. Guizot had said nothing to me as to any reference made, or to be made to Mehemet Ali. That the French Government was then much occupied by Parliamentary affairs, and might naturally require some time to give us its answer to our proposal; and that no great practical inconvenience could arise from some trifling delay in this matter. Towards the end of June, I think it was on the 27th of that month, M. Guizot came to me, and read to me, from a letter addressed to him by M. Thiers, the answer of the French Government to our proposal. This answer was a positive refusal. M. Thiers stated, "That the French Government knew for certain that Mehemet Ali *would not consent to any division of Syria*, unless compelled thereto by force. That France could not co-operate in the employment of force against Mehemet Ali for such a purpose; and, therefore, France could not be a party to the proposed arrangement."

France having thus refused the ultimatum of the British Government, it became necessary for the Plenipotentiaries of the Four Powers to consider what course their Governments should then pursue.

The position of the Five Governments was this. All Five had declared their conviction that it is essential for the balance of power, and for the preservation of the peace of Europe, that the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire under its present dynasty should be maintained; and all Five had pledged themselves to employ all their means of action and influence to maintain that integrity and independence. But France, on the one hand, contended that the best way to maintain the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire was to leave the Sultan to the mercy of Mehemet Ali, and to advise the Sultan to submit to any terms which Mehemet Ali might determine to insist upon, as a *sine quà non* of peace; while the Four Powers, on the other hand, considered that the further continuance of the present state of military occupation of the Sultan's Provinces by Mehemet Ali, would be destructive of the integrity of the Turkish Empire, and fatal to its independence. They thought, therefore, that it was necessary to confine Mehemet Ali within narrower limits.

France, after nearly two months' deliberation, had not only refused to agree to the plan proposed by the Four Powers as an ultimatum of concession on their part, but had again declared that she could be no party to any arrangement to which Mehemet Ali should not of his own accord, and without coercion, consent. The Four Powers, therefore, had no other alternative, but either to adopt the principle of settlement pressed upon them by France, and which consisted in recommending to the Sultan entire submission to the demands of Mehemet Ali; or else to act upon their own principle, which was, that Mehemet Ali should be compelled to agree to some arrangement consistent in its form with the rights of the Sultan, and compatible in its substance with the integrity of the Turkish Empire. By the first course, the co-operation of France would have been obtained; by the second course, that co-operation must be foregone.

The earnest desire of the Four Powers for the co-operation of France had been sufficiently manifested by the persevering efforts they had made to obtain it, during many months of negotiation. They well knew its value, not only in regard to the particular object at present in view, but with reference to the general and permanent interests of Europe; but

that which they wanted, and that which they valued, was the co-operation of France for the purposes of peace; for the attainment of future security to Europe; for the practical execution of principles, which all the Five Powers had concurred in declaring. They valued the co-operation of France, nor for its own sake alone, nor for the advantage and convenience of the moment, but for the good it was to accomplish, and for the future consequences that were to result from it. They were anxious to co-operate with France in doing good; but they were not prepared to co-operate with France to do evil. Therefore, believing, as they did, that the policy recommended by France was injudicious, was unjust towards the Sultan, was pregnant with future dangers to Europe, was at variance with the public engagements of the Five Powers, and inconsistent with the principles which the Five Powers had deliberately professed, the Four Powers felt that they could not make the sacrifice which was required at their hands, as the price of the co-operation of France; if indeed that can be called co-operation, which was to consist in letting events take their own course. Unable, therefore, to adopt the views of France, the Four Powers determined to carry into execution their own.

But this determination had not been unforeseen; nor had its probability been concealed from France.

On the contrary, at various times during the negotiation, and as early as October last, I had stated to the French Ambassador at this Court, that our desire to remain united with France on these matters must have a limit; that we were anxious to go forward with France, but that we were not prepared to stand still with France; and that if France could not find the means of coming to a common understanding with the Four Powers, she must not be surprised if the Four Powers were to come to an understanding together, and were to act without her.

To this Count Sébastiani replied, that he foresaw that we should do so, and that he would foretell the result. That we should try to accomplish our own arrangement without the participation of France, and that we should find our means insufficient; that France would remain a perfectly quiet and passive spectator of events; that after a year, or a year and a half, of unsuccessful efforts, we should acknowledge that we had failed, and should then address ourselves to France; and that France, as friendly after our failure, as she had been before our attempt, would give her good offices to arrange matters, and would probably persuade us then, to agree to things which we declined to consent to now.

Similar intimations were also made to M. Guizot, as to the course which the Four Powers would probably pursue, if they should be unable to come to an agreement with France. Therefore the French Government having declined the ultimatum of the Four Powers, and having, in declining it, again laid down a principle of conduct which it knew that the Four Powers could not adopt, the principle, namely, that no settlement ought to be made between the Sultan and his subject, except upon such conditions as the subject might choose spontaneously to accept, or, in other words, to dictate, the French Government must have been prepared to see the Four Powers determine to act without France: and the Four Powers, in determining so to do, could not justly be represented as separating themselves from France, or as excluding France from the settlement of a great European affair. On the contrary, it was France who separated herself from the Four Powers. For it was France who had laid down for herself a principle of action which rendered her co-operation with the other Four Powers impossible.

And here, without wishing to indulge in controversial observations on the past, I feel it indispensably necessary to remark that this voluntary separation of France from the Four Powers was not merely evinced by the course of the negotiations in London, but, unless Her Majesty's Government has been greatly misinformed, it had also taken place in a still more decided manner by the course of the negotiations at Constantinople.

The Five Powers had, by the Collective Note which was presented to the Porte on the 27th of July 1839, by their Representatives at Constantinople, declared to the Sultan that their union was assured; and they had

requested him to abstain from any direct negotiation with Mehemet Ali, and to make no arrangement with the Pasha, without the concurrence of the Five Powers. And yet Her Majesty's Government have good reason to believe, that for many months past, the French Representative at Constantinople has, with respect to the matters to which that note referred, distinctly separated France from the other Four Powers, and has earnestly and repeatedly pressed the Porte to negotiate directly with Mehemet Ali, and to make an arrangement with the Pasha, not only without the concurrence of the other Four Powers, but under the single mediation of France, and according to the particular views of the French Government. It is France, therefore, that has separated herself from the Four Powers, and not the Four Powers that have separated themselves from France.

With respect to the course pursued by Great Britain, the French Government must admit, that the views and opinions of Her Majesty's Government upon the affairs of the Levant, have never, from the commencement of these negotiations, varied in the slightest degree, except in as far as Her Majesty's Government has offered to modify those views and opinions for the purpose of obtaining the co-operation of France; and those views and opinions have at all times been frankly and unreservedly explained to the French Government, and have been most earnestly and constantly pressed upon that Government by arguments which to Her Majesty's Government appeared to be conclusive.

In the early stages of the negotiation, the declarations of principle made by the Government of France, led Her Majesty's Government to imagine that the Two Governments could not but agree as to the means of carrying their common principles into execution. If the intentions and opinions of the French Government upon the means of execution differed, even in the outset of the negotiations, from those of the British Government, then France has no right to represent, as an unexpected schism between England and France, a difference which the French Government knew all along to exist. If the intentions and opinions of the French Government as to the means of execution, have undergone a change since the negotiations began, then France has no right to impute to Great Britain a divergence of policy, which arises from a change on the part of France, and not from a change on the part of Great Britain. But in any case, when Four out of the Five Powers found themselves agreed, upon one course, and when the Fifth had determined to pursue a course entirely different, it could not reasonably be expected that the Four should, in deference to the Fifth, give up opinions in which they were daily more and more confirmed, and which related to a matter of vital importance to the great and permanent interests of Europe.

But as France still holds to the general principles which she declared at the outset, and still affirms that she considers the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire under its present dynasty, necessary for the preservation of the balance of power, and for the security of peace; as France has never denied that the arrangement which the Four Powers intend to effect between the Sultan and the Pasha, would, if it could be executed, be the most complete and the best: and as the objections of France have applied not to the end in view, but to the means by which that end is to be accomplished; her opinion being that the end was good, but the means insufficient or dangerous; Her Majesty's Government trust that the separation of France from the other Four Powers, which Her Majesty's Government most deeply regret, cannot be of long duration.

For when the Four shall, in conjunction with the Sultan, have brought about such an arrangement between the Porte and its subject, as may be compatible with the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and with the future peace of Europe, there will no longer remain any point of difference between France and the Allies; and there can then be nothing to prevent France from concurring with the Four Powers in such further engagements for the future, as may appear to be necessary, in order to give due stability to the good effects of the interposition of the Four

Powers in favour of the Sultan; and to secure the Ottoman Empire from a recurrence of danger.

Her Majesty's Government will look forward with eagerness to the moment when France will thus be at liberty again to take her place in the union of the Five Powers; and Her Majesty's Government hopes that the arrival of that moment will be hastened by the full exertion of the moral influence of France. Although the French Government has, for reasons of its own, declined to take part in measures of coercion against Mehemet Ali, surely that Government cannot object to employ its means of persuasion to induce the Pasha to submit to the arrangements which are to be proposed to him; and it is obvious, that there are many topics which might be urged, and many prudential considerations which might be pressed upon the Pasha with more effect by France, as a neutral Power, taking no part in those affairs, than by the Four Powers, who are actively engaged in executing the measures of coercion.

But be this as it may, Her Majesty's Government feels confident that Europe will acknowledge the integrity of purpose which has actuated the Four Powers on this occasion; for their object is disinterested and just. They look to reap no selfish advantage from the engagements which they have contracted; they seek to establish no exclusive influence, and to make no territorial acquisition; and the ends they aim at, must be as beneficial to France as to themselves, because France, like themselves, is interested in the maintenance of the balance of power, and in the preservation of general peace.

You will transmit officially to M. Thiers a copy of this despatch.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 92.

Count Nesselrode to Count Medem.—(Communicated by Baron Brunnow, September.)

Monsieur le Comte, *St. Pétersbourg, le Juillet*, 1840.

JE m'empresse de vous transmettre ci-jointe la Convention qui vient d'être signée à Londres entre la Russie, l'Autriche, l'Angleterre, la Prusse, et la Porte Ottomane, et qui règle définitivement la Question d'Egypte, et réalise ainsi d'un commun accord l'assistance que les Puissances s'étaient engagées à accorder au Sultan dans ses différends avec Méhémet Ali.

Lorsque vous recevrez la présente, l'Agent de Sa Hautesse sera déjà probablement arrivé à Alexandrie, et aura sans doute obtenu de vous et de vos Collègues tout l'appui et toute la co-opération que vous aurez été à même de lui accorder, pour assurer le succès de sa mission.

Nous connaissons la haute sagesse et la profonde sagacité de Méhémet Ali; nous ne saurions donc croire qu'il se fera plus longtems illusion sur sa position et les dangers auxquels il s'exposerait, s'il repoussait les offres d'accommodement qui vont lui être faites; nous aimons au contraire à espérer que la fermeté avec laquelle les Quatre Puissances sont décidées à assurer en commun le maintien de la paix en Orient, lui fera comprendre l'intérêt qu'il doit attacher désormais à placer son sort sous la sauvegarde d'une transaction Européenne, et à assurer en même tems la stabilité de sa famille pour un long avenir.

Cependant, si contre toute attente, Méhémet Ali repoussait les offres de conciliation qui lui auraient été faites, il ne pourra s'en prendre qu'à lui des fâcheuses conséquences qui en résulteraient nécessairement pour lui. Aussi, Monsieur le Comte, nous ne saurions assez vous engager à user de tous les moyens de persuasion dont vous pourrez disposer, pour inspirer à Méhémet Ali des sentimens de modération, et pour le porter à adopter une résolution conforme à ses véritables intérêts.

Veuillez, dans ce but, vous associer à vos Collègues et agir avec un

parfait accord avec eux, car cet accord est le plus sûr garant du succès; toutefois, les Cabinets signataires de la Convention du $\frac{3}{15}$ Juillet, ayant réservé à l'Angleterre la tâche de réaliser les combinaisons qui ne sauraient manquer de faire une vive impression sur l'esprit de Méhémet Ali, ce sera aussi à Mr. Hodges qu'il appartiendra plus particulièrement de prendre l'initiative des démarches qui devront en être la conséquence; mais dans tous les cas, vous accorderez à lui, ainsi qu'à MM. Laurin et Wagner, la co-opération la plus franche et la plus cordiale, pour réaliser les vues des Quatre Cours, et pour arriver à une solution prompte et satisfaisante de la crise actuelle.

Recevez, &c.,
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

(Translation.)

Count Nesselrode to Count Medem.

M. le Comte, *St. Petersburgh, July* , 1840.

I HASTEN to send you herewith the Convention which has just been signed at London, between Russia, Austria, England, Prussia, and the Ottoman Porte, and which settles definitively the Egyptian Question, and thus realizes by common agreement the assistance which the Powers had engaged themselves to grant to the Sultan in his differences with Mehemet Ali.

When you receive this despatch the Sultan's agent will probably have already arrived at Alexandria, and will doubtless have obtained from you and from your colleagues, all the assistance and all the co-operation which it will have been in your power to afford him, to ensure the success of his mission.

We are acquainted with the extreme wisdom and profound sagacity of Mehemet Ali; we cannot, therefore, believe that he will any longer delude himself as to his position, and as to the dangers to which he would expose himself, if he were to reject the offers of accommodation which are about to be made to him; on the contrary, we would fain hope that the firmness with which the Four Powers have determined to ensure in common the maintenance of peace in the East, will cause him to understand the interest which he must hereafter feel in placing his own fate under the protection of an European agreement, and in securing, at the same time, the stability of his family during a long futurity.

Nevertheless, if, contrary to all expectation, Mehemet Ali should reject the offers of reconciliation made to him, he will only have himself to blame for the grievous consequences which would necessarily result to him therefrom. So that, M. le Comte, we cannot sufficiently exhort you to employ all the means of persuasion at your disposal, to inspire Mehemet Ali with sentiments of moderation, and to induce him to adopt a resolution in conformity with his true interests.

Have the goodness for this purpose to associate yourself with your colleagues, and to act in perfect harmony with them, for such harmony is the surest guarantee of success; however, the Cabinets who signed the Convention of July $\frac{3}{15}$, having reserved to England the task of carrying into effect the combinations which cannot fail to produce a lively impression on the mind of Mehemet Ali, it will likewise belong more peculiarly to Colonel Hodges to take the initiative in the steps which must be the result of those combinations; but in all cases, you will afford him, as well as MM. Laurin and Wagner, the most sincere and cordial co-operation, in order to realize the views of the Four Courts, and to arrive at a prompt and satisfactory solution of the present crisis.

Receive, &c.,
(Signed) NESSELRODE.

No. 93.

Count Nesselrode to M. de Titow.—(Communicated by Baron Brunnow, September.)

Monsieur, *St. Pétersbourg, le Juillet,* 1840.

VOUS avez déjà été informé directement par M. le Baron de Brunnow, que la grave et importante question sur laquelle s'était fixée depuis près d'une année toute la sollicitude de l'Empereur, vient d'être résolue d'une manière entièrement conforme aux hautes intentions de notre Auguste Maître. En effet, après des efforts constans et multipliés, notre Ministre à Londres a signé, le $\frac{3}{15}$ Juillet, une Convention destinée à régler la Question d'Egypte, d'un commun accord, entre la Russie, l'Autriche, l'Angleterre, la Prusse, et la Porte Ottomane, et à réaliser ainsi l'appui que les Puissances ont formellement promis d'accorder au Sultan dans ses différends avec Méhémet Ali.

En vous transmettant aujourd'hui une copie de cet Acte, je me fais un devoir de vous prévenir, Monsieur, que Sa Majesté Impériale, dans la ferme persuasion qu'il aura été accueilli par le Sultan avec autant de satisfaction que de reconnaissance, s'est empressée de le revêtir de sa haute sanction.

Il est probable que lorsque vous recevrez la présente, la Porte aura déjà usé de l'initiative qui lui appartient, pour faire notifier à Méhémet Ali les conditions de l'arrangement qui vient d'être arrêté, et que le fonctionnaire chargé de sommer le Pacha d'y souscrire dans le délai fixé, sera déjà parti de Constantinople pour sa destination.

Nous croyons donc inutile de rien ajouter aux indications que M. le Baron de Brunnow n'aura sans doute pas manqué de vous faire parvenir, sur les conseils à offrir à la Porte dans cette grave circonstance, et sur les moyens d'assurer le succès de la démarche qu'elle se sera empressée de faire à Alexandrie.

Tout semble autoriser à croire que l'unanimité avec laquelle les Quatre Puissances ont arrêté leur résolution, et l'appui que cette démarche obtiendra de la part de leurs Agens en Egypte, suffiront pour déterminer le Pacha à accepter les offres d'accommodement qui lui seront faites au nom de Sa Hautesse. Méhémet Ali, selon toute apparence, ne voudra pas s'opposer à la volonté unanime de la Russie, de l'Angleterre, de l'Autriche, et de la Prusse, et préférera peut-être de se soumettre plutôt à leur décision que d'exposer son avenir et celui de sa famille, à tous les dangers et à toutes les incertitudes que son obstination pourrait entraîner pour lui.

Cependant, en prenant connaissance des documens que vous recevrez aujourd'hui, vous voudrez bien observer que les Cabinets Alliés ont dû établir comme une éventualité possible, que Méhémet Ali refuse les offres de conciliation qui lui seront faites, et qu'il veuille pousser les choses à l'extrême, en faisant marcher ses troupes par l'Asie Mineure, pour menacer et s'emparer de Constantinople.

Pour un pareil cas, vous voudrez bien, Monsieur, déclarer à la Porte, que l'Empereur, invariablement résolu, comme il l'a toujours été, de ne point permettre que le trône du Sultan soit mis en péril par son vassal, et pénétré plus que jamais des engagemens réciproques que les Puissances viennent de contracter entre elles, Sa Majesté Impériale sera prête à envoyer sa flotte de la Mer Noire avec des troupes de débarquement, pour défendre la capitale de l'Empire Ottoman, du moment où l'Armée Egyptienne tenterait de franchir le Taurus et où Sa Hautesse croirait devoir faire un appel à l'assistance de la Russie.

Mais tout en vous chargeant, Monsieur, d'offrir cette assurance à la Porte, nous nous plaisons à croire qu'une semblable nécessité ne se présentera point pour le Sultan: l'apparition des escadres Anglaise et Autrichienne sur les côtes de la Syrie; l'appui qu'elles prêteront aux populations qui cherchent à secouer le joug de Méhémet Ali; les dangers que ces soulèvemens peuvent amener pour l'Armée Egyptienne; l'impos-

sibilité où elle sera de recevoir désormais des secours et des munitions ; enfin, la certitude de rencontrer sur son chemin les forces de la Russie, sont autant de motifs pour nous faire espérer que Méhémet Ali, loin de vouloir tenter de nouvelles agressions, se décidera à accepter les termes de la pacification qui lui sera proposée de la part du Sultan, dès qu'il aura acquis la conviction qu'il ne saurait plus compter désormais sur la jalousie et sur les hésitations des Cabinets.

Tels sont du moins les vœux bien sincères que nous formons.

Veuillez bien, Monsieur, vous associer à toutes les démarches que les Représentans d'Autriche, d'Angleterre, et de Prusse, croiront devoir faire auprès de la Porte, soit pour lui inspirer les déterminations les plus conformes aux vues des Quatre Cours, soit pour accélérer, autant que cela pourra dépendre de vous et des autres Représentans, le moment d'une pacification prompte et immédiate. Plus que jamais il est d'une haute importance que les Représentans des Puissances signataires de la Convention du $\frac{3}{15}$ Juillet, se maintiennent sur une même ligne de pensée et d'action, et qu'ils constatent aux yeux de Méhémet Ali l'intime accord qui règne entre les Cabinets, car cet accord suffira pleinement pour obtenir le résultat désiré et pour assurer sur des bases durables la paix future de l'Orient.

Recevez, &c.,
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

(Translation.)

Count Nesselrode to M. de Titow.

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, July* , 1840.

YOU have already been informed directly by Baron Brunnow, that the serious and important question upon which for nearly a year all the solicitude of Europe was fixed, has just been solved in a manner entirely in conformity with the exalted intentions of our August Master. In fact, after constant and repeated exertions, our Minister in London signed, on the $\frac{3}{15}$ July, a Convention, having for its object to settle the Egyptian Question, by common agreement between Russia, Austria, England, Prussia, and the Ottoman Porte, and thus to realize the support which the Powers formally promised to grant the Sultan in his differences with Mehemet Ali.

In transmiting to you to day a copy of that Act, it is my duty to inform you, Sir, that His Imperial Majesty, in the firm conviction that it will be received by the Sultan with as much satisfaction as gratitude, has lost no time in bestowing upon it his high sanction.

It is probable that when you receive this despatch, the Porte will already have availed itself of the initiative which appertains to it, in order to notify to Mehemet Ali the conditions of the arrangements which have been agreed upon, and that the functionary commissioned to summon the Pasha to acquiesce therein within the fixed delay, will have already set out from Constantinople for his destination.

We therefore consider it useless to add anything to the suggestions which Baron Brunnow will doubtless not have failed to convey to you, as to the advice to be given to the Porte in this important matter, and as to the means of ensuring the success of the step which it will have hastened to take at Alexandria.

Everything appears to warrant the belief that the unanimity with which the Four Powers have taken their determination, and the support which this step will receive from their agents in Egypt, will suffice to decide the Pasha to accept the offers of accommodation which will be made to him in the name of His Highness. Mehemet Ali, according to all appearance, will not be willing to oppose himself to the unanimous will of Russia, England, Austria, and Prussia, and will perhaps prefer rather to submit to their decision, than to expose his future fate and that of his

family to all the dangers and all the uncertainties in which his obstinacy might involve him.

Nevertheless, on making yourself acquainted with the documents now sent to you, you will have the goodness to observe that the Allied Cabinets have been under the necessity of laying down as a possible contingency that Mehemet Ali might refuse the offers of reconciliation which will be made to him, and might choose to push matters to extremity, by causing his troops to march on Asia Minor, to threaten and gain possession of Constantinople.

In such a case, you will have the goodness, Sir, to declare to the Porte, that the Emperor, invariably resolved, as he has ever been, not to allow the throne of the Sultan to be placed in peril by his vassal, and impressed more than ever with the reciprocal engagements which the Powers have just contracted among themselves; His Imperial Majesty will be ready to despatch his Black Sea fleet, with troops for disembarkation, in order to defend the capital of the Ottoman Empire, at the moment that the Egyptian Army should attempt to cross the Taurus, and that the Sultan should consider it necessary to apply for the assistance of Russia.

But at the same time that we direct you, Sir, to offer this assurance to the Porte, we take pleasure in believing that such a necessity will not present itself to the Sultan: the appearance of the English and Austrian squadrons on the coast of Syria; the support which they will afford to the populations who seek to throw off the yoke of Mehemet Ali; the dangers which these insurrections may occasion to the Egyptian Army; the impossibility in which it will be placed of receiving henceforth succours and stores; lastly, the certainty of encountering on its road the forces of Russia; are grounds sufficient to make us hope that Mehemet Ali, far from wishing to attempt new aggressions, will decide upon accepting the terms of the pacification which will be proposed to him on the part of the Sultan, as soon as he shall have required the conviction that he can no longer reckon hereafter on the jealousy and on the hesitations of the Cabinets.

Such at least are the very sincere wishes which we form.

Have the goodness, Sir, to co-operate in all the steps which the Representatives of Austria, England, and Prussia, shall think it necessary to take at the Porte, either to inspire it with the determinations most conformable with the views of the Four Courts, or to accelerate, as far as that shall depend upon you and the other Representatives, the period of a speedy and immediate pacification. It is more than ever of great importance that the Representatives of the Powers who signed the Convention of July $\frac{3}{15}$ should keep themselves in one and the same line of thought and action, and that they should exhibit to Mehemet Ali the intimate union which subsists between the Cabinets, for that union will fully suffice to obtain the desired result, and to ensure on durable bases the future peace of the East.

Receive, &c.,
(Signed) NESSELRODE.

No. 94.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 3, 1840.

I HAVE to signify to your Excellency the entire approbation of Her Majesty's Government of the steps taken by you, in pursuance of the Convention of the 15th July, as reported in your despatches of the 8th and 9th of August.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 95.]

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 3.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 11, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy of an Official Note presented by the Representatives of the Four Powers to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 95.

Note from the Representatives of the Four Powers to Rechid Pasha.

LES Soussignés, Représentans des Quatre Puissances signataires de la Convention conclue à Londres le 15 Juillet dernier, se sont empressés de donner communication par leurs Drogmans à son Excellence M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Sublime Porte, des rapports qu'ils ont reçus de leurs Consuls respectifs en Egypte.

Son Excellence y aura vu que Méhémet Ali, qui avait déjà été informé qu'une décision allait être prise par la Conférence de Londres, s'en est expliqué envers ces Consuls de manière à faire croire qu'il ne consentira à aucune restitution territoriale, et, de plus, qu'il parait disposé à recourir à des mesures extrêmes dans le cas où des moyens coërcitifs seraient employés contre lui.

Les Soussignés croient inutile de s'arrêter à faire ressortir l'invraisemblance de l'exécution de menaces auxquelles les nombreux embarras de la position de Méhémet Ali ôtent le caractère de gravité qu'il voudrait leur donner. Mais en tout état de cause, ils saisissent cette occasion pour renouveler à la Sublime Porte l'assurance la plus formelle de la ferme résolution de leurs Cours de vouer tous les moyens dont elles peuvent disposer, à la défense de la cause à laquelle elles viennent de s'identifier par un Acte solemnel et mémorable; et quelles que soient les éventualités à venir, les Soussignés ont la juste confiance de croire que cette cause triomphera de tous les obstacles et de tous les périls.

Les Soussignés, etc.,

(Signé) PONSONBY.
BARON DE STURMER.
TITOW.
COMTE KŒNIGSMARCK.

Constantinople, le 11 *Août,* 1840.

(Translation.)

Note from the Representatives of the Four Powers to Rechid Pasha.

THE Undersigned, Representatives of the Four Powers who signed the Convention concluded at London on the 15th of July last, hastened to communicate by their Dragomans to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sublime Porte, the reports which they received from their respective Consuls in Egypt.

His Excellency will have seen therein that Mehemet Ali, who had already been informed that a decision was about to be taken by the Conference of London, expressed himself thereupon towards those Consuls in a manner to occasion the belief, that he will not consent to any restitution of territory, and, moreover, that he appears disposed to have recourse to extreme measures, in case measures of coercion should be employed against him.

The Undersigned deem it useless to pause, in order to demonstrate the improbability of menaces being executed, which the numerous embarrassments of Mehemet Ali's position divest of the character of seriousness which he would wish to give them. But, in any case, they take this opportunity to repeat to the Sublime Porte, the most formal assurance of the firm resolution of their Courts to devote all the means at their disposal to the defence of the cause with which they have just identified themselves by a solemn and memorable Act; and whatever contingencies may occur, the Undersigned are justly confident in the belief, that that cause will triumph over all obstacles and over all perils.

The Undersigned, &c.,

(Signed) PONSONBY.
BARON DE STURMER.
TITOW.
COUNT KŒNIGSMARCK.

Constantinople, August 11, 1840.

No. 96.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 4.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, August* 17, 1840.

RECHID PASHA sent M. Franceschi to me this morning to communicate a message the Pasha has received from the French Ambassador, through M. Cor, the French Dragoman. My servant, by mistake, denied me to M. Franceschi, who went on to the Internuncio, and delivered his message to his Excellency, who came here immediately with M. Franceschi, and prepared a despatch for Prince Metternich, detailing the transaction, and of which I have now the honour to inclose a copy that will save your Lordship the trouble of details from me.

M. Franceschi said, that Rechid Pasha is not alarmed, though he is aware of the gravity of the situation of the affairs; he said, the Sultan is not alarmed and is firm.

With the concurrence of M. de Stürmer, I desired M. Franceschi to tell his Excellency Rechid Pasha, that the Sultan might depend upon the support of his Allies.

I added, that the Internuncio and myself, and, I doubted not, our Colleagues also, would be ready to give Rechid and the Ottoman Ministers any aid, if any should be wanting, to confirm the Sultan in his views.

I was, to a certain degree, prepared for the hostility of France, by what passed at a visit made by M. Titow to the French Ambassador, when the latter, in the course of conversation, said he thought war between France and England inevitable. This appeared to me to manifest either a very injudicious and improper levity in the Ambassador, or that he had received information from his Government that warranted what he said.

Inclosure in No. 96.

Baron Sturmer to Prince Metternich.

Constantinople, le 17 *Août,* 1840.

M. LE MINISTRE des Affaires Etrangères vient d'envoyer M. Franceschi chez mes Collègues d'Angleterre, de Russie, de Prusse, et chez moi, pour nous faire la communication suivante:—

M. l'Ambassadeur de France a fait dire hier, le 16 de ce mois, par son Drogman à Réchid Pacha:

Qu'il a l'ordre de lui signifier, que le Gouvernement Français, le Roi et la Nation, considèrent comme une injure faite par le Plénipotentiaire Ottoman à la France la conclusion du Traité qu'il a signé à Londres sans

le concours et à l'insçu du Plénipotentiaire Français, et qui a pour objet une question où la France, dès le principe, a été partie intégrante;

Que le Gouvernement Français s'opposera de tous ses moyens à toute intervention armée contre le Pacha d'Egypte;

Qu'il attend, pour se décider, le résultat des démarches qu'il fait faire dans ce moment auprès des Cabinets de Vienne et de Berlin, afin d'en obtenir l'annulation du Traité;

Que loin d'employer, comme on le lui demandait, son influence morale auprès du Pacha pour le porter à la soumission, il lui accordera toute l'assistance qui est en son pouvoir pour l'aider à résister à l'intervention étrangère;

Qu'il réunira ses efforts aux siens pour soulever les populations d'Asie et d'Europe contre l'administration actuelle en Turquie, dont le Gouvernement Français se déclare l'ennemi, et qu'il considère comme celui du pays;

Que M. de Pontois fera connaître au Sultan et à toute la Nation Mussulmane, que la France, loin d'avoir pris part à une Convention dirigée contre les intérêts de l'Islâmisme, la condamne hautement, et s'opposera à son exécution.

Réchid Pacha a répondu, que ce langage a d'autant plus lieu de le surprendre, que la France avait elle-même concouru à la Note Collective du 27 Juillet de l'année dernière. Là-dessus le Drogman de France a répliqué, que M. de Pontois avait prévu cette objection, mais que d'abord le Gouvernement Français avait accepté, sans avoir jamais approuvé, la co-opération de son Ambassadeur à cette démarche; qu'au surplus, il s'agit ici de mesures coërcitives dont il n'est fait aucune mention dans la Note susdite, et que c'est contre ces mesures que la France se prononce en ce moment.

Le Pacha a répondu: "Je suis profondément affligé de la déclaration que vous venez de me faire, car j'ai toujours considéré la France comme une des plus anciennes amies de la Porte; il ne dépend pas de moi d'empêcher la réalisation d'un Acte auquel la Porte ne s'est décidée qu'avec le concours de quatre de ses Alliés, et quels qu'en puissent être les résultats, le Gouvernement Turc s'y résignera." Il a ajouté que, si M. de Pontois veut faire connaître au Sultan ce qu'il vient de lui faire dire par son Drogman, le Pacha est prêt à l'accompagner à l'audience de ce Monarque pour lequel il ne saurait avoir rien de caché.

Je n'ai pas besoin de dire à votre Atlesse combien Réchid Pacha a trouvé dur et hostile le langage que le Gouvernement Français a chargé son Ambassadeur de tenir à la Porte dans cette circonstance.

M. Franceschi m'a raconté, que Réchid Pacha ayant été appelé hier chez le Sultan, Sa Hautesse lui avait donné connaissance d'une lettre que la Sultane Mère venait de recevoir de l'ex-Capitan Pacha, on ne sait par quelle occasion, mais probablement par le bateau à vapeur Français arrivé le 14 de ce mois. Dans cette lettre, Ahmed Fevzi Pacha, après avoir assuré à la Sultane que Méhémet Ali était inébranlable dans sa résolution de résister, ajoute qu'il dépend de lui de révolutionner toutes les Provinces d'Asie et d'Europe; et il adjure, implore, et supplie la Sultane d'interposer son influence auprès de son fils pour éviter à la Nation les maux dont elle est menacée, et peut-être la chûte de l'Empire.

Ces notions m'ont paru assez importantes pour les porter à la connaissance de votre Altesse par une estafette qui partira demain à l'aube du joir.

Agreéz, &c.,
(Signé) STURMER.

(Translation.)

Baron Sturmer to Prince Metternich.

Constantinople, August 17, 1840.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs has just sent M. Franceschi to my colleagues of England, Russia, and Prussia, and myself, in order to make to us the following communication:—

The Ambassador of France caused to be said by his Dragoman to Rechid Pasha, yesterday, the 16th instant:

That he has orders to notify to him that the French Government, the King, and the nation, consider as an injury done to France by the Ottoman Plenipotentiary the conclusion of the Treaty which has been signed at London, without the concurrence and without the knowledge of the French Plenipotentiary, and which has for its object a question in which France has from the beginning been an integral party;

That the French Government will oppose itself to the utmost of its ability to all armed intervention against the Pasha of Egypt;

That it awaits, in order to make its decision, the result of the measures which it is now causing to be taken with the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin, in order to obtain from them the annulment of the Treaty;

That far from employing, as it was asked to do, its moral influence with the Pasha, to incline him to submission, it will afford him all the assistance in its power to aid him in resisting foreign intervention;

That it will join its efforts with his to raise the populations of Asia and Europe against the present administration of Turkey, of which the French Government proclaims itself the enemy, and which it considers as the enemy of the country;

That M. de Pontois will let the Sultan and the whole Mussulman nation know, that France, far from having taken part in a Convention opposed to the interests of Islamism, condemns it loudly, and will resist its execution.

Rechid Pasha replied, that this language could not but surprise him the more, since France had herself concurred in the Collective Note of the 27th of July of last year. Thereupon the French Dragoman rejoined, that M. de Pontois had anticipated this objection, but that, in the first place, the French Government had acquiesced in, without having ever approved of, the co-operation of its Ambassador in that measure; that, moreover, it is now a question of coercive measures of which no mention is made in the aforesaid Note, and it is against those measures that France at the present time protests.

The Pasha replied, "I am deeply afflicted at the declaration which you have just made to me, for I have always considered France as one of the most ancient friends of the Porte; it does not depend upon me to prevent an Act being carried into effect which the Porte did not decide upon but with the concurrence of four of its Allies; and be the results thereof what they may, the Turkish Government will resign itself to them." He added, that if M. de Pontois desires to make known to the Sultan what he had just caused to be said to him by his Dragoman, the Pasha is ready to accompany him to an audience of that monarch, from whom he could have nothing concealed.

I have no occasion to tell your Excellency how harsh and hostile Rechid Pasha felt the language which the French Government directed its Ambassador to hold to the Porte on this occasion.

M. Franceschi told me that Rechid Pasha, having been summoned yesterday to the Sultan, His Highness had communicated to him a letter which the Sultana Mother had just received from the late Capudan Pasha, it is not known by what opportunity, but probably by the French steam-vessel which arrived here on the 14th of this month. In this letter, Ahmed Fevzi Pasha, after having assured the Sultana that Mehemet Ali was immovable in his determination to resist, adds, that it depends on him to revolutionize all the provinces of Asia and of Europe; and he

adjures, implores, and supplicates the Sultana to interpose her influence with her son, in order to ward off from the nation, the evils with which it is threatened, and perhaps the downfall of the Empire.

These particulars have appeared to me sufficiently important to convey them to your Excellency by an estafette, which will set out to-morrow at day-break.

Receive, &c.,
(Signed) STURMER.

No. 97.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 4.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 17, 1840.

I INCLOSE two reports from the Austrian Consul-General, which the Internuncio was so good as to give me. They state that Mehemet Ali has ordered Ibrahim to concentrate his troops, to be ready to march into Anatolia, and to threaten Constantinople.

I conceive the Pasha has grossly exaggerated both the amount of his army and of his influence. I think it might be shown that he could not march 10,000 men under the circumstances of Syria; and it is to be recollected that at least 16,000 of the troops are Syrians, who are kept with their colours solely by the Albanian police. They will be able to abandon Ibrahim when any other standard is raised.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 97.

M. de Laurin to the Baron de Sturmer.

M. le Baron, *Alexandrie, le 6 Août*, 1840.

MEHEMET ALI ayant appris qu'un courrier extraordinaire de Lord Palmerston, chargé de dépêches pour l'Amiral Stopford, avait passé par Malte le 29 Juillet, sur le bateau à vapeur la "Gorgone," pour se rendre à Vourla, résolut de ne laisser sortir aucun de ses vaisseaux de guerre du port d'Alexandrie.

Par conséquent, les restes de l'Armée d'Arabie, qui, d'après mon rapport d'hier, auraient dû être transportés en Syrie sur quatre vaisseaux de ligne, dont deux Egyptiens et deux Ottomans, seront probablement expédiés par la voie d'El-Harisch, si toutefois l'on ne renonce entièrement à cette expédition. En attendant, on a donné l'ordre que ces troupes s'arrêtassent au Caire pour y reposer; et cet ordre a été transmis par télégraphe, du Palais de Rass-Eddin, aujourd'hui à 8 heures du matin.

Les vaisseaux de guerre Anglais paraissent avoir fait naître dans l'esprit de Méhémet Ali des appréhensions sérieuses qu'il s'efforce de cacher, mais qui sont révélées par des mesures extraordinaires et par des propos qu'on n'est pas habitué à entendre de sa bouche. C'est ainsi que lui est échappée la remarque qu'il n'était plus prudent d'expédier par mer les provisions et les munitions pour l'Armée du Taurus. Par cette raison, des Girmen (bâtimens de transport Egyptiens), sur lesquels on avait commencé à charger ces provisions, ont été employés depuis à des courses sur le Nil, et l'on a aussitôt renoncé à les affrêter dans le but sus-indiqué.

La disposition d'esprit de Méhémet Ali est toujours la même. Il fait entendre aux Consuls, à chaque occasion, qu'il porterait les choses à l'extrémité, si l'on voulait lui arracher quelques provinces. Il dit qu'il a 150,000 hommes de troupes en Syrie qui sont prêts à se battre, et avec lesquels il peut inonder l'Asie Mineure et menacer même Constantinople. Il prétend pourvoir compter sur l'esprit qui règne parmi la population Musulmane tant en

Asie qu'en Europe. Mais comme il a appris que les Egyptiens n'ont aucune envie de faire la guerre aux Européens, il fait accroire aux siens, en contradiction avec ce qu'il dit aux étrangers, qu'il ne s'agit pas de guerre ; qu'il n'y a pas de différends entre lui et le Sultan, mais seulement avec quelques étrangers; qu'au surplus, la France tâchait d'applanir ces différends par son intervention ; enfin, que tout pourrait bien, sous peu, être arrangé à l'amiable.

Cependant ces assertions ont manqué leur but ; car les Musulmans, qui depuis quelque tems sont habitués à consulter les étrangers sur la situation politique du Pacha, ont pu facilement s'apercevoir de tout ce qu'il y a de contradictoire dans ses paroles, et n'en sont que plus consternés et découragés.

La question de savoir si Méhémet Ali par suite de cette position des choses cédera ou embrassera le parti insensé de révolutionner la Turquie, cette question, dis-je, est difficile à résoudre.

Personne n'ose lui conseiller la première alternative. Quelques uns sont tombés en disgrâce pour l'avoir fait, d'autres sont soupçonnés par lui de perfidie. Un de mes Collègues et moi, nous lui parlâmes, en tout dernier lieu, dans ce sens. Il accueillit nos observations comme des sujets de controverse depuis longtems épuisés, et nous pria de ne plus l'entretenir de restitutions. Mais il semble qu'une voix intérieure dans laquelle il place une aveugle confiance, le pousse à prendre le dernier parti. Il me dit à cette occasion, "Je ne saurais vous expliquer les motifs de cette confiance; je ne suis pas savant, mais je sens que je ne peux qu'agir comme je le fais, ou périr."

Cette manière de voir le tient presq'entièrement isolé de ses entours. Il n'y a que quelques amis et quelques journaux qui le confirment dans ces idées, ainsi que je m'en vais le démontrer.

Je connais assez bien les personnes de sa suite et ses principaux employés ; j'ai entretenu des relations fréquentes avec plusieurs d'entr'eux. Aucun d'eux ne le pousse à la résistance. Ce sont autant d'admirateurs passifs de ses hauts faits, qui, au fond, craignent qu'il n'amène par quelque résolution précipitée, sa ruine et la leur. Les officiers supérieurs de l'armée partagent à peu près ce sentiment. Un petit nombre de ces derniers, et ce ne sont pas les plus éclairés, préfèrent la guerre à la paix. L'ambition et la jalousie d'Ibrahim Pacha a fini par leur faire éprouver du dégôut pour leur état.

Ceux qui poussent Méhémet Ali à la guerre ce sont quelques Européens établis ici, et quelques illustres voyageurs qui firent connaissance avec lui, et qui lui ont fait accroire que les Cabinets Européens ne se prêteraient jamais à accorder à la Porte une assistance matérielle contre lui; que par conséquent il n'avait qu'à vaincre le Sultan pour disposer à son gré de la Turquie Asiatique ; enfin, qu'un fait accompli était toujours pardonné et sanctionné. C'est dans ce sens que ses conseillers s'expriment dans les feuilles publiques, et c'est ainsi qu'ils raisonnent dans leur correspondances confidentielles avec Boghos Bey et les habitués du palais.

Méhémet Ali dit qu'il peut compter sur le concours des Musulmans au-delà du Taurus comme aussi de ceux d'Europe. Au fond, le Pacha lui-même ne sait pas ce qu'il doit en penser. Les efforts d'exciter les sujets du Sultan à la revolte ont été souvent renouvelés, mais sont toujours restés sans effet. Il y a eu, dit-on, des promesses vagues de la part de quelques Chefs religieux et même de quelques Primats des provinces Ottomanes ; mais personne jusqu'ici n'a pu apprendre si, et jusqu'à quel point, on pouvait faire fond sur ces promesses.

S'il est victorieux il peut compter sur des partisans, vaincu il devra s'attendre à une défection générale.

Cette prédiction doit être sortie de la bouche d'Ibrahim Pacha, lorsque, l'an passé, son père eut proféré la menace d'envahir l'Anatolie, si les Puissances au bout d'un mois n'arrangeaient pas ses affaires au gré de ses désirs. Ces mots sont d'autant plus significatifs qu'ils expriment la conviction de l'homme à la valeur duquel Méhémet Ali a confié tous les moyens de réaliser ses vastes projets.

Méhémet Ali ne s'est exprimé très-clairement qu'à l'occasion dont j'ai fait mention dans mon rapport du 31 du mois passé. Il a dit alors que pour détourner une attaque de la Syrie et de l'Egypte, il envahirait l'Anatolie, et il paraitrait même devant Constantinople.

Dans le même rapport que j'eus l'honneur d'adresser à votre Excellence sous le No. 103, je parlai d'un ordre relatif à la concentration de l'armée.

D'après cet ordre, les troupes échelonnées sur le chemin qui conduit de Damas à Alep sont dirigées sur Alep et de là sur Ourfa. Osman Pacha reste dans le mont Liban ; Solyman Pacha doit se rendre à St. Jean d'Acre ; et Abbas Pacha retourner en Egypte. Ses Rédifs (milices) et ses Albanais doivent prendre leurs quartiers dans les trois villes maritimes, Saïda, Beyrout, Tripoli, et leurs alentours.

L'armée de Marache n'est ni nombreuse ni pourvue du nécessaire ; par cette dernière raison, elle ne saurait être augmentée, d'autant moins que les contrées avoisinantes n'offrent aucune ressource.

Les troupes réglés en Egypte se composent, à l'exception de la flotte, de 3,000 hommes. En revanche, on exerce avec beaucoup d'assiduité les milices d'Alexandrie et du Caire ; mais ces exercices sont si peu du gout des indigènes, que de deux régimens formés au Caire par les ouvriers de fabriques, plus de 3,000 hommes se sont évadés ou cachés.

D'après les rapports de M. Champion, qui vont jusqu'au 3 de ce mois, il règne au Caire une grande consternation et une disette d'argent excessive. Le Kalisch (digue du Nil près du Caire) fut percé le 1er de ce mois, le Nil ayant atteint une hauteur de 17 piques et 9 kerat. Ce fleuve n'arrive d'ordinaire que vers le 20 Août à la hauteur sus-indiquée. Méhémet Ali craint que la crue ne devienne si forte qu'elle mette les digues en danger.

La frégate à vapeur Anglaise "la Gorgone," nous apporte dans ce moment des nouvelles de Beyrout qui vont jusqu'au 3 de ce mois, et d'après lesquelles les deux vaisseaux Anglais stationnés devant cette ville avaient fait voile pour Vourla.

Les insurgés de Tripoli opposaient encore une résistance qui, bien que faible, ne laissait pas d'occasionner aux Egyptiens des pertes sensibles. A Beyrout et dans ses alentours tout était tranquille ; seulement les Albanais continuaient à commettre leurs excès habituels.

J'ai l'honneur, etc.,
(Signé) LAURIN.

P.S. du 6 au soir.

Méhémet Ali s'est tout-à-coup décidé à quitter Alexandrie pour 14 à 20 jours, et à faire un voyage dans la Province Charkié (Damiette). Il partira dès demain matin. La nouvelle des décisions prises au sujet des affaires de ce pays, laquelle vient d'arriver par le bateau à vapeur "Le Cyclope" expédié de Vourla, parait l'avoir consterné. Je le verrai dans une heure et tâcherai d'apprendre quelque chose sur cette détermination subite.

(Translation.)

M. de Laurin to the Baron de Sturmer.

M. le Baron, *Alexandria, August* 6, 1840.

MEHEMET ALI having learnt that an extraordinary courier from Lord Palmerston with despatches for Admiral Stopford had passed by Malta on the 29th of July, on board the steam-vessel the "Gorgon," on his way to Vourla, determined not to allow any of his ships of war to go out of the harbour of Alexandria.

Consequently, the remains of the army of Arabia, who, according to my report of yesterday, ought to have been conveyed to Syria in four sail of the line, of which two were to be Egyptian and two Turkish, will probably be sent by the way of El-Arish, if, indeed, they do not altogether abandon this expedition. Meanwhile, orders have been given that these troops should halt at Cairo to rest there ; and this order was sent this morning at 8 o'clock by telegraph from the palace of Rass-Eddin.

The English ships of war appear to have produced in the mind of Mehemet Ali serious apprehensions which he exerts himself to conceal, but which are revealed by extraordinary measures, and by observations which it is not usual to hear him utter. Thus, the remark escaped him that it was no longer prudent to send by sea provisions and stores for the army of the Taurus. For this reason, the djerms, (Egyptian vessels used as transports,) on board of

which these provisions had already begun to be embarked, have subsequently been employed on the Nile, and the freighting them for the purpose above-mentioned was forthwith abandoned.

The disposition of Mehemet Ali's mind is still the same. He tells the Consuls on every occasion, that he would carry matters to extremities, if it was desired to wrest some provinces from him. He says that he has 150,000 soldiers in Syria ready to fight, and with whom he might overwhelm Asia Minor, and even threaten Constantinople. He pretends that he can reckon upon the spirit which reigns among the Mussulman population, as well in Asia as in Europe. But as he has learnt that the Egyptians have no desire to wage war with the Europeans, he makes the people about him believe, in contradiction to what he says to foreigners, that there is no question of war; that there are no differences between him and the Sultan, but merely with certain foreigners; that, besides, France was striving by her intervention to smooth down these differences; finally, that everything might very well, in a short time, be amicably settled.

Nevertheless these assertions have missed their object; for the Mussulmans, who for some time are accustomed to consult foreigners on the political situation of the Pasha, have easily been able to remark what is contradictory in his words, and are only the more alarmed and discouraged in consequence.

The question whether Mehemet Ali, in consequence of this state of things, will yield, or will embrace the insane project of revolutionizing Turkey, this question, I say, is difficult to solve.

No one dares to advise him to adopt the former alternative. Some have fallen into disgrace for having done so, others are suspected by him of perfidy. One of my colleagues and myself spoke to him very recently in this sense. He received our observations as matters of controversy long since exhausted, and requested us to talk no more to him about restitutions. But it appears that an inward voice, in which he places a blind confidence, impels him to take the latter course. He said to me on this occasion, "I cannot explain to you the grounds of this confidence; I am not learned, but I feel that I cannot but act as I do, or perish."

This manner of seeing things keeps him almost altogether isolated from those about him. There are only a few friends and a few newspapers which confirm him in these notions, as I am about to show.

I am tolerably well acquainted with the persons in his suite, and the principal persons employed by him; I have kept up constant intercourse with several of them; not one of them urges him to resist. They are so many passive admirers of his mighty deeds, who, at bottom, fear lest, by some precipitate revolution, he should bring on his ruin and their own. The superior officers of the army share pretty nearly this opinion. A small number of the latter, and they are not the most enlightened, prefer war to peace. The ambition and jealousy of Ibrahim Pasha have ended by making them feel disgusted with their position.

Those who urge Mehemet Ali to war are certain Europeans established here, and some illustrious travellers who made acquaintance with him, and who have made him believe that the European Cabinets would never lend themselves to grant the Porte material assistance against him; that consequently he had only to conquer the Sultan in order to dispose of Asiatic Turkey at his pleasure; finally, that a thing once done, was always pardoned and sanctioned. It is in this sense that these advisers express themselves in the public papers, and it is thus that they reason in their confidential communications with Boghos Bey and the frequenters of the palace.

Mehemet Ali says that he can reckon upon the concurrence of the Mussulmans beyond the Taurus, as likewise of those of Europe. At bottom, the Pasha himself does not know what to think of it. The efforts to excite the subjects of the Sultan to revolt have frequently been renewed, but have always been ineffectual. There have, it is said, been some vague promises on the part of some Chiefs of religion, and even of some principal persons of the Ottoman Provinces; but no one, up to this time, has been able to learn, whether, and up to what point, reliance could be placed on those promises.

If he is victorious, he can count upon partisans,—conquered, he must look to a general defection.

This prediction is said to have been uttered by Ibrahim Pasha, when his

father had threatened last year to invade Anatolia, if the Powers should not at the end of a month settle his affairs according to his wishes. These words are the more significant since they express the conviction of the man to whose valour Mehemet Ali has confided all his means of realizing his vast designs.

Mehemet Ali has only expressed himself clearly on the occasion which I mentioned in my report of the 31st of last month. He then said, that in order to divert an attack from Syria and from Egypt, he would invade Anatolia, and would appear even before Constantinople.

In the same report No. 103, which I had the honour to address to you, I spoke of an order relative to the concentration of the army. According to that order, the troops stationed on the road which leads from Damascus to Aleppo, are moved upon Aleppo, and from thence upon Orfa. Osman Pasha remains in Mount Lebanon; Solyman Pasha is to proceed to St. Jean d'Acre; and Abbas Pasha to return to Egypt. The militia and the Albanians under his command, are to take up their quarters in the three maritime towns, Saïda, Beyrout, Tripoli, and their vicinity.

The army of Marash is neither numerous nor provided with necessaries; for this last reason it cannot be augmented, the less so, that the neighbouring districts offer no resources.

The regular troops in Egypt are composed, with the exception of the fleet, of 3,000 men. On the other hand, the militia of Alexandria and of Cairo are very diligently exercised; but these exercises are so little to the taste of the natives, that out of two regiments formed in Cairo out of the workmen in the factories, more than 3,000 men have escaped or concealed themselves.

According to the reports of M. Champion, which come down to the 3rd of this month, there is great consternation at Cairo and an excessive want of money. The Kalisch (the dyke of the Nile near Cairo,) was cut on the 1st instant, the Nile having attained the height of seventeen pics and nine kerats. The river does not ordinarily reach the height above-mentioned before the 20th of August. Mehemet Ali fears lest the rise should become so powerful, as to endanger the dykes.

The English steam-vessel, the "Gorgon," brings us just now news from Beyrout, up to the 3rd of this month, according to which two English ships of the line, stationed before that city, had sailed for Vourla.

The insurgents of Tripoli continued to offer a resistance which, although feeble, did not fail to occasion sensible loss to the Egyptians. Everything was quiet at Beyrout and in its neighbourhood; only the Albanians continued to commit their usual excesses.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) LAURIN.

P.S.—Mehemet Ali has suddenly determined upon quitting Alexandria for from fourteen to twenty days, to make a journey into the Province of Charkié, (Damietta). He will set out to-morrow morning. The news of the decisions taken on the subject of the affairs of this country, which has just arrived by the steam-vessel "the Cyclops," despatched from Vourla, appears to have thrown him into consternation. I shall see him in an hour, and I will endeavour to learn something respecting this sudden determination.

Inclosure 2 in No. 97.

M. de Laurin to the Baron de Sturmer.

M. le Baron, *Alexandrie, le 6 Août, 1840, à 11 heures du soir.*

JE reviens dans ce moment d'une audience chez Méhémet Ali.

Il quitte Alexandrie pour 8 à 10 jours seulement; les ordres qu'il avait adressés à Ibrahim, pour qu'il eût à concentrer son armée pres du Mont Taurus, furent renforcés en dernier lieu. Toutes les troupes disponibles en Syrie sont dirigées sur Marache et Ourfa. Méhémet Ali croit que, jusqu'à la fin de ce mois, environ 50,000 hommes pourront être réunis sur ces deux points pour avancer au premier signal. Il dit que tout est prêt, et que, quand même il ne

pourrait rassembler que 5,000 hommes, toutes les populations s'uniraient à eux, et qu'en peu de tems l'Anatolie entière serait en état de révolution. "On ne doit pas se faire illusion," continua-t-il, "la guerre est résolue; elle commencera dès qu'un vaisseau de guerre ennemi fera mine de bloquer Alexandrie; il y aura beaucoup de sang versé, mais il vaut mieux laisser aller les choses jusqu'à ce point que de faire des restitutions. Il ajoute, que cela pourrait mal terminer pour lui, mais qu'il voulait laisser pleuvoir sur lui pierre sur pierre jusqu'à sa ruine complète. Quelle horrible et affreuse détermination! L'Armée du Yémen est arrivée au Caire. Il ignore encore ce qu'il doit faire d'elle. Tantôt il donne l'ordre de l'envoyer ici, tantôt il veut qu'elle reste là où elle se trouve; et finalement il fera partir ces pauvres victimes pour le désert, afin de les envoyer en Syrie par la voie d'El Arish et de Gaza.

Il a remis les Villes Saintes (Mecque et Médine) au Chérif Mahomed. Il dit avoir dissout les troupes irrégulières, et n'en avoir conservé qu'un petit nombre nécessaire au Chérif, et qui ont été remises sur l'ancien pied. Les deux autres Généraux du Hedjaz et du Nedjid, Ahmed et Kourchid Pachas, retournent pareillement en Egypte; leurs neuf régimens ont, dit-il, beaucoup souffert, mais ils comptent encore 11,000 hommes qu'il veut expédier en Syrie.

Tout donc doit se porter en Syrie. C'est là qu'il veut allumer l'incendie qui devra s'étendre sur toute l'Anatolie, afin que tout s'y précipite pour l'éteindre, et que personne n'attaque son côté vulnérable (la Syrie et l'Egypte); il tient ferme à ce plan d'actions.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,

(Signé) LAURIN.

(Translation.)

M. de Laurin to the Baron de Sturmer.

M. le Baron, *Alexandria, August* 6, 1840, 11 P.M.

I HAVE this instant returned from an audience of Mehemet Ali.

He is leaving Alexandria only for eight or ten days; the orders which he had given to Ibrahim Pasha to concentrate his army near Mount Taurus, were recently confirmed. All the disposable troops in Syria are moved upon Marash and Orfa. Mehemet Ali believes that, up to the end of this month, about 50,000 men can be assembled on these two points to be ready to advance at the first signal. He says that all is prepared, and that even if he could only get together 5,000 men, the whole population would join them, and that in a short time the whole of Anatolia would be in a state of revolution. "It is no use deluding oneself," continued he, "war is determined on; it will commence as soon as a ship of war shall offer to blockade Alexandria; there will be much bloodshed, but it is better to let matters proceed to that length than make restitution." He adds, that it might turn out badly for him, but that he would be willing that stone upon stone should be suffered to rain down upon him, even to his utter ruin. What a horrible and frightful determination! The army of the Yemen is arrived in Cairo. He does not know as yet what to do with it. At one time he orders that it should be sent hither, at another he chooses that it should remain where it is; and at last he will make these poor victims set out for the desert, in order to send them to Syria by way of El-Arish and Gaza.

He has delivered the Holy Cities (Mecca and Medina) to the Sheriff Mahomed. He says that he has disbanded the irregular troops, and retained only the number necessary for the Sheriff, and who have been replaced on the ancient footing. The two Generals of the Hedjaz and of the Nedjid, Ahmed and Kourchid Pashas, return in like manner to Egypt; their nine regiments, he says, have suffered much; but they still number 11,000 men, whom he wishes to send into Syria.

Everything therefore is to go to Syria. It is there where he wishes to light up the flame which is to spread over the whole of Anatolia, in order

that everything may be thrown there to extinguish it, and that no one may attack his vulnerable side (Syria and Egypt): he persists in this plan of action.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) LAURIN.

No. 98.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 4.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 17, 1840.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship the copy of a letter which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Consuls at Damascus, Aleppo, and Tarsus.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 98.

Viscount Ponsonby to Her Majesty's Consuls at Damascus, Aleppo, and Tarsus.

Sir, *Therapia, August 14, 1840.*

I HAVE to request that you will exert all your means for obtaining information of any intention, or any act indicating intention, on the part of Ibrahim Pasha, to assemble his army with a view to march in the direction of the Bosphorus; and if you see any such indication, you will despatch messengers to me with all the information you can furnish; and I have further to beg, that you will not trust to one messenger alone for transmitting intelligence of importance, but employ more.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 99.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 4.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, August 17, 1840.*

M. TITOW read me despatches from his Government, stating that the Emperor had ratified the Convention with the greatest pleasure. I know your Lordship will see these despatches, and I say nothing more of them.

M. Titow cordially agreed to a proposition I made, that the Four Representatives should visit Rechid Pasha to-morrow, for the purpose of giving the Porte encouragement, and of discussing affairs, to show, that however much the conduct of France may be a cause for regret, there is no reason to have the least fear of the success of her arms, should she act in conformity with her threats.

No. 100.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September 4, 1840.*

I HAVE received this afternoon your Excellency's despatches to the 17th of August.

With reference to your despatch of that date, giving an account of the

threatening communication made to Rechid Pasha by the French Ambassador, on the 16th of August, with a view to deter the Porte from ratifying the Treaty of the 15th of July, I have to state to your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government cannot for a moment doubt that the firmness of the Turkish Government will have led it to ratify that Treaty immediately, without the slightest regard to those menaces; and Her Majesty's Government are persuaded that the Turkish Ministers have too much penetration not to have seen that these threats were solely intended to intimidate the Porte. It is most probable, indeed, that they will be disavowed by the French Government; and that it will be said at Paris, either that M. de Pontois exceeded his instructions, or that the French Dragoman delivered his message incorrectly.

At all events, it is little creditable to the French Government, that its agents at London and at Constantinople should hold on the same subject, and at the same time, language so diametrically opposite; and that while in London (and indeed at Paris also, through M. Thiers to Lord Granville), France is giving the most positive and unequivocal assurances of peace, it should at Constantinople be threatening immediate and even revolutionary war. But the very violence of the menaces of M. de Pontois is a sufficient proof that those menaces were never intended to be followed up by corresponding action.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 101.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 4.)

(Extract.) *Königswart, August* 30, 1840.

AN Estafette having arrived yesterday evening from Constantinople, Prince Metternich immediately sent for Count Maltzhan and myself, and read with us the despatches from Baron Stürmer and Count Königsmarck, which coincide with the report inclosed in Lord Ponsonby's despatch of August 17, with some modification, however, in M. de Testa's account of the language held to Rechid Pasha by M. Franceschi, as received by him from the mouth of his Excellency. The difference, however, does not affect the substance of the message of which M. Franceschi was the bearer.

No. 102.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 4.)

(Extract.) *Königswart, August* 30, 1840.

M. DE ST. AULAIRE came here on the 28th, as he had promised, having received a courier from Paris.

He began by stating to Prince Metternich, that in a conversation between M. Guizot and Baron Bülow, the latter had admitted that some plan for reuniting France to the Four Powers, might by possibility be hit upon by Prince Metternich, if it were tried at Vienna. To this the Prince at once answered, that Austria would not consent that the negotiation should be transferred there.

M. de St. Aulaire then produced the instructions to M. Cochelet and M. Périer, notifying that both these gentlemen had utterly failed, and that Mehemet Ali would make no concession whatever.

I pointed out to M. de St. Aulaire, the danger to which Mehemet Ali is exposing himself by the game he is playing, as in case the tide should set against him, he may be swept out of Egypt as well as Syria.

All the projects for reuniting France to the Four Powers, which have as yet been communicated to Prince Metternich as having received the sanction of any French Agent, have reposed upon the supposition that the Four Powers are to begin by retracting the Acts they have signed. This, Prince Metternich declares to be utterly inadmissible; so that, if France is in earnest in wishing that reunion to take place, she must seek it in another direction.

According to the reports from Paris and London, there exists a wish and an expectation that Prince Metternich should bring forward a plan by which this reunion is to be effected. This plan has been already proposed by him. It is, that France should delare her continued adhesion to the principles of the Collective Note ; that she should separate herself from the coercive measures intended to enforce them ; that she should leave the question of Syria to be decided between the Four Powers and Mehemet Ali ; and, that she should notify these intentions at Alexandria, at Constantinople, and to the Four Powers.

No. 103.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 4.)

(Extract.) *Königswart, August* 31, 1840.

PRINCE METTERNICH was to have gone to Plass to-day, and I intended to have left Königswart for Vienna yesterday evening, but he came to me in the morning, and said, that if he were to persist in this intention, he should be separated from the Ambassadors for ten days, which might be fertile of events of the highest interest. He therefore proposed to me to remain here, in which case he should request M. de Tatistcheff to return, and would also call upon M. de St. Aulaire to fix himself here, when he should leave Marienbad. He further stated, that he had sent for that Ambassador, in order to show him the last reports from Constantinople, adding, that he should immediately despatch a courier to Paris. Your Lordship may suppose, that I had no difficulty in assenting to a proposition made upon these grounds.

In the course of the morning, M. de St. Aulaire arrived, and having read the reports, declared it to be impossible that such a message could have been sent to Rechid Pasha. Prince Metternich had no difficulty in proving that this was not the case ; and then, remarking upon the difference of the language which France has held at Alexandria and at Constantinople, said, that it was of little importance to him whether M. de Pontois or M. Cochelet had correctly rendered the purposes of M. Thiers ; but that what he was entitled to know, was the intention of France.

It is impossible to suppose the conduct of M. de Pontois to have been anything more than an attempt to intimidate the Porte from ratifying the Convention.

No. 104.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 4.)

(Extract.) *Königswart, August* 31, 1840.

DESPATCHES were received late last night from Baron Neumann, and were hastily and imperfectly read to me. I collect from them that a plan has been discussed for displacing the negotiation from London, and transferring it first to Vienna, and then to Constantinople.

I have already stated to your Lordship, that Prince Metternich had pronounced himself against this project ; and upon this occasion he renewed his protest against it with additional force, saying, that if an attempt were made to remove the machine which has been set up in London, it would never be got together again ; and that an attempt to carry on a simultaneous negotiation in two places would lead to inextricable confusion.

No. 105.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, September* 9, 1840.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch of the 30th ultimo, reporting what passed between Prince Metternich and M. de St. Aulaire, and M. de St. Aulaire and your Excellency, with reference to the suggestion made by France that some plan for reuniting France to the Four Powers might possibly be hit upon by Prince Metternich if it were tried at Vienna, I have to inform your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government approve generally the language held by you to M. de St. Aulaire.

No. 106.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 9, 1840.

WITH reference to the contents of your Excellency's despatch of the 31st ultimo, I have to inform you, that Her Majesty's Government entirely concur with Prince Metternich in thinking that it would be inexpedient to transfer the negotiations on Turkish affairs from London to Vienna, and they think so for the reasons assigned by Prince Metternich.

This idea has been mentioned to me, but I stated that I thought it impracticable.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 107.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 6.)

(Extract.) *Paris, September* 4, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches to the 1st instant.

In conformity with your Lordship's instructions, I made an official communication of your Lordship's despatch of August 31, to the President of the Council, with whom I had some conversation as to its contents, though he was at that time but imperfectly acquainted with them; his principal object, however, seemed to be to ascertain whether your Lordship made any proposition relative to a change in the Treaty of the 15th of July; and I understand that he has since expressed to others, though he did not to me, his disappointment that such was not the case.

A variety of rumours, proceeding from persons supposed to have official information as to such a circumstance, had, indeed, for the last few days been prevalent, and these idle reports, by now creating a sort of disappointment, may unfortunately interfere with the good effects which the conciliatory tone and satisfactory statement of your Lordship were otherwise so well calculated to produce.

M. Thiers, however, spoke to me with much calm, and said, that it was far from his wish to appear in any way to menace or to alarm Her Majesty's Government; such an attempt, he added, would he knew be frivolous and ineffectual; but at the same time, he thought it his duty to state, that he was thoroughly convinced that Mehemet Ali would not make the concessions that were required from him; and that also, on referring to the words he made use of with respect to his own measures, he (M. Thiers) was almost persuaded, those words being, "that he would not resort to aggressive measures, unless he was

himself attacked," that the Pasha would consider even a blockade an attack, and that, consequently, every probability existed, of instructions being sent to Ibrahim Pasha to cross the Taurus.

I replied to M. Thiers, that such an event would, doubtless, be one of a very serious character, and that I could not say it would not happen, but that I still entertained some hopes that, placed in the face of the perils of so unequal a contest, Mehemet Ali would yet, though at the last moment, yield, and thus afford the happiest termination to our present differences.

I should, however, inform your Lordship, that I have since learnt from private sources, that there may be some reason to fear that the Viceroy of Egypt may adopt the hazardous project to which M. Thiers alludes, though I cannot but at the same time believe, that the people who hear and report his observations, are not sufficiently aware that no person in the East ever talks of giving way, until the moment at which he finally resolves to abandon all resistance, is arrived; but, be this as it may, I have the satisfaction of being able to observe to your Lordship, that the warlike feelings which, but a short time since, were so general throughout this country, seem at present to be rather dying away, under the influence of a variety of circumstances calculated to produce such a result.

People begin to see that the mighty efforts of 1793 could hardly be effected without its revolution; while the publication of the Memorandum has removed a variety of erroneous impressions; in short, the reaction to which from the first I looked forward amongst the more quiet part of the population, is taking place.

At the same time, many circumstances may arise out of the present state of affairs in the East, which would almost compel the present President of the Council to act up to the tone which his organs have used; and in that case, offering his resignation as an alternative, which he would do, it is difficult to say whether he might not force the Government to yield to his demands; or, which is more probable, whether, as head of a powerful opposition, and appealing to the love of military glory by which his nation is distinguished, he might not, in spite of all the efforts of a wiser policy, excite one of those warlike paroxysms with which this country has been so often seized, and for which it may always be well, during a crisis like the present, to be prepared.

No. 108.

Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 7.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, ~~September~~ August 29, 1840.*

YOUR Lordship's despatches to the 18th of August, were delivered to me on the 26th instant by the messenger Waring.

I called yesterday on Count Nesselrode for the purpose of learning if he had received any intelligence from the Levant, but he said that nothing whatever had arrived, nor had any fresh light been thrown on the Eastern Question since our conversation last week. His Excellency read me the latest despatches from Paris and London. The language of M. Thiers is described as become more calm, since he had received accounts of the ratifications of the Convention of July 15, having been despatched to London.

I inquired if any further instructions had been sent about the march of troops from the Crimea, and his Excellency said not. He seemed to hope that the presence of a Russian force before Constantinople would yet be unnecessary; but he said, that in three or four days he should receive fresh news from Alexandria, which he would immediately communicate to me.

No. 109.

Viscount Palmerston to M. Guizot.

Foreign Office, September 9, 1840.

THE Undersigned, Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in accordance with what was agreed upon between himself and M. Guizot, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary from His Majesty the King of the French at this Court, in their recent interview, has the honour to transmit to M. Guizot an extract from a despatch received by Her Majesty's Government a few days ago, from Lord Ponsonby, together with a copy of the inclosure therein referred to.

Her Majesty's Government was convinced, even before the Undersigned had the honour of showing these papers to M. Guizot, that the message intended to be conveyed to the Porte by M. de Pontois, must have been much altered by the person who delivered it, or else, that M. de Pontois must have made such a communication entirely without instructions or authority from his own Government, and, indeed, in direct opposition to the spirit of the instructions which he had received; because the language used upon this occasion by M. de Pontois was directly at variance with the language which has been held by the French Government to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris; by M. Guizot to Her Majesty's Government in London; and, as far as Her Majesty's Government are informed, by the French Agents at Alexandria to Mehemet Ali. For, at Paris, M. Thiers, on his return, not long ago, from the meeting held at the Château d'Eu, assured Earl Granville, that the strictest orders had been sent to the French Admirals in the Levant, to avoid anything which might lead to collision between the French and British ships of war; in London, M. Guizot, both before and since his visit to the Château d'Eu, has always stated to the Undersigned, that the armaments of France are purely precautionary, and in no respect whatever aggressive; that France intends to remain for the present entirely quiet; but thinking that the measures which the Four Powers are about to take in the Levant may, by possibility, lead to events which might affect the general balance of power, or alter the state of possession of the Powers of Europe, or, in some way or other, bear upon the direct interests of France, the French Government had deemed it right to place itself in an attitude of observation; and, at Alexandria, the French Agents are understood to have declared to Mehemet Ali, that France has no intention whatever of taking up arms in his support. It was therefore obvious to Her Majesty's Government, that M. de Pontois could not have been instructed or authorized by the French Government to hold, at Constantinople, a language directly the reverse of that which had been held by the French Government everywhere else; and the more especially, as the language held by M. de Pontois is directly at variance with all the public and official declarations made by the French Government, of the principles upon which the policy of France, with regard to the Affairs of the Ottoman Empire, is founded.

The Undersigned has great pleasure in acknowledging that the conviction thus felt by Her Majesty's Government has been confirmed by the belief expressed to him by M. Guizot upon this matter, on which, however, M. Guizot stated, that he had received no information from his own Government, and of which he knew nothing but what the Undersigned had laid before him. The Undersigned, therefore, in transmitting to M. Guizot the accompanying papers, in order that they may be made known to the French Government, begs to assure M. Guizot that he makes the communication, not in consequence of any doubt which Her Majesty's Government entertain of the sincerity and good faith of the Government of France, but because it is fitting that, in a matter of such deep importance to the peace of Europe, the French Government should know how much the language which is reported to have been used by one of its diplomatic agents, differs from that which the French Government itself has held.

The Undersigned has, &c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 109.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.

[See No. 96, p. 116.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 109.

Baron Stürmer to Prince Metternich.

[See Inclosure in No. 96, p. 116.]

No. 110.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 9.)

(Extract.) *Paris, September 7, 1840.*

YOUR Lordship may be aware, that Count Appony having received from Prince Metternich a report from Baron Stürmer as to the conduct of the French Ambassador at Constantinople, was instructed to ascertain from M. Thiers, whether that Ambassador was ever authorized by his Government to inform the Porte that in the event of the Sultan's becoming party to the Treaty of the 15th of July, France would appeal from such a policy to the Mahometan population, and even assist Mehemet Ali against the Four Powers. Having learnt that in conformity with such Instructions, Count Appony had waited on the President of the Council, I called on Count Appony this morning, in order to ascertain what had passed. It appears that M. Thiers, entering into some explanation, observed, that M. de Pontois might have said that France would appeal to the opinions of the Mahometan population, but not to the population itself; and that he (M. de Pontois) might also have warned the Porte that there were certain acts of coercion which France would not tolerate; but that his Instructions (to which M. Thiers was perfectly certain that he strictly conformed) went no further than this; which might imply little or much, according to the circumstances that occurred.

No. 111.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 11.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, August 19, 1840.*

THE Representatives of the Four Powers visited Rechid Pasha last night to assure him, *vivâ voce*, of the union existing amongst themselves, and of their zealous attention to the instructions of their Courts in execution of the Convention of the 15th of July; and also to learn from the Pasha's own mouth the message sent by the French Ambassador, which he repeated substantially as it is reported in the despatch of his Excellency the Internuncio, of which I transmitted a copy to your Lordship; and the Pasha told us that the same message had been delivered by the French Dragoman to the Grand Vizier, to the Seraskier Pasha, the Capudan Pasha, to Fethi Ahmed Pasha, and Riza Pasha.

I am told that the French merchants here disapprove of the policy of the French Government. All the mercantile interests are in favour of the Convention, which offers a fair prospect of the termination of a state of things highly unfavourable to trade.

Orders are in execution for assembling in the neighbourhood of the capital 34,000 men; and the soldiers are to be found. These troops will be divided into three corps of different numerical force: one, the smallest, will be kept in and about Constantinople; another will be stationed at the Dardanelles; another in the pass near Ismid. If the army of Ibrahim Pasha were in fact equal to the reports spread abroad of its strength, I am certain the Turkish military means would be sufficient to defeat the utmost efforts of that Pasha exerted in attack against this part of the country; but believing, as I do, that Ibrahim is not strong,—that the power of Mehemet Ali is exaggerated,—I entertain no alarm. Mehemet Ali endeavours to frighten the ignorant with threats of raising the people of Anatolia against the Sultan, and creating a revolution. Let the extent of Anatolia be noticed, and the number of its inhabitants, and their physical and moral means, and then let it be determined what power there can be in such a country and its inhabitants to do serious mischief to the Sultan, even if they should be the dupes of Mehemet Ali; but of that I see no one symptom whatever. I believe the Turks of Asia are bound, by genuine and sincere religious feelings, to the Sultan, their Caliph. I believe that it is by the action of fear upon the Mussulmans generally, that Mehemet Ali has been able to bring them into the field against their Sovereign; fear being aided in its influence by the ignorance of those who, accustomed always to consider the authority of the Pasha who governed them as the authority of the Sultan, have not known how to distinguish accurately between the rebel and the servant. Mehemet Ali, like others who have acted, with more or less success, a part like his in the Turkish Empire, has constantly concealed (to the utmost of his power) the fact of his being in actual rebellion against the Sultan, and has studiously professed unbounded loyalty and fidelity and obedience to him. These professions have deceived many, for the people are grossly ignorant.

No. 112.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 9.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 22, 1840.*

I RECEIVED on the 20th instant, from Rechid Pasha, a letter written by the Grand Vizier to the Emir Bechir, with the intent of recalling that Prince to his allegiance to the Sultan.

I have inclosed the letter to Mr. Wood, and directed him to cause it to be conveyed to the Emir; and I have also directed him to call the attention of those persons who may have access to the Emir, to the consideration of the position of Mehemet Ali, who now is engaged in a contest with the Four great Monarchies of Europe, acting in aid of the Sultan; and to ask them if the Emir is prepared to share the fortunes of the Pasha, at the risk of being destroyed, if the Sultan and his Allies prove victorious, and also with the certainty of continuing to be the slave of Mehemet Ali, should he be successful; and to state to those persons, that it is wise that the Emir should look at probabilities, and calculate the forces of parties at war, and judge for himself, if Mehemet Ali can succeed against Russia, Austria, England and Prussia, and the Sultan. That the crisis is come; that there is no longer doubt or hesitation; and that those who oppose must abide the consequences of their act, which may be very unpleasant.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 113.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 9.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 22, 1840.*

THE French Ambassador denied the correctness of the report of his Excellency's message to Rechid Pasha, delivered by M. Cor, and which has been transmitted to your Lordship.

There has been a good deal of movement in consequence. M. de Butenval called on me to make, in the name of M. de Pontois, a formal denial of it; and I beg leave to refer to my letter to the Internuncio, for the account of what passed at that visit.

I send inclosed, a Report made to me by Mr. Doyle, whom I sent with Mr. Stephen Pisani, at the earliest hour next morning, to Rechid Pasha, to communicate what had passed between M. de Butenval and myself. Your Lordship will find in Mr. Doyle's report, a copy of a letter from the French Ambassador to Rechid Pasha, and I inclose his Excellency's reply to it.

Your Lordship will judge the question.

I have thought it best to forward to your Lordship copy of the Internuncio's despatch to Prince Metternich, which his Excellency was so good as to permit me to make known to you.

It is a much better report of events than I am able to make, and will no doubt prove more satisfactory to you than my own.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 113.

Viscount Ponsonby to the Baron de Stürmer.

(Extract.) *Therapia, Thursday night, August 20, 1840.*

M. DE BUTENVAL has just been here to tell me, in the name of M. de Pontois, that he had not said the French Government would assist Mehemet Ali to resist the force that might be used against him; that he had never said the French would *soulever* the people, &c., &c. You will hear fully from our Colleagues, M. de Königsmarck and M. de Titow, what M. de Butenval said to them. I confine myself to state the above-mentioned denial made by him in the name of the French Ambassador of those two points. I said I could not see that the Porte could have any interest in propagating things or inventing them, which, if true, were injurious to the cause of the Sultan, by making it appear that France would protect Mehemet Ali; and I said, I could as little imagine how it could be the interest of any other person to do so, at least it was certainly the interest of all our Governments and Colleagues (their servants) to wish for the preservation of peace, and of the relations of friendship between our Governments and the French Government; that I must suppose the statement, wherever it came from, was occasioned by mistake and error alone.

In reply to a sort of regret he expressed, which had something the air of a complaint, that I had not asked the Ambassador for information, I replied, that I did not think myself at liberty to do so, because I felt that, if by ill-fortune it should be true that such things had been said, (and it was possible,) I should have placed myself in a very disagreeable situation with respect to the Ambassador, who might give me a reply unpleasant to receive. The conversation was nearly a repetition in varied phrases of the same things, but with the expression of the great satisfaction with which I learnt that France had not expressed those intentions which had been mentioned.

I have here to add, that M. de Butenval carefully marked that he spoke of things that were asserted to have been said by the Ambassador, and that it was not to be understood to give any intimation whatever of the measures or policy France might think proper to pursue in future. M. de Butenval said the affair must be investigated.

I had nearly forgotten to mention that I told M. de Butenval that the report of the communication from the French Ambassador to the Porte, was known very publicly immediately after it had taken place. I added, that the message was said to have been delivered to the Grand Vizier, the Seraskier, Capudan Pasha, Fethi Ahmed Pasha, and Riza Pasha. I have ordered my courier to be in readiness to carry despatches to-morrow, Friday night, for I think it necessary to convey as soon as possible to our Courts, the denial given by the French Ambassador. Pray inform our Colleagues of it.

Inclosure 2 in No. 113.

Mr. Doyle to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 21, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excelleney that, in compliance with your directions, I went this morning with M. E. Pisani to Rechid Pasha, at Balta Liman, to inform him that the French Ambassador last night sent his first Secretary of Embassy to you, and to the Representatives of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, to say, that his Excellency denied that he had stated to the Porte that the French Government would take the two following steps, namely: "That the French Government would use the means in its power to support the Pasha in his resistance to foreign intervention;" and, secondly, "that the French Government would assist him in raising a revolt amongst the people of Europe and Asia," &c. I begged M. Pisani to state this to the Pasha in Turkish, which he was doing, when the Baron de Testa, Dragoman of the Austrian Mission, arrived, and brought with him the reports of M. Franceschi and his own, drawn up on the 17th instant, after their interview with the Pasha, who had previously received the French Ambassador's communication through M. Cor, the French Dragoman. As there was a difference between the two reports, we requested the Pasha to state exactly what had been said; and we drew up from them the statement which I have the honour to inclose, and which has been certified as correct by the Pasha himself. His Excellency then informed me, that M. Cor had expressed his extreme regret that he should have been employed on this occasion; and said, that he would not have undertaken to make the communication, had not the other Dragoman been too ill to do so. His Excellency also said, that M. Cor's language to the Grand Vizier and the other Ministers was much stronger than that to himself; to the former he said, "that France desired the greatest publicity to their declaration, and that they would willingly have made it from all the minarets in the city." He also told the Pasha's Secretary, M. Rouet, that France was determined to turn out the present Ministry and all their partisans, that they might thus bring about a direct arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali. M. de Butenval, the first Secretary of the French Embassy, also said to the same gentleman, yesterday, "Qu'il fallait que quelqu'un cédât, mais que ce ne serait pas la France."

His Excellency then told me, that he should request all the Ottoman Ministers to whom this communication had been made, to state exactly what had been said to them; adding, that by such means would be seen the correctness of his statement. He showed me an official Note, which he had received late last night from the French Ambassador, a copy of which he allowed me to take, and which is herewith inclosed.

I have, &c,
(Signed) PERCY W. DOYLE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 113.

Report of the Austrian Dragoman.

SON Excellence Réchid Pacha m'a dit aujourd'hui, que M. l'Ambassadeur de France lui a fait faire hier par l'intermédiaire de M. Cor, la déclaration suivante: que dès l'avènement au trône du Sultan Abdoul Medjid, la France n'avait pas voulu l'intervention étrangère dans l'Affaire Turco-Egyptienne; que malgré ses conseils réitérés, la Porte venait de conclure à Londres une Convention que la France regardait comme une injure; que la France avait espéré qu'avant de la signer, Chékib Effendi en aurait prévenu l'Ambassadeur de France à Londres; que la France est par conséquent tout-à-fait contre l'administration actuelle de la Turquie; qu'elle ferait connaître ses intentions à toute la nation Musulmane; et qu'elle favoriserait toutes les combinaisons et tous les individus contraires au système politique actuel; que non seulement elle n'emploierait pas son influence auprès de Méhémet Ali dans le sens désiré par les Quatre Cours, mais qu'elle soutiendrait au contraire le Pacha d'Egypte, si les interêts et la dignité de la France l'exigent; que M. de Pontois demanderait s'il le fallait une audience de Sa Hautesse pour lui dire tout cela; enfin, que ceci n'était pas le langage de M. Thiers seulement, mais celui de toute la nation Française.

17 *Août*, 1840. (Signé) BARON DE TESTA.

Je trouve parfaitement exact ce rapport; et il contient tout ce qui m'a été dit par M. Cor.

(Signé) RECHID.

Balta Liman, le 21 *Août*, 1840.

Rapport du 17 Août, 1840, rectifié et légalisé par son Excellence Réchid Pacha, en présence et à la demande des Soussignés.

(Signé) PERCY W. DOYLE.
ET. PISANI.

Balta Liman, le 21 *Août*, 1840.

(Translation.)

Report of the Austrian Dragoman.

HIS Excellency Rechid Pasha told me to-day that the Ambassador of France had yesterday caused to be made to him, through M. Cor, the following declaration:—that from the time of the accession of Sultan Abdul Medjid to the throne, France had not wished for foreign intervention in the Turco-Egyptian business; that notwithstanding her repeated advice, the Porte had just concluded in London a Convention which France regarded as an injury; that France had hoped that before signing it, Chekib Effendi would have apprized the French Ambassador in London of it; that, consequently, France is altogether opposed to the existing Administration of Turkey; that she would make known her intentions to the whole Mussulman nation; and that she would favour all the combinations and all the individuals opposed to the existing political system; that not only would she not employ her influence with Mehemet Ali in the sense desired by the Four Courts, but that, on the contrary, she would support the Pasha of Egypt, if the interests and the dignity of France require her to do so; that M. de Pontois would, if necessary, demand an audience of the Sultan to tell him all this; lastly, that this was not the language of M. Thiers only, but that of the whole French nation.

(Signed) BARON DE TESTA.

August 17, 1840.

I find this report perfectly correct; and it contains everything that was said to me by M. Cor.

(Signed) RECHID.

Balta Liman, August 21, 1840.

Report of August 17, 1840, amended and certified by his Excellency Rechid Pasha, in the presence and at the demand of the Undersigned.

(Signed) PERCY W. DOYLE.
ET. PISANI.

Balta Liman, August 21, 1840.

Inclosure 4 in No. 113.

M. de Pontois to Rechid Pasha.

M. le Ministre, *Thérapia, le* 19 *Août*, 1840.

IL vient de m'être rapporté qu'il a été donné communication à MM. les Représentans des Cours d'Autriche, de la Grande Bretagne, de Prusse, et de Russie, d'une prétendue déclaration faite, en mon nom, au Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse, et annonçant, de la part de la France, l'intention de soutenir la cause de Méhémet Ali et de favoriser l'insurrection des populations placées sous l'autorité de la Sublime Porte.

Je crois devoir vous déclarer officiellement, M. le Ministre, que si cette communication a été réellement faite à MM. les Représentans des Quatre Cours, elle est fondée sur deux assertions complètement inexactes, et que je rends, dès à présent, son auteur responsable de toutes les conséquences qu'elle peut avoir.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,
(Signé) ED. DE PONTOIS.

(Translation.)

M. de Pontois to Rechid Pasha.

M. le Ministre, *Therapia, August* 19, 1840.

IT has just been reported to me that a communication has been made to the Representatives of the Courts of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, of a declaration alleged to have been made in my name to the Government of the Sultan, and announcing, on the part of France, the intention to support the cause of Mehemet Ali, and to favour the insurrection of the populations placed under the authority of the Sublime Porte.

I deem it my duty to declare officially to you, M. le Ministre, that if this communication has really been made to the Representatives of the Four Courts, it is founded on two assertions altogether incorrect; and that, from henceforth, I hold the author of it responsible for all the consequences which it may have.

I have the honour, &c.,
(Signed) ED. DE PONTOIS.

Inclosure 5 in No. 113.

Rechid Pasha to M. de Pontois.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, *Thérapia, le* 22 *Août*, 1840.

J'AI reçu l'office que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 19 de ce mois au sujet du message dont elle avait chargé M. Cor auprès de moi, relativement à la manière dont le Gouvernement Français envisageait la Convention du 15 Juillet.

Je m'empresse, M. l'Ambassadeur, de reproduire ici textuellement, tels que me les a rapportés M. Cor, les deux passages de ce message que votre Excellence signale comme ayant été inexactement répétés.

"La France est tout-à-fait contre l'Administration actuelle de la Turquie; elle fera connaître ses intentions à toute la nation Musulmane, et elle favorisera toutes les combinaisons et tous les individus contraires au système politique actuel; elle n'emploiera non seulement pas son influence auprès de Méhémet Ali dans le sens désiré par les Quatre Cours, mais elle soutiendra au contraire le Pacha d'Egypte, si les intérêts et la dignité de la France l'exigent."

Voilà, M. l'Ambassadeur, ce que m'a dit M. Cor. Ayant vu hier cet Interprête à la Porte, et lui ayant répété ses paroles, il est convenu que c'étaient bien à peu près celles dont il s'était servi, à la seule différence qu'il croyait n'avoir pas employé le mot "individus," en disant que la France favoriserait toute combinaison contraire au système actuel du Gouvernement Turc.

Je profite de cette occasion, &c.,

(Signé) RECHID.

(Translation.)

Rechid Pasha to M. de Pontois.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Therapia, August* 22, 1840.

I HAVE received the communication which your Excellency did me the honour to write to me on the 19th instant, on the subject of the message which you had directed M. Cor to deliver to me, relative to the manner in which the French Government looked upon the Convention of July 15.

I hasten, M. l'Ambassadeur, to repeat in this place, word for word, in the same manner as they were delivered to me by M. Cor, the two passages of that message which your Excellency points out as having been incorrectly repeated.

"France is altogether opposed to the existing Administration of Turkey; she will make known her intentions to the whole Mussulman nation, and she will favour all the combinations and all the individuals opposed to the existing political system; she will not only not employ her influence with Mehemet Ali in the sense desired by the Four Courts, but, on the contrary, she will support the Pasha of Egypt, if the interests and the dignity of France require her to do so."

This, M. l'Ambassadeur, is what M. Cor said to me. Having yesterday seen that interpreter at the Porte, and having repeated his words to him, he admitted that they were pretty nearly the same as those which he had employed, with the single difference that he did not think that he had used the word "individuals," when saying that France would favour every combination opposed to the present system of the Turkish Government.

I avail myself of this opportunity, &c.,

(Signed) RECHID.

Inclosure 6 in No. 113.

The Baron de Stürmer to Prince Metternich.

(Extrait.) *Constantinople, le 22 Août*, 1840.

UNE communication importante et tout-à-fait inattendue, nous a été faite hier par M. l'Ambassadeur de France, à mes Collègues d'Angleterre, de Russie, et de Prusse, et à moi. M. le Comte de Pontois ayant été retenu chez lui par une indisposition, il chargea son premier Secrétaire d'Ambassade, M. Ilis de Butenval, de se rendre successivement chez chacun de nous. Etant allé chez Réchid Pacha à l'heure où il passait chez moi (je suis le seul qu'il n'ait pas trouvé), il pria en conséquence M. le Chargé d'Affaires de Russie, qui loge le plus près de moi, de m'informer de l'objet de sa visite.

M. de Butenval dit à M. de Titow qu'il avait été chargé par M. de Pontois, de nous demander s'il était vrai que la Porte nous eût adressé une Note ou toute autre communication par écrit, où elle nous aurait fait part d'un message qui lui serait parvenu de la part de l'Ambassadeur de France? M. de Titow lui ayant répondu que la Porte ne nous avait rien écrit à ce sujet, M. de Butenval lui dit que, d'après ce qui était revenu à M. de Pontois, elle nous avait fait savoir que la France voulait soutenir Méhémet Ali de tous ses moyens, et l'aider à révolutionner ce pays; et que dans ce cas, l'Ambassadeur lui avait enjoint de nous déclarer que ces deux assertions étaient également fausses. Il ajouta ensuite, dans le cours de la conversation, que le Gouvernement Français veut nullement cacher son jeu; qu'il s'est prononcé ouvertement en désapprouvant la Convention, et surtout les mesures coërcitives, qu'il croit très-dangereuses; et que, par conséquent, il se tient à l'écart. M. de Titow lui ayant fait observer que cette désapprobation était purement une manifestation d'opinion, et que chaque Puissance était libre d'avoir la sienne, M. de Butenval répliqua qu'une désapprobation accompagnée d'un armement avait un grand poids quand elle vient d'une Puissance comme la France; et que de tout ce qu'il venait de lui dire de l'attitude prise par son Gouvernement, il ne résultait aucunement que celui-ci ne suivît dès demain, s'il le fallait, telle ligne de conduite que ses intérêts et sa dignité lui traceraient.

M. de Titow me dit que d'après l'impression que lui a laissé tout cet entretien, il croyait pouvoir admettre comme à peu près certain, que la France n'emploierait jamais des mesures matérielles pour assister Méhémet Ali, mais qu'elle voulait entraver l'exécution de la Convention du 15 Juillet.

M. le Comte de Königsmarck a reçu de M. de Butenval la même communication, mais sans que celui-ci, se bornant au fait, fût entré dans aucun développement, et sans que M. le Ministre de Prusse, de son côté, y eût donné lieu par une question ou observation quelconque. La seule nuance qu'il y ait eu, cette fois, dans les paroles de M. de Butenval, c'est, qu'en protestant contre l'imputation faite à la France de vouloir révolutionner la Turquie, il ajouta qu'elle ne voulait révolutionner ni ce pays, ni aucun autre.

M. l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre vient de m'adresser le billet ci-joint pour me faire part de la communication que M. de Pontois lui a fait faire, et de l'entretien qu'il a eu avec M. de Butenval, et sur lequel il a bien voulu me donner les détails les plus circonstanciés.

Je ne sais encore que penser de tout cela. M. de Pontois avait-il fait dire *ab irato* à Réchid Pacha ce qu'il se croit obligé de rétracter aujourd'hui? Et dans ce cas, comment se serait-il permis d'affirmer que ce langage lui a été prescrit par son Gouvernement? Ou bien, M. Thiers a-t-il cru que ces menaces feraient un tel effet sur les Turcs, qu'ils se jetteraient à genoux devant l'Ambassadeur, et que non seulement ils se refuseraient à ratifier la Convention, mais qu'ils se déclareraient prêts à faire tout ce qu'il voudrait? Dans ce cas, l'évènement aurait cruellement trompé l'attente de M. le Président du Conseil. Les Turcs ont trop de bon sens pour se faire des ennemis de Quatre Alliés puissans et sincères, pour se jeter entre les bras d'un Gouvernement qui, dans l'isolement où il s'est placé volontairement, ne saurait jamais leur offrir les mêmes avantages. Ils se sont empressés de porter à notre connaissance l'espèce de déclaration de guerre que leur a faite la France, et lorsque M. de Pontois aura su cela, et qu'il aura été informé du peu d'effet qu'avait produit sur nous son langage,

ainsi que de la démarche collective que nous avons faite (notre visite chez Réchid Pacha, le 18 au soir, à laquelle nous avons donné exprès la plus grande publicité) pour rassurer la Porte, il aura pensé que cela pourrait mener son Gouvernement trop loin, faire naître cette guerre dont on nous menace, et qu'il ne peut être dans l'interêt de la France de susciter.

Si cette supposition est fondée, il ne s'agit plus que d'examiner comment M. de Pontois s'y est pris pour réparer le mal qu'il a cru avoir fait. D'après la connaissance que j'ai du caractère de Réchid Pacha, je suis prêt à garantir qu'il n'a pas altéré un mot de ce que lui a dit le Drogman de l'Ambassade de France. Ce Drogman (M. Cor) est un homme personnellement dévoué au Pacha, et d'un caractère doux et conciliant ; ce n'est donc pas lui qui aura envenimé le message, qu'il a cherché au contraire à adoucir autant qu'il a pu, en assurant le Pacha (d'après ce que j'ai su depuis) combien le devoir qu'il avait à remplir était pénible pour lui. M. Franceschi, que le Pacha envoya chez nous pour nous faire part du message de M. de Pontois, a beaucoup trop d'esprit et d'habitude des affaires pour supposer qu'il eût mal saisi les paroles du Pacha dans une circonstance aussi importante. Il en avait d'ailleurs noté les principaux points dans son calepin pour ne pas se tromper, et ce sont ces notes que j'ai eues devant mes yeux en rédigeant mon rapport à votre Altesse, que j'ai lu et relu ensuite avec M. Franceschi, qui m'a dit qu'il n'y avait pas une syllabe à changer, et que c'était là exactement ce que le Pacha lui avait dit. Cela est si vrai, qu'ayant été chez Lord Ponsonby après avoir été chez moi, il se référa auprès de cet Ambassadeur à mon rapport, que celui-ci me demanda pour en envoyer une copie à Lord Palmerston. En outre, pendant que M. Franceschi se rendit chez nous, Réchid Pacha fit la même communication au Secrétaire Interprête, Baron de Testa, dont le rapport, que j'ai eu l'honneur de soumettre à votre Altesse, s'accorde à quelques nuances près pour le fond avec le message que nous a fait M. Franceschi. Enfin, le jour de notre visite chez Réchid Pacha (le 18 de ce mois), ce Ministre nous répéta en partie les paroles de M. Cor, et se plaignait à nous de ce qu'elles renfermaient d'outrageant pour une Puissance indépendante.

Il fallait donc croire que M. de Pontois pour se tirer d'affaire, donne aujourd'hui un démenti formel à Réchid Pacha, auquel ce démenti pourra peut-être susciter quelque désagrément, en commençant ainsi à miner l'administration actuelle. Voilà ce que nous devions tirer au clair dans l'intérêt de Réchid Pacha et de la vérité. Je suis convenu avec MM. le Comte de Königsmarck et Titow, que j'enverrais dès le lendemain le Baron Testa chez le Pacha pour informer ce Ministre et l'avertir de se mettre en garde. J'ai chargé M. de Testa de lui lire non seulement ma dépêche à votre Altesse qui contient le message tel qu'il a été rendu par M. Franceschi, mais aussi celui que lui-même m'avait adressé, et de me rendre un compte fidèle des observations auxquelles ces deux pièces auraient pu avoir donné lieu de la part du Pacha, ainsi que des passages, s'il y en a, qu'il trouverait inexacts ou dont sa mémoire ne pourrait garantir l'authenticité.

Votre Altesse daignera voir, par le rapport ci-joint de M. de Testa, comment il s'est acquitté de cette commission. A ce rapport s'est trouvé annexé un autre, rectifié, sur le message de l'Ambassadeur de France, que Réchid Pacha a apostillé de sa propre main pour attester la vérité de son contenu. En comparant les assertions qui s'y trouvent avec celles que renferme le message tel qu'il nous a été rendu par M. Franceschi, on est obligé de convenir que, quelle que soit la différence des termes et l'ordre dans lequel se suivent les idées, les points principaux restent les mêmes.

M. Franceschi nous a dit que " le Gouvernement Français unirait ses efforts à ceux de Méhémet Ali pour soulever les populations d'Asie et d'Europe." Réchid Pacha ne garantit pas cette expression, mais bien celle que la " France est tout-à-fait contre l'administration actuelle de la Turquie ; qu'elle fera connaître ses intentions à toute la Nation Musulmane ; et qu'elle favorisera toutes les combinaisons et tous les individus contraires au système politique actuel."

M. Franceschi nous a dit, en outre, que la France, loin d'employer son influence morale auprès du Pacha pour le porter à la soumission, lui accordera toute l'assistance qui est en son pouvoir pour l'aider à résister à une intervention étrangère. D'après le rapport rectifié du Baron Testa, cette menace n'aurait été que conditionnelle, c'est-à-dire, elle ne serait effectuée que si les intérêts et la dignité de la France l'exigent.

Réchid Pacha, avec qui j'ai passé la soirée hier, m'a raconté que le message que M. de Pontois lui avait fait faire et qu'il voudrait nier aujourd'hui, a

été fait à tous les fonctionnaires publics ; qu'on s'était servi envers plusieurs d'entre eux de termes encore beaucoup plus forts qu'envers lui ; que M. Cor a dit au Grand Vizir, que "le Gouvernement Français voudrait pouvoir faire annoncer du haut de chaque minaret ce qu'il venait de lui dire de la part de son Ambassadeur ;" que l'on ne s'était pas borné à ces communications, mais qu'on s'était efforcé à repandre le message de M. de Pontois dans le public ; et que tous les habitans de Constantinople en avaient été informés presqu'en même temps que lui ; que M. Cor avait dit à M. Rouet (le Secrétaire particulier de Réchid Pacha), que la France était déterminée à faire éloigner toute l'administration actuelle et ses adhérens, pour parvenir à effectuer un arrangement direct entre le Sultan et Méhémet Ali ; que M. de Butenval avait dit au même individu, qu'il fallait que quelqu'un cédât dans cette affaire et que ce ne serait pas la France.

Réchid Pacha regrette comme de raison, de n'avoir pas dit à M. Cor dans le temps, qu'un message aussi important que celui qu'il venait de lui faire, ne saurait être communiqué que par écrit, afin que l'on ne puisse pas se méprendre sur la valeur des termes.

Outre la communication faite par M. de Pontois aux Quatre Représentans, cet Ambassadeur en a adressé une pour le même objet, par écrit, à Réchid Pacha. Sa lettre se trouve ci-jointe ainsi que la réponse de ce dernier.

(Translation.)

The Baron de Stürmer to Prince Metternich.

(Extract.) *Constantinople, August* 22, 1840.

AN important and altogether unexpected communication was yesterday made by the Ambassador of France to my Colleagues of England, Russia, and Prussia, and to myself. M. le Comte de Pontois having been kept at home by indisposition, he directed his first Secretary of Embassy, M. Ilis de Butenval, to proceed to each of us in succession. As I had gone to Rechid Pasha at the hour at which M. de Butenval called on me (I am the only one whom he did not find at home), he, in consequence, requested the Chargé d'Affaires of Russia, who lives nearest me, to inform me of the object of his visit.

M. de Butenval told M. de Titow, that he had been directed by M. de Pontois to ask us whether it was true that the Porte had addressed to us a Note, or any other communication in writing, in which it had apprised us of a message alleged to have been conveyed to it, on the part of the Ambassador of France? M. de Titow having replied to him, that the Porte had written nothing to us on that subject, M. de Butenval told him that, according to what had reached M. de Pontois, the Porte had informed us that France was disposed to support Mehemet Ali to the utmost of her ability, and to assist him to revolutionize this country; and that, in that case, the Ambassador had enjoined him to declare to us that these two assertions were equally false. He went on to say, in the course of the conversation, that the French Government is in no wise inclined to conceal its game; that it has openly expressed its disapprobation of the Convention, and especially of coercive measures, which it considers very dangerous; and that consequently it stands aloof. M. de Titow, having remarked to him that this disapprobation was merely a manifestation of opinion, and that each Power was at liberty to entertain its own, M. de Butenval rejoined that a disapprobation, accompanied by an armament, had a great weight when proceeding from such a Power as France; and that, from all that he had just said to him respecting the attitude assumed by his Government, it by no means resulted that his Government would not follow from the very next day, if necessary, such course of conduct as might be traced out for it by its interests and its dignity.

M. de Titow told me, that from the impression which the whole of this conversation produced upon him, he thought he might take it for nearly certain that France would never employ material measures for the assistance of Mehemet Ali, but that she wished to obstruct the execution of the Convention of the 15th of July.

M. le Comte de Königsmarck received from M. de Butenval the same communication, except that the latter, confining himself to the fact, did not enter into any detail, and that the Minister of Prussia, on his side, did not give an opportunity for his doing so by any question or observation whatsoever. The only shade of difference which appeared on this occasion in the words of M. de Butenval is, that while protesting against the imputation cast upon France of being desirous of revolutionizing Turkey, he added, that France did not wish to revolutionize this or any other country.

The Ambassador of England has just written to me the inclosed Note, in order to inform me of the communication which M. de Pontois caused to be conveyed to him, and of the conversation which he had had with M. de Butenval, and respecting which he has had the goodness to give me the most circumstantial details.

I do not yet know what to think of all this. Did M. de Pontois, under the influence of passion, cause to be said to Rechid Pasha, that which he thinks himself obliged now to retract? And in this case, how could he allow himself to assert that this language had been prescribed to him by his Government? Or, on the other hand, has M. Thiers imagined that these menaces would produce such an effect upon the Turks, that they would throw themselves on their knees before the Ambassador, and that they would not only refuse to ratify the Convention, but would also declare themselves ready to do everything he should desire? In this case, the event must have cruelly deceived the expectation of the President of the Council. The Turks have too much good sense to make enemies of four powerful and sincere Allies, in order to throw themselves into the arms of a Government which, in the state of isolation in which it has voluntarily placed itself, can never offer them the same advantages. They hastened to bring to our knowledge the sort of declaration of war which France had made to them; and when M. de Pontois became acquainted with this fact, and was informed of the little effect which his language had produced upon us, as well as of the collective step (our visit to Rechid Pasha on the evening of the 18th, to which we had purposely given the greatest publicity) which we had taken in order to reassure the Porte, he thought that this might carry his Government too far, give rise to that war with which we are threatened, and which it cannot be for the interest of France to stir up.

If this supposition has any foundation, nothing remains but to examine what course M. de Pontois has taken, in order to repair the mischief which he imagines that he has done. From the knowledge which I have of the character of Rechid Pasha, I am ready to guarantee that he has not altered a single word of what was said to him by the Dragoman of the French Embassy. That Dragoman (M. Cor) is a man personally devoted to Rechid Pasha, and of a mild and conciliatory character; it is certainly not he, then, who will have embittered the message, which, on the contrary, he sought to soften as much as he could, by assuring the Pasha (according to what I afterwards learnt), how painful to him was the duty which he had to discharge. M. Franceschi, whom the Pasha sent to us to apprize us of M. de Pontois' message, has far too much cleverness and habit of business for it to be supposed, that he should have incorrectly understood the words of the Pasha on so important a matter. He had besides taken a note in his pocket-book of the principal points, in order that he might make no mistake; and I had these notes before my eyes while drawing up my report to your Highness, which I afterwards read over and over again with M. Franceschi, who told me there was not a syllable to be altered, and that it was exactly what the Pasha had told him. This is so true that, having been with Lord Ponsonby after me, he referred while with that Ambassador to my report, which the latter requested of me, in order to send a copy of it to Lord Palmerston. Besides, while M. Franceschi came to us, Rechid Pasha made the same communication to the Secretary Interpreter, the Baron de Testa, whose report, which I have had the honour of submitting to Your Highness, agrees, with the exception of some trifles, in substance with the message which M. Franceschi conveyed to us. Lastly, on the day of our visit to Rechid Pasha (the 18th instant), that Minister repeated to us in part the words of M. Cor, and complained to us of their being offensive to an independent Power.

It must be believed then that M. de Pontois, in order to get himself out of the business, gives now a formal denial to Rechid Pasha, to whom this denial will perhaps occasion some annoyance, thus beginning to undermine the existing administration. This is what it becomes us to clear up, for Rechid Pasha's and for the truth's sake. I agreed with Count Königsmarck and M. Titow, that I would send on the morrow Baron Testa to the Pasha, to inform that Minister, and to warn him to be upon his guard. I directed M. de Testa to read to him not only my despatch to Your Highness, which contains the message such as it was reported by M. Franceschi, but also the message which he had himself addressed to me, and to give me a faithful report of the observations which these two documents might have given rise to on the part of the Pasha, as well as of the passages, if there are any, which he might find inaccurate, or of which his recollection might not be able to warrant the authenticity.

Your Highness will observe, by the annexed report from M. de Testa, how he executed this commission. To this report another, and an amended one, is annexed, respecting the message of the Ambassador of France, to which Rechid has with his own hands affixed his initials, in order to attest the truth of its contents. On comparing the assertions which appear therein with those contained in the message, such as it was reported to us by M. Franceschi, it cannot but be admitted that, whatever may be the difference of the terms, and the order in which the ideas follow each other, the principal points remain the same.

M. Franceschi told us, that "the French Government would join its efforts to those of Mehemet Ali to stir up the populations of Asia and of Europe." Rechid Pasha does not warrant that expression, but he does the expression, that "France is altogether opposed to the existing administration of Turkey; that she will make known her intentions to the whole Mussulman nation; and that she will favour all the combinations and all the individuals opposed to the present political system."

M. Franceschi further told us that France, far from employing her moral influence with the Pasha to induce him to submit, will afford him all the assistance in her power to aid him in resisting a foreign intervention. According to the amended report of Baron Testa, this menace was only conditional, that is to say, it was not to be carried into effect, unless the interests and the dignity of France require it.

Rechid Pasha, with whom I passed yesterday evening, informed me that the message which M. de Pontois had caused to be conveyed to him, and which he wished now to deny, was conveyed to all the public functionaries; that towards many of them, terms had been employed even much more strong than those employed towards him; that M. Cor told the Grand Vizier, that "the French Government wished that it could proclaim from the summit of each minaret that which he had just said to him on the part of his Ambassador;" that they had not contented themselves with these communications, but had exerted themselves to spread abroad among the public M. de Pontois' message; and that all the inhabitants of Constantinople had been informed of it, nearly at the same time with himself; that M. Cor had said to M. Rouet, (the Private Secretary of Rechid Pasha,) that France was resolved to remove the whole existing administration and its adherents, in order to accomplish a direct arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali; that M. de Butenval had said to the same individual, that some party must give way in this business, and that it would not be France.

Rechid Pasha naturally regrets not having said to M. Cor at the time, that so important a message as that which he had just delivered to him, should only be communicated in writing, in order that there might be no mistake as to the force of the terms.

Besides the communication made by M. de Pontois to the Four Representatives, that Ambassador has addressed one in writing to Rechid Pasha, with the same object. His letter, as well as the answer of the latter, are annexed.

No. 114.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 10, 1840.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government approve the Note which you, together with the Representatives of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, addressed to the Porte, on the 11th of August, and of which a copy is inclosed in your despatch of that day.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 115.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 14, 1840.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the steps which, as reported in your despatch of August 19, your Excellency and your Colleagues took for the purpose of assuring Rechid Pasha of the union existing between you, and of your zealous attention to the instructions which you have received from your respective Courts with reference to the Convention of the 15th of July.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 116.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 9.)

(Extract.) *Alexandria, August* 17, 1840.

ON the 11th instant Rifat Bey, bearer of the demands of the Sublime Porte, reached Alexandria. The general object of his mission soon began to be known in the city, and as the French and Russian Consuls-General had within a few days officially cautioned the merchants and residents of their respective nations, I felt that the time was now arrived to follow that example. I therefore addressed to Mr. Consul Larking the inclosed despatch of the 11th instant, which produced the three subsequent public letters of the 12th, 14th, and 15th of August, all of which I have the honour to submit to your perusal.

I shall only add, that as twenty sail of British merchant ships are now in this harbour, and as a very large amount of commercial property is in other ways at stake, I shall use every effort to assist and protect those very important interests.

Inclosure 1 in No. 116.

Colonel Hodges to Mr. Consul Larking.

(Circular.)
Sir, *Alexandria, August* 11, 1840.

THE resolutions which have been taken by four of the Great European Powers for the pacification of the East, the arrival this morning of a special Envoy from the Sublime Porte, and the inflexible demeanour assumed by Mehemet Ali, have inspired some doubts as to the continuance of friendly relations with that Pasha.

I am not indeed without hope that the prudence and moderation of Mehemet Ali may avert an embarrassing complication of affairs: still it becomes a necessary precaution for you to call together the British Subjects and Protégés trading in Alexandria. You will recommend them to limit their credits, to arrange their affairs without any loss of time, and to remain generally on their guard.

You will also communicate the same instructions and advice to every Vice-Consul and Consular Agent belonging to your jurisdiction.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

Inclosure 2 in No. 116.

Mr. Consul Larking to Colonel Hodges.

British Consulate,
Sir, *Alexandria, August* 12, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge having received your circular letter of the 11th instant, and in accordance with the instructions therein contained, I yesterday called together the British Residents and Protégés in Alexandria, to whom I communicated its contents.

A wish having been expressed by several of those assembled to obtain fuller information on the present position of affairs as affecting their commercial interests, I was requested and consented to adjourn the meeting to this day, and I have now the honour to inclose you a copy of the resolutions that were passed, embodied in the minutes of the said meeting.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) JOHN W. LARKING.

Sub-Inclosure in Inclosure 2 in No. 116.

Alexandria, August 13, 1840.

MINUTE of Proceedings at a meeting held this day at the house of Her Britannic Majesty's Consul, convened at the request of the British merchants and residents of Alexandria, to take into consideration a communication made to them on the preceding day by order of Colonel Hodges, Her Britannic Majesty's Agent and Consul-General.

PRESENT:—

Messrs. Briggs, Terry, Peel, Friend, Harris, Todd, Bell, Roberts, Joyce, A. Thurburn, Taylor, Schiff, Reynolds, Bell, Walmass, Pothonier, Popolani, Riga Gire, Nani, Spiro Airermo, Stevens, Morris, Malin, Tibaldi, Fraser, Cortes, Giglio, and Metaxa.

Read the communication of Colonel Hodges, dated the 11th August, 1840, of which the following is a true copy:—

"(Circular.)

"Sir, "*Alexandria, August* 11, 1840.

"The resolutions which have been taken by four of the Great European Powers for the pacification of the East, the arrival this morning of a special Envoy from the Sublime Porte, and the inflexible demeanour assumed by Mehemet Ali, have inspired some doubts as to the continuance of friendly relations with that Pasha.

"I am not indeed without hope that the prudence and moderation of Mehemet Ali may avert an embarrassing complication of affairs, still it becomes a necessary precaution for you to call together the British Subjects and Protégés trading in Alexandria. You will recommend them to limit their credits, to arrange their affairs without any loss of time, and to remain generally on their guard.

"You will also communicate the same instructions and advice to any Vice-Consul and Consular Agent belonging to your jurisdiction.

"I have, &c.,

(Signed) "G. LLOYD HODGES."

On the motion of Mr. Harris seconded by Mr. Peel, it was unanimously resolved:

1. That this meeting yesterday learnt for the first time, with much regret, and with no little anxiety, that there is a prospect of an interruption of the friendly relations which have hitherto existed between the British Government and His Highness Mehemet Ali.

2. That with reference to the second paragraph of Colonel Hodges' letter, which contains the following sentence; "You will recommend them to limit their credits, to arrange their affairs without any loss of time, and to remain generally on their guard;" this meeting requests Mr. Consul Larking to correspond with Colonel Hodges on behalf of all the parties addressed in the above letter; to lay before him the proceedings of this meeting; and to call his attention to the facts stated below, showing the nature and importance of British commercial interests in this country as well as those of a more permanent nature, viz.:

That British merchants have purchased, directly and indirectly, from the Local Government about 47,000 cantars of cotton of the last crop, of the value of about £140,000 sterling, of which, more than one half remains to be shipped: That they have British vessels in port loading cotton and other goods, and that time is required for pressing and stowing the same: That they have British and other merchandize in store to a large amount unsold, which not being disposable for cash must in some way be put in safety: That they have outstanding credits to a large amount with the native traders in the country, which credits cannot be collected without great delay or at a great sacrifice: That many of them have accounts with the Government of His Highness the Viceroy which remain to be adjusted: That several of them have more permanent interests in the country, arising out of long residence, namely, houses and grounds; and others of them are cultivators of land to the extent of about 25,000 acres, on which considerable capital has been laid out: That many of them have families and establishments, which it would be difficult to remove, but whose safety is of paramount importance.

3. That these circumstances induce the British merchants and residents to apply to Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General, through Mr. Consul Larking, to afford them all the information generally in his power, and particularly on the following points, more immediately affecting their position:

Whether from his (Colonel Hodges's) certain information, the measures contemplated by the Great Powers (should His Highness continue inflexible) will be such as to render it necessary for British residents to quit this country, and in the event of such a contingency, what length of time remains for arranging their concerns, previous to the cessation of British protection?

Whether it is to be understood from the tenor of Colonel Hodges' letter, that an immediate removal of British property should be made? and if an

immediate removal be not necessary, whether a future notice will be given, and that a sufficient one, to effect the withdrawal of existing British interests?

(Signed) JOHN W. LARKING.

Inclosure 3 in No. 116.

Colonel Hodges to Mr. Consul Larking.

Sir, *Alexandria, August* 14, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your public letter of yesterday's date. You there inform me of the proceedings of a meeting of British merchants and residents held at your house, and you detail certain questions which the meeting has been pleased to propose to me through your medium.

The merchants and residents are probably sensible that I cannot give particular information as to the state of pending negotiations, and that any warnings of mine must for the present be couched in general and guarded terms.

Every thing seems to depend on the resolutions of Mehemet Ali, of which I can know nothing with certainty; and if I were to say what may be the limit of our friendly relations with that Pasha or the period of actual hostilities, I should be merely giving utterance to a private opinion of which I cannot be expected to assume the responsibility.

I wish it to be understood that I have as yet received no definite instructions from Her Majesty's Government having relation to the commercial interests of British Subjects in this country. The example of the Consul-General of a Great Power, and my anxiety for the welfare of the British merchants in Egypt, are the motives which urged me to furnish the advice contained in my despatch of the 11th of August, 1840.

Convinced of the serious and menacing situation of affairs, I beg of you to repeat again emphatically to the British merchants and residents, my former warning to limit their credits, to arrange their affairs, and to remain generally on their guard.

In conclusion you will please to assure my fellow countrymen that their safety and interests will occupy my most serious attention.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

Inclosure 4 in No. 116.

Mr. Consul Larking to Colonel Hodges.

Sir, *Alexandria, August* 15, 1840.

I HAVE the honour herewith to inclose you a copy of the resolutions of a meeting of British merchants and residents in Alexandria held this day, which I have been requested to communicate to you.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) JOHN W. LARKING.

Sub-Inclosure in Inclosure 4 in No. 116.

Minute of a Meeting of British Merchants and Residents in Alexandria.

AT a meeting of British Merchants held on the 15th instant, to take into consideration the contents of a letter from Her Britannic Majesty's Agent and Consul-General, dated the 14th instant, read to them this morning at the residence of Mr. Consul Larking;—It was resolved:

That the British Merchants of Alexandria feel surprised, and deeply concerned, to learn from that communication, that "in the present very serious and menacing situation of affairs," Her Majesty's Consul-General "had received no definite instructions from Her Majesty's Government having relation to the commercial interests of British subjects in this country."

That the deputation of Merchants in London, interested in this trade, who waited upon Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the beginning of May last, be again requested to bring these interests under his Lordship's notice, and to point out the painful state of suspense in which British merchants in Egypt are now placed.

That Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General be thanked for his communications and his promised attentions to their safety and interests.

That Mr. Larking be requested to communicate these resolutions to Colonel Hodges.

(Signed)	S. Briggs.	(Signed)	G. Fraser.
	Geo. Malin.		A. E. Harris.
	Alexr. Todd.		Alexr. Thurburn.
	Wm. Peel.		R. H. Galloway.
	J. Tibaldi.		Sidny Terry.
	Fr. Walmass.		C. Joyce.
	Thomas Bell.		

Alexandria, August 15, 1840.

No. 117.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 9.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, August* 19, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship copies of two despatches addressed by me to his Excellency Viscount Ponsonby, and which were forwarded to his Excellency by a recent opportunity.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

Inclosure 1 in No. 117.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) *Alexandria, August* 16, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatch of the 6th instant, containing your instructions, to which I shall faithfully conform. In compliance with the desire there expressed, that the

Convention should be widely promulgated in Syria, I have already sent thither three copies of that document; and I have directed the Consuls at Damascus, Aleppo, and Beyrout, to exert every effort towards forwarding the intentions of your Excellency.

A copy of the Convention, and the consequent instructions of Viscount Palmerston, had reached me as early as the 6th of August.

On the 11th of August, Rifat Bey reached this port, and was subjected to six days' quarantine, which expire this morning. He has been lodged very commodiously in the Pasha's sea baths. Both in conjunction with my Colleagues, and alone, I have had with his Excellency several protracted and confidential interviews. We are all gratified by the very judicious choice of the Sublime Porte, whose Envoy displays those rare qualities which render him perfectly equal to the difficult mission with which he is entrusted.

On the 12th instant, the French steamer of war "Tartare" reached Alexandria, having come in eight days from Toulon. She brought despatches for M. Cochelet, and also conveyed the Comte Walewski, charged with an extraordinary mission to Mehemet Ali. This arrival, and the news from France, which speedily circulated, produced a powerful impression in the city.

The precise object of Count Waleski's mission has not yet completely transpired, but enough has appeared to leave little doubt as to its general character. The Count, in conversations with the Russian Consul-General and with myself, declared openly that he had not come to dissuade Mehemet Ali from accepting the terms of the Convention of the 15th of July; but he added, that he possessed no instructions to advise his acquiescence with those propositions; and that he was directed to inform the Pasha that, as regards the Egyptian Question, France has decided on adopting an armed neutrality, awaiting the further progress of events.

Mehemet Ali is much accustomed to view every communication in the light most favourable to his own interests, and your Excellency can well estimate the effect such a message must have on his ardent and resolute temperament. Hence, there can now subsist hardly a doubt as to the fate of Rifat Bey's proposals.

Some days past, during the temporary absence of the Pasha from Alexandria, the officers of the Turkish squadron applied to Ahmed Pasha to know when they should be allowed to return to their homes? They also had the imprudence to sign a sort of round-robin, which, of course, constituted a grave breach of discipline. It is also pretended, truly or otherwise, that they had entered into some plot, which many say had for object the destruction by fire of both the fleets. The result has been melancholy. Last night, seven superior officers, after having been bitterly upbraided by the Pasha, were sent to the fortress of Aboukir, and thirty-eight officers of inferior rank have been sent as prisoners to the Arsenal.

Some little time since, the army of Arabia entered Egypt. It is commanded by Ibrahim Pasha junior, nephew of Mehemet Ali. Yesterday evening, a first detachment of these troops, conveyed in seven large boats, reached Alexandria.

Measures of precaution and defence continue to be pursued day and night with unremitting activity. The regiments in garrison are paraded with frequency and are diligently exercised in ball-practice, and the general use of their arms.

Thus every thing tends to the apprehension that Mehemet Ali has already finally resolved on a course of resistance which must prove unavailing.

Inclosure 2 in No. 117.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) *Alexandria, August* 16, 1840.

ON the arrival of Rifat Bey in Alexandria, Mehemet Ali was absent from thence on a tour of the Delta.

The Pasha returned to this city on the afternoon of the 14th instant. The same evening he was visited by the French Consul-General.

Early this morning, Rifat Bey was liberated from quarantine, and at half-past eight o'clock, A.M., he had his first audience of the Pasha. This was private, as had been arranged between Rifat Bey and the Consuls-General of the Four Powers.

It appears that the reception of the Sultan's Envoy was anything but gracious or favourable; but the results of that interview are fully related by Rifat Bey himself, in Minutes which I have now the honour to inclose.

Discouraged by his want of success, Rifat Bey at first proposed an immediate return to Constantinople; but, in conjunction with my Colleagues, I represented to him the propriety of awaiting the expiration of the first and second periods of ten days specified in the Convention, and at the termination of which it will be proper to make new and formal summonses of compliance. With these suggestions Rifat Bey has fully concurred, and we have exerted our joint efforts to encourage the Envoy, and to console him for his recent check.

To-morrow I shall proceed, together with my Colleagues, to wait on Mehemet Ali, and we purpose urging on him respectfully, but most earnestly, the acceptance of the terms proposed by His Imperial Majesty the Sultan. Unhappily, I cannot hold out to your Excellency much hope that our representations will produce any advantageous effects. The truth is, that the Pasha's determinations now depend wholly on France, and it is no longer permitted to doubt what are the inclinations of that Power.

This very day, in returning a visit of Count Walewski, now residing with the French Consul-General, I had a conversation of some importance both with the Envoy and with M. Cochelet. The tone of both was full of menace, but it did not strike me that they were yet perfectly certain as to the precise policy of their Government. They evidently await the arrival of the next steam-packet with intense anxiety. Count Walewski, however, told me very distinctly, that backed by the strong manifestation of public opinion in France, and highly dissatisfied with the uncourteous communication of Lord Palmerston to his Excellency M. Guizot, the French Cabinet was resolved to resist at once any measures of coercion exercised against Mehemet Ali.

I must beg permission humbly to submit to your Excellency, that if coercive measures are to be adopted, it is essential to strike at once and energetically. Delay may be fatal. At the same time, cool, prudent, and professional measures, are of vital and paramount importance. The smallest check either to the Turkish or any other forces employed in the contemplated operations, would be the probable ruin of the cause. As to a blockade, I conceive that it would prove useless.

Inclosure 3 in No. 117.

Report of the Interview between Rifat Bey and Mehemet Ali.

AUJOURD'HUI Dimanche, à 2 heures à la Turque, son Excellence Rifat Bey s'est rendu sur invitation expresse chez Méhémet Ali, accompagné des individus attachés à sa personne, et le résultat de l'entretien qui eut lieu entre eux est contenu dans les lignes suivantes:

Après les saluts et les complimens d'usage, le Pacha se trouvant seul avec Rifat Bey, lui demanda ce qu'il avait à lui dire, ainsi que la nature de sa mission? Rifat Bey répondit, "Ma mission consiste à vous notifier de la part et au nom du Sultan, que Sa Hautesse, Chef de la Nation Mahométane, a daigné vous accorder à vous et vos descendans en ligne directe, le gouvernement de l'Egypte, ainsi que le commandement de la province de St. Jean d'Acre votre vie durant. En vous annonçant cette faveur Impériale à votre égard, j'espère que votre Altesse voudra bien se contenter des provinces qui viennent de lui être accordées, sans faire des difficultés d'aucun genre, qui pourraient amener des conséquences graves."

A cette déclaration de Rifat Bey, Méhémet Ali fit une réponse qui n'est rien moins que celle qu'il faisait à nous dès le début de cette question. Il commença par dire qu'il était parfaitement instruit de la position actuelle de l'Empire Ottoman, ainsi que des vues secrètes des Puissances Européennes; "Je m'étonne fort," dit-il, "que l'Empire Ottoman se soit mépris jusqu'à ce jour, sur mes véritables vues, qui ne tendent qu'à chercher les moyens les plus propres pour rendre à l'Empire Ottoman son ancienne force et tous les services dont je pourrai être capable; et je regrette vraiment, de voir que vous rejetiez si indignement les bons offices que je vous offre. J'ai eu tort d'envoyer Sami Bey à Constantinople, et j'ai maintenant presque la certitude que Hosrew Pacha n'a pas été, ainsi que je l'avais toujours cru, le seul qui se soit opposé à l'arrangement de notre affaire; mais aussi tous mes autres collègues qui sont à Constantinople, sont également animés de dispositions hostiles contre moi.

"Je dois vous faire observer cependant, que du vivant du feu Sultan Mahmoud, de glorieuse mémoire, on m'a offert la possession héréditaire de l'Egypte et des provinces de Saïda, jusqu'à Tripoli, et on m'a assuré en même temps, que plus tard on s'entendrait aussi, pour ce qui concerne le gouvernement des provinces de la Syrie. Les propositions qu'on me fait maintenant sont évidemment absurdes, et de nature à occasionner ma perte. La France est prête à venir à mon secours, et m'a offert plus d'une fois son intervention, mais je l'ai toujours refusée, puisque mon intention est de ne point permettre aux troupes des Puissances Chrétiennes, de ravager le territoire Musulman; et je suis prêt à sacrifier à l'amour de ma nation, ma vie et tout ce que je possède."

Rifat Bey répondit:—"Les efforts que nous avons toujours employés, et que nous employons encore, ne tendent aussi qu'à un seul et même but, celui de l'amélioration du sort de l'Empire Ottoman et de la Nation Musulmane; mais permettez-moi de vous dire, que toutes les protestations et les assurances que dans ce sens, votre Altesse a faites jusqu'ici à l'Empire Ottoman, sont restées sans résultat, et se sont malheureusement bornées à des paroles vides de sens. Pourquoi l'Empire Ottoman n'aurait-il pas voulu vous admettre au nombre de ses Vizirs? pourquoi aurait-il eu recours à l'intervention des Puissances Européennes, pour vous mettre à la raison? Je crois que c'est votre Altesse qui a été cause que cette affaire est arrivée à ce point; car si dans le commencement elle avait voulu être moins prétentieuse et plus modérée dans ses demandes, cette question serait arrangée il y a longtemps. Quant à votre inimitié contre Hosrew Pacha, elle date de longtemps, nous le savons; mais je dois vous faire observer aussi, que ni Hosrew Pacha, ni les autres Ministres de la Sublime Porte, sont nullement opposés, ainsi que vous le supposez, à la solution de la Question Egyptienne; et si maintenant ils agissent autrement envers vous, c'est le nouvel état des choses qui leur en impose l'obligation. Sami Bey lui-même en aurait fait autant, s'il eût compté au nombre des fonctionnaires de la Sublime Porte; aussi votre Altesse croit que les Ministres de Sa Hautesse sont animés de dispositions hostiles. Votre Altesse vient de dire que feu le Sultan Mahmoud avait offert de vous accorder la possession héréditaire des provinces de Saïda, mais je ne crois nullement qu'il ait pu jamais entrer dans l'intention du feu Sultan Mahmoud de lui conférer une telle faveur. Quoiqu'il en soit, votre insistance à ne point vouloir faire abandon d'aucune des provinces qui sont en ce moment sous votre domination, ne prouve que trop, que ce n'est point, ainsi que vous vouliez me faire croire tout à l'heure, l'intérêt de l'Empire Ottoman, mais que vous aviez réellement en vue votre propre intérêt et celui de votre famille."

Méhémet Ali se laissa emporter par ces dernières paroles, et dans sa colère, dit à Rifat Bey: "Vous êtes un homme cruel; le langage que vous me tenez est diamétralement opposé à mes vues, qui sont toutes dans les intérêts de la

Porte. Ces paroles là ne sont bonnes qu'à tromper un petit enfant, et pas un vieillard de soixante-douze ans."

Rifat Bey lui répondit, " Vous avez tort de me donner la qualification de cruel sans m'avoir connu, et vous m'autorisez ainsi à ne point ajouter foi à aucune des protestations que vous venez de me faire."

A cette réponse de Rifat Bey, le Pacha se leva tout en riant et se promena quelques instans le long de la chambre, et puis, tout d'un coup, reprit la parole: " Croyez-moi," dit-il à Rifat Bey, "je n'aime jamais à faire des sermens, et je déteste tous ceux qui ont contracté ce vice; mais puisque vous m'y obligez, je vous jure sur ma foi et ma parole d'honneur, que je ne pense nullement à mes intérêts, ni à ceux de ma famille, et que je n'ai rien de plus à cœur que de rendre des services à mon empire et à ma nation. Le territoire de l'Egypte pourrait bien suffire à mes successeurs."

A ces paroles Rifat Bey répondit, " Il est du devoir de l'Empire Ottoman de penser aussi à ses intérêts ; et il ne serait pas bien aise de faire le démembrement de son empire."

Méhémet Ali répondit, " Ce que vous dites n'est point exact; en m'accordant la possession des provinces qui sont sous mes ordres, la Porte conserve encore pour elle la majeure partie de son empire. Mon intention était, une fois les affaires arrangées, de me rendre à Constantinople, d'être admis à l'honneur d'être présenté au Sultan et voir mes Collègues, et de passer le peu de temps qui me reste à vivre, tantôt à Constantinople, tantôt ici. Maintenant, puisque je vois qu'au lieu d'apprécier ma fidélité et le zèle dont je suis constamment animé pour le bien de ma nation, vous cherchez à me contrarier de toutes les manières possibles, il ne me reste qu'à chercher à me défendre par tous les moyens en mon pouvoir ; et je suis prêt à périr plutôt que d'accepter vos propositions. Voici ma première et ma dernière réponse."

Rifat Bey répondit: " Ma mission ne consiste qu'à vous faire la notification de l'arrangement arrêté entre les Quatre Grandes Puissances, et d'obtenir votre réponse définitive. Mes instructions ne m'autorisent nullement à employer auprès de vous des voies de persuasion pour vous engager à vous y soumettre, et si je le fais maintenant c'est pour prévenir l'effusion du sang, et les conséquences graves auxquelles donnera lieu votre refus d'accepter les propositions de l'arrangement dont il s'agit ; et comme il ne dépend que de vous d'éviter tous ces malheurs, je vous laisse la lettre vizirielle qui vous a été expédiée à ce sujet, afin que vous ayez le temps de la lire bien à votre aise et de faire vos réflexions pour me donner une réponse définitive, que je viendrai chercher d'ici à quelques jours." En disant ces paroles, Rifat Bey quitta le Pacha et se rendit auprès de Sami Bey, qui lui donna à entendre, que c'était avec un sentiment de déplaisir qu'il avait lu le contenu de la lettre vizirielle, et le langage que je lui ai tenu.

Sami Bey assura son Excellence qu'il lui était impossible d'exprimer à Rifat Bey, dans toute son étendue, la peine que le Pacha avait éprouvé, intérieurement, à entendre lire la première ligne de la lettre vizirielle, et particulièrement celle dans laquelle il est question des termes de dix et vingt jours. Sami Bey dit en outre à Rifat Bey, que lui-même de son particulier n'en était qu'excessivement désolé, et que d'après le contenu de la lettre ci-haut énoncée, il ne voyait pas la moindre possibilité pour le Pacha d'accéder aux vues des Quatre Puissances signataires: mais que pour tout, il le priait dans le cas où il serait obligé de retourner à Constantinople, de laisser l'affaire en suspens.

A ces paroles de Sami Bey, son Excellence répondit, " Les instructions qui à cet effet m'ont été données par la Sublime Porte, sont loin d'être étendues pour pouvoir en agir ainsi ; elles sont, au contraire, excessivement limitées, et ma mission ne consiste, sachez le bien, que d'avoir du Pacha, dans le délai accordé, telle réponse qu'il jugerait à propos de me donner, quelle que d'ailleurs en puisse être la nature.

Il est très-essentiel aussi de vous faire remarquer, que la nature du Protocole de la Question Orientale conclu en dernier lieu à Londres, ne permet pas à la Sublime Porte d'y déroger aucunement en faveur de votre Chef. quand bien même elle en aurait plus tard le désir. Aussi est-il de mon devoir, au moment de prendre congé de vous, de vous engager encore une fois à faire comprendre au Pacha l'importance de ce Traité, ainsi que la gravité des conséquences et l'énormité des malheurs de plus d'un genre qu'il ne manquerait de s'attirer en

cas où il persisterait, ainsi qu'il l'a fait jusqu'ici, à ne point se soumettre aux exigences du Traité dont il s'agit."

Voilà, Messieurs les Consuls, le rapport exact et circonstancié de l'entretien qui eut lieu aujourd'hui entre son Excellence Rifat Bey et Méhémet Ali, ainsi que Sami Bey son aide-de-camp.

(Translation.)

Report of the Interview between Rifat Bey and Mehemet Ali.

THIS day, Sunday, at 2 o'clock, Turkish time, His Excellency Rifat Bey proceeded to Mehemet Ali, at his express invitation, accompanied by the individuals attached to his person, and the result of the Interview which took place between them, is contained in the following lines:—

After the customary salutations and compliments, the Pasha being alone with Rifat Bey, asked him what he had to say to him, and also what was the nature of his mission. Rifat Bey replied, "The object of my mission is to announce to you, on the part, and in the name of the Sultan, that His Highness, the Chief of the Mahometan nation, has deigned to confer the Government of Egypt upon you, and upon your descendants in a direct line, as well as the command of the province of St. Jean d'Acre, for your own life. In announcing to you this Imperial favour, I hope that your Highness will be contented with the provinces which are granted to you, without making difficulties of any kind, which might entail serious consequences.

To this declaration of Rifat Bey, Mehemet Ali returned an answer which is precisely the one which he made to us from the very beginning of this question. He began by saying that he was perfectly aware of the actual position of the Ottoman Empire, as well as of the secret views of the European Powers. "I am greatly astonished," said he, "that the Ottoman Empire should have been so mistaken up to this moment as to my real views, which only aim at seeking the best means of restoring to it its ancient force, and of rendering all the services of which I am capable; and I really regret to see that you so shamefully rejected the good offices which I offer to you. I did wrong to send Sami Bey to Constantinople, and I am now almost certain that Hosrew Pasha has not been the only one, as I had always supposed, who opposed the arrangement of our business; but all my other colleagues also, who are at Constantinople, are equally animated by hostile feelings against me.

"I must request you to observe, however, that during the life-time of the late Sultan Mahmoud, of glorious memory, the hereditary possession of Egypt, and of the provinces of Saida, as far as Tripoli, was offered to me, and I was assured at the same time, that an understanding would subsequently be come to with regard to the Government of the provinces of Syria. The propositions which are now made to me are evidently absurd, and of a nature to cause my ruin. France is ready to come to my aid, and has more than once offered me her intervention, but I have always refused it, because my intention is not to allow the troops of the Christain Powers to ravage the Mussulman territory; and I am ready to sacrifice my life, and everything that I possess, to the love of my nation."

Rifat Bey replied: "The efforts which we have always made, and which we are still making, have also only one and the same object, that of ameliorating the lot of the Ottoman Empire and the Mussulman nation; but allow me to tell you, that all the protestations and the assurances to this effect, which Your Highness has hitherto made to the Ottoman Empire, have remained without result, and have unfortunately been confined to empty words. Why should the Ottoman Empire have been unwilling to admit you among the number of its Viziers? Why should it have had recourse to the intervention of the European Powers to bring you to reason? I think it is owing to your Highness that this business has arrived at this point; for if, at the commencement, you had chosen to be less exacting, and more moderate in your

demands, this Question would long ago have been arranged. As for your enmity to Hosrew Pasha, it is, we know, of long standing; but I must also request you to observe, that neither Hosrew Pasha, nor the other Ministers of the Sublime Porte, are in any way opposed, as you imagine, to the solution of the Egyptian Question; and if they are now acting otherwise towards you, it is the new state of things which obliges them to do so. Sami Bey himself would have done as much, if he had been among the functionaries of the Sublime Porte; wherefore Your Highness thinks that the Ministers of His Highness are animated by hostile feelings. Your Highness has just said that the late Sultan Mahmoud had offered to confer upon you the hereditary possession of the Provinces of Saida, but I do not at all believe that the late Sultan Mahmoud ever intended to grant you such a favour. Be this as it may, your insisting upon not abandoning any one of the Provinces which are now under your sway, only proves too clearly that you have really your own interest and that of your family in view, and not that of the Ottoman Empire, as you wished to make me believe just now."

Mehemet Ali allowed himself to be carried away by these last words, and said, in his passion, to Rifat Bey:—"You are a cruel man; the language which you hold to me is diametrically opposed to my views, which are all for the interest of the Porte. These words are only fit to deceive a little child, and not an old man of seventy-two."

Rifat Bey replied:—"You are wrong to apply the term cruel to me, without knowing me, and you thereby authorize me to put no faith in any of the protestations which you have just made to me."

At this answer of Rifat Bey, the Pasha rose up laughing, and walked up and down the room for some moments, and then suddenly resumed:—"Believe me," said he to Rifat Bey, "I never like to take oaths, and I detest all those who have contracted that vice; but since you compel me, I swear to you, on my faith and on my word of honour, that I in no way think of my own interests, nor of those of my family, and that I have nothing more at heart than to render services to my Empire and to my nation. The territory of Egypt might well suffice for my successors."

To this Rifat Bey replied:—"It behoves the Ottoman Empire to think of its interest also; and it would not be very well pleased to dismember its Empire."

Mehemet Ali replied:—"That which you say is not exact; by granting me the possession of the provinces which are under my orders, the Porte would still keep for itself the greater part of its Empire. My intention was, when once affairs were arranged, to proceed to Constantinople, to have the honour of being presented to the Sultan, and to see my Colleagues, and to pass the short time which remains for me to live, sometimes at Constantinople, sometimes here. Now, since I perceive that instead of appreciating my fidelity and the zeal by which I am constantly animated for the good of my nation, you seek to thwart me in every possible manner, it only remains for me to seek to defend myself by all the means in my power; and I am prepared to perish rather than to accept your propositions. This is my first and my last answer."

Rifat Bey replied:—"My mission is only for the purpose of notifying to you the arrangement concluded between the Four Great Powers, and of receiving your definitive answer. My instructions in nowise authorize me to employ the means of persuasion to induce you to submit, and if I do so now, it is only to prevent the effusion of blood and the serious consequences which will result from your refusal to accept the propositions of the arrangement in question; and since it only depends upon you to avoid all these evils, I leave with you the vizirial letter which has been addressed to you on this subject, in order that you may have time to peruse it quite at your ease, and to make your reflections before giving me a definitive answer, which I shall come and seek in a few days hence." Thus saying, Rifat Bey left the Pasha and repaired to Sami Bey, who gave him to understand that it was with a feeling of displeasure that he had read the contents of the vizirial letter, and the language which I had held to him.

Sami Bey assured his Excellency that it was impossible for him to express to Rifat Bey, in its full extent, the pain which the Pasha inwardly felt

on hearing read the first line of the vizirial letter, and particularly that in which there is question of the periods of ten and twenty days. Sami Bey said, besides, to Rifat Bey, that he himself, personally, was excessively distressed at it, and that, according to the contents of the abovementioned letter, he did not see the slightest possibility of the Pasha agreeing to the views of the Four signing Powers; but that, at all events, he begged him, should he be obliged to go back to Constantinople, to leave the affair in suspense.

To these words of Sami Bey, his Excellency replied:—"The instructions which have been given me by the Porte for this purpose, are far from allowing me latitude to act in such a manner; they are, on the contrary, excessively limited; and the object of my mission, you must know, is only to obtain from the Pasha, within the given time, such answer as he shall think proper to give me, be its nature moreover what it may.

"It is, moreover, very essential for you to remark that the nature of the Protocol on the Eastern Question lately concluded in London, does not allow the Sublime Porte to deviate from it in any way in favour of your Chief, supposing even that hereafter it might wish to do so. It is my duty, therefore, at the moment of taking leave of you, to entreat you once more to make the Pasha understand the importance of this Treaty, as well as the serious consequences and the immeasurable evils of more than one kind which he would not fail to bring down upon himself in case he were to persist, as he has hitherto done, in not submitting to the demands of the Treaty in question."

Such, Gentlemen, is the exact and circumstantial report of the interview which took place to-day between his Excellency Rifat Bey and Mehemet Ali, and with his Aide-de-Camp Sami Bey.

No. 118.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 9.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, August* 19, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that on the evening of the 17th instant, I proceeded together with my Colleagues to wait upon Mehemet Ali, and we attempted to urge on him respectfully, but earnestly, the advantages of speedy compliance with the demands of the Sublime Porte.

The Pasha, however, stopped the completion of our representations by a declaration, that his determination was taken. I have the honour to inclose the minute of our interview drawn up by one of my Colleagues.

Nothing seems to remain but to await the expiration of the twenty days expressed in the Convention, when a last application will be again made to Mehemet Ali.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

Inclosure in No. 118.

Minute of the Interview between the Consuls-General of the Four Powers and Mehemet Ali, on the 17*th of August,* 1840.

LE 17 Août, à 4 heures de l'après-midi, les quatre Consuls-Généraux se réunirent à l'effet de se rendre chez le Pacha, et de s'acquitter des ordres dont ils avaient été munis de la part des Représentans de leurs Cours à Constanti-

nople, relativement à la mission de Rifat Bey et aux résolutions de la Convention de Londres. Au moment de nous diriger vers le Palais, le Vice-Roi traversa la place d'Alexandrie, et nous ayant fait engager à le rejoindre à un des jardins de la ville, nous nous rendimes à cette invitation.

Après les premiers complimens d'usage, et quelques questions adressées sur son excursion récente dans le Delta, nous fimes part au Pacha du but de notre visite, et nous nous exprimâmes, à cette occasion, de la manière suivante :

" Votre Altesse a déjà eu connaissance par son Excellence Rifat Bey, de la Convention conclue entre nos Cabinets respectifs et la Sublime Porte, pour la pacification de l'Orient. Nous sommes chargés de leur part, de vous engager à vous soumettre aux conditions de cette Convention. C'est avec beaucoup de regret que nous avons appris la réponse que vous avez donnée à l'Envoyé de Sa Hautesse, elle n'est rien moins que satisfaisante ; mais nous espérons qu'une plus mûre réflexion vous fera accepter les stipulations qui vous ont été communiquées."

Méhémet Ali écouta silencieusement cette allocution, se bornant de faire, de tems à autre, un mouvement de tête affirmatif. Après la dernière phrase, il prit la parole et nous dit : " Rifat Bey m'a en effet informé du but de sa mission et des décisions de la Conférence de Londres. La réponse que je lui ai donnée est celle à laquelle vous deviez vous attendre de ma part. Je ne puis accepter les conditions qui me sont offertes, et vous connaissez trop bien le caractère de Méhémet Ali pour pouvoir supposer qu'il veuille se laisser enterrer vivant."

Nous répondimes que nous nous flattions, malgré cette réponse, qu'il reviendrait sur sa décision primitive, après avoir mieux consulté ses véritables intérêts, et qu'il finirait par prendre une résolution plus conforme aux vœux de nos Cours, à ceux de la Sublime Porte, et compatible avec le repos général.

" Mon parti est arrêté," reprit le Pacha, " n'en doutez point ; je suis décidé à la résistance, et je vous prie en grâce de ne pas faire d'inutiles efforts pour me faire changer d'avis, car vous n'y réussirez point. Je ne me soumettrai jamais à des conditions déshonorantes pour moi."

" Les clauses du Traité ne sont nullement déshonorantes pour vous," fut notre réplique, " elles ne peuvent l'être, puisqu'elles sont fondées sur la justice et l'équité. Les circonstances ne sont plus les mêmes aujourd'hui ; votre position a changé ; vous ne sauriez dorénavant vous flatter d'obtenir de la Porte les concessions que vous espériez lui arracher à une époque où vous vous trouviez dans une situation plus forte et plus menaçante vis-à-vis d'elle. Ne vous abusez point surtout du vain espoir d'une assistance de dehors qui vous manquerait au moment du danger."

Le Pacha répéta alors sa prière de ne point entrer en pourparlers avec lui sur cette question ; " si vous avez des observations à m'adresser," nous dit-il, " mettez les par écrit, et je vous répondrai de même ; de cette manière nous éviterons toute discussion désagréable."

Nous consentimes, sur sa demande, à changer de sujet, mais tout en lui exprimant qu'il était autant du devoir de notre charge comme de celle de l'intérêt que nous lui portions, de l'engager, par tous les moyens en notre pouvoir, à écouter la voix de la prudence et de la modération, à ne point se laisser aller à des extrémités qui pourraient avoir les conséquences les plus funestes, tant pour lui spécialement que pour la tranquillité générale ; que nous nous réservions, en conséquence, de revenir sur ce sujet dans un moment plus opportun, ayant, avant tout, à cœur de ne négliger aucune tentative de le ramener à des déterminations plus conciliatoires et plus analogues avec les intentions des Grandes Cours et de la Sublime Porte.

La conversation roula encore quelque temps sur des objets plus ou moins en dehors de la politique, après quoi nous nous retirâmes. L'entrevue avec le Pacha avait duré environ une heure.

(Translation.)

Minute of the Interview between the Consuls-General of the Four Powers and Mehemet Ali, on the 17th of August, 1840.

AT four o'clock in the afternoon of the 17th of August the four Consuls-General met together for the purpose of proceeding to the Pasha, and of fulfilling the instructions with which they had been furnished by the Representatives of their Courts at Constantinople respecting the mission of Rifat Bey, and the resolutions of the Convention of London. At the moment that we were proceeding to the Palace the Viceroy crossed the Square of Alexandria, and having invited us to rejoin him in one of the gardens of the city, we accepted the invitation.

After the usual compliments and some questions respecting his recent excursion in the Delta, we communicated to the Pasha the object of our visit, and we expressed ourselves, on this occasion, in the following manner :

" Your Highness has already been made aware, through His Excellency Rifat Bey, of the Convention concluded between our respective Cabinets and the Sublime Porte, for the pacification of the East. We are directed by them to request you to submit to the conditions of that Convention. It is with much regret that we have learnt the answer which you have given to the Envoy of His Highness ; it is anything but satisfactory ; but we hope that more mature reflection will induce you to accept the stipulations which have been communicated to you."

Mehemet Ali heard this address in silence, contenting himself from time to time with making a motion of the head in the affirmative. After the last sentence, he spoke, and said to us : " Rifat Bey has in truth informed me of the object of his mission, and of the decisions of the Conference of London. The reply which I have made to him is that which you ought to expect from me. I cannot accept the terms which are offered to me, and you know the character of Mehemet Ali too well to suppose that he will allow himself to be buried alive."

We replied, that, notwithstanding this answer, we flattered ourselves that he would reconsider his first decision, after having better reflected on his true interests, and that he would end by taking a resolution more in conformity with the wishes of our Courts, and with those of the Sublime Porte, and more compatible with general tranquillity.

" My resolution is taken," replied the Pasha, " do not doubt it ; I have decided upon resisting, and I beg of you not to make useless efforts to induce me to change my opinion, to you will not succeed. I will never submit to conditions which are dishonourable to me."

" The stipulations of the Treaty are in no wise dishonourable to you," was our reply : " They cannot be so, since they are founded on justice and equity. Circumstances at this moment are no longer the same ; your position is altered ; you cannot henceforward expect to obtain those concessions from the Porte, which you hoped to extort from it at a period when you found yourself in a stronger and more threatening position with regard to it. Above all, do not delude yourself with the vain hope of assistance from without, which would fail you at the moment of danger."

The Pasha then repeated his entreaty not to enter into discussions with him on this question ; " If you have any observations to make to me," said he, " put them in writing, and I will answer you in the same manner ; by this method we shall avoid all disagreeable discussion."

We consented, at his request, to change the subject, assuring him, however, at the same time, that the duty imposed upon us, no less than the interest which we felt for him, required us to urge him by every means in our power to listen to the voice of prudence and moderation, and not to allow himself to be carried away to extremes which might entail the most mischievous consequences, not only on himself in particular, but on the general tranquillity ; that we reserved to ourselves, therefore, the power of reverting to this subject at a more favourable moment, having above all things at heart to neglect no endeavour to bring him back to a more conciliatory determination, and one more in accordance with the intentions of the Great Courts and of the Sublime Porte.

The conversation turned then for some little time upon subjects more or less unconnected with politics, after which we withdrew. The interview with the Pasha lasted about an hour.

No. 119.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 9.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, August* 19, 1840.

I RECEIVED yesterday morning a visit from Count Walewski, special Envoy from the Court of the Tuileries to Mehemet Ali.

When I had last the honour of meeting Count Walewski with M. Cochelet, the tone of both was hostile and menacing. The conversation of the Count now assumed a more pacific character. He said that he hoped public opinion had become more calm in France; that his country had felt strongly the hasty step of signing a Convention from which France is excluded; but that, perhaps, the British Government might re-consider the matter, and he still trusted that war might be averted. He added, that every wish of France was for the continuance of peace.

Count Walewski declared that his desire was to communicate with me confidentially, and that such was the wish of M. Thiers. He urged me to use my endeavours to stop all hostile operations of the Admiral, adding that should I not consent, he was instructed to go on board the Admiral's ship, and to press on him a moderate and patient course, since the next packet from France might possibly bring the news of a solution having been found for the present complication of interests.

I replied that the Admiral possessed his instructions, and that it certainly did not depend on me to effect any alteration, whatever might be the nature of those orders.

The Count here said that he would give me a proof of the desire of France to preserve tranquillity; but he requested that what he was about to say might not be communicated to my Colleagues.

I answered that, as regarded the present negotiations, I could have no secrets from my Colleagues, and that if what was to be disclosed could prejudice the affairs with which we are all four charged, it might be better to observe silence. Count Walewski rejoined, that what he had to say could not fetter my actions; and he continued to inform me that, three days before, the Pasha had ordered his son Ibrahim to advance, but that, moved by the strong representations of France, he had suspended his commands.

I now understood, distinctly, that one very principal object of the Count's real mission was to prevent Mehemet Ali from moving.

I observed that the facts of the Pasha's order, and of its subsequently being suspended, were no secrets, and were known the day before not only to myself, but I believed to my three Colleagues. I added, that I could hardly suppose that French influence had much effect on the latter resolution, since it was generally understood that the arrival of 6,000 Turkish troops in Cyprus was the real cause which had altered the first intentions of the Pasha.

With reference to the now declared motive of the Count's mission, I remarked, that I felt pained at his not having been instructed to urge the submission of the Pasha, since his present message appeared to me more likely to be productive of injury than of advantage.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 120.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 9.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, August* 19, 1840.

ON the evening of the 18th instant, I received from his Excellency Boghos Bey a circular despatch, which had also been simultaneously addressed to the Consuls-General of Austria, Prussia, and Russia.

Having next day consulted with my Colleagues, we drew up and presented a joint Note in reply to the communication of his Excellency Boghos Bey.

I have now the honour to inclose both documents for the information of your Lordship.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

Inclosure 1 in No. 120.

Boghos Bey to Colonel Hodges.

M. le Consul-Général, *Alexandrie, ce* 18 *Août,* 1840.

J'AI eu l'honneur de vous informer par ordre de son Altesse le Vice-Roi mon maître, que l'insurrection du Liban avait été appaisée. Son Altesse ayant acquis la certitude qu'elle avait été fomentée en grande partie par les intrigues de quelques étrangers, désire prévenir le retour de pareilles machinations. Afin d'arriver à son but, son intention est de faire exercer la surveillance la plus active sur toutes les côtes de la Syrie; elle a résolu, en conséquence, d'ordonner que les quarantaines qui avaient été momentanément suspendues à cause des événemens, soient rétablies dans toute leur vigueur; elle a donc décidé que les navires, les marchandises, et les passagers, viendraient purger leur quarantaine à Beyrout et à Jaffa. En outre, son Altesse est bien résolue à sévir contre tout individu qui viendrait troubler l'ordre et la tranquillité, lorsqu'elle aura acquis des preuves positives de leurs intrigues son intention est de faire arrêter et de les remettre ici aux Consuls-Généraux auxquels ils appartiennent.

Son Altesse m'a ordonné de vous transmettre la présente communication, afin que vous vouliez bien la faire connaître aux Agens sous vos ordres; elle ne doute point de votre empressement à entrer dans ses vues, pour éviter de nouveaux malheurs.

Daignez agréer, &c.,
(Signé) BOGHOS JOUSSOUFF.

(Translation.)

Boghos Bey to Colonel Hodges.

Sir, *Alexandria, August* 18, 1840.

I HAD the honour, by order of His Highness the Viceroy my Master, to inform you that the insurrection of the Lebanon had been put down. His Highness having acquired the certainty that it had been excited in a great measure by the intrigues of some foreigners, is anxious to prevent the recurrence of similar machinations. In order to attain his object, it is his intention to cause the most active superintendence to be exercised over all the coast of Syria; he has determined consequently to order the quarantines, which had been momentarily suspended on account of the state of affairs, to be re-established in all their force; and he has therefore decided that all vessels, merchandize, and passengers, should perform their quarantine at Beyrout and at Jaffa. Moreover His Highness is firmly determined to proceed against any individuals who shall disturb public order and tranquillity, when he shall acquire positive proof of their intrigues; his intention is to cause them to be

arrested, and to be delivered over here to the Consuls-General to whom they may belong.

His Highness has ordered me to make this communication to you in order that you may make it known to the Agents under your orders; he does not doubt your readiness to enter into his views, in order to prevent fresh misfortunes.

Accept, &c.,
(Signed) BOGHOS JOUSSOUFF.

Inclosure 2 in No. 120.

The Consuls-General of the Four Powers to Boghos Bey.

Alexandrie, le 19 *Août*, 1840.

LES Soussignés ont pris connaissance de la Circulaire de son Excellence Boghos Bey, en date du 18 courant. Ils ne sauraient se conformer aux désirs exprimés par son Altesse le Vice-Roi au sujet des affaires de la Syrie, attendu que d'après l'Article II. de la Convention conclue à Londres le 15 Juillet, entre les Cours d'Autriche, de la Grande Bretagne, de Prusse, de Russie, et de la Sublime Porte, cette province, moins le Pachalic d'Acre, doit être considérée comme rentrée sous la domination immédiate de la Sublime Porte, et qu'ils sont appelés à encourager et à soutenir, de tous leurs moyens, ceux des sujets de Sa Hautesse qui manifesteraient leur fidélité et leur obéissance à leur Souverain.

(Signé) A. LAURIN.
G. LLOYD HODGES.
E. WAGNER.
A. MEDEM.

(Translation.)

The Consuls-General of the Four Powers to Boghos Bey.

Alexandria, August 19, 1840.

THE Undersigned have taken cognizance of the Circular of his Excellency Boghos Bey, dated the 18th instant. They are unable to conform to the wishes of His Highness the Viceroy on the subject of the affairs of Syria, seeing that by the 2nd Article of the Convention concluded at London on the 15th July between the Courts of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, and the Sublime Porte, that Province, with the exception of the Pashalic of Acre, is to be considered as restored to the direct rule of the Sublime Porte, and that they are called upon to encourage and support by every means in their power those subjects of His Highness who should manifest their fidelity and their obedience to their Sovereign.

(Signed) A. LAURIN.
G. LLOYD HODGES.
E. WAGNER.
A. MEDEM.

No. 121.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 9.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, August* 19, 1840.

AT about 10 o'clock this morning I was visited officially by Hosrew Effendi, Dragoman of Mehemet Ali.

He informed me that the Viceroy had received an express from Abbas Pasha at Béyrout, stating that four British ships of war had arrived off the

coast ; and that the English Consul, together with a naval officer, had summoned his Excellency to yield the fort of Beyrout, to evacuate the province with his troops, and to restore to the Druses the arms taken from them on the suppression of the late disturbances. He added, that Abbas Pasha had replied to these demands by requesting an interval of ten days, in order to obtain the instructions of the Viceroy.

Hosrew Effendi now announced to me, that Mehemet Ali had sent orders to his grandson to repel force by force, and also that the British Consul should be obliged to quit Beyrout the moment hostilities commenced.

To a question of mine, whether the Consular officers of other Powers would also be removed from Syria, Hosrew Effendi answered, that they had taken no part whatever against the Government of the Viceroy.

Hosrew Effendi further asked me whether I was aware that the naval officer commanding on the Syrian coast, had received any orders that could warrant such a course of conduct as that recently adopted ; and if I had been informed of those orders, he wished to know why I had not communicated them to his master ?

Having in the course of the morning related to my Colleagues the details of Hosrew Effendi's visit, it was determined to return a verbal answer to a verbal communication. We therefore instructed Mr. Alison, along with the first Dragoman of each of the other three Consulates-General, to proceed to the Pasha. They were desired first to read to Mehemet Ali my Minutes of the interview with Hosrew Effendi, and to inquire whether the Pasha's message had been correctly delivered. Upon receiving an affirmative reply, they were desired to state in our names what follows :—

That in virtue of the Convention signed at London on the 15th of July, Syria was now to be considered as replaced under the direct authority of the Sublime Porte. That on the requisition of the Sublime Porte, the Admirals of the fleets in the Mediterranean, belonging to the Powers parties to the above-mentioned Convention, had orders to give every assistance and support to such subjects of the Sultan as might manifest their submission or fidelity to their legitimate Sovereign. That as to the instructions of the Viceroy to his own authorities, enjoining them on the commencement of hostilities to expel from Syria the Consuls and Consular Agents of Her Britannic Majesty, we had to observe that the Viceroy could not with right and justice take any such step, since those Consuls and Agents were acting under Berats from His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, and in the dominions of that monarch. That should the Viceroy persist and put his threats in execution, the responsibility of his acts would rest entirely with himself.

This message was accordingly delivered to Mehemet Ali, and elicited the following verbal reply :—

" Be all that as it may, these are countries actually under my government. I am in my own possessions, and have not invaded those of the English. They, on the contrary, have come to attack mine. However, we shall see to whom God will accord these territories. As to the Consuls, if hostilites commence, they must naturally lower their flags."

On retiring, Hosrew Effendi said to the Austrian Dragoman that the British naval officer at Beyrout had not accorded a delay of ten days to Abbas Pasha, as I had understood in my interview of this morning.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 122.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 9.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, August 20, 1840.*

IN the interview of myself and Colleagues with Mehemet Ali on the 17th instant, as detailed in the Minutes inclosed in my despatch of the 19th of August, the Viceroy having stopped our verbal representations, requested us to submit to him in writing any reflexions we might have to make on the

present posture of affairs, and on the motives which should induce him to comply with the demands of the Sublime Porte supported by the Four Powers parties to the Convention of the 15th of July.

We therefore jointly drew up, and, under date of yesterday, addressed to the Viceroy, a Mémoire on the above subjects; and I have now the honour to transmit a copy of that Mémoire for the information of your Lordship.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

Inclosure in No. 122.

Mémoire addressed by the Consuls-General of the Four Powers to Mehemet Ali.

Alexandrie, le 19 *Août*, 1840.

PAR la conclusion de la Convention du 15 Juillet, la position politique de Méhémet Ali se trouve entièrement changée. Jusqu'à présent il n'était en dissidence et dans un état d'hostilité passive qu'avec la Sublime Porte seule ; mais en rejetant les conditions qui lui ont été offertes, il se trouverait en hostilité ouverte avec son Souverain ainsi qu'avec les Grandes Puissances signataires de ce Traité. Méhémet Ali ne saurait ignorer la haute portée et la force d'une Convention solennelle. Le système politique de l'Europe entière ne repose que sur la foi et sur l'exécution réligieuse des Traités. C'est ainsi que malgré des difficultés bien graves qui entouraient les questions de la Grèce, de la Belgique, et de l'Espagne, les Conventions y relatives ont reçu leur complète exécution, bien que les intérêts de toutes les Puissances Européennes à l'égard de ces questions n'aient pas toujours été identiques.

Croire encore à la possibilité d'un changement, ou d'une modification des conditions de la Convention du 15 Juillet, ou de l'Acte Séparé, ce serait se bercer d'un vain espoir ; ces stipulations sont inaltérables et irrévocables ; les termes péremptoires qui ont été fixés pour leur acceptation sont une preuve patente de l'impossibilité de tout changement ultérieur. Examinons maintenant les alternatives qui se présentent dans le cas de l'acceptation ou de la non-acceptation de la susdite Convention par Méhémet Ali.

En accédant à l'arrangement qu'on lui propose, le Vice-Roi prouverait à l'Europe et à la postérité, qu'il n'a pas seulement été un conquérant heureux comme tant d'autres avant lui qui n'ont su s'arrêter à tems et consolider leurs conquêtes, mais qu'il est à la fois homme d'état et profond politique. Quoi de plus glorieux que de fonder une nouvelle succession, de la voir reconnue par son suzerain et par l'Europe entière ; quelle consolation de pouvoir se dire à la fin d'une carrière brillante, "ce que j'ai créé passera à ma postérité, à mes enfans, auxquels personne ne pourra l'arracher."

De nos jours, ce n'est plus l'étendue territoriale d'un Etat, ni même sa force matérielle, qui en font le bonheur et la surêté ; ce sont les garanties plus solides des Traités qui constituent son intégrité en le faisant entrer dans le système politique de l'Europe. C'est ainsi qu'en jetant les yeux sur la carte, on y trouve beaucoup de petits Etats sans ressources, à côté des Empires les plus puissans ; ils n'ont à craindre aucune injustice ou oppression ; toute l'Europe veille sur leur honneur et leur sécurité. Des garanties pareilles une fois obtenues, qu'importe à Méhémet Ali ou à ses descendans d'acquérir quelques districts de plus, qui ne lui ont été jusqu'ici d'aucune utilité, et dont la possession a absorbé non seulement leurs propres ressources, mais encore la majeure partie de celles de l'Egypte. Le Vice-Roi connait mieux que qui que ce soit, les sacrifices en hommes et en argent que lui a coûtés l'occupation de la Syrie et celle de l'Arabie.

Ce n'est pas tout. A la place des différends qui ont malheureusement existé entre la Porte Ottomane et son Altesse, il y aurait une amitié sincère et une union fondées sur l'identité des intérêts politiques et de la croyance. La Nation Musulmane regagnerait son ancienne force et prospérité ; si jamais (ce qu'à Dieu ne plaise) l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman était menacée du dehors, la Turquie pourrait compter sur l'appui de l'Egypte, et l'Egypte sur celui de la Turquie, pour la défense de la patrie commune.

L'intérêt personnel de Méhémet Ali, celui de sa famille, le sort des habitans

de l'Egypte, et celui de la Nation Musulmane, les vœux pour l'intégrité et la prospérité de l'Empire Ottoman, dont il s'est toujours déclaré le plus zélé défenseur, tout, en un mot, dicte au Vice-Roi l'acceptation des conditions très-honorables, et plus avantageuses que ne le serait une simple extension de territoire précaire et coûteuse à maintenir.

Méhémet Ali aurait encore une carrière bien glorieuse et brillante devant lui; tranquillisé entièrement sur le sort de ses possessions, il pourrait vouer toute son énergie et tous ses efforts à la consolidation des belles institutions créées par lui en Egypte. Les riches contrées de la Nubie, du Soudan, et du Sénaar, offrent un vaste champ aux conquêtes de la science et de la civilisation. C'est ainsi que Méhémet Ali acquerrait le nom de régénérateur de l'Egypte, l'ancien berçeau des lumières.

Passons à l'autre alternative,—celle d'un refus d'accepter les conditions de la Convention.

Une conséquence immédiate d'un tel refus serait l'emploi des mesures coërcitives.

Le Vice-Roi est trop éclairé, et connait trop les moyens et les ressources dont les Quatre Grandes Puissances peuvent disposer, pour se flatter un seul instant de pouvoir, par ses faibles moyens, résister même à l'une ou l'autre d'entr'elles. Ce serait se bercer d'un espoir bien funeste, que de compter dans les circonstances actuelles sur un appui de l'étranger. Qui pourrait arrêter les décisions des Quatre Grandes Puissances, qui oserait les braver? Qui voudrait sacrifier ses propres intérêts à ceux d'autrui; compromettre sa propre sûreté par pure sympathie pour Méhémet Ali? D'ailleurs, quel avantage réel en résulterait-il? Il provoquerait un conflit général dans lequel le Vice-Roi serait le premier sacrifié et succomberait inévitablement; loin de lui être favorable, une telle intervention en sa faveur ne ferait que hâter sa perte, alors devenue certaine.

Les Quatre Grandes Puissances développeront des forces plus que suffisantes pour combattre tout ce qui pourrait s'opposer à l'exécution de la Convention. C'est sur Méhémet Ali seul que peserait toute la responsabilité d'une guerre; c'est lui qui aurait été la cause de l'intervention et de la présence de troupes Européennes en Egypte et en Asie. Les peuples Musulmans sauront que c'est lui qui est l'auteur des maux d'une guerre qui lui est entièrement personnelle. Méhémet Ali a menacé de verser beaucoup de sang avant de céder; les Puissances Européennes, au contraire, ont à cœur d'épargner autant que possible le sang des Mussulmans, et celui des Chrétiens rangés sous les drapeaux de la Sublime Porte. On portera là où le cas l'exigera, des forces suffisantes pour rendre toute résistance impossible et l'anéantir d'un seul coup.

Peut-on douter que le Vice-Roi succombe, et sera-ce avec gloire? Non, puisqu'il n'y a point de gloire à succomber par sa propre faute, par suite d'une aveugle témérité, et en engageant une lutte désespérée. Mais il y aurait de la gloire et de la sagesse à céder à la nécessité, et de plier à la force des circonstances. Et si Méhémet Ali succombe, son nom, ira-t-il à la postérité? Non, car ses conquêtes n'ont pas bouleversé le monde, comme celles de Tchengis Khan, de Timourlan, d'Alexandre, et de Napoléon. L'histoire dira, il y avait sous le règne du Sultan Mahmoud, un Pacha d'Egypte, homme d'un grand caractère, de génie et de courage; il eût du succès contre son Souverain. Le jeune successeur de Mahmoud, au moment de monter sur le trône de ses ancêtres, tendit la main à Méhémet Ali pour lui offrir les premières honneurs de l'Empire ainsi que paix et concorde. Le Pacha rejeta ces offres avec hauteur; c'est alors que l'Europe se déclara contre Méhémet Ali; il succomba; son nom se perdra parmi ceux de tant d'autres Pachas, ses dévanciers, révoltés et vaincus.

En refusant d'accepter la Convention, Méhémet Ali pourrait se bercer peut-être de l'espoir chimérique que les Puissances n'emploieront pas avec vigueur et énergie les mesures nécessaires pour mettre à exécution la Convention du 15 Juillet. En l'admettant même, ce qui est impossible, que s'en suivrait il? Le Vice-Roi se flatterait-il d'obtenir par là la continuation du *status quo?* Mais quel est l'Etat qui, avec le glaive des Grandes Puissances constamment suspendu sur sa tête, ayant son commerce anéanti et ses communications coupées, pourrait soutenir un tel état de choses?

Méhémet Ali peut sacrifier ses intérêts et ceux de sa famille à un amour-propre démésuré, à des vues subversives, et à une ambition sans bornes. Il peut porter le fer et le feu dans le cœur de l'Asie Mineure, la désolation parmi

la nation Musulmane; menacer l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman; et provoquer ainsi l'intervention des troupes étrangères; mais il ne le fera pas impunément.

Ibrahim Pacha avancerait, son retour lui sera fermé à jamais; il trouvera en Natolie une défaite certaine, peut-être son tombeau; et entraînera dans sa chûte celle de Méhémet Ali et de toute sa famille.

L'Europe n'acceptera la guerre qu'avec répugnance et comme une regrettable mais impérieuse nécessité. Les Puissances signataires du Traité de Londres, sont trop haut placées pour être accessibles à aucun sentiment de haine et de vengeance. La Convention n'est basée que sur l'équité, la convenance, et la stabilité de l'avenir; son seul but a été la consolidation de l'Empire Ottoman. Elle n'exige de Méhémet Ali que ce qui est juste, conforme à ses propres intérêts, compatible avec sa dignité; mais, en revanche, elle exige avant tout ce qui est adapté aux besoins de la paix générale. C'est là une vérité dont le Vice-Roi doit bien se pénétrer.

Qu'il cède donc à l'empire de la nécessité, et accepte avec reconnaissance de la main de son jeune et magnanime Souverain, et de l'Europe entière, la gloire d'avoir fondé, sous leur égide tutélaire, une nouvelle succession.

Il transmettra ainsi ses œuvres à la postérité, sera béni par ses descendans, et verra son nom honorablement gravé sur les pages de l'histoire.

(Signé) A. LAURIN.
G. LLOYD HODGES.
E. WAGNER.
A. MEDEM.

(Translation.)

Memoir addressed by the Consuls-General of the Four Powers to Mehemet Ali.

Alexandria, August 19, 1840.

BY the conclusion of the Convention of the 15th of July, the political position of Mehemet Ali is entirely changed. Up to the present time, he had differences and was in a state of passive hostility with the Porte alone; but by rejecting the terms which have been offered to him, he would find himself in a state of open hostility with his Sovereign as well as with the Great Powers who signed that Treaty. Mehemet Ali cannot be ignorant of the high import and force of a solemn Convention. The political system of all Europe rests only upon the faith of treaties, and upon their religious execution. Thus it happens, that notwithstanding the very serious difficulties which surrounded the questions of Greece, of Belgium, and of Spain, the Conventions relating to them have been carried into full execution, although the interests of all the European Powers, with regard to these questions, have not in every instance been identical.

To continue to believe in the possibility of a change or modification in the conditions of the Convention of the 15th of July, or of the Separate Act, would be to trust to a vain hope; those stipulations are unalterable and irrevocable; the peremptory terms which have been fixed for the acceptance of those stipulations are a manifest proof of the impossibility of any ulterior change being made. Let us now examine the alternatives which arise in case the above Convention should be accepted or rejected by Mehemet Ali.

By acceding to the arrangement proposed to him, the Viceroy will prove to Europe and to posterity, that he has not been merely a fortunate conqueror, as so many have been before him who knew not how to stop in time and consolidate their conquests, but that he is at the same time a statesman and a profound politician. What can be more glorious than to create a new line of succession—to see it acknowledged by his Sovereign and by all Europe; what a consolation would it be, to be able to say at the close of a brilliant career, "What I have created will descend to my posterity, to my children, from whom no one can take it away!"

In our days, it is no longer the territorial extent nor even the material force of a State which constitute its happiness and security; it is the more solid guarantees of treaties which establish its integrity, by causing it to enter into the political system of Europe. It is thus, that on casting our eyes on the map, many small States without resources are there found bordering upon the most powerful Empires; they have no injustice nor oppression to dread; all Europe

watches over their honour and their security. Such guarantees once obtained, of what importance is it to Mehemet Ali or to his descendants, to acquire some districts more, which have hitherto been of no use to him, and the possession of which has not only exhausted their own resources, but, in addition, the greater part of the resources of Egypt. The Viceroy knows better than anybody the sacrifices in men and money which the occupation of Syria and Arabia has cost him.

This is not all. In the place of the differences which have unhappily existed between the Ottoman Porte and His Highness, there would be sincere friendship and union founded upon the identity of their political interests and of their creed. The Mussulman nation would regain its former strength and prosperity; if at any time (which God forbid) the integrity of the Ottoman Empire were threatened from without, Turkey might reckon upon the support of Egypt, and Egypt upon that of Turkey, for the defence of the common country.

The personal interest of Mehemet Ali, and that of his family, the fate of the inhabitants of Egypt and that of the Mussulman nation, the wishes for the integrity and prosperity of the Ottoman Empire of which he has always declared himself the most zealous defender, all, in a word, enjoin the Viceroy to accept most honourable conditions, and which are more advantageous than would be a mere extension of territory precarious and expensive to maintain.

Mehemet Ali would, still, have before him a very glorious and brilliant career; being entirely at ease with regard to the fate of his possessions, he would be able to devote all his energy and all his efforts to the consolidation of the noble institutions established by him in Egypt. The rich countries of Nubia, of Soudan, and of Senaar, present a wide field for the triumphs of science and civilization. It is thus that Mehemet Ali would acquire the name of regenerator of Egypt, the ancient cradle of knowledge.

Let us turn to the other alternative, that of a refusal to accept the conditions of the Convention.

One immediate consequence of such a refusal would be the employment of coercive measures.

The Viceroy is too enlightened and is too well acquainted with the means and resources which the Four Powers have at their disposal, to flatter himself for one moment that he could, by his feeble means, offer resistance even to one or other of them. To reckon upon foreign support under the present circumstances would be but to cherish a vain hope. Who could stay the decisions of the Four Great Powers,—who would dare to brave them? Who would be willing to sacrifice his own interests for those of another; to compromise his own safety out of pure sympathy for Mehemet Ali? Besides, what real advantage could result therefrom? It would provoke a general struggle in which the Viceroy would be the first sacrifice, and in which he must inevitably fall; far from being of advantage to him, such an interference in his favour would only hasten his downfall, which would then have become certain.

The Four Great Powers will put forth forces more than sufficient to combat every opposition which may be made to the execution of the Convention. On Mehemet Ali alone would rest all the responsibility of a war; he would have been the cause of the intervention and of the presence of European troops in Egypt and in Asia. The Mussulman people will know that he is the author of the evils of a war undertaken purely for his personal interests. Mehemet Ali has threatened to spill much blood before giving way. The European Powers, on the contrary, are desirous to spare as much as possible the blood of the Mussulmans and that of the Christians arrayed under the banners of the Sublime Porte. Forces, sufficient to render all resistance impossible, and to annihilate it at one blow, will be directed to the quarter where there shall be occasion for them.

Can there be a doubt that the Viceroy will be overcome, and will it be with glory? No, for there is no glory in falling through one's own fault, in consequence of blind rashness, and by engaging in a desperate struggle. But there would be glory and wisdom in yielding to necessity and in bending to the force of circumstances. And if Mehemet Ali is overcome, will his name descend to posterity? No, for his conquests have not thrown the world into confusion like those of Tchengis Khan, of Tamerlane, of Alexander, and of Napoleon. History will say, there was, under the reign of Sultan Mahmoud, a Pasha of Egypt, a man of striking character, of genius, and of courage; he was successful against his Sovereign. The young

successor of Mahmoud, immediately on ascending the throne of his ancestors, stretched forth his hand to Mehemet Ali in order to offer him the first honours of the Empire as well as peace and harmony. The Pasha rejected these offers with disdain; it was then that Europe declared herself against Mehemet Ali; he fell; his name will be lost among those of so many other rebel and vanquished Pashas who preceded him.

In refusing to accept the Convention, Mehemet Ali might perhaps flatter himself with the chimerical hope that the Powers will not employ with vigour and energy the measures necessary for carrying into execution the Convention of the 15th July. Even admitting this, which is impossible, what would follow from it? Could the Viceroy flatter himself thus to obtain the continuance of the *status quo?* But what State is there which, with the sword of the Great Powers constantly suspended over it, its commerce annihilated, and its communications cut off, would be able to support such a state of things?

Mehemet Ali may sacrifice his own interests and those of his family to inordinate self-love, to destructive views, and to boundless ambition. He may carry fire and sword into the heart of Asia Minor, desolation throughout the Mussulman nation; he may menace the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and thus provoke the intervention of foreign troops; but he will not do so with impunity.

Should Ibrahim Pasha advance, his retreat will be for ever cut off; he will find certain defeat, perhaps a tomb, in Anatolia; and will involve in his fall that of Mehemet Ali and of all his family.

Europe will not accept war but with reluctance, and as a lamentable but imperious necessity. The Powers who signed the Treaty of London are too exalted to be susceptible of any feeling of hatred or of vengeance. The Convention is only founded on equity, on suitableness, and on stability for the future; its only aim has been the consolidation of the Ottoman Empire. It requires from Mehemet Ali only what is just, consistent with his own interests, compatible with his dignity; but, on the other hand, it requires, above all, that which is adapted to the interests of the general peace. This is a truth with which the Viceroy ought to be deeply impressed.

Let him yield then to imperious necessity, and accept with gratitude from the hand of his young and magnanimous Sovereign, and from that of all Europe, the glory of having founded a new line of succession under their tutelary ægis.

He will thus transmit his works to posterity, will be blessed by his descendants, and will see his name honourably inscribed in the page of history.

(Signed) A. LAURIN.
G. LLOYD HODGES.
E. WAGNER.
A. MEDEM.

No. 123.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 9.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, August* 23, 1840.

ON the 20th instant, his Excellency Rifat Bey was called to an interview with the Pasha in one of the gardens near this city. Its general character seems to have been extremely unsatisfactory, and its conclusion merits the attention of your Lordship.

I have the honour to inclose a copy of the Minute of Rifat Bey detailing the conversation which then took place.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

Inclosure in No. 123.

Minute of a Conversation between Mehemet Ali and Rifat Bey, on the 20th of August, 1840.

MARDI, 18 de Djémazi-ul-Akhir, son Excellence Rifat Bey se rendit sur l'invitation de Méhémet Ali, dans le jardin dit Djebbàra, et là, après les complimens d'usage et quelques paroles insignifiantes échangées de part et d'autre, Méhémet Ali commença par entretenir le Bey pendant près d'une heure, sur les ressources agricoles et financières de l'Egypte, et l'état actuel des nations Européennes, en présence de Habib Efendi et Chérif Aga, que le Bey trouva assis auprès de lui en allant dans le jardin sus-mentionné. Puis, tout d'un coup changeant de discours, il dit au Bey, "Hier j'ai reçu la visite de Messieurs les Consuls-Généraux des Quatre Puissances, qui m'ont fait part de la conclusion du nouveau Traité qui a trait à la solution de la Question Turco-Egyptienne, et la réponse que je leur ai donnée à ce sujet, est la même que vous avez reçue de moi le jour auparavant. Je leur ai dit, en outre, si toutefois ils avaient quelque chose de plus à me dire, de me le communiquer par écrit. Là-dessus, un d'entr'eux se permettant quelques paroles tant soit peu menaçantes, par lesquelles il voulait me donner à entendre que ce n'était pas à faible partie que j'avais à faire, je ne suis pas homme, lui ai-je répondu, à me laisser intimider par de semblables menaces, d'autant plus qu'il est évident que toutes les fois qu'il s'agit d'un fait de ce genre, c'est la partie attaquante qui a toujours le plus à souffrir."

"Il faut espérer," répondit alors Rifat Bey, "que cette affaire sera arrangée sans qu'il soit nécessaire d'en venir à cette entremise, d'autant plus qu'il ne tient qu'à votre Altesse d'y porter un prompt remède par une réponse affirmative."

"Je vois, mon fils," dit Méhémet Ali à Rifat Bey, "que vous avez envie de m'engager à entrer de nouveau dans de longs détails à cet égard;" et après avoir fait signe à Habib Efendi et Chérif Aga de sortir, il reprit la parole.

"Je regrette beaucoup," dit-il, "que pas un de vous n'ait eu jusqu'ici assez de prudence ni assez de sagacité pour reconnaître mon intention, qui n'a eu jusqu'à present, ni ne peut avoir d'autre point de mire, que le bien seul de la Sublime Porte.

"Je regrette de plus, que bien loin de m'en savoir gré, vous excitez sans cesse les Puissances Européennes à m'imposer des conditions si onéreuses et si déshonorantes pour Méhémet Ali; et comment osez-vous prétendre à m'arracher les provinces qui sont sous mes ordres il y a huit ans, et dont le gouvernement m'a été conféré par feu Sultan Mahmoud, d'illustre mémoire."

"Permettez-moi," répondit Rifat Bey, "de vous soumettre à cet égard, certaines observations dont il est impossible de ne pas reconnaître la justesse.

"Dans l'audience que votre Altesse a bien voulu m'accorder, il y a deux jours, elle m'a dit entr'autres, elle doit s'en souvenir, qu'en voulant lui assurer à jamais la possession de toutes les provinces qui se trouvent en ce moment sous ses ordres, elle n'était guidée que par la pensée sincère de rendre à l'Empire Ottoman, devenu malheureusement si faible depuis certain nombre d'années, son ancienne force et sa grandeur d'autrefois. Votre Altesse m'a dit, de plus, qu'elle avait lieu de regretter encore, que cette pensée si sincère, les Ministres de Sa Hautesse, bien loin de l'apprécier comme il était de leur devoir de le faire, l'avaient, au contraire, interprété en mauvaise part; et que, par conséquent, elle désirait savoir par moi, en quoi sa conduite avait pu donner lieu à une telle interprétation de leur part, en même temps qu'elle m'a témoigné le désir de connaître ce qui pouvait les avoir autorisé à recevoir d'elle une idée si peu avantageuse.

"Si, Altesse," ajouta Rifat Bey, "je ne suis pas entré alors dans de longs détails à cet égard, c'est parceque je n'ai pas jugé à propos de vous déranger dans ma première entrevue, par une longue série de mots qui, peut-être, vous auraient ennuyé; mais c'est le cas maintenant de suppléer au silence que j'ai dû tenir alors, et je suis persuadé que ce que je vais vous dire ne vous sera pas désagréable.

"Que votre Altesse me permette de lui demander avant tout, si les provinces actuellement en sa possession, elle veut les avoir avec indépendance, ou bien elle

désire continuer à les administrer au nom de Sa Hautesse, et comme un vassal du Sultan?

"Si vous voulez les avoir avec indépendance, une telle prétention est, votre Altesse ne peut pas en disconvenir, en opposition directe avec les Traités actuellement en vigueur et les droits publics Européens; aussi ne peut-elle obtenir l'assentiment d'aucune Puissance.

"De l'autre côté, je ne puis pas admettre qu'en demandant la possession des dites provinces, la pensée de votre Altesse soit réellement celle de les administrer sous le titre de vassal du Sultan, car je me rappelle, il y a deux ans, que vous avez prouvé le contraire par des prétentions d'indépendance que vous avez mises en avant, et que heureusement les Cinq Grandes Puissances n'ont pas hésité à rejeter unanimement.

"De pareilles prétentions ne sont-elles pas, je vous le demande, en contradiction directe avec la protestation de dévouement que vous venez de me faire, et les assurances que vous m'avez données tout à l'heure que le bien de l'Empire Ottoman est, et a toujours été, le mobile de toutes vos pensées? Admettons que votre Altesse ait pris la résolution ferme, de se contenir dorénavant dans les bornes de sa vassalité, et ne veuille plus mettre en avant des prétentions d'indépendance. Dans une telle hypothèse, il est essentiel de vous faire remarquer, que d'après les lois qui régissent les Gouvernemens de notre siècle, il est indispensable qu'entre le Souverain et le Vassal, il y ait certaines bornes qu'on ne pourrait pas dépasser sans s'exposer à enfreindre les lois dont il s'agit. Votre Altesse ne peut pas désavouer qu'une fois maîtresse des provinces dont elle a actuellement la possession, il ne serait pas impossible qu'elle ne pût être dominée à la longue par de nouvelles pensées d'indépendance.

"Les considérations que j'ai l'honneur de vous soumettre ne sont pas inconnues aux Ministres de Sa Hautesse; et en travaillant dans les intérêts de leur Souverain légitime, ils nourrissent l'espoir que, de son côté, votre Altesse voudra elle-même tenir dorénavant une ligne de conduite plus loyale.

"Voilà, Altesse, les seules raisons qui autorisent les Ministres de Sa Hautesse de ne plus tenir compte de vos protestations de dévouement, et de concevoir de vous une opinion si peu avantageuse; ces raisons sont-elles plausibles ou non? les Ministres de Sa Hautesse ont-ils raison ou tort de n'ajouter foi à aucune de vos paroles? c'est à la prudence bien connue de votre Altesse que je laisse le soin de le juger."

"Mon intention est," répondit Méhémet Ali, "de rester toujours vassal de Sa Hautesse, et si j'ai déclaré, il y a quelques années, des prétentions d'indépendance, les circonstances d'alors m'ont contraint de le faire; mais je n'ai plus de telles pensées; et il ne m'est pas difficile de vous convaincre, par des preuves positives, que c'est le bien seul de mon Empire que j'ai en vue, et que c'est dans ce seul but que sont dirigés tous mes efforts. Vous autres, vous ne connaissez, hélas, la loyauté des sentimens dont je suis animé vis-à-vis de l'Empire Ottoman; et vous songez absolument à la perte de Méhémet Ali; aussi m'est-il impossible d'accéder à vos vues."

Rifat Bey répondit, "Vous avez tort de croire que l'Empire Ottoman songe à votre perte; son intention est, au contraire, tout en maintenant l'intégrité de la Sublime Porte, de conserver intacts vos droits et ceux de vos descendans; il n'entre nullement dans sa pensée de vous abuser, mais elle ne veut pas non plus se laisser abuser par vos protestations mensongères et vos paroles pleines d'artifice et de perversité. Vouloir vous accorder le gouvernement de toutes les provinces actuellement sous vos ordres, ce serait reconnaître en quelque sorte votre indépendance; cette mesure, vous le savez, n'a jamais été agréée non seulement par les Quatre Puissances, mais encore par la France elle-même, qui s'est refusé à prendre part à la conclusion de la Convention qui, à cet effet, vient d'être signée à Londres entre les Représentans des Quatre Puissances; quoiqu'il en soit, au point où en est l'affaire, il ne vous reste plus qu'à vous soumettre aux exigences de cette Convention.

"Dans la circonstance actuelle," ajouta Rifat Bey, "trois choses sont à supposer; 1°. victoire complète de votre part; 2°. perte totale de vos troupes; 3°. continuation du bonheur dont vous jouissez actuellement.

"La première supposition, la force de ce nouveau Traité ne la laissera pas se réaliser; mais en admettant le cas contraire, votre avenir et celui de vos descendans en seraient-ils plus assurés? assurément non; car il est hors de doute, que les Quatre Puissances signataires ne manqueront pas de mettre tout en

œuvre pour atteindre le but du Traité qu'elles viennent de conclure. La perte totale de ces Puissances pourrait seule vous soustraire à leurs poursuites; ne serait-il pas se faire une immense illusion que de se bercer d'un tel espoir, si incontestablement vain et chimérique, et si contraire aux décrets de la Providence? Vous voyez, Altesse, d'après ce que je viens de vous dire, qu'il n'y a pour vous d'autre salut possible que d'accéder aux vues des Puissances signataires. C'est ainsi le seul moyen de conjurer l'orage prêt à éclater de toutes parts."

" Je sais que les Puissances Européennes," répliqua Méhémet Ali, " ont conclu une pareille Convention, mais, par sa position, l'Egypte n'a rien à craindre de leurs attaques; vous ne pouvez pas ignorer que tous les efforts tentés autrefois par les Souverains des différentes nations, pour s'emparer de ce pays, ont été sans succès."

" Il est vrai," répondit Rifat Bey, " qu'autrefois l'Egypte a presqu'été inattaquable; votre Altesse doit savoir aussi que les choses sont beaucoup changé depuis lors, et les circonstances ne sont plus les mêmes aujourd'hui."

" J'en conviens," reprit Méhémet Ali, " mais vous ignorez peut-être, que depuis lors, les choses ont beaucoup changé aussi dans ce pays-ci, le chiffre de l'armée que je possède monte à 200,000 hommes, et il faut, sans exagération, une armée doublement forte pour la tenir en échec, ce qui n'est guère possible, car, politiquement parlant, le nombre des troupes qu'on dirigerait contre moi, ne pourrait s'élever au-delà de 100,000 hommes, et Méhémet Ali est trop puissant pour se laisser battre par une armée si inférieure à la sienne; et d'ailleurs, qui pourvoirait aux immenses frais que devra nécessairement occasionner l'entretien des forces si imposantes?"

" Vous devez savoir, Altesse," reprit Rifat Bey, " que les Quatre Grandes Puissances feront, comme je vous ai déjà dit, tout au monde pour réaliser l'esprit du Traité qu'ils ont conclu entr'elles; leur dignité leur en impose l'obligation; du reste, vous ne devez pas avoir oublié les efforts que du temps du grand homme, ces mêmes Puissances ont déployées pour atteindre leur but, et l'empressement qu'elles ont mis, l'Angleterre surtout, à pourvoir aux frais considérables que leur a coûté le succès d'une si grande entreprise. Il y a plus: si à Dieu ne plaise, sans aviser aux moyens de détruire complètement les pays qui vous sont soumis, ces Puissances se contentaient de bloquer le port d'Alexandrie, cette décision ne serait-elle, en elle-même, de nature à vous contrarier et à entraver toutes vos opérations?"

" L'exemple du grand homme," répliqua Méhémet Ali, " m'a été aussi cité par un de Messieurs les Consuls, mais ma réponse lui fut, que si les Souverains de notre siècle avaient cru devoir suivre l'exemple des monarques qui ont régné avant nous, la nécessité de faire la guerre cesserait d'exister; mais le contraire a lieu toujours, chaque Souverain veut en ce moment agir d'après les idées qui lui sont suggérées par son ascendant. La fortune, mon fils, m'a toujours été favorable; mon étoile est toujours brillante; je ne puis pas la laisser pâlir; et si jamais les Puissances Européennes prenaient, ainsi que vous venez de le dire, la résolution de bloquer le port d'Alexandrie, j'enverrai à l'instant même à Ibrahim l'ordre de marcher; et vous savez qu'une fois en avant à la tête des troupes à sa disposition, ce dernier n'aura pas la moindre difficulté de soulever l'Anatolie, la Perse, et les habitans de Daghistan, sans parler de la Circassie qui est toute prête à s'unir à moi."

A cela Rifat Bey répondit, " Vos troupes jusqu'où peuvent-elles marcher? Supposons qu'elles aillent jusqu'à Scutari, croyez-vous que dans leur marche, elles n'auraient pas à rencontrer d'autres troupes?"

" Dieu me préserve," répliqua Méhémet Ali, " de faire diriger mes troupes vers ce pays-là; Méhémet Ali sait où il faut les faire marcher."

" Serait-il prudent," reprit Rifat Bey, " d'être l'auteur de tant de malheurs qui seront l'effet inévitable de toutes ces mesures, et de laisser couler si impitoyablement le sang de tant de malheureux humains."

" Mon intention n'est point," fut la réplique de Méhémet Ali, " de faire la guerre, mais c'est vous qui la provoquez. On voit d'après le contenu de la lettre que vous m'avez remise, que vous n'êtes pas autorisé d'entrer en négociations pour en venir à un arrangement; et il m'est impossible, sans faire tort à ma dignité personnelle, de faire retirer mes troupes dans l'intervalle de dix à vingt jours, ainsi qu'il est dit dans cette même lettre; ne dirait-on pas alors que les troupes de Méhémet Ali ont été chassées honteusement? L'effet d'un

semblable ordre est trop évidemment déshonorant pour moi, pour que je me décide d'y obtempérer."

"Il me semble que votre Altesse a tort de croire," répondit Rifat Bey, "qu'il y aurait pour elle le moindre déshonneur à retirer ses troupes; au contraire, elle ajoutera, par ce fait, encore davantage à la gloire qu'elle a déjà acquise."

"Tout ce que vous me dites," répondit Méhémet Ali, "ne me fera pas plus d'impression qu'à ceci," montrant la tabatière qu'il avait à la main.

"Je ne suis pas autorisé par mon Gouvernement," répliqua Rifat Bey, "de vous tenir un langage pareil, et si je le fais, ce n'est que dans l'intérêt de votre Altesse; et dès-lors, je crois qu'au point où sont arrivées les affaires, elle ne pourra trouver d'autre chance de salut que dans l'acceptation du Traité signé à Londres par les Quatre Puissances. Je la prie, en conséquence, de ne pas se laisser abuser par les paroles trompeuses de quelques individus qui, peut-être, lui en conseilleraient le contraire. En lui donnant de semblables conseils, ces gens là ne font que consulter leurs propres convenances, et nul doute, qu'ils ne finiront par le trahir cruellement, ainsi qu'ils n'ont pas craint d'en faire autant à l'égard du Sultan Mahmoud, de glorieuse mémoire; il me semble d'après tout cela, que si votre Altesse prenait, dans le délai de ces dix jours, le parti le seul avantageux qu'il lui reste, de donner une réponse affirmative, elle préviendrait les désastres de plus d'un genre qui seront les conséquences immédiates de son refus."

"J'ai déjà fait connaître," reprit Méhémet Ali, "ma réponse à Constantinople; je n'en ai point d'autre à vous donner."

"Sami Bey m'a donné à lire," répliqua Rifat Bey, "la lettre qu'à cet effet vous avez envoyée à Constantinople; cette lettre ne m'a pas paru avoir été rédigée avec sagesse et prévision, et je me flatte qu'une mûre réflexion vous fera revenir sur votre décision primitive."

"Mon parti est arrêté," répondit Méhémet Ali, "je ne changerai pas d'idée, quelque chose qu'il arrive; la France est là pour m'offrir sa médiation. Je vous laisse maintenant le maître d'écrire tout cela à Constantinople et de vous y rendre vous-même."

Telles furent les dernières paroles du Pacha; après quoi, on se retira.

(Translation.)

Minute of a Conversation between Mehemet Ali and Rifat Bey, on the 20th of August, 1840.

ON Tuesday, 18th of Djémazi-ul-Akhir, his Excellency Rifat Bey, on the invitation of Mehemet Ali, repaired to the garden called Djebbàra, and there, after the usual compliments and some unimportant observations exchanged on either side, Mehemet Ali began by conversing with the Bey, for nearly an hour, upon the agricultural and financial resources of Egypt, and the present state of the nations of Europe, in the presence of Habib Effendi and Chérif Aga, whom the Bey, on going into the above-mentioned garden, found seated near to him. Then, on a sudden changing the conversation, he said to the Bey, "I yesterday received a visit from the Consuls-General of the Four Powers, who communicated to me the conclusion of the late Treaty relating to the solution of the Turco-Egyptian Question, and the answer which I gave to them upon this subject, was the same as that which you received from me the day before. I told them, moreover, if they had anything more to say to me, to communicate it to me in writing. Thereupon, one of them venturing to use some rather menacing expressions, by which he wished to give me to understand that it was with no weak party that I had to deal, I replied, I am not a man to allow myself to be intimidated by such threats, more particularly because it is evident, that on all occasions on which there is a question of this nature, it is the assailing party which always suffers the most."

Rifat Bey then answered, "It is to be hoped that this affair will be arranged without the necessity of having recourse to such intervention, more particularly as it only depends upon Your Highness, by an answer in the affirmative, to bring it to a prompt solution."

"I see, my son," said Mehemet Ali to Rifat Bey, "that you wish to

induce me to enter anew into long details on this matter;" and, after having signed to Habib Effendi and Cherif Aga to go away, he resumed the conversation.

"I much regret," he said, "that not one of you should have hitherto had either sufficient prudence or sagacity to perceive my aim, which up to this time has only been, and can only be, the welfare of the Porte.

"I regret, moreover, that, very far from being obliged to me for this, you unceasingly urge the European Powers to impose upon me conditions so onerous and so dishonourable to Mehemet Ali; and how dare you attempt to take from me the provinces which have been eight years under my jurisdiction, and the government of which was conferred upon me by the late Sultan Mahmoud, of illustrious memory?"

"Allow me," answered Rifat Bey, "to submit to you, on this matter, some observations, the justice of which it is impossible not to admi .

"At the audience which your Highness was good enough to grant me, two days since, you told me, among other things, as you must remember, that in wishing to secure to yourself for ever the possession of all the Provinces which are at this moment under your jurisdiction, you were only influenced by the sincere intention of restoring to the Ottoman Empire, which had unfortunately for a certain number of years become so weak, its ancient strength, and its former grandeur. Your Highness told me, moreover, that you had, besides, reason to regret that the Sultan's Ministers, so far from appreciating, as it was their duty to do, that sincere intention, had, on the contrary, taken it in bad part, and that consequently you wished to know from me, in what respect your conduct could have given rise to such an interpretation of it on their part, at the same time that you expressed to me a desire to know what could have justified them in entertaining so little favourable an opinion of you.

"If, Highness," added Rifat Bey, "I did not enter into long details upon this subject, it was because I did not think it fit to trouble you, at my first interview, with a long series of words, which, perhaps, would have wearied you; but it is now time to make up for the silence which I then thought it right to observe, and I am convinced that what I am about to say to you will not be disagreeable to you.

"Will Your Highness permit me to ask you, in the first place, if you wish to have the Provinces now in your possession, with independence, or whether you desire to continue to govern them in the name of the Sultan, and as a vassal of His Highness?

"If you wish to have them with independence, such a pretension is, Your Highness cannot deny it, in direct opposition to the Treaties actually in force, and to the public law of Europe; it cannot, therefore, meet with the approbation of any Power.

"On the other hand, I cannot admit that in claiming the possession of the said Provinces, Your Highness's intention is really to govern them under the title of Vassal of the Sultan, for I remember, that, two years since, you proved the contrary by the pretensions to independence which you put forward, and which fortunately the Five Great Powers did not hesitate unanimously to reject.

"Are not such pretensions, I ask, in direct contradiction to the protestation of devotion which you have just made to me, and to the assurances which you gave me just now, that the welfare of the Ottoman Empire is, and always has been, the moving principle of all your thoughts? Let us admit that Your Highness has come to the firm resolution, henceforward to keep within the bounds of your vassalage, and that you will not again put forward pretensions to independence. Under such a supposition, it is necessary to observe to you, that, according to the laws which regulate the Governments of our time, it is essential that there should be certain bounds between the Sovereign and the Vassal, which cannot be passed without an infraction of those laws. Your Highness cannot deny, that once master of the Provinces which are now in your possession, it might not be impossible that you might in the long run be influenced by new views of independence.

"The considerations which I have the honour to submit to you are not unknown to the Ministers of His Highness; and, in working for the interests of their legitimate Sovereign, they cherish the hope that Your Highness will, on your side, henceforth pursue a more loyal line of conduct.

"These, Highness, are the only reasons which justify the Ministers of His Highness in no longer attaching value to your protestations of devotion, and in entertaining so little favourable an opinion of you; are these reasons plausible or not? are the Ministers of His Highness right or wrong in not putting faith in any of your words? I leave to the well-known prudence of Your Highness the task of deciding this point."

"My intention," replied Mehemet Ali, "is always to remain the Vassal of His Highness; and if I put forth, some years since, pretensions to independence, the circumstances of the time obliged me to do so; but I no longer entertain such thoughts; and it is not difficult for me to convince you, by positive proofs, that it is the welfare of my empire which I have alone in view, and that it is to this end alone that all my efforts are directed. Alas! you none of you know the loyalty of the sentiments by which I am actuated towards the Ottoman Empire; and you absolutely contemplate the ruin of Mehemet Ali; it is therefore impossible for me to accede to your views."

Rifat Bey answered, "You are wrong in thinking that the Ottoman Empire contemplates your ruin; its intention is, on the contrary, while maintaining the integrity of the Sublime Porte, to preserve intact your rights and those of your descendants; it has not the least intention to impose upon you, but it will not on that account allow itself to be imposed upon by your false protestations and by your artful and perverse words. To be willing to grant to you the government of all the provinces now under your jurisdiction, would be in some sort to recognise your independence; that measure, you know, has not only never been agreed to by the Four Powers, but not even by France herself, who refused to take part in the Convention on this matter, which has just been signed at London between the Representatives of the Four Powers; however, in the present state of the affair, it only remains for you to submit to the demands contained in that Convention.

"Under present circumstances," added Rifat Bay, "three things are to be supposed; 1st. Complete victory on your part; 2nd. Total loss of your troops; 3rd. Continuance of the good fortune which you now enjoy.

"As for the first supposition, the power of this new Treaty will not permit it to be realised; but, admitting the contrary to be the case, would your prospects and those of your descendants be thereby more secure? Assuredly not; for there is no doubt that the Four Powers who signed the Treaty will not fail to use every means in their power to attain the object of the Treaty which they have just concluded. The total downfall of those Powers could alone relieve you from their pursuit: would it not be a great self-deception to cherish such a hope, so incontestably vain and chimerical, and so contrary to the decrees of Providence? You see, Highness, from what I have just said to you, that there is no possible safety for you, except in acceding to the views of the Powers who signed the Treaty. This is the only means of calming the tempest which is ready to burst forth from all sides."

Mehemet Ali replied, "I know that the European Powers have concluded such a Convention; but, owing to its position, Egypt has nothing to fear from their attacks; you cannot be ignorant that all the efforts formerly made by the Sovereigns of different nations to obtain possession of this country have been unsuccessful."

Rifat Bey answered, "It is true that formerly Egypt was almost unassailable; Your Highness must also know that things are much changed since that time, and that circumstances are now no longer the same."

"I agree with you," resumed Mehemet Ali, "but you are, perhaps, not aware that, since that time, things are also much changed in this country; the number of the troops which I possess amounts to 200,000 men, and, without exaggeration, it would require an army of double that strength to keep them in check, which would hardly be possible; for, politically speaking, the number of troops which would be directed against me, could not amount to more than 100,000 men, and Mehemet Ali is too powerful to allow himself to be defeated by an army so inferior to his own; and, besides, who would provide for the immense expence which would necessarily be occasioned by the maintenance of such an imposing force?"

"You must know, Highness," replied Rifat Bey, "that the Four Great

Powers will, as I have already told you, do everything in the world to carry out the spirit of the Treaty which they have concluded among themselves; their dignity renders this incumbent upon them; moreover, you cannot have forgotten the efforts which, in the time of the great man, these same Powers exerted to attain their object, and the readiness which they showed, particularly England, to provide for the great expence which the success of so great an undertaking cost them. Further: if, please God, without having recourse to the means of completely destroying the countries which are subject to you, these Powers contented themselves with blockading the Port of Alexandria, would not such a determination be, in itself, of a nature to vex you and to impede all your operations?"

"The example of the great man," replied Mehemet Ali, "was also quoted to me by one of the Consuls, but my answer to him was, that if the Sovereigns of our age had thought fit to follow the example of the Monarchs who reigned before our time, the necessity of making war would not exist; but the contrary is always the case, each Sovereign at this moment wishes to act according to the ideas which his power suggests to him. Fortune, my son, has always been favourable to me; my star is always bright; I cannot allow it to grow pale; and if ever the European Powers decided, as you have just said, upon blockading the Port of Alexandria, I would instantly send orders to Ibrahim to march; and you know that, once in advance at the head of the troops at his disposal, the latter would not have the least difficulty in raising Anatolia, Persia, and the inhabitants of Daghistan, not to mention Circassia which is all ready to join me."

To this Rifat Bey answered, "How far could your troops march? Let us suppose that they went as far as Scutari, do you think that on their march they would not have to encounter other troops?"

"God defend me," replied Mehemet Ali, "from sending my troops in that direction; Mehemet Ali knows where to order them to march."

"Would it be prudent," rejoined Rifat Bey, "to be the cause of such misfortunes as would be the inevitable consequence of all these measures, and so unmercifully to shed the blood of so many unfortunate human beings."

"I have not the least intention," was the answer of Mehemet Ali, "to make war; but it is you who provoke it. It is clear from the contents of the letter which you have delivered to me, that you are not authorized to enter into negotiations for the purpose of coming to an arrangement; it is impossible for me, without derogating from my personal dignity, to withdraw my troops in the space of from ten to twenty days, as is said in this same letter; would it not then be said that the troops of Mehemet Ali had been disgracefully driven away? The effect of such an order would evidently be too dishonourable to me, to admit of my determining to obey it."

Rifat Bey answered:—"It appears to me that your Highness is wrong in thinking that it would be the least dishonour to you to withdraw your troops; on the contrary, you would by that act add still more to the glory which you have already acquired."

"All that you say to me," replied Mehemet Ali, "will produce no more impression upon me than it does upon this," pointing to the snuff-box which he held in his hand.

Rifat Bey replied:—"I am not authorized by my Government to hold this language to you, and if I do so, it is only for Your Highness's interest; and henceforth I think that, at the point to which matters have now come, your only chance of safety is to be found in accepting the Treaty signed at London by the Four Powers. I consequently entreat you not to allow yourself to be imposed upon by the deceitful words of some individuals who would perhaps advise you to the contrary. In giving you such advice, those persons only consult their own convenience, and no doubt they will end by cruelly betraying you, as they did not fear to do as much with regard to Sultan Mahmoud, of glorious memory; it appears to me, from all this, that if Your Highness took, in the space of these ten days, the only advantageous course which remains to you, that of giving an answer in the affirmative, you would prevent the disasters of more than one description which will be the immediate consequence of your refusal."

Mehemet Ali replied:—"I have already made known my answer at Constantinople; I have no other to give you."

Rifat Bey answered:—"Sami Bey gave me, for my perusal, the letter which you sent for that purpose to Constantinople; this letter did not appear to me to be drawn up with wisdom and foresight, and I flatter myself that mature reflection will induce you to reconsider your first decision."

"My line is taken," answered Mehemet Ali, "I will not change my opinion, whatever may happen; France is at hand to offer me her mediation. I now leave you at liberty to write all this to Constantinople, and to repair thither yourself."

These were the last words of the Pasha; after which Rifat Bey retired.

No. 124.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 9.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, August* 23, 1840.

I HAVE just learnt the result of a Council that was held yesterday at the Palace, over which Mehemet Ali presided. It consisted of Boghos Bey, Sami Bey, and the principal officers and dignitaries of the Pasha. When asked for their opinion, they, with one exception, pronounced for peace. Boghos Bey and Sami Bey were loudest in impressing upon the Pasha this wise measure, but they were overruled by Hassan Bey, a Turk educated in France, who entreated the Pasha to run all risks, as he had nothing to fear from the means opposed to him; in that opinion Mehemet Ali gladly coincided.

The Consul-General of France declared yesterday at the Palace before the Pasha and several individuals present, that such was the force of public opinion in France, that he had hardly a hope that a war could be averted. Your Lordship may easily conceive the injurious effects such language has, not only on Mehemet Ali's mind, but on all those around him.

All the European inhabitants of this place are loud in their censures of the coercive measures resorted to against the Pasha; and no portion of those inhabitants is more loud and violent in strictures on Her Majesty's Government, and even myself, than the body of British merchants residing in Alexandria.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 125.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 9.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, August* 24, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that Mehemet Ali has made a formal application to the French Government for its protection and mediation.

Count Walewski and M. Cochelet transmitted the official request by Her Majesty's steamer "Confiance," which sailed from hence on the 21st for Malta.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 126.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 9.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, August* 24, 1840.

WITHIN a few days past, the whole of the Egyptian and Turkish frigates and smaller craft, formerly moored in the old port of Alexandria, have been dismantled and placed in dry dock.

Merchant vessels are now ordered to discharge their cargoes in the new port.

The great harbour is thus cleared, and is now occupied by a crescent of nineteen ships of the line, placed in order of battle. They cannot be approached, owing to the natural obstructions across the entrance of the harbour, which has only three difficult entrances, and of these the principal is defended by a detached force of four first-rate vessels.

On the 14th instant, Her Majesty's ship "Bellerophon" anchored at some distance from this place, and has subsequently been joined by two Austrian frigates having on board Admiral Bandeira and the Archduke Frederick.

This morning, Admiral Sir Robert Stopford arrived in the "Princess Charlotte," and in the evening was followed by the "Daphne" corvette.

I proceeded immediately to pay my respects to the Admiral. As he is placed in quarantine, and other persons were present, my conversation with him could not of course be of a very confidential nature.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 127.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 9.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, August 25, 1840.*

HAVING this morning visited the Pasha, in company with the Consul-General of Austria, a conversation ensued, of which the particulars are contained in the Minute I have the honour to inclose for the information of your Lordship.

This interview has placed it beyond doubt that Mehemet Ali will definitively reject the terms proposed by the Sublime Porte. At the same time, it has become more than probable that, should the Consuls-General of the Four Powers parties to the Convention of the 15th July, not of their own accord quit Alexandria on the expiration of the twenty days of delay specified in the Convention, they will be expelled from Egypt by Mehemet Ali himself.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

P.S.—The Consuls-General of Prussia and Russia have forwarded to me Minutes, which I inclose, of their interview of this morning with Mehemet Ali.

G. L. H.

Inclosure 1 in No. 127.

Minute of a Conversation between Mehemet Ali and the Consuls-General of Great Britain and Austria, on the 25th August, 1840.

LE 25 Août, à 8 heures du matin, MM. les Consuls-Généraux d'Autriche et de la Grande Bretagne se rendirent auprès de Méhémet Ali, pour lui présenter les complimens d'usage des Amiraux Sir Robert Stopford et de M. le Baron Bandeira, et pour lui parler sur le parti à prendre à l'égard de la sommation que son Excellence Rifat Bey venait de lui faire par ordre du Grand Seigneur.

M. le Colonel Hodges lui dit, que tant en sa qualité d'Agent de Sa Majesté la Reine, qu'en son particulier, et comme soldat franc et loyal, il se sentait le devoir de le supplier de prendre en sérieuse considération sa position, et l'attitude que les Puissances signataires de la Convention de Londres ont prise vis-à-vis de lui; de ne pas se faire illusion sur l'issue d'une lutte qu'il pourrait engager, en refusant de se soumettre aux décisions d'une intervention si hautement placée, et aux décrets de son souverain; qu'il doit se souvenir que les Quatre Puissances ont traversé l'Europe, et que dès-lors il n'y avait aucune chance en sa faveur.

Mehémet Ali répondit, qu'il était supérieur aux conseils qu'on pourrait lui

donner à cet égard; qu'il s'est expliqué là-dessus avec Rifat Bey, et avec les Consuls-Généraux; qu'il n'avait rien à ajouter, rien à changer; que sa résolution est prise; il finit par prier de ne plus venir chez lui pour l'entretenir de cette affaire, parce qu'il la considérait comme une question assez discutée et vidée. Il articula ces phrases avec une telle emphase, que le Colonel lui assura qu'il ne lui en parlerait plus, en ajoutant ses regrets sincères d'avoir été poussé par son Altesse à cette déclaration.

Après un moment de silence, M. de Laurin prit la parole. Le Pacha observa, qu'il n'écouterait pas de conseils. M. de Laurin lui dit, qu'il ne voulait pas lui donner de conseils, mais qu'il avait une prière à lui faire. Le Pacha lui ayant accordé la parole, M. de Laurin lui dit qu'il s'agissait d'épargner une guerre à l'Orient. Méhémet Ali protesta de son innocence, disant que jamais il n'avait eu l'intention d'engager une lutte; qu'il ne veut que défendre l'état de ses possessions actuelles, qui en justice ne pourrait lui être contesté.

M. de Laurin lui dit, que la position offerte par la Sublime Porte, reconnue par les Puissances, était assez belle, honorable et solide: que l'Egypte, possédée héréditairement, formait le plus bel héritage du monde, et qu'en la refusant, il aurait à se reprocher la ruine de sa famille et les conséquences d'une guerre sanglante. Méhémet Ali reprit avec chaleur, qu'il n'est pas assez vil pour se faire intimider au point de rendre, sur des représentations, ce qu'il avait acquis par les armes. "Je sais tout," disait-il, "demain vous viendrez pour me dire que je n'ai plus droit à garder St. Jean d'Acre, et après dix jours encore, vous viendrez me dire que l'Egypte ne m'appartient plus. Ce terme passé, j'espère que vous ne viendrez plus chez moi pour me parler de ces choses là. Car n'ayant à vous donner autre réponse, ces visites deviendraient tout-à-fait inutiles. Je désire au contraire que vous prissiez des dispositions pour votre départ, car si la guerre commence je ne puis plus me fier à vous autres; d'ailleurs, votre honneur ainsi que ma sécurité personnelle l'exigent."

M. de Laurin reprit, que nous dépendions des ordres de nos supérieurs; que ce départ ne peut avoir lieu qu'après un rappel formel; que nous sommes ici par les ordres de nos Cours et en vertu du Bérat du Grand Seigneur; qu'à moins que l'honneur et l'indépendance de nos nationaux, et notre sécurité personnelle, ne soient en danger, nous ne partirions pas.

Mr. Hodges ajouta, que quant à lui, il se conformerait strictement à ses instructions, sans égard aux désirs et aux convenances de son Altesse; qu'il y resterait en tant que sa permanence sera compatible avec son honneur et ses devoirs.

Après quoi, nous nous sommes congédiés, en lui disant que nous reviendrions le lendemain pour prendre sa réponse définitive; nous avons en même temps exprimé nos regrets de voir son Altesse persister dans son refus, ainsi que notre espoir d'en obtenir une déclaration plus conforme aux décisions de la Conférence de Londres, et à ses propres intérêts, pour être en suite à même de reprendre bientôt les relations amicales avec lui.

(Signé) G. LLOYD HODGES.
A. LAURIN.

(Translation.)

Miuute of a Conversation between Mehemet Ali and the Consuls-General of Great Britain and Austria, on the 25th of August, 1840.

ON the 25th of August, at 8 o'clock in the morning, the Gonsuls-General of Austria and of Great Britain repaired to Mehemet Ali to present to him the usual compliments of Admirals Sir Robert Stopford and Baron Bandeira and to speak to him as to the course to be taken with regard to the summons which his Excellency Rifat Bey had just made to him by order of the Grand Signor.

Colonel Hodges said to him, that he felt it his duty, both in his capacity of Agent of Her Majesty the Queen, and as a private individual, and also as a frank and loyal soldier, to entreat him seriously to consider his situation, and the attitude which the Powers who signed the Convention of London have assumed towards him; not to delude himself with regard to the issue of a struggle in

which he might involve himself by refusing to submit to the decisions of an intervention of such an exalted character, and to the decrees of his Sovereign; that he should remember that the Four Powers have traversed Europe, and that henceforward there was no chance in his favour.

Mehemet Ali replied, that he was superior to the counsels which might be given to him in this respect; that he had explaned himself thereupon to Rifat Bey and to the Consuls-General; that he had nothing to add, nothing to alter: that his resolution was taken. He finished by begging that no one would come to him any more to talk to him upon this affair, because he considered it a question sufficiently discussed and exhausted. He uttered these phrases with such emphasis, that the Colonel assured him he would say no more to him on the matter, adding his sincere regret at having been driven by His Highness to make this declaration.

After a moment's silence M. de Laurin spoke. The Pasha observed that he would listen to no more advice. M. de Laurin told him that he would not give him advice, but that he had a request to make to him. The Pasha having given him leave to speak, M. de Laurin told him that the question was to spare the East from war. Mehemet Ali protested his innocence, saying, he never had the intention of bringing on a contest; that he only desires to defend the state of his present possessions, which cannot in justice be denied to him.

M. de Laurin told him, that the position offered by the Sublime Porte, recognized by the Powers, was sufficiently great, honourable, and stable; that Egypt, as an hereditary possession, constituted the finest inheritance in the world, and that by refusing it he would have to reproach himself with the ruin of his family and the consequences of a bloody war. Mehemet replied with warmth, that he is not mean enough to allow himself to be intimidated into yielding to remonstrance, that which he had obtained by arms. "I know all," said he; "to-morrow you will come and tell me that I have no longer the right to keep St. Jean d'Acre, and after ten days more you will come and tell me that Egypt no longer belongs to me. When that term has expired, I hope you will come no more to me to speak to me of such things. For having no other answer to give you, these visits would become perfectly useless. I wish, on the contrary, that you would take measures for your departure, for if war begins, I can no longer trust you; moreover, your honour as well as my personal safety demand it."

M. de Laurin replied that we depended upon the orders of our superiors; that this departure cannot take place until after a formal recall; that we are here by the order of our Courts, and in virtue of the Berat of the Grand Signor; that unless the honour and independence of our countrymen, and our personal safety were endangered, we should not depart.

Colonel Hodges added, that for his part he should conform strictly to his instructions without regard to the wishes and convenience of His Highness; that he should remain as long as his continuance should be compatible with his honour and his duty.

After which we took our leave, telling him that we would return the following day to receive his definitive answer; at the same time we expressed our regret at seeing His Highness persist in his refusal, as well as our hope that we should obtain from him a declaration more conformable to the decisions of the Conference of London, and to his own interests, so that we might shortly be enabled to renew our friendly relations with him.

(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.
A. LAURIN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 127.

Minute of a Conversation between Mehemet Ali and the Prussian Consul-General, on the 25th August, 1840.

LE 25 Août, au moment du retour de MM. les Consuls-Généraux d'Autriche et de la Grande Bretagne d'une entrevue avec Méhémet Ali, je me suis rendu au palais du Pacha.

J'ai trouvé Méhémet Ali en compagnie de cinq ou six de ses officiers, dont

deux jouaient aux dames. Le Pacha, qui regardait leur jeu, m'appela auprès de lui, aussitôt qu'il me vit entrer; et après avoir échangé avec lui les complimens d'usage, je lui dis, "Messieurs mes Collègues m'ont fait part de la déclaration formelle que vous venez de leur réitérer, de ne pas vouloir vous soumettre aux conditions avantageuses que la Sublime Porte, de concert avec les Quatre Puissances signataires de la Convention du 15 Juillet, vient de vous offrir; ce refus donné à Messieurs mes Collègues me fait craindre que je ne sois pas plus heureux qu'eux, et je ne puis guère me flatter d'exercer la moindre influence salutaire sur vos résolutions. Permettez-moi, cependant, d'unir mes efforts aux leurs, ne fut-ce que pour constater le parfait accord et l'entière identité de nos Cours."

"Ce que j'ai déjà dit à Messieurs vos Collègues," me répondit Méhémet Ali, "je vous le répète; je suis fermement résolu de ne pas accepter les conditions onéreuses qu'on veut m'imposer. Il est inutile de vouloir m'y persuader; ce que je vous dis aujourd'hui je le dirai demain et après dix jours; je ne consentirai jamais à ma ruine."

"J'avoue que la résolution de votre Altesse me cause la plus grande peine," répondis-je; "mon Gouvernement aurait vivement désiré une solution pacifique de la Question Orientale; vous vous abusez en croyant que les Quatre Puissances veulent votre perte. La Prusse, par exemple, se trouve à 800 lieues de distance de l'Egypte; elle ne peut nourrir aucune inimitié contre Méhémet Ali; son éloignement vous est garant de son désintéressement; ce n'est que pour la cause du droit et de la justice qu'elle s'est associée aux décisions des autres Puissances; nous désirons comme elles, l'intégrité et l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman, et l'union entre ses différentes provinces; enfin, nous voulons un état de choses stable et solide, qui ne menace point de compromettre à tout moment la tranquillité et la paix de l'Europe."

"Eh bien, laissons tout cela," me répliqua Méhémet Ali, "mais dites-moi, après que les vingt jours fixés par la Conférence de Londres seront écoulés, vous quitterez sans doute Alexandrie?" "Cela dépend des circonstances et de nos instructions. Messieurs mes Collègues et moi, nous resterons à Alexandrie aussi longtems que notre présence sera conforme au but pour lequel nous nous trouvons ici, et compatible avec la dignité de nos Cours." "Mais je dois considérer vos Gouvernemens comme mes ennemis; votre présence me cause de l'ombrage; elle m'inspirerait des soupçons et de la méfiance; a-t-on jamais vu les agens d'un ennemi ne pas s'en aller en tems de guerre? je ne doute pas que vous ne partiez après les vingt jours."

"Il est impossible de dire," répondis-je, "si nous partirons après dix, vingt ou trente jours; je ne puis que vous répéter ce que je vous ai déjà dit, et il me semble que cette réponse doit vous suffire."

Méhémet Ali me parut cependant rien moins que satisfait de ma réponse; il secoua la tête en souriant, et je lui fis mon compliment pour me retirer.

(Signé) WAGNER.

(Translation.)

Minute of a Conversation between Mehemet Ali and the Prussian Consul-General, on the 25th August, 1840.

ON the 25th of August I proceeded to the palace of the Pasha, immediately after the Consuls-General of Austria and Great Britain had returned from an interview with Mehemet Ali.

I found Mehemet Ali in company with five or six of his officers, two of whom were playing at draughts. The Pasha, who was looking on at their game, called me to him as soon as he saw me come in; and, after the usual compliments, I said to him, "My colleagues have made me acquainted with the formal declaration which you have just repeated to them, that you will not submit to the advantageous terms which the Sublime Porte, in concert with the Four Powers parties to the Convention of 15th July, has offered to you. This refusal given to my colleagues, makes me fear that I shall not be more fortunate than they are, and I can hardly flatter myself with being able to exercise the least salutary influence over your determination. Allow me, however, to unite

my efforts to theirs, if it is only to record the perfect agreement and the entire identity of views of our Courts."

"That which I have already said to your colleagues, I repeat to you," answered Mehemet Ali. "I am firmly resolved not to accept the hard terms which it is sought to impose upon me. It is useless to attempt to persuade me to do so; that which I say to you to-day I will say to-morrow, and ten days hence: I will never consent to my ruin."

"I confess that Your Highness's determination gives me the greatest pain," I replied; "my Government would have ardently desired a peaceable solution of the Eastern Question; you are mistaken in thinking that the Four Powers desire your ruin. Prussia, for example, is 800 leagues distant from Egypt; she can entertain no animosity against Mehemet Ali. Her distance is a guarantee of her disinterestedness. It is only for the cause of right and of justice that she has taken part in the decisions of the other Powers; we, like them, wish for the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, and the union of its different provinces; finally, we wish for a firm and stable order of things which does not at every moment threaten to compromise the tranquillity and peace of Europe."

"Well let us leave all this," answered Mehemet Ali; "but tell me, after the twenty days fixed by the Conference of London shall have expired, you will doubtless quit Alexandria?" "That depends upon circumstances and upon our instructions. My colleagues and I will remain at Alexandria as long as our presence shall be consistent with the object for which we are here, and compatible with the dignity of our Courts." "But I must consider your Governments as my enemies; your presence gives umbrage to me, it would inspire me with suspicion and mistrust; has it ever been seen that the agents of an enemy did not retire in time of war? I have no doubt that you will depart after the twenty days."

"It is impossible," I replied, "to say whether we shall depart after ten, twenty, or thirty days; I can only repeat what I have already told you, and it seems to me that this answer ought to be enough for you."

Mehemet Ali appeared, however, to be far from satisfied with my answer; he shook his head, smiling, and I made my compliments and withdrew.

(Signed) WAGNER.

Inclosure 3 in No. 127.

Minute of a Conversation between Mehemet Ali and the Russian Consul-General, on the 24th August, 1840.

JE suis allé voir le Pacha dans la soirée d'avant-hier; il était seul. Je le trouvai préoccupé, évidemment abattu, et d'une humeur chagrine. Après les premières salutations, et nous étant assis, il me demanda si c'était le lendemain, ou le surlendemain, que Rifat Bey allait s'embarquer. Sur ma réponse que ce ne serait qu'après deux jours que le premier terme serait expiré, il me dit: "Je ne conçois rien à cet arrangement; pourquoi m'imposer dix jours, quand je ne les réclame pas? J'ai dit à Rifat Bey, à plusieurs reprises, que ma réponse définitive était donnée, qu'il l'aurait par écrit, et que rien ne s'opposait plus à son départ, et cependant Messieurs les Consuls insistent à ce qu'il ne quitte pas Alexandrie avant l'échéance du terme. Il me semble pourtant que quand on négocie (car tout est négoce dans ce monde) et que le négociant qui achète à crédit veut payer avant l'échéance, il en est bien le maître." Je répliquai au Pacha que c'était un ancien usage de fixer un terme pour laisser le temps de réfléchir; qu'il se trompait s'il comparait la politique au négoce; qu'on ne marchandait point en politique; et que dans cette circonstance la comparaison s'appliquerait plutôt à un débiteur qui, malgré ses protestations de ne pas accepter un paiement, ne pourrait être contraint en justice, qu'après l'échéance de l'obligation. J'ajoutai, que Rifat Bey, malgré qu'il n'eut plus l'espoir de

voir le Pacha changer de résolution, devait s'en tenir strictement à ses instructions; et que rien, pas même l'autorisation de son Altesse, ne pouvait le dispenser d'agir selon les prescriptions dont il était muni.

La conversation tomba ensuite sur les nouvelles arrivées de Constantinople, et les avis rassurans parvenus de France sur le maintien de la paix générale.

"Oh," dit le Pacha, "je n'ai jamais compté sur l'appui de la France. Il est vrai qu'elle me l'a offert à trois reprises, mais je ne m'y suis jamais fié; et je vous jure que ma décision n'a été nullement influencée par les déclamations des journaux et le langage de M. Thiers. M. Périer m'a bien dit que la France n'interviendrait pas en ma faveur."

Le Pacha démentit ensuite le bruit répandu ici sur la demande qu'il aurait faite au Gouvernement Français de lui fournir 3,800 marins et 80 officiers de terre. S'étant alors longuement étendu sur plusieurs articles insérés dans les feuilles Françaises il me dit: "Nous sommes d'anciennes connaissances, et je me flatte que vous avez trop bien jugé mon caractère pour ne pas être persuadé que rien ne saurait changer mes résolutions. Dans la lettre que vous m'avez adressée avec vos Collègues, vous m'avez donné des conseils, mais ce n'est pas là ce que je vous demande; je m'attendais de votre part à un simple exposé de vos instructions et non à des admonitions."

Je lui répondis, que nos instructions lui étaient connues depuis longtemps; mais que sur son invitation spéciale de lui soumettre, par écrit, nos observations, nous l'avions fait avec toute la franchise à laquelle il avait droit de s'attendre de notre part.

Méhémet Ali.—Oui, vous avez pensé me convertir par un pareil exposé, et m'engager à souscrire à l'arrangement. Voyant que Rifat Bey n'avait pas réussi dans sa mission, vous vous êtes flattés d'y parvenir par ce moyen; mais vous vous êtes singulièrement mal pris.

Moi.—Si nous connaissions les moyens de vous faire changer de résolution et de souscrire aux stipulations de la Convention de Londres, soyez bien persuadé, que nous les aurions employés volontiers; et je vous serais infiniment obligé, si vous vouliez m'indiquer le moyen d'y réussir, si tant est qu'il en existe encore un. En attendant, nous nous sommes acquittés envers vous d'un devoir de conscience. La lettre vous est adressée directement, et personne hormis vous, n'a eu connaissance de son contenu.

Méhémet Ali.—Oh, quant à moi, je n'en ai fait mystère à personne; ce ne sont certes pas de pareils raisonnemens qui pourront ébranler mes décisions. Mon parti est pris. Je me défendrai à outrance. C'est avec l'aide de la Providence que j'ai obtenu ce que je possède depuis huit ans; c'est elle seule qui me l'arrachera.

Moi.—Vous nommez l'aide de la Providence, la force et la loi du sabre; hé bien, c'est par le même moyen qu'on vous fera rendre ce que vous avez usurpé; vous n'aurez par conséquent pas à vous plaindre.

Méhémet Ali.—Le destin décidera; vous savez que je suis Turc, et par suite fataliste.

Moi.—Je l'ai toujours regretté. Les arrêts des Grandes Puissances sont irrévocables; la lutte que vous allez provoquer pourra être longue, mais son résultat ne saurait être douteux.

Le Pacha se mit alors à se promener dans son appartement; puis passant en revue les forces qu'il possédait en Syrie et le long du littoral (évaluées par lui à 60,000 hommes), il m'annonça l'arrivée d'Ibrahim Pacha à Damas dans un voyage d'inspection, et la réponse que Solyman Pacha (qui se trouvait avec une armée de 20,000 hommes à Beyrout) avait donnée au Commandant Napier. Au dire de son Altesse, il aurait déclaré à l'Amiral, que s'il attaquait la ville, il y mettrait lui-même le feu; et que si les Anglais voulaient opérer un débarquement, il les recevrait à la bayonnette, et les jeterait à la mer.

"Une pareille réponse," lui dis-je, "est plus facile à énoncer qu'à exécuter."

Méhémet Ali m'annonça ensuite la prise de trois de ses bâtimens légers, faite par Napier sur la côte de Syrie, "Cet état de choses," reprit-il, "peut durer longtemps. Avant le printemps prochain la guerre n'aura pas éclaté, car pour l'entreprendre il faut des troupes de débarquement, et les Autrichiens ne sont pas prêts; il leur faut des transports, et ils ne les ont point encore frêtés."

"Ne vous inquiétez pas à ce sujet," répondis-je, "et songez à vous-même. Les Puissances sont préparées, et les forces Autrichiennes ne tarderont pas à

paraître. Il y a encore deux à trois mois de tems, et j'espère que d'ici là tout sera terminé."

Notre entretien roula ensuite sur la prochaine visite de congé de Rifat Bey, au sujet de laquelle le Pacha me dit, qu'il lui remettrait une lettre conçue dans des termes très-polis et renfermant sa réponse. Puis il s'étendit sur le caractère personnel de l'Ambassadeur Turc; loua beaucoup ses manières conciliantes, son esprit, et ses connaissances; et m'assura que Rifat Bey réunissait toutes les qualités pour remplir un jour un poste très-élevé.

Après avoir fait encore quelques tours dans le salon, et au moment de prendre congé du Pacha, il me dit: "Mais, à-propos, après l'expiration des dix jours, que comptez-vous faire? Messieurs les Consuls se proposent-ils de rester ici malgré les hostilités? Cela ne pourrait avoir lieu, puisque nos rapports ne sauraient plus avoir un caractère amical, et qu'il existera de la méfiance entre nous?"

"Nous agirons selon nos instructions," répliquai-je, "et d'après ce que nous déciderons entre nous. Ce n'est qu'après l'expiration des vingt jours que nous serons en mesure de vous marquer quelque chose de positif à ce sujet."

Méhémet Ali.—Je conçois que vous devez rester ici jusqu'au second terme. Mais en prolongeant votre séjour, vous vous exposeriez à des insultes sans que je sois à même de les prévenir. Il me semble convenable et juste que vous ne dépassiez pas les vingt jours; et vous m'excuserez si je vous engage alors à partir.

Moi.—Je vous répète que nos instructions et nos résolutions fixeront l'époque de notre départ. Si nous jugeons convenable de partir même avant le terme prescrit, nous le ferons; et si au contraire nous jugeons à propos de rester plus longtemps, nous le ferons également. Nous n'avons absolument aucun ordre à recevoir de vous à ce sujet, et nous agirons selon les exigences du moment. Vous pouvez employer la force, et braquer des canons contre nous, mais vous en assumerez sur vous toute la responsabilité et les conséquences.

Méhémet Ali.—Je sais bien que de grandes responsabilités pèsent sur moi, puisque je suis condamné et que j'ai été mis au ban par les Grandes Puissances. Mais comme nos relations amicales ont cessé, je ne vois pas de raison pour que Messieurs les Consuls restent ici.

"Nous agirons," repris-je, "selon notre devoir et notre dignité; et c'est par notre visite de congé, que vous connaîtrez le jour de notre embarquement."

Ainsi se termina mon dernier entretien avec Méhémet Ali.

(Signé) MEDEM.

(Translation.)

Minute of a Conversation between Mehemet Ali and the Russian Consul-General, on the 24th of August, 1840.

I WENT to see the Pasha in the evening of the day before yesterday: he was alone. I found him thoughtful; evidently cast down, and vexed. After the first salutations, and when we had sat down, he asked me if it was to-morrow, or the day after to-morrow, that Rifat Bey was to embark. On my replying that the first period would not be expired until two days had elapsed, he said, "I do not understand this arrangement at all; why impose ten days upon me, when I do not demand them? I have told Rifat Bey, repeatedly, that my definitive answer was given, that he should have it in writing, and that nothing any longer prevented his departure; and nevertheless the Consuls insist that he shall not leave Alexandria before the expiration of the term. It appears to me however that when one is carrying on a bargain (for every thing in this world is bargaining) and that the merchant who purchases on credit wishes to pay before his bill becomes due, he is fully at liberty to do so." I replied to the Pasha that it was an old custom to fix a term in order to leave time for reflection; that he deceived himself if he compared politics to bargaining; that there was no bargaining in politics; and that in the present case, the comparison should rather be applied to a debtor who, notwithstanding his protestations that he would not undertake a payment, could not legally be compelled to do so, until the bond should become due. I

added, that Rifat Bey, notwithstanding he had no longer any hope of seeing the Pasha change his determination, must strictly abide by his instructions; and that nothing, not even the authorization of His Highness, could exempt him from acting according to the instructions with which he was provided.

The conversation afterwards fell upon the news arrived from Constantinople, and the encouraging intelligence which had come from France as to the maintenance of the general peace.

"Oh!" said the Pasha, "I have never reckoned upon the assistance of France. It is true that she offered it me three times, but I never trusted it; and I swear to you that my decision has in no wise been influenced by the declamations of the newspapers and the language of M. Thiers. M. Périer told me plainly that France would not interfere in my favour."

The Pasha afterwards contradicted the report spread abroad as to his having demanded of the French Government to supply him with 3,800 sailors, and 80 land-officers. Having thereupon spoken at length upon the several articles inserted in the French newspapers, he said to me; "We are old acquaintance, and I flatter myself that you have estimated my character too well not to be satisfied that nothing can change my resolution. In the letter which you have addressed me with your colleagues, you have given me advice, but that is not what I ask of you; I looked for a simple statement from you of your instructions, and not for admonitions."

I replied that our instructions were long since known to him; but that on his special request that we should lay before him in writing our observations, we had done so with all the frankness which he had a right to expect on our part.

Mehemet Ali.—Yes, you thought to convert me by such a statement, and to induce me to agree to the arrangement. Seeing that Rifat Bey had not succeeded in his mission, you flattered yourselves that you would come at it, by this means, but you went singularly the wrong way to work.

I.—If we knew the means of making you alter your resolution, and agree to the stipulations of the Convention of London, be well assured, that we would willingly have employed them, and I should be infinitely obliged to you, if you would point out to me the means of succeeding in doing so, that is to say if there are any. Meanwhile, we have acquitted ourselves towards you of a duty of conscience. The letter is addressed directly to you, and no one but yourself has had any knowledge of its contents.

Mehemet Ali.—Oh! as for myself, I have made no mystery of it to any one; it is certainly not such reasonings that will be able to shake my decisions. My determination is taken. I will defend myself to the utmost. It is by the aid of Providence that I have obtained what I possess for eight years; it is Providence alone which shall wrest it from me.

I.—You call the aid of Providence, force and the law of the sword; very well, it is by the same means that you will be made to restore what you have usurped; consequently, you will have no reason to complain.

Mehemet Ali.—Destiny will decide, you know that I am a Turk, and therefore a fatalist.

I.—I have always regretted it. The decrees of the Great Powers are irrevocable, the struggle which you are about to provoke, may possibly be long, but there can be no doubt as to its result.

The Pasha thereupon began to walk about his room; then reviewing the forces which he had in Syria, and on the sea-coast (which he estimated at 60,000 men), he announced to me the arrival of Ibrahim Pasha at Damascus on a tour of inspection, and the answer which Solyman Pasha (who was at Beyrout with an army of 20,000 men) had given to Commodore Napier. According to His Highness, he declared to the Admiral that if he attacked the City, he would himself set fire to it; and that if the English wished to disembark, he would receive them with the bayonet, and cast them into the sea.

"Such an answer," said I, "is easier to utter than to execute."

Mehemet Ali afterwards stated to me the capture of three of his light vessels by Napier on the coast of Syria. "This state of things," he resumed, "may last for a long time. The war will not have broken out before next spring, for to undertake it troops are required for disembarkation, and the Austrians are not ready; they require transports, and they have not yet taken them up."

"Do not trouble yourself on that point," I replied, "and think of yourself.

The Powers are prepared, and the Austrian forces will presently make their appearance. There is still two or three months' time, and I hope between this and then all will be ended.

Our conversation then turned upon Rifat Bey's approaching visit to take leave, on the subject of which the Pasha said to me that he would deliver to him a letter drawn up in very polite terms, and containing his answer. He then enlarged on the personal character of the Turkish Ambassador; praised much his conciliatory manner, his sense and his information; and he assured me that Rifat Bey united all the qualifications to enable him one day to fill a very exalted post.

After he had taken a few more turns in the room, and at the moment that I was taking my leave of the Pasha, he said to me, "But, now I think of it, what do you reckon upon doing after the expiration of the ten days? Do the Consuls propose to remain here notwithstanding hostilities? That cannot be so; since our relations can no longer bear an amicable character, and there will be mistrust between us?"

"We shall act according to our instructions," I replied, "and in conformity with what we shall decide upon among ourselves. It is only after the expiration of the twenty days that we shall be in a state to give you any positive information on that matter."

Mehemet Ali.—I conceive that you must remain here until the second term. But by prolonging your stay, you would expose yourselves to insults, without its being possible for me to prevent them. It appears to me suitable and right that you should not exceed the twenty days; and you will excuse me if I request you then to depart.

I.—I repeat to you that our instructions and our determinations will settle the period of our departure. If we deem it fitting to depart even before the prescribed term, we shall do so; and if, on the contrary, we shall consider it proper to remain still longer, we shall equally do so. We have absolutely no order to receive from you on that subject, and we shall act according to the exigencies of the moment. You may employ force, and point cannon against us; but you will take upon yourself the whole responsibility and the consequences of doing so.

Mehemet Ali.—I am well aware that great responsibility rests upon me, since I am condemned, and have been outlawed by the Great Powers. But as our amicable relations have ceased, I see no reason why the Consuls should remain here.

"We shall act," I replied, "according to our duty and our dignity; and it is by our visit to take leave that you will know the day of our embarkation."

Thus ended my last conversation with Mehemet Ali.

(Signed) MEDEM.

No. 128.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 9.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, August* 26, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship a correspondence I have had with Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.

As regards my removal from hence on the ultimate refusal by Mehemet Ali of the terms recently proposed, I shall conform to his Excellency's interpretation of your Lordship's instructions to me; and I do so because it seems possible, that the Admiral may have reasons connected with the service, which induce him to urge a particular view of this subject on my attention.

I have shown to my Colleagues as much of your Lordship's despatch of the 18th July, as regards my continuance here; but they seem strongly of opinion that those instructions do not warrant my remaining after the departure of Rifat Bey. Hence I can by no means answer for the course these gentlemen may adopt on the expiration of the twenty days of delay.

Were I to be guided solely by the late conversations of the Pasha, as they are related to your Lordship in my previous despatches, I should conclude that

Mehemet Ali will not permit our continuance in Egypt after the 5th of September. It, however, seems to me possible that the influence of France will be exerted in this matter, and that the Pasha will be deterred from insisting on our removal. Thus it appears to me safest and best to hold my present position until I find it untenable, and until his Excellency the Admiral shall concur in the same opinion.

With reference to a question of Sir Robert Stopford, as to the prospective safety of the Indian mails, and to my reply to that query, I have to add, that the Pasha, two or three days since, declared to Mr. Briggs, one of the principal British merchants established here, that the moment hostilities commence, he will stop the communications with India.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

P. S.—Since writing, I have received a letter from the Admiral, in which he informs me, that having become acquainted with my late conversation with Mehemet Ali, he now believes that I shall not be able to stay in Egypt after the 5th of September; and his Excellency kindly offers to receive me on board the "Princess Charlotte." Still, as I think that circumstances may arise, rendering my presence here of some importance, I shall not abandon my post except at the last extremity.

Inclosure 1 in No. 128.

Admiral Sir Robert Stopford to Colonel Hodges.

Sir, "*Princess Charlotte*," *off Alexandria, August* 25, 1840.

UNDERSTANDING from our conversation yesterday, that you intended, in conjunction with your Colleagues, to embark and leave your position in the event of the Pasha's non-compliance with the ultimate terms of the proposals made him by the Sultan, I beg to state that it appears to me from the perusal of Lord Palmerston's letter to you of the 18th July, of which I was furnished with a copy, that "this step should only be taken in the event of Mehemet Ali threatening to use any personal violence towards yourself, or British subjects, and property, or to interrupt the passage of the mails; and that it is desirable that you should stay as long as you properly can do so, in order to be an organ of communication with the Pasha, assuring him, that the British Government is not guided by any ill-will towards him;" thus breathing a spirit of anything but direct hostility, till he shall himself force it upon us. I would therefore recommend great caution in taking a step of this nature, so long as your own safety and the honour and dignity of the country are not compromised.

I am very desirous to know, whether there is any intention of cutting off our communication with India, that I may send the necessary information by the "Alecto," now expected to start for Malta; as well as any decided information you can procure as to the protection of our Coal Depôt and means of coaling, in order to adopt some other mode of securing our supplies if necessary.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) ROBERT STOPFORD,
Admiral.

Inclosure 2 in No. 128.

Colonel Hodges to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.

Sir, *Alexandria, August* 25, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your Excellency's despatch of this date, which I have just received.

I completely coincide with your Excellency's opinion as regards Viscount Palmerston's instructions, and whatever may be the resolution of Rifat Bey, or of my Colleagues, I shall not remove from hence until circumstances absolutely force me to adopt such a measure. But, after the Pasha's declaration of this morning, that on the expiration of the twenty days' delay, neither our honour nor his interests will allow the continuance of the Four Consuls-General in Egypt, I consider it nearly certain that by the 5th of September next, I shall have no other alternative than to embark. Until then I entertain confident hopes that I shall be able to maintain my present position; unless, indeed, any warlike operations should be attempted on the Syrian coast, when it will be impossible to calculate on the steps the Pasha may take.

As regards the Indian mails, and the Coal Depôts in Egypt, I do not believe that they are in danger, so long as tranquillity subsists; but there can hardly exist a doubt that both will be interrupted the moment hostilities commence.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 129.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 9.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, August* 26, 1840.

YESTERDAY evening I received a visit from Count Walewski, special Envoy from France.

Our conversation, though of some length, was general, and of an unimportant nature, with the exception of one or two particulars.

The object of Count Walewski appears to me to be the creation of distrust between myself and my Colleagues. To obviate such an effect, I related to those gentlemen all that had passed in my interview with the Count.

The Envoy expressed his pleasure at finding that the alliance with France still subsisted in safety. He told me again that his main mission to Egypt is to watch Mehemet Ali, and to dissuade him from taking such extreme steps as might create new irritation, and embroil the general tranquillity.

This morning the steamer had reached Alexandria from Toulon, and conveyed despatches for Count Walewski and M. Cochelet. The former assured me, that they were, in a great measure, the repetition of former instructions already known to me, with this difference, that he was directed by M. Thiers to draw up and forward a report on the military and other resources of Mehemet Ali.

The Count used every effort to impress on me the necessity of a moderate course. He told me that when the Pasha first heard of the detention of the frigate transport "Cafarshir," he directed that an embargo should be placed immediately on Her Majesty's steamer "Confiance," then in this harbour. He added that it was only on the urgent and energetic interposition of France, that Mehemet Ali was induced to countermand that order.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 130.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 9.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, August* 26, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for the information of your Lordship, the minute of an interview which took place this morning between Mehemet Ali and his Excellency Rifat Bey, the special Envoy from the Sublime Porte, who was accompanied by the Consuls-General of the Four Powers parties to the Convention of the 15th July.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

Inclosure in No. 130.

Minute of an interview on the 26th of August, between Mehemet Ali and Rifat Bey, accompanied by the Consuls-General of the Four Powers, on the expiration of the first term of ten days.

SON Excellence Rifat Bey et les Consuls-Généraux d'Autriche, de la Grande Bretagne, de Prusse, et de Russie, s'étant rendus aujourd'hui, à 9 heurs du matin, au Palais El Rass-Eddin, ont été introduits à la salle d'audience du Pacha.

Après les complimens usités, son Excellence Rifat Bey adressa au Pacha l'allocution suivante :—

"J'ai déjà fait part à votre Altesse, il y a dix jours, des décisions qui ont été prises entre la Sublime Porte et les Quatre Puissances ses Alliés, relativement à la solution de la Question Turco-Egyptienne, et nous avons eu sur ce sujet différentes discussions; il n'est donc plus nécessaire d'y revenir; mais comme aujourd'hui expire le premier terme de dix jours, je suis venu, accompagné de Messieurs les Consuls des Cours Contractantes, pour recevoir votre réponse officielle."

Méhémet Ali répondit, "Je vous ai déjà fait ma réponse, tant à vous qu'à Messieurs les Consuls, et celle que je vous donne dans ce moment ne peut être que la même."

Rifat Bey reprit, "Permettez-moi de vous faire observer, que l'intention de la Sublime Porte, ainsi que des autres Puissances Contractantes, étant la conservation de la paix, et d'épargner l'effusion de sang, la responsabilité de tout ce qui arrivera par la suite pesera sur votre Altesse. Ainsi je me suis acquitté de ma mission."

"Il n'y a que Dieu," répartit Méhémet Ali, "qui puisse juger là-dessus; et c'est à lui seul que je suis responsable."

Après cette déclaration, les Consuls-Généraux, par l'organe de M. le Colonel Hodges, ont encore une fois demandé au Pacha, s'ils avaient à considérer sa présente réponse, faite à l'occasion de l'expiration du premier terme, comme un refus formel et définitif de se soumettre aux conditions que lui sont offertes par la Convention de Londres, du 15 Juillet?

Méhémet Ali a répondu de la manière la plus positive, "Oui, j'ai déjà refusé dès le commencement; je refuse encore officiellement aujourd'hui, et je le ferai de même après dix jours."

Les Consuls-Généraux répliquèrent, "Si c'est ainsi, nous prenons formellement acte de votre déclaration, et nous devons en même temps vous prévenir, que vous prenez sur vous toute la responsabilité et les conséquences de ce refus."

"Je répète," a dit le Pacha, "que je ne suis responsable qu'à la Providence."

Sur la demande de Rifat Bey, si le Pacha lui remettrait la réponse par écrit qu'il lui avait promise à la lettre vizirielle dont il était porteur, le Pacha répliqua qu'il la lui donnerait le jour de son départ.

Son Excellence Rifat Bey regardant la séance comme terminée, prit congé, et nous quittâmes ensemble le Palais.

(Signé) RIFAT BEY.
A. LAURIN.
G. LLOYD HODGES.
E. WAGNER.
A. MEDEM.

Alexandrie, le 26 *Août,* 1840.

(Translation.)

Minute of an interview on the 26*th of August, between Mehemet Ali and Rifat Bey, accompanied by the Consuls-General of the Four Powers, on the expiration of the first term of ten days.*

HIS Excellency Rifat Bey and the Consuls-General of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, having proceeded to day at 9 o'clock in the morning to the Palace El Rass-Eddin, were introduced into the audience-chamber of the Pasha.

After the usual compliments, Rifat Bey made to the Pasha the following address:—

"I have already, ten days ago, communicated to your Highness the decisions which have been taken between the Sublime Porte and the Four Powers its Allies relative to the solution of the Turco-Egyptian Question, and we have had different discussions on that matter; it is no longer necessary therefore to revert to them; but as the first term of ten days expires to day, I am come in company with the Consuls of the Contracting Courts, to receive your official answer."

Mehemet Ali answered, "I have already given to you my answer, as well to you as to the Consuls, and that which I give you at present can only be the same."

Rifat Bey replied, "Allow me to observe to you that the intention of the Sublime Porte, as well as of the other contracting parties, being the preservation of peace, and to prevent the effusion of blood, the responsibility of all that shall happen hereafter will rest on your Highness. Thus have I executed my commission."

"God only," rejoined Mehemet Ali, "can judge thereupon; and to him alone am I responsible."

After this declaration, the Consuls-General, through Colonel Hodges, once again demanded of the Pasha whether they were to consider his present answer, given on the occasion of the expiration of the first term, as a formal and definitive refusal to submit to the conditions offered to him by the Convention of London of the 15th of July.

Mehemet Ali replied in the most positive manner, "Yes, I have already from the beginning refused; I again refuse officially to day; and I will act in the same manner after ten days."

The Consuls-General rejoined, "If such is the case, we formally record your declaration, and it is our duty at the same time to warn you, that you take upon yourself all the responsibility and the consequences of this refusal."

"I repeat," said the Pasha, "that I am only responsible to Providence."

On the demand of Rifat Bey, whether the Pasha would give him in writing the answer which he had promised to the Vizirial letter of which he was the bearer, the Pasha replied that he would give it him on the day of his departure.

His Excellency Rifat Bey, considering the conference concluded, took leave, and we quitted the Palace together.

(Signed) RIFAT BEY.
A. LAURIN.
G. LLOYD HODGES.
E. WAGNER.
A. MEDEM.

Alexandria, August 26, 1840.

No. 131.

Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 14, 1840.

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your despatches to the 26th of August.

I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve the steps which you took, and the language which you held, with reference to the proceedings of Her Majesty's ships on the coast of Syria, as reported in your despatch of August 19.

Her Majesty's Government also approve the Note which you, in conjunction with your Colleagues of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, addressed to Mehemet Ali on the 19th of August, and of which a copy is inclosed in your despatch of the 20th of August.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 132.

Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 14, 1840.

WITH reference to your despatch of the 23rd of August, I have to instruct you to undeceive Mehemet Ali as to his idea that the Five Powers who are parties to the Convention of the 15th of July, would accept the mediation of France between themselves and him. Those Powers can enter into no negotiation with Mehemet Ali. They have determined upon certain arrangements, and those arrangements they are resolved and able to carry into execution.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 133.

Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 14, 1840.

WITH reference to your despatch of the 17th of August, I have to instruct you to state in writing to Mehemet Ali, if the state of things should render it necessary to do so, that Egypt is a portion of the dominions of the Sultan; that British subjects have certain rights and privileges as to the security of their persons, property, and commerce, in all parts of the Ottoman Empire, by virtue of Treaties concluded between the British Crown and the Porte; and that any subject of the Sultan, whether in a state of obedience to, or of revolt against, the authority of the Sultan, who should take upon himself in any way, or in the slightest degree, to molest British subjects, or to interfere with the exercise of their rights and privileges, would incur a heavy and most serious responsibility.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 134.

Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 15, 1840.

I HAVE to acquaint you, that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held in the conversation with Count Walewski, reported in your despatch of the 19th of August.

Her Majesty's Government also approve your intention of remaining in Egypt as long as circumstances will admit of your doing so, as reported in your despatch of the 26th of August.

Her Majesty's Government also approve the answer which you and your Colleagues returned to the communication made to you by Boghos Bey on the 18th of August, as reported in your despatch of the 19th of August, respecting the intention of Mehemet Ali to re-establish a system of quarantine on the coast of Syria.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 135.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 14.)

My Lord, *Paris, September* 11, 1840.

HAVING heard that an explanation as to Commodore Napier's conduct had been demanded from the British Government, I asked M. Thiers to-day, whether such was the case, and he replied that he did intend to give M. Guizot instructions to mention the matter to your Lordship, but that he had not yet done so, and that he had not even as yet answered your Lordship's Note of the 31st of August.

The capture of the Egyptian vessels has produced a very strong sensation here, partly because it has convinced the Parisians that the Four Powers are in earnest, and partly because it took place prior to the expiration of the term which the Porte allowed the Pasha for consideration; people not seeing, or not being willing to admit, that when a delay of this kind is allowed, it is on the understanding that the party to whom it is granted, should remain in the same situation as that in which the summons found him, and that if he endeavours to improve that position, he forfeits insomuch the truce accorded to him. At all events, the event in question has raised that excitement which I have always considered any accident of the kind might produce here; the journals have resumed their violent tone; the funds have fallen within these few days 10 or 12 per cent.; a panic at the Bourse still exists; and the apprehension of war is daily increased by the preparations to meet it. A contract for 20,000 horses at 850 fr. per horse, has been concluded; the effective of the infantry of the marine has been increased from 10,000 to 15,000 men. Reports are rife of Colonels having received orders to place their regiments on a war footing; the National Guard, notwithstanding the difficulties which the execution of this project encounters, is to be rendered moveable at an expence, as I understand, of 150,000,000 of francs. The fortifications of Paris, at last determined upon, will cost 100,000,000 more; while it also appears that Valenciennes and the other towns on the northern frontier, are to be placed in a state of defence.

These extraordinary measures necessarily create an idea that they cannot be undertaken without some adequate necessity, more especially as the charge to the country which they involve is so considerable. Many persons, therefore, think that we are on the verge of hostilities which must already have been decided upon.

The state of the funds is in general so nicely indicative of what is passing in the Council, that it is not altogether impossible that some *coup d'éclat* may be in contemplation; but upon the whole, judging from

the conversation of persons well qualified to know, and well disposed to say what is doing, I am inclined to think that this is not yet the case; but, at the same time, I should add, that with an increased wish for peace, an increased fear that it will hardly be maintained, is gaining ground. The landing of European troops in Syria, and more particularly the arrival of Russian troops at Constantinople, though I do not consider that either of these events would make war certain, would create a great clamour for war. Any event compromising the influence of Mehemet Ali without crushing him (for the fallen seldom excite sympathy), would have the same effect; and it seems to me in the nature of things, that that crisis of which I have already spoken, as one which must place M. Thiers in the necessity of either retiring or acting, is at hand.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 136.

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 15, 1840.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith, for your information, a copy of a despatch which I have received from Colonel Hodges*, together with copies of two despatches which he had addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, reporting the course of events at Alexandria.

With reference to that part of Colonel Hodges' despatch which relates to the language held by Count Walewski, I have to instruct you to mention to M. Thiers, that Count Walewski has used at Alexandria, in conversation with Colonel Hodges, menacing language, which could not have been authorized by his instructions.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 137.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 16.)

My Lord, *Paris, September* 14, 1840.

YOUR Lordship will have observed in my despatch of September 11, a notice of the report that this Government intended some *coup d'éclat*, the nature of which, however, was wholly unknown.

I have some reason to believe that a measure has been adopted, or at all events is agitated in the Cabinet at this moment, which accords in a certain degree with the rumours that are abroad, and will yet not wholly contradict the assurances which have been made to me. This measure is the sending of the whole fleet to Canea, where there is a good harbour. In this manner the French Government would hope to reap the double advantage of avoiding any act of hostility to the Four Powers, and at the same time of doing an act which would give them the possession of Candia at any moment they thought proper to seize it.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

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* See No. 117, page 144.

No. 138.

Viscount Palmerston to M. Guizot.

Foreign Office, September 16, 1840.

THE Undersigned, &c., had the honour, on the 17th of July, to inform M. Guizot, &c., that a Convention upon the Affairs of Turkey had been signed on the 15th of that month by the Plenipotentiaries of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia, on the one hand, and by the Plenipotentiary of the Porte, on the other. The ratifications of that Convention having now been exchanged, the Undersigned has the honour of transmitting to M. Guizot, for the information of the French Government, a copy of that Convention and of its annexes.

The Undersigned cannot make this communication to M. Guizot, without again expressing to his Excellency the very sincere regret of Her Majesty's Government, that the objections which the French Government has felt to taking any share in the measures, for the execution of which this Convention provides, have created an obstacle which has prevented France from being a Contracting Party to this compact. But Her Majesty's Government feel confident, that the Cabinet of the Tuileries will see in the provisions of this Convention indisputable proofs that the Four Powers, in undertaking the engagements which it contains, have been animated by a disinterested desire to maintain those principles of policy with regard to Turkey, which France has, on more than one occasion, distinctly and emphatically declared to be her own: that they do not seek to obtain, by the arrangements which they have in view, any exclusive advantage for themselves: and that the great object of their aim is, to uphold the existing balance of power in Europe, and to avert events which would disturb the general peace.

The Undersigned has, &c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 139.

PROTOCOLE d'une Conférence tenue à Londres, le 17 *Septembre,* 1840.

Présens:

Les Plénipotentiaires

d'Autriche;
de la Grande Bretagne;
de Prusse;
de Russie; et
de la Turquie.

LES Plénipotentiaires des Cours d'Autriche, de la Grande Bretagne, de Prusse, et de Russie, après avoir échangé les ratifications de la Convention conclue le 15 Juillet dernier, ont résolu, dans le but de placer dans son vrai jour le désintéressement qui a guidé leurs Cours dans la conclusion de cet Acte, de déclarer formellement:

Que dans l'exécution des engagemens résultant de la susdite Convention pour les Puissances Contractantes, ces Puissances ne chercheront aucune augmentation de territoire, aucune influence exclusive, aucun avantage de commerce pour leurs sujets que ceux de toute autre nation ne puissent également obtenir.

Les Plénipotentiaires des Cours susdites ont résolu de consigner cette déclaration dans le présent Protocole.

Le Plénipotentiaire de la Sublime Porte Ottomane, en rendant un juste hommage à la loyauté et au désintéressement de la politique des Cours Alliées, a pris acte de la déclaration contenue dans le présent Protocole, et s'est chargé de la transmettre à sa Cour.

(Signé) NEUMANN.
PALMERSTON.
SCHLEINITZ.
BRUNNOW.
CHEKIB.

(Translation.)

Protocol of a Conference held at London, September 17, 1840.

Present :

The Plenipotentiaries

of Austria ;
Great Britain ;
Prussia ;
Russia ; and
Turkey.

THE Plenipotentiaries of the Courts of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, after having exchanged the ratifications of the Convention concluded on the 15th of July last, have resolved, in order to place in its true light the disinterestedness which has guided their Courts in the conclusion of that Act, formally to declare :

That in the execution of the engagements resulting for the Contracting Powers from the aforesaid Convention, those Powers will not seek for any augmentation of territory, any exclusive influence, any commercial advantage for their subjects except what the subjects of every other nation shall equally be able to obtain.

The Plenipotentiaries of the Courts aforesaid have resolved to record this declaration in the present Protocol.

The Plenipotentiary of the Sublime Ottoman Porte, while paying a just tribute to the uprightness and disinterestedness of the policy of the Allied Courts, has taken note of the declaration contained in the present Protocol, and has engaged to transmit it to his Court.

(Signed) NEUMANN.
PALMERSTON.
SCHLEINITZ.
BRUNNOW.
CHEKIB.

No. 140.

Viscount Palmerston to M. Guizot.

Foreign Office, September 18, 1840.

THE Undersigned, Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, with reference to the Note which, on the 16th instant, he had the honour to address to M. Guizot, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary from His Majesty the King of the French at this Court, communicating to his Excellency the Convention upon the affairs of Turkey, of the 15th of July last, together with its annexes, has now the honour to transmit to his Excellency, for the information of the French Government, a copy of the Protocol of a Conference held at the Foreign Office by the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Turkey, since the exchange of the Ratifications of that Convention, by which Protocol, the Four Powers bind themselves not to seek, in

the execution of the engagements of the above-mentioned Convention, any territorial acquisition, any exclusive influence, or any commercial advantages for their subjects, which may not be equally open to the subjects of other nations.

The French Government will see in this Declaration an additional proof of the disinterestedness which animates the Four Powers in their endeavours to effect a settlement of the affairs of Turkey.

The Undersigned has, &c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 141.

M. Guizot to Viscount Palmerston.

Londres, le 18 *Septembre,* 1840.

LE Soussigné, &c., a l'honneur d'informer son Excellence M. le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique pour les Affaires Etrangères, qu'il a reçu et transmis au Gouvernement du Roi la copie, que son Excellence a fait au Soussigné l'honneur de lui envoyer, de la Convention, y compris ses trois Annexes, signée le 15 Julliet dernier par les Plénipotentiaries d'Autriche, de la Grande Bretagne, de Prusse, et de Russie, d'une part, et par le Plénipotentiaire de la Porte, de l'autre, ainsi que la Note en date du 16 Septembre qui accompagnait cette communication.

Le Soussigné, &c.,

(Signé) GUIZOT.

(Translation.)

M. Guizot to Viscount Palmerston.

London, September 18, 1840.

THE Undersigned, &c., has the honour to inform his Excellency Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that he has received and transmitted to the Government of the King the copy which his Excellency has done the Undersigned the honour to send to him of the Convention, together with its three Annexes, signed on the 15th of July last, by the Plenipotentiaries of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, on the one part, and by the Plenipotentiary of the Porte on the other, as well as the Note dated the 16th of September which accompanied that communication.

The Undersigned, &c.,

(Signed) GUIZOT.

No. 142.

M. Guizot to Viscount Palmerston.

Londres, le 18 *Septembre,* 1840.

LE Soussigné, Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté le Roi des Français auprès de Sa Majesté Britannique, a l'honneur d'informer Son Excellence Monsieur le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique pour les Affaires Etrangères, qu'il a reçu et transmis au Gouvernement du Roi les extraits que son Excellence a fait au Soussigné l'honneur de lui communiquer, de deux dépêches écrites de Constantinople, en date du 17 Août dernier, l'une par Lord Ponsonby, Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Britannique, l'autre par Monsieur le Baron de Stürmer, Internonce de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche à Constantinople, et relatives aux communications faites récemment à la

Porte Ottomane par son Excellence Monsieur de Pontois, Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté le Roi des Français auprès de Sa Hautesse le Sultan.

Ainsi que le Soussigné a déjà eu l'honneur d'en exprimer la conviction à Monsieur le Secrétaire d'Etat des Affaires Etrangères, les renseignemens contenus dans ces dépêches, au sujet des dites communications, sont inexacts, et Monsieur de Pontois, selon ses instructions, a tenu à Constantinople un langage conforme à celui que le Gouvernement du Roi a tenu lui-même à Paris, et fait tenir, soit à Londres, soit ailleurs, par ses Représentans. Lorsque Monsieur le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique pour les Affaires Etrangères fit au Soussigné l'honneur de lui remettre le *Mémorandum* du 17 Julliet dernier, dans lequel on lisait, que "le Gouvernement Français avait plusieurs fois déclaré que, dans aucun cas, la France ne s'opposerait aux mesures que les Quatre Cours, de concert avec le Sultan, pourraient juger nécessaires pour obtenir l'assentiment du Pacha d'Egypte," le Soussigné se hâta de faire observer qu'il ne pouvait accepter cette expression *dans aucun cas*, et qu'il était certain de n'avoir jamais rien dit qui l'autorisât: "le Gouvernement du Roi," dit-il alors à Monsieur le Secrétaire d'Etat des Affaires Etrangères, "ne se fait, à coup sûr, le champion armé de personne, et ne compromettra jamais, pour les seuls intérêts du Pacha d'Egypte, la paix et les intérêts de la France. Mais si les mesures adoptées contre le Pacha par les Quatre Puissances avaient, aux yeux du Gouvernement du Roi, ce caractère ou cette conséquence que l'équilibre actuel des Etats Européens en fût altéré, il ne saurait y consentir; il verrait alors ce qu'il lui conviendrait de faire; et il gardera toujours, à cet égard, sa pleine liberté."

Le 24 Juillet suivant, lorsque le Soussigné eut l'honneur de lire et de remettre à Monsieur le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires Etrangères, la réponse du Gouvernement du Roi au *Mémorandum* du 17 Juillet, cette réponse, en faisant allusion au désir témoigné par les Quatre Puissances que la France continuât de leur prêter son concours moral à Alexandrie, se terminait par le paragraphe suivant:

"Le concours moral de la France, dans une conduite commune, était une obligation de sa part. Il n'en est plus une dans la nouvelle situation où semblent vouloir la placer les Puissances. La France ne peut plus être mue désormais que par ce qu'elle doit à la paix et ce qu'elle se doit à elle-même. La conduite qu'elle tiendra, dans les graves circonstances où les Quatre Puissances viennent de placer l'Europe, dépendra de la solution qui sera donnée à toutes les questions qu'elle vient d'indiquer."

Et le Soussigné, en insistant de tout son pouvoir sur la gravité de la situation où l'Europe allait entrer, eut l'honneur de répéter à Monsieur le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique, que "la France y garderait sa pleine liberté, ayant toujours en vue la paix, le maintien de l'équilibre actuel entre les Etats de l'Europe, et le soin de sa dignité et de ses propres intérêts."

Le Soussigné est autorisé à déclarer, que ces intentions du Gouvernement du Roi, qu'il a manifestées au moment même où il a eu connaissance de la Convention conclue par les Quatre Puissances, et dans sa réponse au *Mémorandum* du 17 Juillet, sont constamment demeurées et demeurent constamment les mêmes; et que ce sont les intentions dont Monsieur de Pontois a été l'interprête auprès de la Sublime Porte, en s'efforçant, comme un ancien et sincère ami, de l'éclairer sur la situation où elle se plaçait, et sur les périls qui pouvaient en résulter pour elle.

Le Soussigné a l'honneur, &c.,

(Signé) GUIZOT.

(Translation.)

M. Guizot to Viscount Palmerston.

London, September 18, 1840.

THE Undersigned, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of the French at the Court of Her Britannic Majesty, has the honour to inform his Excellency Her Britannic Majesty's

Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that he has received and transmitted to the Government of the King, the extracts which his Excellency has done him the honour to communicate to him, of two despatches written from Constantinople, dated the 17th of August last, one by Lord Ponsonby, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, the other by Baron de Stürmer, the Internuncio of His Majesty the Emperor of Austria at Constantinople, and relative to the communications recently made to the Ottoman Porte by his Excellency M. de Pontois, Ambassador of His Majesty the King of the French at the Court of His Highness the Sultan.

As the Undersigned has already had the honour of expressing his conviction to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the information contained in these despatches, on the subject of the said communications, is inexact; and M. de Pontois, agreeably to his instructions, has held at Constantinople a language in conformity with that which the Government of the King has itself held at Paris, and has caused to be held either at London or elsewhere, by its Representatives. When Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs did the Undersigned the honour of delivering to him the Memorandum of the 17th of July last, in which it was read that, "the French Government had several times declared, that in any case France would not oppose herself to the measures which the Four Courts, in concert with the Sultan, might deem necessary to obtain the assent of the Pasha of Egypt," the Undersigned hastened to make the observation that he could not admit that expression *in no case*, and that he was certain that he had never said anything which could authorize it: "the Government of the King," he then said to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, "assuredly does not constitute itself the armed champion of any one, and will never compromise, for the interests of the Pasha of Egypt alone, the peace and the interests of France. But if the measures adopted against the Pasha by the Four Powers, should, in the estimation of the Government of the King, have that character, or that consequence, which might occasion an alteration in the existing balance of the European States, it could not consent thereto; it would then see what it might be fitting for it to do; and it will always preserve its entire liberty in this respect."

On the following 24th of July, when the Undersigned had the honour to read and to deliver to the Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the answer of the Government of the King to the Memorandum of the 17th of July, that answer, while alluding to the desire manifested by the Four Powers, that France should continue to afford to them her moral concurrence at Alexandria, ended by the following paragraph:—

"The moral concurrence of France in a common course of conduct was obligatory upon her. It is no longer so in the new situation in which the Powers appear to be willing to place themselves. France, henceforth, cannot be influenced save by what she owes to peace, and by what she owes to herself. The conduct which she shall maintain in the serious circumstances in which the Four Powers have just placed Europe, will depend upon the solution which shall be given to all the questions which she has pointed out."

And the Undersigned, dwelling to the utmost of his power upon the seriousness of the situation into which Europe was about to enter, had the honour to repeat to Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that "France would preserve her entire liberty, having always in view peace, the maintenance of the existing balance between the States of Europe, and the care for her own dignity and her own interests."

The Undersigned is authorized to declare that these intentions of the King's Government, which it manifested at the very moment when it acquired a knowledge of the Convention concluded by the Four Powers, and in its answer to the Memorandum of the 17th of July, have constantly remained, and do constantly remain the same; and that such are the intentions of which M. de Pontois has been the interpreter to the Sublime Porte, endeavouring, as an ancient and sincere friend, to enlighten it on

the situation in which it was placing itself, and on the perils which might result to it therefrom.

The Undersigned has the honour, &c.,

(Signed) GUIZOT.

No. 143.

Viscount Palmerston to M. Guizot.

Foreign Office, September 22, 1840.

THE Undersigned, Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has had the honour to receive the Note which M. Guizot, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary from His Majesty the King of the French at this Court, has addressed to him, dated the 18th instant, in answer to the Note of the Undersigned dated the 9th instant, in which the Undersigned transmitted to M. Guizot extracts of despatches from Constantinople, relating to communications between M. de Pontois and the Turkish Minister, Rechid Pasha.

With reference to that part of M. Guizot's Note, in which his Excellency recapitulates what he said to the Undersigned respecting the expression "dans aucun cas," used by the Undersigned in the Memorandum of the 15th of July, the Undersigned has the honour to observe, that he did, at the time referred to, and in answer to the remark then made by M. Guizot, explain to his Excellency what he now takes this opportunity of repeating, that by the expression in question it was never meant to imply, that France had engaged to consent to measures or arrangements that would have the effect of "altering the present balance of power in Europe." The passage in the Memorandum relates only to such measures of coercion as may be necessary in order to carry into execution the arrangements contemplated by the Treaty; and those arrangements are calculated to maintain, and not to impair, the balance of power in Europe.

The Undersigned has, &c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 144.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 18.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, August* 26, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to forward copy of a letter from the French Ambassador to his Excellency the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs, which he tells me he intends to answer, and to communicate his reply to the Representatives of the Four Powers.

Inclosure in No. 144.

M. de Pontois to Rechid Pasha.

Monsieur le Ministre, *Thérapia, le* 24 *Août,* 1840.

J'AI l'honneur d'accuser réception à votre Excellence de sa lettre en date du 23 de ce mois.

Je commencerai par vous faire observer, M. le Ministre, que la dénégation de M. Cor ne s'applique pas seulement aux mots signalés dans votre lettre comme formant l'unique différence entre sa version et la vôtre, mais que cet Interprête affirme en outre n'avoir dit à votre Excellence, ni à aucune autre personne, "que la France soutiendra le Pacha d'Egypte si ses intérêts et sa dignité l'exigent," et s'être borné à déclarer, conformé-

ment à l'esprit et à la lettre de ses instructions, "que la France se croira désormais en droit de ne prendre conseil que de ses intérêts et de son honneur."

J'ajouterai, qu'en admettant même que les expressions dont s'est servi M. Cor fussent textuellement celles que lui attribue la lettre de votre Excellence, elles n'auraient nullement le sens que parait leur avoir prêté la communication faite aux Représentans des Cours signataires de la Convention de Londres, c'est-à dire, qu'elles n'impliqueraient ni une détermination déjà arrêtée de la part de la France de soutenir la cause de Méhémet Ali, ni la pensée d'exciter des soulèvemens dans le sein de l'Empire Ottoman.

Je suis donc en droit de me plaindre hautement et de la fausse interprétation donnée à mes paroles, et de l'usage qui en a été fait. J'espère que la réparation dûe au Représentant de la France ne lui sera pas refusée.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,
(Signé) E. DE PONTOIS.

(Translation.)

M. de Pontois to Rechid Pasha.

M. le Ministre, *Therapia, August* 24, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's letter dated the 23rd instant.

I will begin by remarking to you, M. le Ministre, that the denial of M. Cor does not only apply to the words specified in your letter as forming the sole difference between his version and yours, but that this interpreter moreover affirms that he never said to your Excellency, nor to any other person, "that France will support the Pasha of Egypt, if her interests and her dignity require her to do so," and that he confined himself to declaring, in conformity with the spirit and with the letter of his instructions, "that France will henceforth consider herself entitled to take counsel only of her interests and of her honour."

I will add, that even admitting that the expressions used by M. Cor were word for word those which your Excellency's letter attributes to him, they would by no means bear the sense which the communication made to the Representatives of the Courts who signed the Convention of London appears to have given to them, that is to say, they would not imply either a determination already taken on the part of France to support the cause of Mehemet Ali, or the idea of exciting insurrections within the Ottoman Empire.

I am therefore warranted in complaining loudly of the false interpretation given to my words, and of the use which has been made of them. I hope that the reparation which is due to the Representative of France will not be refused to him.

I have the honour, &c.,
(Signed) E. DE PONTOIS.

No. 145.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 20.)

My Lord, *Paris, September* 18, 1840.

BEING aware that M. Thiers had just received despatches from the Levant, I called on him yesterday morning, in order to be able to communicate to your Lordship their contents; and in answer to my inquiry as to news, M. Thiers showed me passages from the communications he had received from M. Cochelet, the purport of which was:—

First; That the Viceroy of Egypt had accepted the hereditary government of Egypt, and informed the Consuls of the Four Powers,

that as to the expectations he entertained with respect to the other possessions which he held, he had referred to the magnanimity of the Sultan.

Secondly; That his demands on the Porte, in explanation of this phrase, were the government of Syria, Adana, and Candia (giving up the Holy Cities), for himself during his own life, or for Ibrahim during Ibrahim's life.

Thirdly; That the French Agents, MM. Cochelet and Walewski, had obtained from him, in addition to these terms, the further immediate concession to the Porte of Adana and Candia; and that, consequently, his (the Viceroy's) demands were now confined to the hereditary Government of Egypt for himself and family, together with the government of the Pashalics of Tripoli, Damascus, and Aleppo for himself during his own life, or for his son Ibrahim, during that son's life.

M. Cochelet continued to say, that the utmost limit of Mehemet's concessions was now arrived at; and that he considered that the French Government having obtained such concessions from his friendship, was bound to stand by him, if those concessions were not accepted.

After showing me this despatch, M. Thiers had a long conversation with me upon the subject of which it treated. It is difficult to report a conversation of this kind, without, on the one hand, giving it a tone of menace, which in no wise belonged to it, or without, on the other hand, weakening the impression which I saw it was M. Thiers' intention to convey to my mind, and which, therefore, it is my duty to convey to your Lordship. I trust, therefore, it will suffice to say, that I felt clearly convinced that M. Thiers wished me to understand, that he was anxious that peace should be maintained; that with this view he had done all in his power to persuade Mehemet Ali to be reasonable in his conditions; that he thought the present conditions reasonable, and that if they were accepted, there was an end of the impending struggle. But if they were refused, and the execution of the Treaty rigorously insisted on, he, for his own part, without having given any pledge to the Pasha, still felt in a certain degree pledged towards him; and that he was convinced, putting himself out of the question, that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to form any Government which would remain a perfectly passive and disinterested spectator of the measures to be pursued. Consequently, that without any decided act of immediate hostility, or any positive declaration of war, such a state of things would ensue, as must, ere long, disturb the peace of the world.

A great part of this was especially said to me as an intimate acquaintance, and the terms in which I report it are, after all, rather ambiguous; but the subject of the conversation was so serious, and might, if expressed officially, or said more clearly, have such serious consequences, that I was not anxious, in the present stage of the business, to press for any language more explicit, being satisfied with communicating to your Lordship that it was evidently the President of the Council's wish to impress on my belief, in a manner that would not be offensive, his conviction, that things were now arrived at a crisis, in which they would either terminate, at once, peaceably, or assume a new and more dangerous character, which, through more or less transitions, must lead eventually to war.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 146.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 20.)

(Extract.) *Paris, September* 18, 1840.

I HAVE had two or three visits from a French gentleman who is anxious to arrive at some settlement of the present Question, which might, as he fancies, satisfy all parties. The idea he suggested was, that of a Note on the part of Turkey, deprecating anything like hostility between

the Great European Powers, and offering to make some concession from its present demands if that could bring them all together as its defenders. I told him that I feared it was out of the question to attempt any plan of this kind, since even if other difficulties did not exist, there was an insuperable difficulty in the language of France, which said it would never coerce the Pasha; and therefore it was clear that any concessions that the other Powers made, must go far enough to please Mehemet Ali, in order to secure the assistance of France; and, consequently, we should only be adopting a round-about way of yielding to that personage. "But if France agreed to coerce the Pasha if necessary?" he said; in that case, I replied, it would be time enough to talk about the matter. He came to me to-day, and said that he had seen M. Thiers, and that he was convinced that the French Government would agree, *moyennant* some slight concession, to enter into the Treaty of the 15th of July, and to coerce the Pasha, if he did not accede to the terms proposed to him. But that France could not make any proposition of this kind, unless she was pretty certain of having it accepted, but that if I told him that such a proposition would be accepted, he would engage it should be made.

As I was anxious to ascertain whether the plan he alluded to was that now offered by Mehemet Ali, or something more, I said that I did not think that Her Majesty's Government would consent to what was now talked of. He said, "I tell you frankly, that I think something less might be given in the way of compromise." "What? the Pashalic of Tripoli?" I said. "Yes," he said, "I think the Pashalic of Tripoli would do."

As I know that he has seen many of the Ministers, and M. Thiers twice within these few days, I think it desirable to give your Lordship the substance of what has passed between us.

No. 147.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 20.)

(Extract.) *Paris, September* 18, 1840.

IN regard to Count Walewski's mission, Lord Granville, in his despatch of the 3d of August, mentioned what this Government always said on the subject; and the rest being only conjecture, I did not myself communicate any opinion officially to your Lordship; but I believe that the Count was originally sent in order to obtain a *carte blanche* from Mehemet Ali, with which France, through the medium, perhaps, of the Porte, might effect some middle arrangement. But his instructions, which I believe were verbal, would necessarily vary with circumstances, the main object of this Government being to get the Pasha to concede much, since it hoped that matters might thus be arranged, but to prevent his conceding all. In one case, consequently, it is likely that he would have been enjoined to threaten, in the other to promise.

No. 148.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 20.)

My Lord, *Paris, September* 18, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that I understand that some munitions of war have recently been sent from Marseilles to the coast of Syria; and I am furthermore informed by good authority, though I cannot vouch for the correctness of the information, that the French Government, though other names are employed, are the real agents in this business.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 149.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 20.)

My Lord, *Paris, September* 18, 1840.

YOUR Lordship will see in the despatches that I send by this post, the recent intelligence from the East, and the substance of a conversation I have had with the President of the Council, which seems to bear out my previous impression, that the time was approaching at which he would probably take some decided step; though if he do so, it is evident that it will be with great unwillingness.

I have thought that it might be agreeable to your Lordship to accompany these despatches by some general reflections.

From the beginning of this question there have been two dominant feelings here,—the one, that peace was, if possible, to be preserved; the other, that France could never allow the question of the East to be settled without her, and contrary to her wishes. A variety of efforts have been made to reconcile these two feelings. The general armament and system of intimidation at the first announcement of the Treaty was one, since it was hoped that Prussia and Austria might thus be induced to withhold their ratification to the Treaty which their Ministers had consented to. Other efforts in London were made, by which it was hoped to obtain some proposition which might seem a concession to French policy, and justify the French Government in the eyes of the country for also making some concessions.

The mission of Count Walewski to Alexandria has also had this object: his instructions being, I have no doubt, to induce the Pasha to make considerable concessions to the Porte, but not to make all the concessions which France had declared were impossible.

Every effort hitherto to adopt a decided line, either for maintaining peace, or vindicating what are now known and received to be the views of France, has failed. The proposition to seize Candia, the convocation of the Chambers, and a variety of other schemes tantamount to war, have been rejected. On the other hand, no one has advocated the resolution of remaining quiet at all events, though if it were thought certain that the attempts of the Allies would be restricted to a blockade, which it is believed would fail, I have no doubt that the French Government would remain a spectator of what took place. In the meantime, the opinion of the country has undergone incessant fluctuations, but, upon the whole, has settled, as might be expected, into a wish amongst the more reflecting and opulent classes to avoid hostilities, and amongst the lower and more turbulent to provoke them.

The propositions of Mehemet Ali have brought things to a sort of crisis, since they are a new endeavour to satisfy conflicting sentiments. To be sure, they are a complete refutation of all the repeated declarations that the Viceroy of Egypt was a "Man of bronze," and would make no concessions; declarations either founded on total ignorance of the character of all people in the East, or on a desire to maintain the Pasha in possessions which it has been seen that when things came to extremities he would yield. So far, then, the judgment of the supporters of Mehemet Ali has been at fault, or their objects have been foiled. Still the mission of Count Walewski having been in this much successful, viz., that he has obtained something to offer to the Porte, and has prevented all from being granted, if the present scheme be adopted, the French will, doubtless, claim a considerable share in the merit of having brought this question, at the most critical moment, to a conclusion, and of having at the same time saved the Pasha and averted war.

I should add, that great expectations are entertained, in consequence of the position of Rechid Pasha at Constantinople, that the Divan, without referring the question to the Four Powers, will accept the propositions made to them. If this expectation, like others, be disappointed, and the matter comes before the Four Powers, a considerable time must elapse, during which the measures of coercion that have been agreed upon will have been adopted, and their result will form part of the considerations by which Her Majesty's Government will be decided. For my own part, weighing all matters as impartially as I can,

my opinion is, that unless some decided turn in public opinion should take place, the course of this Government, under any circumstances that may occur, will be guided by the mixed disposition which I have described. On the one hand, an earnest desire to avoid war, for which they are by no means prepared, notwithstanding all their expences and exertions, would induce them to consent to less favourable terms for the Pasha than are now spoken of. A conviction, on the other hand, that they could not after such expences and exertions remain perfectly passive, were his ruin to be at hand, and they had time and means to prevent it without losing their character with the nation, would most probably induce them, in such an extremity, to interfere in his behalf; but the manner of doing so, even in this case, unless the nation were under considerable excitement, would probably be of a half decided character; and were any excuse at all palateable to the public mind to offer itself for remaining quiet, I even believe such an excuse would be adopted.

In the mean time, however, preparations are certainly and seriously making for the worst; while it is expected, owing to the season, that if the next three weeks pass over, which it was one of the objects of the proposition of which Count Walewski is the bearer, to gain, the winter will intervene, affording at the same time the means of further negotiations, and of preparing for their failure.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 150.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 21.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September* 1, 1840.

YESTERDAY morning Her Majesty's steamer "Hydra" brought the reports from the Consuls at Alexandria, which being before your Lordship, need not be further mentioned. I immediately despatched M. Etienne Pisani to his Excellency Rechid Pasha, with the intelligence of the rejection by Mehemet Ali of the Sultan's propositions, based upon the Convention of 15th July.

His Excellency the Internuncio called on me soon after 9 o'clock, and having examined the reports, &c., &c., we agreed upon the measures as below:

1°. That new Pashas should be named to the various Pashalics now vacant by the refusal of Mehemet Ali, with the exception of Egypt, which latter should be unnoticed till after the expiration of the second term of ten days ordained by the Convention of 15th July.

2°. That a firman should be given, appointing Emir Bechir El-Kasim, nephew of the Emir Bechir, to be Prince of the Druses, should the old Emir fail to return to his allegiance to the Sultan; a blank being left in the firman for the date thereof, which Mr. Wood should be authorized to fill up, if it become necessary to supersede a firman, just granted, by which the present Emir Bechir is nominated Prince of the Druses. Your Lordship will see the reason for this measure, in Mr. Wood's letter of the 23rd of August.

3°. The propriety of recalling the Consuls from Alexandria, in order to avoid the inconvenience of their being ordered away by Mehemet Ali.

4°. To have some corrections made in the orders from the Sultan to the Commander of the Ottoman troops sent to Cyprus, by which he (Selim Pasha) is enjoined to defer entirely to the counsels, &c., of Sir Charles Smith, in accordance with your Lordship's instructions of July 27.

I communicated to his Excellency the Internuncio, Mr. Wood's letter of 23rd August (copy of which I inclose), and his Excellency was as much gratified as myself with the admirable activity and energy of that gentleman, in the performance of the duties he has been charged with. Mr. Wood's letter contains more solid information on the affairs of Syria, than all the other accounts put together; it states facts instead of vague suppositions, and it affords sound grounds for measures and for just

conclusions, and the Internuncio was much pleased when I proposed to him to take it to Rechid Pasha for his Excellency's information. In fine, it was agreed that the Internuncio should have the goodness to visit the Pasha, and settle with him the points I have noted in this despatch, and his Excellency went from hence, taking with him the chief Dragoman, M. Frederic Pisani, to seek Rechid Pasha, whom they found at Constantinople.

The Internuncio called on me at night, on his way home, and informed me that all had been done; that the Ottoman Ministers had been in the very highest degree pleased with Mr. Wood's letter, and praised that gentleman's conduct in the strongest terms; and I take the liberty of expressing my hope that your Lordship will approve of the zeal and judgment with which Mr. Wood has acted in the difficult business confided to him for execution.

It was agreed between the Internuncio and me, to send to the Consuls of our respective Governments in Constantinople a notice, for the purpose of warning traders of the alteration of the state of public affairs, so far as Egypt and Syria, &c., are concerned, but not to issue, as yet, any formal declaration upon the point.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 150.

Mr. Wood to Viscount Ponsonby.

Her Majesty's ship "Powerful,"
(Extract.) *Beyrout, August* 23, 1840.

INTELLIGENCE that reached me having called me away to Tripoli for the second time, it was only on my return on the 13th instant, that I had the honour of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 4th August, and in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I addressed immediately a letter to the Emir Bechir, a copy of which is herewith transmitted, inclosing at the same time a proclamation from Commodore Napier to the Syrians. In announcing to the Emir the resolution of the Four Great Powers to restore Syria to the Sultan, I made use of the arguments which I consider would persuade him to co-operate with us; and though he did not deem it prudent to reply to my letter, or to my verbal communications, in writing, nevertheless, he sent yesterday his medical attendant to ascertain in a more positive manner the intentions of Her Majesty's Government, and to say, that he felt an inward pleasure and satisfaction at what was intended to be done for Syria, qualifying that declaration by stating, that as the people had been often deluded by vain promises, he conceived that his own personal safety imposed upon him the necessity of acting with caution and prudence, not to compromise his position by a premature avowal of his sentiments, more especially as he was but ill provided with the necessary quantity of arms to ward off, single-handed, the vengeance of the Egyptians. His messenger frankly stated, that the Emir would prefer waiting until the troops, arms, &c., arrived from Constantinople, when he would be able to join us without apprehension.

Undoubtedly, the delusive promises lately made by the French residents here, must have greatly contributed to make the Emir distrustful, cautious, and incredulous. The seizure, however, of all the Egyptian vessels, and other hostile demonstrations made by us, must have shown him that England was in earnest; and an Arabic version of the Convention of London, with which he was furnished, must have removed his doubts with regard to our sincerity, and have made him partisan of the Sultan.

To encourage him in his favourable disposition to his Sovereign, I wrote him a confidential letter, wherein I explained to him, that far from apprehending any enmity from the Porte, he could have my assurance

that the Porte entertained no bad feeling towards him; that the Porte knew the difficulties of his position; and that the moment he returned to his allegiance to the Sultan, the Four Great Powers would not only support him, but would endeavour to secure to Mount Lebanon, its laws, liberty, and rights.

I have also written to our friend, the Emir Bechir El-Kasim, to remind him of his promise, and to tell him that the moment was now come to fulfil it. In his reply, he expresses a ready willingness to support our views, and to furnish us with 15,000 men, or even a greater number, if we can arm them.

I have the most positive assurances from the most notable Druse Sheiks, of their impatience to throw off the Egyptian yoke, and return to their duty to the Sultan.

While I was on shore I received daily messages from them, and from the Christian Princes allied to the Emir Bechir, who disapproved of his conduct in the insurrection. They asked for assistance in the most energetic terms, and urged on me the necessity of having immediate succours sent them from the Porte, that they may put themselves in a position without delay to counteract the measures that the Egyptian Government are likely to take to prevent their co-operation.

My verbal communications with the Maronite Patriarch, whose influence in the mountains is very great, gave me an opportunity to ascertain, in a positive manner, the feelings of himself and of the clergy towards the Egyptians; and I have great pleasure in being able to affirm that they are as decidedly inimical to them, as they are favourable to the Sultan.

To preserve the good intelligence that exists between the Patriarch, his clergy, and myself, I have thought it incumbent on me to address him also a letter, notifying to him the Convention of London, and the determination of the Four Great Powers to carry it through at the risk of going to war with Mehemet Ali.

Through these channels I have acquainted every individual mountaineer with the steps taken by Great Britain.

The whole of Syria is in the utmost state of excitement; and it is not improbable that the Turkish population of the towns will make an effort to expel the garrisons from them as soon as hostilities commence.

In short, my Lord, the moment the Turkish troops arrive, the whole country will be in arms; and provided the means employed are sufficient to insure success in the first onset, the views of Her Majesty's Government will be accomplished forthwith.

The letter of the Grand Vizier to the Emir Bechir will have a great weight with him; but I may be permitted to suggest the expediency of having a firman addressed to the Emir Bechir El-Kasim, the Emir's nephew, to be given him in the event of his uncle refusing to unite against the Viceroy. From a thorough knowledge of the character of the mountaineers, I consider such a firman to be of the greatest importance and utility; for should the Great Prince act dishonestly, it will be very difficult, indeed, to unite all the other Chiefs under any Chief not duly appointed by the Porte. If it can be procured, and your Lordship does not object to it, I beg to be entrusted with it, that I may be provided with a document which I can make use of, should any emergency render its use indispensable.

Commodore Napier has commenced hostile demonstrations, such as anchoring with two ships of the line within 400 paces of Beyrout, while with three other ships he threatened the Egyptian camp, and encouraged the desertion of the Turkish troops, seizing all Egyptian men-of-war, stores, and other craft laden with provisions, ammunition, arms, troops, &c. I need not add that this has produced a magic effect all over the country: and Christians, Turks, and Pagans, are all ardent in their prayers for our success; we have already taken 600 barrels of powder, between 600 and 700 muskets, and eleven field pieces.

I have sent an express to Donié above Tripoli, to the Turkish Sheiks who yet retain their arms, to tell them what has been done, and to encourage them not to lay them down, but to trust to the succour they will shortly receive.

I am on the point of opening a communication with the people of the Haouran, who are in possession of their arms, and are greatly exasperated against the Egyptians, when I shall call upon them to return to their allegiance to the Sultan, which call, I am sure, they will obey with alacrity. The Egyptian army, drawing its supplies from that district and its environs, will be greatly distressed by being deprived of that resource, now that the sea is shut up to it. It will be, besides, an encouragement to the Damascenes to rise, when they are certain of an asylum. Similar measures will be resorted to in regard to the Mutualis who inhabit the Anti-Libanus.

The Anzaris, who occupy the mountains on the high road from Latakia to Aleppo, are a warlike race of people who have been barbarously treated for revolting against the Egyptian Government. I feel certain they will revolt instantaneously, if we can spare them arms.

It is gratifying to me to be able to convey to your Lordship the answer that I have just received from Emir Abdallah, nephew to the Emir Bechir and Governor of the province of Kesrouan, to my letter to him. His Excellency has decided to join us, without even consulting the wishes of his uncle. I look upon his decision to join us as a fortunate occurrence, inasmuch as it will facilitate the landing of the Turkish troops, together with the marines. He has asked an explanation relative to the reports afloat of the intention of France to support Mehemet Ali with 100,000 men, and which I gave him as amply as I could.

I trust to have acted agreeably to your Lordship's wishes. I have spared no trouble to organize a reaction in Syria, nor have I allowed any personal danger to deter me from doing what I conceived to be my duty, and shall deem myself amply repaid, if I continue to enjoy your Lordship's confidence and protection.

Inclosure 2 in No. 150.

Instructions from the Supreme Council at Alexandria to the Emir Bechir.

After the usual Compliments,

THE Austrian, English, and Russian Consuls, anxious to spread disorder, have thought they could not do it better than by promulgating the Resolution (Convention) taken in London, the seat of the British Government, which has for object the creating of discord between our master the Viceroy and the Sublime Porte.

They have already been employing their clerks day and night to make drafts of the aforesaid Convention, and they have sent yesterday an English steamer to Beyrout with letters from them to make the Syrians revolt—in short, they intend to propagate this among the people, by which they hope to accomplish their purpose.

As this is an unbecoming affair, we write to inform your Excellency of it, that you may be prepared to check disturbances and disorders in those places by preventing such news reaching the people. We have written to the same effect to Mahmoud Bey (Governor of Beyrout), and to others, particularly as the French Government are understood with our master the Viceroy, and are preparing 100,000 troops, 24 ships of the line, 80 steamers, and 700,000 purses by way of succour, according to the positive information we have received, and this without delay.

So soon as our master the Viceroy returns to Alexandria, he will write more in detail to your Excellency in the manner His Highness may think proper.

(L.S.) IBRAHIM,
Vice-President of the Supreme Council.

True Translation.
(Signed) R. Wood.

Inclosure 3 in No. 150.

Commodore Napier's Proclamation to the Syrians.

Syrians!

GREAT BRITAIN, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, in conjunction with the Sultan, have decided that the rule of Mehemet Ali shall cease in Syria, and I have been sent here with an advanced squadron to assist you in throwing off the yoke of the Pasha of Egypt.

Syrians, you know that a Hatti Sheriff has been issued by the Sultan, securing the life and property of his subjects, which is in full operation throughout the Turkish territories, in addition to which the Allied Powers have engaged to recommend to the Sultan to make an arrangement to render your condition happy and prosperous.

Inhabitants of Lebanon, you who are more immediately under my eye, I call upon you to rise, and throw off the yoke under which you are groaning. Troops, arms, and ammunitions are daily expected from Constantinople, and in the mean time, the Egyptian ships shall no longer insult your coast.

Soldiers of the Sultan, who were treacherously led from their homes to the burning sands of Egypt, and have been since transported to Syria, I call upon you, in the name of the Great Powers, to return to your allegiance. I have placed two line-of-battle ships close to the lazaretto, where you are encamped; put yourselves under my protection, and should a single soldier of the Pasha approach you, he shall be annihilated!

All past events will be forgotten, and your arrears of pay discharged by the Sultan, as also the arrears of any soldiers who may join the Sultan's standard.

Inclosure 4 in No. 150.

Mr. Wood to the Emir Bechir El-Shehaby.

(Translation.)

After the usual Compliments, *August* 13, 1840.

WHEN I had the honour of paying my respects to your Excellency, four years ago, I alluded to the probable separation, some day, of Syria from the dominion of Mehemet Ali.

Since the unfortunate battle of Nezib, and the efforts of the mountaineers to regain their liberty, so lately displayed in the insurrection of the Druses, the British Government, in concert with the Governments of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, have adopted the resolution of assisting their Ally the Sultan to recover his Syrian provinces usurped by the very vassal who owes his success and consideration to the munificence of the Porte.

The lively interest that Her Majesty's Government takes in the prosperity of your family, of your Excellency, and of the people placed under your government, makes me anxious to announce, without delay, to you and to the Syrians, in the name of his Excellency the British Ambassador, that Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, have determined on assisting the Sultan to recover Syria; to effect which Her Majesty's Government have ordered the British fleet to cut off all communication by sea between Alexandria and Syria, and to succour the Syrians by all possible means. The Sultan will send arms, ammunition, and troops, to assist them in their efforts to regain their liberty, and other measures for their protection and support are preparing as fast as possible.

The Four Great Powers having unanimously adopted the above resolution, your Excellency can have nothing to fear. The foresight and talents which so eminently distinguish your Excellency, will easily suggest to your mind the results of the step taken by the Great Powers which must infallibly lead to the downfall of Mehemet Ali, and the restitution of Syria to

the Sultan, in which event your future prosperity and the happiness of your children will materially depend on the assistance and support you give the Sultan, who, on his part, promises faithfully to pardon and reward those who return to his allegiance; and it will be the care of the Four Powers to secure to the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon the laws, liberty, and privileges they enjoyed formerly under the authority of their legitimate Sovereign.

I am instigated in addressing the present letter to your Excellency by the great desire I have to make my services available to you, and to acquaint you, at the same time, with the favourable determination of Great Britain in your behalf, and in behalf of your people.

May God lend you his assistance in espousing the cause that will ensure you peace and happiness and liberty to your subjects; and, in concluding, I may be permitted to remind your Excellency of the services rendered you by Sir Sydney Smith, and to assure you that a British Commodore is willing and ready to tender you the same, &c., &c.

(Signed) RICHARD WOOD.

Inclosure 5 in No. 150.

Mr. Wood to the Emir Bechir El-Kasim.

(Translation.)

After the usual Compliments, *August* 13, 1840.

I SHOULD have done myself the honour of waiting on your Excellency, had I not been told by our friend Mr. Traad, that I should find you absent at the Emir Bechir's.

Mr. Traad will communicate to you the determination of Great Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, to assist the Sultan to recover Syria. The English fleet has received orders to cut off the communication by sea between this country and Alexandria; to succour the Syrians; and, in short, to adopt all such measures as will assist your countrymen in their endeavours to free themselves from the tyranny of Mehemet Ali.

The Sultan, on his part, has faithfully promised to send you arms and ammunition for the same purpose.

My Prince! you must remember the conversation we had together four years ago, and the determination you then declared to arm your countrymen, provided England assisted you in your noble efforts to procure liberty for your countrymen;—the happy moment is now come. England is determined to assist you; Austria, Prussia, and Russia have joined themselves to her: can you, therefore, entertain for a moment any doubts about the result? Mehemet Ali must either abandon Syria, or he will run the risk of being driven even out of Egypt. You can have nothing to apprehend now; make your arrangements, that you may be ready to fulfil your promises, and rest assured that Her Majesty's Government will not abandon you, and the Sultan will not forget your services.

Mr. Traad is instructed by me to communicate to you other matters on the same subject; to fix a place of rendezvous, and to agree with you on the means of establishing a free and open communication, &c., &c.

(Signed) RICHARD WOOD.

Inclosure 6 in No. 150.

Mr. Wood to His Holiness the Maronite Patriarch.

(Translation.) *August* 15, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Holiness, that the Four Great Powers, namely, England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, allies of the Sublime Porte, have decided on the restitution of Syria to the Sultan,

thereby delivering the Syrians from the burdens of the Egyptian yoke. In consequence, the British and Austrian squadrons have received orders from their respective Governments to blockade Alexandria. Four ships of the line are already here to act according to circumstances, agreeably to the above decision.

I take the liberty to inclose herewith a copy of the Proclamation issued by the Commodore of the squadron immediately on his arrival at Beyrout, from which your Holiness will infer in brief the actual state of things; nevertheless, I cannot refrain from adding, that the happy moment is arrived for freeing the oppressed inhabitants of Lebanon,—an opportunity which they must not lose for securing to themselves freedom, peace, and happiness.

I have already notified to the Emir Bechir the good intentions of the Sultan towards him. The Sublime Porte has readily pardoned the past, and has only at heart now the general prosperity of its Syrian subjects, to whom it will grant the free exercise of its laws and perfect liberty; and the powerful intervention of England and Austria will secure these blessings to them. Your Holiness must feel the inestimable advantages that will necessarily accrue from this favourable disposition of the Sultan towards the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon, and I am, therefore, confident that your Holiness will exert all your influence to make them sensible of it, that they may redouble their efforts in the support of those measures which alone can save them.

The Sultan's troops are already on their way hither, accompanied by English ships of war. They have on board arms and ammunition; and I fully hope and expect, after the communications that have passed between us, that the people will seize this opportunity to render themselves worthy of the friendship and consideration of the protecting Powers, &c., &c.

(Signed) RICHARD WOOD.

Inclosure 7 in No. 150.

Mr. Wood to the Emir Abdallah.

(Translation.)

After the usual Compliments, *August* 15, 1840.

IT is with a lively pleasure that I announce to your Excellency that Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, have unanimously decided on restoring Syria to the Sublime Porte. To this effect, Her Majesty's Government have ordered the British fleet to blockade, together with the Austrian ships of war, the port of Alexandria. Four ships of the line, commanded by a Commodore, have taken their position before the town of Beyrout, and their Commander has already demanded of the Egyptian Authorities the Turkish troops pressed into the service of Mehemet Ali, and the restitution of the arms belonging to the mountaineers.

Hostilities would have commenced ere this, had not the Commodore taken into consideration the destruction of the town and of its inhabitants, who are the subjects of the Sultan; otherwise, as I told His Highness Abbas Pasha, the town would have been ours. In the mean time, I have addressed a letter to your Excellency's uncle, the Emir Bechir, a copy of which I inclose herewith, as well as a Proclamation issued by the Commodore of the British squadron, from the contents of which you will easily infer the actual state of things. I refrain, therefore, for the moment from making any further observations, which would be useless after the verbal explanation I gave your Excellency, when I had the pleasure of calling upon you, except repeating the assurance I then gave you, that the Four Great Powers have no other object in view than the general good of the oppressed Syrians, &c., &c.

(Signed) RICHARD WOOD.

Inclosure 8 in No. 150.

The Emir Bechir El-Kasim to Mr. Wood.

(Translation.)

After the usual Compliments,

YOUR letter reached us at a very propitious moment, the contents of which we have well understood, and are also happy to hear of your good state of health. You are pleased to inquire after our own,—thank God, we are well.

Everything you have written us about we have literally understood. By the help of Providence nothing shall be left untried on our own part, which you must feel assured of; but unfortunately late events have greatly tended to raise apprehension in the minds of every one. The people have been often deceived, and will no longer rely on vain promises; but I trust on the Almighty that, the moment they see indubitable proofs that the Great Powers are in earnest, their doubts will cease, and with them their fears, and we shall be able to obtain even a greater number of men than I ever promised.

As regards us personally, we are equally as amicable and as well disposed as before; and, although I wish greatly to see you, yet the moment is not a favourable one. Mr. Traad, the bearer of our letter, is authorised to make you some verbal communication from us, &c., &c.

(L.S.) EMIR BECHIR EL-KASIM.

Inclosure 9 in No. 150.

Mr. Wood to the Emir Bechir El-Shehaby.

(Confidential.)

After the usual Compliments,

I HAVE already done myself the honour to inform your Excellency the reasons that have rendered necessary the appearance of the British squadron here under Commodore Napier, and as my communication reached you, any repetition on the same subject becomes superfluous; but the personal esteem and regard I have for your Excellency impose upon me the agreeable duty of furnishing you with all the information I possess respecting your Excellency personally, and which may not be altogether unworthy of consideration.

In availing myself of the present opportunity to inquire after your Excellency's health, and to reiterate the assurance of my perfect regard for you, I beg to remark that my first letter had for object the good of the public in general; the present one concerns your Excellency in particular.

On the day of my departure from Constantinople, I had an interview with Rechid Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs, when we discoursed a great deal about your Excellency, and he positively assured me that the Sultan was conscious of the difficulties that surrounded you, and the impossibility you were in to act otherwise than you did, when the current of events was too strong and rapid for you to stem it unassisted; but that His Highness the Sultan was convinced, now that the decision of the Great Powers to relieve the country from the burdens imposed upon it, particularly that part that is governed by you, has changed the aspect of affairs altogether, and has placed in your disposal means you never possessed before, you will not hesitate to return to your allegiance, particularly when assured that Syria must be restored at the risk even of a protracted war.

His Highness the Sultan has forgotten all the past, and moreover will reward your Excellency for any service you may render. This is not a mere promise, for the Porte has given the same assurance to his

Excellency the British Ambassador, who again authorises me to convey it to your Excellency, and to state at the same time that, besides the liberty which will be granted you, you shall reap the full benefit of your past and future services, and shall hold your authority direct from the Sublime Porte, which is an advantage worthy of your Excellency's most serious consideration.

The Ambassador, after authorising me to make the above communication, observes to me in particular, that in case you put forward difficulties, the Allied Powers will be called upon to act with greater vigour, and that then your submission will not be looked upon as a voluntary act, but the result of compulsion, when you will have to bear the consequences of having opposed the Sultan, England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia.

Feelings of great regard for your Excellency have made me take the liberty of transcribing the above paragraph for your very serious consideration; for I am sure, after mature reflection, your Excellency will not hesitate to side with the Allies,—a circumstance which will be the more gratifying, as I feel personally interested in seeing your Excellency preferred and exalted above the other Emirs. The same sentiments I publicly avowed on my first arrival in these countries, long before these events occurred; and I am not afraid, therefore, that my declaring the same sentiments anew will be attributed to any other motive under present circumstances. They are the simple expression of my unaffected attachment for your Excellency.

I regret very much that circumstances render it impossible for me to pay my respects to your Excellency personally, by which I am deprived of the opportunity of conversing more in detail with you on the Convention, and other matters equally interesting; but what I regret the most is, my not being able to ascertain from your Excellency's own mouth your desires, that I may communicate them to the proper quarter, where I am sure they would meet with a ready attention; but this being impossible for me just now, I must limit myself to the foregoing only, which I beg again to submit to your Excellency's most serious consideration.

(Signed) R. WOOD.

Inclosure 10 in No. 150.

M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Péra, ce* 31 *Août*, 1840.

NOUS avons vu Réchid Pacha à la Porte. La lettre pour Sélim Pacha a été changée. J'ai corrigé la traduction que le Baron Stürmer a prise. Il a lu le rapport de Mr. Wood, et il a demandé les deux firmans. A 4 heures après-midi, je suis parti de la Porte, et Réchid Pacha allait partir pour Balta-Liman avec l'Internonce.

On y arrangera aussi l'affaire des deux firmans.

Je suis, &c.,

(Signé) FREDERIC PISANI.

(Translation.)

M. Frederic Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Pera, August* 31, 1840.

WE have seen Rechid Pasha at the Porte. The letter to Selim Pasha has been changed. I have corrected the translation which Baron Stürmer took. He has read Mr. Wood's report, and has applied for the two fir-

mans. I left the Porte at four o'clock in the afternoon, and Rechid Pasha was about to leave for Balta-Liman with the Internuncio.

The business of the two firmans will also be settled there.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) FREDERIC PISANI.

No. 151.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerstan.—(Received September 21.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 1, 1840.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith copies of his Excellency Rechid Pasha's answer to the French Ambassador's letter of the 23rd ultimo, and of the Count de Pontois' reply to that communication.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 151.

Rechid Pasha to M. de Pontois.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, *Le 27 Août, 1840.*

EN réponse à la lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 23 de ce mois, je ne puis que lui répéter, en ce qui concerne le message de M. Cor, que la version que j'en ai donnée dans mon office du 22, est la seule que ma mémoire me permette de considérer comme exacte. J'ajouterai, M. l'Ambassadeur, que je ne saurais répondre que de cette version là, et que je reste dès-lors étranger à toute autre version, ainsi qu'à toutes les interprétations dont son Excellence pense avoir à se plaindre aujourd'hui.

Quant à l'usage qui a été fait du message, je n'hésite pas à déclarer, que je l'ai en effet communiqué à quelques unes des Cours amies de la Sublime Porte; et j'aime à me persuader que votre Excellence n'aura rien vu dans cette démarche qui puisse paraître contraire à la pratique diplomatique dans des circonstances analogues. D'ailleurs, M. Cor, loin de manifester le désir que ce message n'acquît pas de la publicité, en a fait au contraire l'objet de communications officielles envers les autres Ministres de la Sublime Porte, auxquels il a même ajouté, qu'il monterait sur les minarets pour faire connaître à la nation entière la manière dont son Gouvernement envisageait l'état actuel des choses.

D'après ce qui précède, votre Excellence est sans doute trop équitable pour ne pas reconnaître que ce serait plutôt au Gouvernement Ottoman à désirer une réparation, puisque M. Cor a déclaré que la France était contre l'administration actuelle; lorsque cette administration a la conscience de n'avoir exercé aucun acte que le Gouvernement Français peut considérer comme dirigé contre ses droits, et de s'être bornée à défendre ceux de son Souverain dans les circonstances dont il s'agit.

Je profite de cette occasion, etc.,

(Signé) RECHID.

(Translation.)

Rechid Pasha to M. de Pontois.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, *August 27, 1840.*

IN reply to the letter which your Excellency has done me the honour to address to me, dated the 23rd of this month, I can only repeat to you, with respect to the message of M. Cor, that the version which I gave of it

in my Note of the 22nd, is the only one which my memory enables me to consider as exact. I will add, M. l'Ambassadeur, that I can only be responsible for that version, and that I am consequently a stranger to any other version of it, as well as to all the interpretations of which your Excellency considers you have now to complain.

With respect to the use which has been made of the message, I do not hesitate to declare that I have in fact communicated it to some of the Courts who are friendly to the Sublime Porte; and I flatter myself that your Excellency will have seen nothing in this step which can appear at variance with diplomatic custom in corresponding circumstances. Moreover, M. Cor, far from evincing a wish that this message should not become public, made it, on the contrary, the subject of official communications to the other Ministers of the Sublime Porte, to whom he even added that he would ascend the minarets to proclaim to the whole nation the light in which his Government viewed the present state of things.

Your Excellency is doubtless too just not to acknowledge, from what precedes, that it would be rather for the Ottoman Government to ask reparation, since M. Cor has declared that France was opposed to the present administration; while this administration has the consciousness of having performed no act which the French Government can consider as being directed against its rights, and of having confined itself to defending those of its Sovereign in the circumstances in question.

I avail myself of this opportunity, &c.,

(Signed) RECHID.

Inclosure 2 in No. 151.

M. de Pontois to Rechid Pasha.

Monsieur le Ministre, *Thérapia, le* 31 *Août*, 1840.

J'AI recu dans la journée d'hier, la lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire en date du 28 (27) de ce mois; je vais la transmettre à mon Gouvernement, dont j'attendrai les ordres.

Je ne prolongerai pas une discussion pour le moment inutile. Il me suffira de prendre acte aujourd'hui de l'assurance que me donne votre Excellence d'être demeurée étrangère à l'interprétation, contre laquelle j'ai dû protester hautement, parcequ'elle était contraire à la vérite, et tendait à calomnier les dispositions bien connues de la France envers la Sublime Porte, et les motifs qui lui font désapprouver et combattre le périlleux système dans lequel s'engage aujourd'hui le Divan.

J'ai l'honneur, etc.,

(Signé) E. DE PONTOIS.

(Translation.)

M. de Pontois to Rechid Pasha.

Monsieur le Ministre, *Therapia, August* 31, 1840.

I RECEIVED, in the course of yesterday, the letter which your Excellency has done me the honour to write to me, dated the 28th (27th) of this month; I will transmit it to my Government, whose orders I shall await.

I will not prolong a discussion which at the present moment is useless. It will be sufficient for me now to take note of the assurance which your Excellency gives me of having been a stranger to the interpretation against which it has been my duty loudly to protest, because it was contrary to the truth, and tended to calumniate the well-known

feelings of France towards the Sublime Porte, and the motives which induce her to disapprove and combat the perilous system in which the Divan is now engaging itself.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) E. DE PONTOIS.

No. 152.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 21, 1840.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch, of August 26, inclosing copy of a Note addressed by the French Ambassador at Constantinople to Rechid Pasha, respecting the message which M. de Pontois is reported to have sent to the Turkish Minister; and I have to instruct your Excellency to give Rechid Pasha every support in your power in this affair.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 153.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 21.)

My Lord, *Aleppo, July* 2, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, copies of two despatches I addressed to Viscount Ponsonby, under the 4th and 25th ultimo.

Since the date of the above communications, with the exception of the province of Donié, in the Tripoli district, and the mountains of Akka, between Tripoli and Latakia, whose inhabitants have evinced insurrectionary spirits, nothing further of any interest has happened within this consular jurisdiction, which continues for the present to be perfectly quiet.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) F. H. S. WERRY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 153.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) *Aleppo, June* 4, 1840.

SINCE the date of my last despatch to your Lordship, little or nothing of any interest has transpired within this district in any way meriting your Lordship's attention.

His Highness the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha continues to remain at Marash, and nothing for the present indicates any movement on the part of His Highness.

The different corps of the Egyptian Army concentrated on the northern and north-eastern frontier of Syria, in the Adana and Marash districts, and on the Orfa line, as well as all those within this consular jurisdiction, continue to occupy the same positions with little or no material change.

By the last advices from Orfa, everything was perfectly quiet in that district. His Excellency Maggiun Bey had returned from the expedition he undertook against some of the Gherba Arab tribes along the River Khaboor; in which attack he completely repulsed the Arabs, taking much spoil, and possessing himself of several of the minor Chiefs; who, with their followers, it is said, he has brought under subjection to the Egyptian authority.

His Excellency Osman Pasha, late Colonel of the first regiment of the Guards, reached this on the 30th ultimo from Marash.

His Excellency is invested with a mission on the part of His Highness the Seraskier, the object of which is to visit every district throughout Syria, to urge and compel the Governors to pay up the balances of the different miri revenues. His Excellency on his arrival here found, among different items owing to the Government, that there was a balance of 15,000 piastres arising from the Ferdeh Tax, which still remained uncollected, which sum he caused the Governor to pay down immediately, and to receive when collected.

His Excellency Osman Pasha left this yesterday for Damascus and the south of Syria, on the same mission as above noted.

I beg to inform your Lordship, that his Excellency the Seraskier has sent to Alexandretta to be shipped for Egypt, the revenue of the villages and private property in this country, amounting to 6,000 purses, all in Spanish pillared dollars; and Mr. Vice-Consul Hays informs me, that a corvette had reached for to take the same.

I had the honour to acquaint your Lordship in my last despatch, that the erection of the platform at the barracks, as noted under the 13th April, has been abandoned; nor has it yet been resumed; but all the masons and workmen have been seized by the Government, and are all employed in finishing the new barracks, situated north-west of the town, which were commenced three years ago, but never finished. This step has been taken in consequence of the orders received from His Highness the Seraskier, to finish that building with all possible despatch.

The last advices from our Agents on the coast report their respective districts perfectly tranquil, and I am happy to be able to acquaint your Lordship that the whole of this consular jurisdiction is tranquil.

Inclosure 2 in No. 153.

Mr. Pro-Consul Werry to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) *Aleppo, June* 25, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that the advices from Damascus state, that on the demand made by this Government on the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon, for the delivery up of their arms and the paying of taxes, to which they would not accede, the whole population of those mountains, both Christians and Druses, as also those of Naplouse, immediately evinced a spirit of insurrection, and parts of them are, it is said, in open rebellion. But I make no doubt your Lordship possesses full details of this affair from Mr. Consul Werry of Damascus, and Mr. Consul Moore of Beyrout, within whose districts these events are taking place, and which will be more correct than any I could lay before your Lordship from hence.

Since my last communication to your Lordship, in consequence of this insurrectionary spirit which has manifested itself in the south of Syria, some movement has taken place among the different corps of the Egyptians which have been concentrated on this frontier and within this district.

On the 6th instant, the 9th, 10th, and 14th Regiments of Infantry in garrison here, received orders to march south to Hamah; and on the following day, the 34th Regiment of Infantry and 1st idem of Foot Guards reached this from Killis, and also marched south. The Artillery has not yet left this, but everything is in readiness and hourly expecting to receive orders to leave.

His Highness the Seraskier Ibrahim Pasha continues to occupy Marash, which point it is not expected he will quit for the present. The force he has with him is now only composed of two regiments, and one at Aintab; the other regiments hitherto on that frontier have all been ordered south, and on the coast, to Latakia and Tripoli.

I am informed, that the force at Adana had not undergone material change, if any, for a very small part of the force from that district has been ordered to join the expedition to the south.

I am also enabled to note to your Lordship, that by a very recent arrival

from Orfa, I am assured that the corps of the Egyptian Army concentrated on that line, both regulars and irregulars, continue to occupy without any change the same positions as I have already noted to your Lordship. And I am further assured, that tranquillity reigns at present throughout that district.

There exists at present here a great "Sochra." All animals are being forcibly seized by the Government for the transport of provisions and ammunition, which are, from inquiry I have made, being conveyed to Hamah for the Egyptian forces destined for the mountains.

The last advices I have from Mr. Vice-Consul Hays state, that the Alexandretta district, and the neighbouring mountains of the Giaour Dagh, and the whole range extending on that line to the Taurus, are for the present tranquil, and have not evinced as yet an insurrectionary spirit like the southern mountaineers.

The last letters I have from our agents at Latakia and Tripoli, assert that the inhabitants of the Akkar Mountains had also in part risen, but that they are watching the movements of the Emir Bechir's mountains. With this exception, the whole of this Consular district enjoys for the present every tranquillity, and is free from infectious and contagious diseases.

No. 154.

Mr. Consul Werry to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 21.)

(Extract.) *Damascus, August* 18, 1840.

YOUR Lordship will have been informed that the Mount Lebanon insurrection has been suppressed; and what remains of it in the neighbourhood of Tripoli Mr. Consul Moore will transmit your Lordship information thereon.

It was given out by the Government here, that part of the forces employed in the mountain affair would arrive here under Abbas Pasha, and proceed to the Ledgea, for the construction and completion of the redoubts around the principal springs there, for which object materials were being collected here; the forces were also to march to the Haouran district, to compel the inhabitants to pay the Ferdeh Tax and furnish the annual quantities of grain required for the military depôt here. For this end, Sheik Mahomed Ruffai was sent for, to make the intimation to the Haouran population, and to require their co-operation to expel the Snutt Arabs from the Ledgea, to oblige them to return to their avocations, and to desist from marauding and subjecting the country to their depredations. He is still here, and it is believed the Government has succeeded in concluding a favourable negotiation on these subjects.

I have not since heard that Abbas Pasha's forces are on their march hither; and since the reported determination of Mehemet Ali to maintain himself in Syria by force of arms, there may be reason to think that these forces have been distributed along the coast.

I have not heard of any acts of open insurrection and rebellion to the south; and the country north of this city is, for the present, in a tranquil state.

The Mutuali Emir, Mahomed Gewad Harfoush, of the Balbec district, has been here, and made his submission, and affairs are for the present in a tolerable quiet state on that line: there are, however, some strong bodies of Irregular Cavalry in that direction, employed by the Government to keep affairs in that state, and to give escort to the supplies of provisions which are sent from hence to the army.

By the latest advices from Aleppo of the 9th instant, Ibrahim Pasha was at Marash with but a small force. He was reported to be indisposed from fever.

No. 155.

Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 21.)

My Lord, *Beyrout, August* 21, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to transmit a copy of my official letter and inclosures, dated the 19th instant, to Colonel Hodges, Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General in Egypt, in reply to his communication to me of the "Acte Séparé" signed at London on the 15th July, 1840, by the Representatives of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, and which arrangement has for its object the pacification of the Levant.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) N. MOORE.

P.S.—By the arrival of Her Majesty's steam-vessel "Alecto," this morning, I have been honoured with your Lordship's despatch of the 18th July, 1840, the contents of which, I beg leave to say, have my most careful attention.

Inclosure 1 in No. 155.

Mr. Consul Moore to Colonel Hodges.

Sir, *Beyrout, August* 19, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 11th instant, inclosing a copy of an "Acte Séparé" signed at London on the 15th July, 1840, by the Representatives of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, and which arrangement has for its object the pacification of the Levant.

I am further informed, that a Protocol was signed at London on the 15th July last, by which it is established, that should Mehemet Ali reject the propositions of his Sovereign the Sultan, certain preliminary measures of coercion shall be adopted without waiting for the formal ratification of the Convention.

I carefully notice your instructions, Sir, to promulgate and make public, as widely as I can, in my own district, and if possible throughout all Syria, the substance of the "Acte Séparé," to the end that the Syrians may therein find motives for consolation and encouragement; and I beg to assure you that, according to my means, I will co-operate with the utmost activity and zeal in promoting the objects and intentions now brought to my knowledge.

I beg leave to inform you that Commodore Napier arrived before Beyrout on the 13th instant, with four ships of the line, and has since been reinforced by Her Majesty's ship "Castor," and the "Gorgon" steam frigate.

On the 14th instant, Commodore Napier addressed to me a communication, of which I have the honour to inclose a copy, and which I notified conformably with his desire, to the European Consuls, and to the British merchants resident here.

I likewise inclose transcript of a Proclamation to the Syrians issued the same day by Commodore Napier. The effect of the publication of the latter document has been most favourable, to re-animating and encouraging the Syrians, who are now only waiting the appearance of the promised succour of arms and ammunition, to rise and throw off the Egyptian yoke. I daily receive pressing inquiries from the inhabitants of Lebanon, when these supplies are to arrive. I trust they will not be long delayed; for not only may procrastination give time for the ardour of the Syrians to cool, but will be made use of by the Egyptian Government to sow dissensions, if possible; to strengthen their own position; and to pre-occupy the most advantageous military stations.

Communications have been opened with the Turkish troops; but owing to the measures adopted by the Government, this has been a work of difficulty, and

it will require time ere the false notions that have been instilled into the minds of the Turkish forces can be eradicated.

Four individuals,—one of the rank of major, and the others captains,—have taken refuge on board Her Majesty's ship "Powerful," and a Colonel, with two other Beys, are anxious to follow their example. Hassan Pasha, however, their General, has been too completely gained over by the Egyptians to leave much hopes of his returning to his allegiance.

With regard to the troops in general, notwithstanding their ardent longing after their native country and homes, I fear that until a Turkish force appears off Beyrout they will hardly have courage to rise. With a view to animating them in any attempt they might be disposed to make to recover their liberty, Commodore Napier ordered Her Majesty's ship "Ganges" to anchor off the lazaretto, where they have been encamped, surrounded by Egyptian forces; but such is the effect of previous notions impressed upon them, that they at first considered the measure as one of hostility, and that it was intended to attack them: the idea, it is true, has since been removed, but time must be allowed before the Proclamation can have its full effect.

The Emir Bechir has hitherto given no reply to the notifications which have been made to him by Commodore Napier, and through other channels; —this need not, perhaps, excite much surprise, or even the measure he has taken of promulgating orders to his subjects not to mention the arrival of the English ships, nor to take arms if offered; as, until the moment of action, he may adopt the above proceedings from motives of policy. Until the arrival of the Turkish forces, it will be impossible to judge decidedly what course the Emir will pursue.

The Emir Bechir El-Kasim, nephew of the great prince, and next to him in influence in Lebanon, has replied to the communications made to him, in terms the most favourable to the Sultan's cause; and both from his present assurances and past conduct, may be reckoned upon as a faithful and most valuable co-operator with the Sultan's forces on their arrival.

An Albanian chief with sixty men has just offered to take service with the Sultan.

Commodore Napier has captured four or five vessels, with some troops, arms, and ammunition on board, and also an Egyptian cutter of war.

With the exception of a few insurgents in the district of Donié, near Tripoli, the late revolt must be considered as completely quelled; but the smothered fire, which is day by day growing in intensity, will, I feel, burst into a flame throughout Syria, when the Sultan's standard is once fairly unfurled.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) N. MOORE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 155.

Commodore Napier to Mr. Consul Moore.

Her Majesty's ship "Powerful,"
Beyrout, August 14, 1840.

Sir,

I BEG you will communicate to the Consuls of the different Powers and the British merchants at Beyrout, that Great Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, have decided that Syria is to be restored to the Porte. I have demanded that the Turkish troops be put under my protection, and that the arms be restored to the inhabitants of Lebanon. I trust the Governor will not provoke hostilities; if he does, the responsibility of uselessly shedding blood must be on his own head.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) CHARLES NAPIER,
Commodore.

Inclosure 3 in No. 155.

Proclamation to the Syrians.

[See Inclosure 3 in No. 150, page 204.]

No. 156.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 24.)

My Lord, *Paris, September 21, 1840.*

I RETURNED to Paris from Hâvre on Saturday night.

I this morning visited M. Thiers at Auteuil. I found him on the point of setting off to attend a Cabinet Council at the Tuileries, and I accompanied him in his carriage to Paris. His Excellency spoke to me of the communications which he had instructed M. Guizot to make to your Lordship relative to the negotiations of Count Walewski at Alexandria, and of his own conversations with Mr. Bulwer upon that subject. He trusted that the concessions which had been obtained from Mehemet Ali would lead to a pacific arrangement; and he was the more anxious that advantage should be taken of those concessions to establish peace between the Sultan and the Pasha, because he was persuaded that they afforded the only means of avoiding the danger of a general war in Europe, of which no one could foresee the consequences to all the Powers engaged in it. He said, that the acceptance of those concessions implied nothing inconsistent even with the conditions of the Treaty of July, and that therefore there was no point of honour to induce the Powers who were parties to the Treaty to reject an arrangement founded upon those concessions. The Treaty of the 15th of July stipulated that Mehemet Ali should hold hereditarily the government of Egypt, and for his life the Pashalic of St. Jean d'Acre; but it did not bind the Porte to withhold from Ibrahim Pasha the grant of the Pashalics of Aleppo, of Damascus, and of Tripoli. He had no doubt, he said, that the Sultan would gladly conclude a peace upon these conditions, but having signed the Treaty of July, he must refer the question to the consideration of the other parties to the Treaty. M. Thiers expressed his hope that I would report his conversation to your Lordship, and in a way to dispose my Government to a favourable consideration of the means suggested for a pacific settlement.

I observed to M. Thiers, that the question was one which could be only determined by the concurrence of all the parties to the Treaty. M. Thiers, in reply, said he had every reason to believe (though he did not mean to say he had received any declaration from the Austrian or Prussian Governments to that effect) that no objection would be made by the Courts of Vienna and of Berlin; and that, in short, general peace or general war was in the hands of the English Government. If nothing came from the concessions of Mehemet Ali, he had no hope of preventing the march of Ibrahim's army upon Constantinople; and he would not conceal from me, that the position of France relatively to Mehemet Ali had become one of nearer connexion ("plus serrée"), since he has yielded to the representations of the French Government, than it was before.

M. Thiers made no allusion to the possibility of the concessions made by Mehemet Ali being further extended, but I have heard from a person much in the confidence of the French Government, of those concessions being considered as the basis of an arrangement, and as if they were susceptible of extension.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 157.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 25.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, September 2, 1840.*

I HAVE despatched by the "Hydra," the firman mentioned in Mr. Wood's letter of the 23rd of August, to be delivered to Emir Bechir El-Kasim, if the old Emir Bechir should not return to his allegiance to the Sultan, and I have given to Mr. Wood instructions upon the point.

I have acquainted Mr. Wood with the intention of the Sublime Porte to send the Levant steamer from hence on Sunday next (the 6th instant), to convey a Turkish officer of distinction to Beyrout, who will be the bearer of a Proclamation to the Syrians, which he is charged to have distributed amongst the population.

I also acquainted him with the intention of the Sublime Porte to publish to-morrow or next day, in the official Gazette, a list of the new Pashas appointed to the Pashalics of Syria, &c.; and I called to his notice the fact, that, hereafter, those persons who shall usurp the authority of the Sultan are rebels against His Imperial Majesty, &c.

I sent to Sir Charles Smith the letter written to Selim Pasha by the Sultan's command, and also a translation of it, and your Lordship's instruction to me of the 27th of July.

I wrote to Colonel Hodges stating the new appointments of Pashas of Syria, and the coming change with respect to Mehemet Ali, observing that British Consuls act under a Berat from the Sultan, and cannot have any official connection with any Pasha who is not in possession of his post by the authority of the Sultan; I advised Colonel Hodges not to risk being ill treated by Mehemet Ali.

The Porte could not prepare the official publication of the list of the new Pashas, nor the Proclamation to the Syrians, in time for the "Hydra."

No. 158.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September 26, 1840.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the several steps which you have taken in furtherance of the objects of the Convention of July 15, as reported in your despatch of September 2.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 159.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 25.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 3, 1840.*

COLONEL BARON LIEVEN has arrived here from Odessa. It is intended to employ him here in case of need. He brings M. Titow news from St. Petersburgh of the 20th of August, and confirms all we have heard of the feelings of the Emperor as to the question here.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 160.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 25.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, September* 3, 1840.

THE most perfect agreement exists amongst the Representatives of the Great Powers here in all things. We encouraged the Porte to act upon the refusal of Mehemet Ali to accept the Sultan's propositions to him.

The Pashas have been named for Syria, and those now holding the posts are of consequence removed. I think it absolutely necessary that Mehemet Ali should be superseded after Rifat Bey's departure from Alexandria, which will take place on the 5th or 6th instant. It would be imprudent to leave Mehemet Ali in legal possession of the Sultan's authority to be made use of against the very existence of the Sultan's throne,—I may say it would be absurd.

I beg to be permitted to say that my Colleagues and myself are much indebted to the Internuncio for the exertion his Excellency has made in the cause.

No. 161.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 21.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, September* 1, 1840.

EMIR HAIDAR, Emed Ali, and five other Emirs, were betrayed by the Emir Bechir, and delivered up to Mehemet Ali, and have been sent into exile in Upper Egypt. They wrote to Mr. Wood, to implore his interference, which of course was useless.

I send you Mr. Alison's letter to me.

Inclosure in No. 161.

Mr. Alison to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) *Alexandria, August* 26, 1840.

THE Pasha continues the rigorous measures taken by him with regard to the Captains of the Imperial fleet, seven of whom are still confined in the dungeons of Aboukir (while above twenty of the officers are imprisoned in the Arsenal), and he has prevailed upon the Port Admiral, Ibrahim Bey, who accompanied us from Constantinople, if not wholly to detach himself from Rifat Bey, yet to act in a manner calculated to throw a false light upon his mission.

The desire of the Pasha for Rifat Bey's departure, has within the last five days been most unequivocally expressed. Besides urging himself its expediency, he has given out that the Bey had, of his own accord, come to that decision; and fixing the day for his departure, he asked him on the 22nd to a farewell dinner; and subsequently inquired, sneeringly, of an English gentleman, whether his Consul would not embark with him? The Four Consuls have been equally pressed by him to leave Alexandria, and he has formally declared to them, that henceforward he can place neither trust nor confidence in them, and leaves it entirely to them to answer for the consequences of remaining further under those circumstances.

Rifat Bey, on the first hint being given him to leave, being empowered in his instructions to return to Constantinople after the unequivocal rejection of the Propositions of the Porte, referred the question to the decision of the Consuls. They settled that he should remain the whole term; arguing, that while his departure before its expiration could be productive of no good, it might afford the Pasha a pretext for withholding the orders alluded to in the Convention for the evacuation of the territories, &c., removed from his jurisdiction.

The day after his first visit, the four Consuls waited upon the Pasha. They were received very coldly, and dismissed with a request to state what they might further have to say in writing. A Collective Note was in consequence addressed to the Pasha.

No reliance can be placed upon the numerous reports we hear of the Pasha's future plans and movements. The greatest activity is displayed here in fortifying the harbour; and the heavy ships of the Turco-Egyptian squadrons have been drawn up in a line at a sufficient distance from each other to prevent the communication of flames, should an attempt be made to fire them by the disaffected Turks. The lighter crafts are unrigged, and laid up in dock.

The same idle reports of the warlike intention of France, are still in circulation among the lower classes.

In connexion with the discontent of the Egyptian soldiery, and the general detestation in which Mehemet Ali is held by the Fellahs, I may mention, that it is well known that several of the Pasha's Ministers disagree with him widely in the course he is pursuing with regard to Rifat Bey's mission. Sami Bey and several others have warmly remonstrated with him on this subject; but the Pasha takes no counsel. The fact, however, is kept a profound secret, for any indications of disaffection on the part of his immediate Ministers, through whom he oppresses the multitude, would be attended with the most evil results to him. Among them there are above ten Pashas in different places, who only remain faithful to him, owing to the comparative destitution which his downfall would entail upon them.

The motives ascribed by well-informed persons to Mehemet Ali, for offering such a stubborn resistance, are founded upon the calculation that the Allies cannot possibly take any efficient measures for coercing him before the ensuing spring; by that time he thinks that the influence of France, acting upon the conflicting interests of the European Powers, may lead to a more favourable arrangement than that now proposed to him. The news said to have been brought to him by the French steamer of yesterday, and the day before, of the strictly neutral intentions of the French Government, would not appear to have made any alteration in the views he has adopted; indeed it is remarked, that the cautious language of the Foreign Consuls, has rather confirmed him in his opinion. Although they have all acted with great firmness subsequently to the Convention, yet, as he looks upon that measure as having been hastily adopted under a false view of the extent of the insurrection in Syria, it has had very little effect on him. The means of defence he is actively engaged in, are had more with the view of impressing the conviction of his determination on the Courts of Europe, than in the hope of successfully combating the coercive measures of the Allies. In this day's audience he dismissed the whole body with a sneer upon his countenance, which, as I turned round to look upon him in leaving the hall, I could perceive still characterized it.

The unfortunate Druses, with the Emir Haidar, have been sent into Upper Egypt.

Fifteen officers of the Imperial fleet have disappeared within the last five days.

The Admiral, with the "Bellerophon" and "Daphne," and the Austrian frigate, having the young Archduke on board, are riding in the offing.

No. 162.

Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 25.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, September* 12, 1840.

I HAD an interview with Count Nesselrode yesterday, and, according to your Lordship's instructions, communicated to his Excellency your despatch to Mr. Bulwer of August 31. Count Nesselrode told me, that he had had the satisfaction of receiving a copy of this despatch from Baron Brunnow, which he had immediately forwarded to the Emperor, and was glad to be put

in possession of a second copy of this document, of every part of which he expressed his fullest approbation.

After some conversation on the strange difference between the language held by the French Government at Paris and its Representatives at Constantinople and Alexandria, his Excellency put into my hands his last despatches from Count Medem, dated August $\frac{5}{17}$, transmitting the report delivered to the Consuls by Rifat Bey of his interview with Mehemet Ali. As your Lordship will be already in possession of this paper, I need not allude further to it; but I cannot omit mentioning the stress laid by Count Medem on the language of Count Walewski and M. Cochelet to Mehemet Ali as calculated to excite the passions of the Pasha, and uphold him in his stubborn unwillingness to yield, by giving him hopes of support from France, should coercive measures be adopted by the Allies.

No. 163.

Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 25.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, September* 12, 1840.

CONSIDERABLE activity prevails at Cronstadt, in consequence of the Emperor having ordered one division of the Baltic fleet, nine sail of the line, and six frigates, (which had just been dismantled and laid up for the winter,) to be immediately prepared for sea.

This squadron, as Count Nesselrode assures me, is to be held in readiness to co-operate with the British squadron in the Mediterranean if wanted there.

When ready, it will proceed to Sweaborg, where it will be available for one month later in the year, and could put to sea some weeks earlier in the spring than if it remained at Cronstadt.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) J. A. D. BLOOMFIELD.

No. 164.

Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 25.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, September* 12, 1840.

M. CASIMIR PERIER, first Secretary to the French Embassy, reached St. Petersburgh on the 10th instant.

The language of the French Ambassador since the arrival of M. Périer is somewhat changed. He seems to count more on an alteration in the opinions of the Allies on the Turco-Egyptian Question than on any change in those of his Government, to facilitate the return of a good understanding between the Five Powers. M. de Barante appears surprised at the sudden order sent to Cronstadt for instantly equipping a division of the Russian fleet, and despatched a messenger to Paris yesterday. He gives out as his opinion, that some important decision must be taken next month; that France is determined, if war should be inevitable, to be armed and to be ready to strike fiercely at the very onset.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) J. A. D. BLOOMFIELD.

No. 165.

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bloomfield.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 28, 1840.

I HAVE received your despatch of September 12, reporting that Count Nesselrode had stated to you that it was intended to hold in readiness to proceed, if it should be necessary, to co-operate with the British squadron, nine

Russian sail of the line, and six frigates, which the Imperial Government had ordered to be immediately equipped; and I have to instruct you to convey to Count Nesselrode the thanks of Her Majesty's Government for this arrangement of the Emperor, which Her Majesty's Government have learnt with great satisfaction.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 166.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 26.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, September* 8, 1840.

I INCLOSE a list of Pashas appointed by the Sultan to the government of the Pashalics which have been till now administered by the creatures of Mehemet Ali. This measure, as I have before stated, was proposed by the Ottoman Minister, and deferred till the expiration of the first term of ten days. The refusal of the first proposition by Mehemet Ali, appeared to my Colleagues and myself, to render it necessary to take this step. I have acquainted your Lordship with the instructions I sent to the Consuls in Syria, &c., and to Mr. Wood. Your Lordship will have received, perhaps, later intelligence from Colonel Hodges than is contained in the despatch and inclosure he has sent to me under flying seal, and which I forward by this messenger.

I also forward a letter I have received from Mr. Alison, wherein you will find accounts of the state of Egypt, which are confirmed by the reports of the Austrian and Russian Consuls, and in which the proceedings of the Sheiks and Ulemas is represented in still stronger colours than by Mr. Alison.

An offer has been made by the Ottoman Minister, to send 10,000 more troops to Cyprus to be employed in Syria.

It is necessary that the measures of coercion in Syria should be executed with celerity and force, and to do so, the more troops employed the better.

If the Convention is executed with promptitude and vigour, there is not a reasonable doubt to be entertained of its complete success, but if delay and trifling be allowed, it will fail.

Count Walewski has arrived here as a traveller. The French Ambassador has acquainted Rechid Pasha with his intention to present the Count to him.

Your Lordship may rely upon the firmness of the Sultan and his Ministers, and the policy of the Sultan towards Mehemet Ali has been fully approved of in Council by the Chiefs of the corps of Ulemas, and their approbation authenticated in a formal act signed by them all. The feeling of the public is extremely good.

Baron Lieven has arrived here to examine into the state of affairs and to report to his Government.

Inclosure 1 in No. 166.

List of the Pashas in Syria, named by the Porte.

Moushirs.	St. Jean d'Acre	Izzet Méhémed Pacha.
	Damas	Hadji Ali Pacha.
	Alep	Essad Pacha.
	Au District d'Adana	Izzet Pacha.

Fériks. Arabie, ce Pachalic a été donné au Pacha de Bagdad, qui enverra son beau-fils, Izzet Pacha, comme son substitut.

Candie, Moustapha Pacha (le même qui avait été nommé de la part de Méhémet Ali), avec le grade de Moushir.

(Translation.)

Moushirs.

St. Jean d'Acre - - - -	Izzet Mehemed Pasha.
Damascus - - - - -	Hadji Ali Pasha.
Aleppo - - - - -	Essad Pasha.

To the District of Adana - - - Izzet Pasha.

Feriks.

Arabia, this Pashalic has been given to the Pasha of Bagdad, who will send his son-in-law, Izzet Pasha, as his substitute.

Candia, Mustapha Pasha (the same who had been named by Mehemet Ali), with the rank of Moushir.

Inclosure 2 in No. 166.

Mr. Alison to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) *Alexandria, August* 30, 1840.

THE people of Alexandria are now well acquainted with the provisions of the Convention, and fully comprehend the results which will attend the obstinate resistance of the Pasha. It would appear from the news of some display of public feeling at Cairo, and of fresh risings in Syria, that matters are equally well understood in those quarters; and the Pasha is also said to have received letters from his son Ibrahim, which have caused him great dissatisfaction and uneasiness.

It was on the receipt of this intelligence that the Sheiks of Alexandria went in a body the day before yesterday to the Pasha, to throw in their weight in favour of a quiet settlement of the question, according to the terms of the Convention. Mehemet Ali appeared to be forcibly struck with their prayers and arguments, and promised to do everything he could to meet their wishes. He sent accordingly forthwith for Rifat Bey and the Consuls, and made the proposals which your Lordship will read in the procès-verbal of that interview.

While matters were yet in the course of discussion, all Alexandria echoed the joyful news of his submission, which he had purposely promulgated; but this it was intended should not last long. Another voice came from the palace, ere the interview was yet over, "Mehemet Ali has submitted to the desire and to the decision of his Sovereign,—but of what avail? The Consuls have paralyzed his good intentions by insisting on the observance of some unnecessary formalities, and have thus assumed the whole responsibility of whatever may result from it."

The impression made by this stratagem was soon effaced here, although it may have the effect of pacifying for a time the public at Cairo, to which place the report was immediately telegraphed.

After the interview, the Pasha summoned the Sheiks, and told them what he had done, and how he had been frustrated. They are, however, now in full possession of the true version of the story, and see very clearly into the deceit; so that matters are just where they were after the 26th.

The Pasha, in the mean time, pretends to be furious. He desired Colonel Hodges yesterday to say to his Colleagues, that if they came in a body to offer him any more advice, he would send them out into the anti-room to Sami Bey. "I can no longer tolerate this bow-wow-wow," continued he; "come to me separately; put me a simple question, and I will give you a categorical answer. I am an old infirm man, and am wearied to death with you."

I may mention that the palace version of all the interviews between the Pasha and the Consuls is immediately promulgated in Alexandria; and although in this instance it was perfectly correct, yet it is generally a matter

of no small difficulty to remove the false impressions which are thus created, and put things in their proper light;—as in the instance of the last general interview. A common Bedouin early this morning apostrophized me thus:—"Are the Pasha's boils to trouble the peace of the world (in allusion to his complaint)? Are we to be the dupes of his perfidy and the victims of its effects?"

Count Medem has just come (half-past 10, A.M.) from the palace to Rifat Bey. He had been to communicate the ratification of the Convention on the part of the Emperor. Mehemet Ali declared his determination to abide by the consequences of his non-acceptance, saying, "I am a poor, persecuted man."

An Austrian schooner brought us the day before yesterday evening the news of Captain Walker's arrival off Marmorizza, with twenty-seven troop-ships, as well as that of your Lordship's spirited Note to M. de Pontois.

No. 167.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 26.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, August 30, 1840.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that on the evening of the 29th instant, Mehemet Ali called together his Excellency the special Envoy of the Sublime Porte and the Consuls-General of the Four Powers parties to the Convention of the 15th July.

What passed on that occasion is fully detailed in the procès-verbal which I have now the honour to inclose.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

Inclosure in No. 167.

Minute of an interview on the 29th August, between Mehemet Ali and Rifat Bey, accompanied by the Consuls-General of the Four Powers.

SUR l'invitation faite au nom du Vice-Roi par l'entremise de Hosrew Efendi, les Consuls-Généraux de l'Autriche, de la Grande Bretagne, de Prusse, et de Russie, se sont rendus au Palais de Rass-Eddin, deux heures avant le coucher du soleil (5 heures de l'après-midi). Ils y ont trouvé son Excellence Rifat Bey, qui venait à peine d'arriver, conversant avec son Altesse.

Après les complimens d'usage, le Vice-Roi nous fit l'ouverture suivante:—

"J'ai donné, il y a trois jours, un refus catégorique d'accéder aux conditions du premier terme fixé par la Convention de Londres. Mais je viens de me décider à accepter celles du second terme, savoir, l'hérédité de l'Egypte pour moi et ma famille. Je vais écrire officiellement à la Porte à ce sujet, et je me permettrai en même temps une très-humble prière concernant le gouvernement de la Syrie; son Excellence Rifat Bey voudra bien, je me flatte, se charger d'être le porteur de ma lettre."

L'Envoyé Ottoman ainsi que les Consuls-Généraux, exprimèrent au Vice-Roi leurs félicitations au sujet de cette résolution, ajoutant que son Altesse, en acceptant les stipulations du second terme, ne pouvait y mettre des conditions, et que les vœux qu'elle adresserait à son Souverain ne devaient être considérés que comme un appel à sa générosité; qu'elle n'ignorait pas que toute acceptation devait être accompagnée du renvoi immédiat de la flotte, et la remise des ordres pour l'évacuation de la Syrie.

"J'attendrai, avant de remplir ces conditions," reprit Méhémet Ali, "la réponse de Sa Hautesse et des Quatre Grandes Puissances; et si elle m'est favorable, je procéderai incessamment à ces mesures."

Nous fimes observer au Pacha, que d'après la lettre du Traité, l'acceptation soit des conditions du premier soit du second terme, n'admettait aucune restriction, et que par conséquent, son Altesse devait se persuader qu'il ne pouvait y

avoir d'adhésion aux conditions du Traité sans le renvoi simultané de la flotte Ottomane, et sans l'évacuation de la Syrie.

"Je vous prie," reprit le Vice-Roi, "de ne pas me susciter des embarras et mettre obstacle à mes ouvertures, mais de vous borner à les porter à la connaissance de la Sublime Porte, et de vos Ambassadeurs à Constantinople; car d'après la teneur de la lettre Vizirielle qui me fait part du Traité de Londres, Sa Hautesse conserve la faculté, soit pour le cas que j'accepte ou que je refuse, de m'accommoder une grâce."

Nous reprimes, "Les explications que vous nous donnez sur la démarche que vous comptez faire, démontrent que ce n'est nullement une acceptation pure et simple que vous entendez. Que feriez-vous en cas que vos prières fussent rejetées?"

"J'attendrai la réponse qui ne peut tarder d'arriver. Si elle m'est favorable, comme je l'espère, je procéderai sans délai à la stricte exécution de mes obligations; mais si l'on refuse ma demande, je me confierai au sort des armes."

"S'il en est ainsi, ce n'est donc pas une simple grâce que vous demandez, et nous ne pouvons en aucune manière accepter une pareille ouverture de votre part, car ni nous, ni nos Ambassadeurs, ni la Porte Ottomane, n'avons la faculté d'accéder à une proposition conditionnelle qui n'est pas compatible avec la lettre de la Convention. Par le fait même de cette transaction, la Sublime Porte et les Quatre autres Cours Contractantes ne forment dorénavant qu'une seule Puissance à l'égard de la Question Egyptienne. C'est donc à la Conférence de Londres que votre demande doit aboutir, et sa décision pourrait à peine nous parvenir en deux mois. Loin donc de pouvoir nous rendre l'intermédiaire d'un offre qui n'a évidemment pour but que de gagner du temps, nous devons au contraire décliner formellement cette demande, et vous déclarer, que les mesures de coërcitions auront leur cours et ne pourront être arrêtées par aucune démarche ou négociation contraire à l'esprit et à la teneur du Traité."

"Eh bien, que les hostilités continuent," répartit le Pacha; "en attendant, ma proposition ira à Constantinople ou à Londres; et je me flatte de recevoir, ne fut-ce qu'après deux mois, une réponse analogue à mes désirs."

"Sans être accompagné du renvoi de la flotte et d'une garantie de votre bonne foi, vos propositions ne pourront être accueillies, et seront indubitablement rejetées."

Ici le Pacha se leva sur son séant et s'écria, "Ne me tourmentez pas par vos paroles, car si vous me poussez à bout, vous aurez la guerre pour cinq ans, je vous en réponds."

"Libre à vous de vous défendre aussi longtems que vous en aurez des moyens; mais cela ne changera en rien la question. Ne croyez pas que vos déclamations puissent en rien nous faire dévier de notre devoir; nous suivrons toujours la ligne qui nous est tracée par le Traité."

L'état de souffrance physique et moral du Pacha ne nous ayant pas permis de prolonger la conversation, nous quittâmes son Altesse.

Alexandrie, le 29 *Août*, 1840.

(Translation.)

Minute of an interview between Mehemet Ali and Rifat Bey, accompanied by the Consuls-General of the Four Powers.

ON a request made in the name of the Viceroy through Hosrew Effendi, the Consuls-General of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, repaired to the palace of Rass-Eddin, two hours before sunset, (5 o'clock in the evening). They found there his Excellency Rifat Bey, who had only just arrived, conversing with His Highness.

After the usual compliments, the Viceroy made to us the following overture:—

Three days ago I gave a categorical refusal to accede to the conditions of the first term fixed by the Convention of London. But I have just decided to accept those of the second term, namely, the hereditary possession of Egypt for myself and my family. I am about to write officially to the Porte on this subject, and I shall allow myself at the same time to make a most humble prayer with respect to the Government of Syria; his

Excellency Rifat Bey will have the goodness, I flatter myself, to be the bearer of my letter.

The Ottoman Envoy, as well as the Consuls-General, offered to the Viceroy their congratulations on this resolution, adding, that His Highness, in accepting the stipulations of the second term, could not annex conditions thereto, and that the wishes which he expressed to his Sovereign could only be considered as an appeal to his generosity; that he was not ignorant, that any acceptance must be accompanied by the immediate restoration of the fleet and by the delivery of orders for the evacuation of Syria.

"Before fulfilling these conditions," replied Mehemet Ali, "I shall await the answer of His Highness, and of the Four Great Powers, and if that is favourable to me, I shall immediately proceed to put these measures into execution."

We observed to the Pasha, that according to the letter of the Treaty, the acceptance of the conditions either of the first or of the second term, did not admit of any restriction, and that consequently His Highness ought to be convinced that there could be no adherence to the conditions of the Treaty, without the simultaneous restitution of the Ottoman fleet, and the evacuation of Syria.

"I beg of you," said the Viceroy, "not to raise embarrassments, and put difficulties in the way of my overtures; but to limit yourselves to conveying them to the knowledge of the Sublime Porte, and of your Ambassadors at Constantinople; for, according to the tenour of the vizirial letter, which communicates to me the Treaty of London, His Highness reserves to himself the power, either in the case of my acceptance, or of my refusal, of conferring on me an act of grace.

We rejoined, "The explanations which you give us upon the course which you intend to pursue, prove that it is by no means a pure and simple acceptance which you meditate. What would you do in case your prayers should be rejected?"

"I will await the answer which must soon arrive. If it is favourable to me, as I hope it may be, I shall proceed without delay to the strict fulfilment of my obligations; but if my demands are refused, I will trust to the fate of arms."

"If that be so, it is not then a simple favour which you demand, and we can in no way accept such an overture on your part, for neither we ourselves, nor our Ambassadors, nor the Ottoman Porte, have the power to agree to a conditional proposition, which is not in accordance with the letter of the Convention. By the very fact of this transaction, the Sublime Porte and the Four other Contracting Powers form henceforth but one Single Power with respect to the Egyptian Question. It is to the Conference of London, therefore, that your demand must ultimately be submitted, and its decision can scarcely reach us in two months. So far, therefore, from being able to make ourselves the channel of an offer, which has evidently no other object than that of gaining time, it is our duty, on the contrary, formally to decline this demand, and to declare to you, that the measures of coercion will take their course, and cannot be stayed by any step or negotiation contrary to the spirit and tenour of the Treaty."

"Well, then, let hostilities continue," replied the Pacha; "in the mean time, my proposition will go to Constantinople, or to London, and I flatter myself that I shall receive, if it should not be till after two months, an answer in accordance with my wishes."

"Unless accompanied by the restoration of the fleet, and by a guarantee of your good faith, your propositions cannot be entertained, and will be undoubtedly rejected."

Here the Pasha raised himself on his seat, and cried out, "Do not torment me with your words, for if you push me to extremities, you shall have war for these five years, I will answer for it."

"You are free to defend yourself as long as you have the means of doing so, but that will in no way alter the question. Do not imagine that your harangues can in any manner induce us to deviate from our duty; we shall always pursue the line pointed out to us by the Treaty."

The Pasha's state of suffering, both physical and moral, no longer permitting us to prolong the conversation, we quitted His Highness.

Alexandria, August 29, 1840.

No. 168.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 28.)

(Extract.) *Paris, September 25, 1840.*

I CALLED this morning upon M. Thiers at Auteuil. He began his conversation with me by expressing his indignation at a paragraph which had appeared in the "Morning Chronicle," stating that the French Agents at Alexandria had induced Mehemet Ali to retract the concession which he had made to Rifat Bey and to the Consuls of the Four Powers, of the conditions of peace imposed upon him by the Treaty of the 15th of July.

M. Thiers then took out of his bureau two despatches, one from Count Walewski, and the other from the French Consul, which we read over together. As far as I can recollect, the following is the account given by both of them of what passed; it is in most respects the same as what was reported to your Lordship by Mr. Bulwer, in his despatch of September 18. Mehemet Ali told Rifat Bey and the Consuls, that he accepted the hereditary government of Egypt, and that with respect to his other possessions, he trusted to the magnanimity of the Sultan. When Count Walewski and M. Cochelet heard of this declaration, which seemed so inconsistent with the previously-expressed resolutions of the Pasha, they inquired what it was he expected from the magnanimity of the Sultan? The Pasha replied to this inquiry, that Rifat Bey had given him to understand that if he thus accepted the conditions proposed, the Sultan would, in the form of a spontaneous grant, place other Pashalics at his disposal, and that he expected to retain possession for his life, of Syria, of Adana, and of Candia. The French Agents represented that the Porte, acting under the advice of the Four Powers, would never consent to such an arrangement; and they pressed upon him the necessity of his giving up Adana and Candia.

Mehemet Ali for some time resisted their advice, and they represent that they were indebted to the suffering which the Pasha underwent from a surgical operation which weakened his moral force, for his finally yielding.

There were paragraphs in the despatches of both Count Walewski and M. Cochelet (but they were but few) which M. Thiers passed over; they could not, however, have been in contradiction to the above statement. Some of these paragraphs, I am inclined to think, referred to what France promised the Pasha in return for his being guided by the counsels of the French Government.

M. Thiers, on one occasion, said, "I will not read you this paragraph, but you cannot suppose that we obtained gratis what we asked." There was another paragraph which, I rather conjecture from some words which preceded it, had reference to a plan of military or naval operation.

I feel it necessary to observe, after making this statement, that I am far from believing that the French Government or their Agents would have willingly acquiesced in the unqualified acceptance by the Pasha of the conditions proposed to him by the Sultan and his Allies; it is not that the French Government attach importance to the retention of the whole of Syria by Mehemet Ali, or by Ibrahim Pasha, but they think that France would suffer in its consideration and influence in Europe, if any arrangement of this question were to be completed, to which she is no party, and which she has always represented as unattainable.

M. Thiers said to me to-day, "il n'y a pas d'extrémité que je ne braverai plutôt que la France soit humiliée;" and though he did not say so, I have no doubt he meant me to understand that the forcing Mehemet Ali to subscribe to the exact conditions imposed by the Treaty of the Five Powers would in his opinion humiliate France.

P.S.—I have the honour to inclose the "Moniteur," containing an article in contradiction of the statement put forth by the "Morning Chronicle."

Inclosure in No. 168.

Article from the "Moniteur Universel" of September 25.

LE "Morning Chronicle," dans son numéro du 21, émet une assertion dont il importe de relever la fausseté. Ce journal prétend que Méhémet Ali avait d'abord annoncé à l'Envoyé de la Porte, et aux Consuls des Quatre Puissances, des concessions amples et satisfaisantes qui auraient tout terminé, et que c'est par suite de l'intervention des Agens Français qu'il les aurait restreintes à l'investiture héréditaire de l'Egypte et à la possession viagère de la Syrie.

Nous sommes en mesure d'opposer à cette assertion la dénégation la plus absolue. Nous pouvons même ajouter que, sans les vives instances des Agens Français, les concessions de Méhémet Ali n'auraient pas été portées aussi loin. Il demandait, en effet, qu'on lui laissât garder, à titre viager, non-seulement la Syrie, mais la totalité des territoires qu'il occupe en ce moment, et ce n'est qu'après une très-forte résistance qu'il s'est décidé à y renoncer.

Les preuves de ce que nous avançons ici seront fournies aux deux Chambres.

(Translation.)

Article from the "Moniteur Universel" of September 25.

THE "Morning Chronicle," in its number of the 21st, puts forth an assertion, the falsehood of which it is necessary to establish. That journal pretends that Mehemet Ali had at first announced to the Envoy from the Porte, and to the Consuls of the Four Powers, that he would make ample and satisfactory concessions which would have settled the whole matter, and that it was in consequence of the interference of the French Agents, that he confined those concessions to the hereditary investiture of Egypt, and to the possession of Syria for life.

We are enabled to meet this assertion with a most positive denial. We may even add that, but for the pressing entreaties of the French Agents, the concessions of Mehemet Ali would not have been carried so far. In fact, he requested that he might be allowed to keep, for life, not only Syria, but the whole of the territories which he occupies at this moment, and it was only after a very strong resistance, that he determined upon giving up that pretension.

The proofs of what we here put forward, will be furnished to the two Chambers.

No. 169.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 28.)

My Lord, *Paris, September* 25, 1840.

A COURIER arrived on Wednesday last with despatches from Prince Metternich to the Austrian Ambassador. Count Appony this morning read to me one of those despatches which he yesterday communicated to M. Thiers. It contains an argumentative dissertation upon the state of the Eastern Question. It is written in a pacific and conciliatory spirit towards France; and Prince Metternich seems to wish and to expect that the concert between the Four Powers and France, which he considers to have been suspended by the Treaty of the 15th of July, may be re-established. I need not, however, attempt to give an account of these despatches to Count Appony, as I understand they have been transmitted to Baron Neumann for communication to your Lordship.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 170.

Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 29.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, September* 18, 1840.

YESTERDAY the French Ambassador received a messenger from Paris. Amongst other things he was the bearer of a copy of your Lordship's despatch to Mr. Bulwer of August 31, which was accompanied by the observation, that the arguments contained in this document are precisely of the same tendency as those advanced in the Memorandum of July 17, only more diffuse; and that as France was unable to discover in it any new proposition, her attitude in the Turco-Egyptian Question must remain unchanged.

Count Nesselrode informs me, however, that notwithstanding this declaration, he has indirectly learnt that M. de Barante is charged with a communication to the Imperial Government, the object of which is to endeavour to lay the ground-work for some plausible excuse to the French Chambers for the vast expences to which the country has been exposed by the naval and military armaments; but the French Ambassador has not yet made any communication, nor has he even sought an interview with the Vice-Chancellor.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) J. A. D. BLOOMFIELD.

No. 171.

Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 29.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, September* 18, 1840.

I CALLED on Count Nesselrode to-day, and his Excellency allowed me to read his last despatches from Alexandria, of the 26th August.

Count Nesselrode appears desirous for the application of the most vigorous measures against Mehemet Ali.

The intelligence contained in Count Medem's reports will have long since reached your Lordship. The tone of his despatches scarcely calls for a remark: his language throughout is moderate, and shows an anxious desire for cordial co-operation with his Colleagues. In alluding to M. Walewski and M. Cochelet, Count Medem says that their instructions appear to have been much modified, and that M. Cochelet had now been directed to engage Mehemet Ali to accept, without delay, the conditions of the London Convention.

No. 172.

Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 29.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, September* 19, 1840.

AFTER the interview which I had yesterday with Count Nesselrode, the post of the 8th instant arrived from Constantinople, bringing accounts from Alexandria of the 30th ultimo.

Count Nesselrode has just sent me M. de Titow's despatch, covering one from Count Medem, in which the latter reports that Mehemet Ali had accepted the conditions of the second term, but had addressed an humble prayer to the Sultan about Syria.

The impression conveyed to me by the despatches of M. de Titow and Count Medem is, that the proposal about Syria is inadmissible and illusory; for it appears, though not clearly defined, to consist in a demand for the whole of Syria, and to have been conceived with the view of staying coercive measures and gaining time, and also of forming an opening for French mediation, by the practical adoption of her view of the question.

No. 173.

Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 29.)

(Extract.) *Berlin, September* 23, 1840.

BARON WERTHER desired to see me yesterday, to tell me that Count Bresson had communicated to him a despatch from M. Thiers, in which an account is given of the effect made by Count Walewski's proposals on Mehemet Ali, and the disposition shown by the Pasha of Egypt to make concessions to the Sultan. Baron Werther appeared to be much pleased with the news, and to think that a basis was laid, on which a final and satisfactory settlement of the Oriental Question might be formed.

On my return home, I found that Count Bresson desired to see me. He read to me Count Walewski's despatch to the President of the Council, and the President's despatch to himself, both of which have, I believe, been communicated to your Lordship, at least the matter. He likewise read to me a private letter from M. Thiers, in which he said, that immense and unexpected concessions had been obtained from the Pasha of Egypt by Count Walewski; and that an opening was made by which this dangerous question might be settled; that he was to appeal seriously, but calmly, to the judgment of the King of Prussia, and to say that, should these offers be rejected, war must be the inevitable consequence.

I told Count Bresson, that I thought the Pasha of Egypt still asked too much, and that the Four Powers having signed a formal Treaty, could not allow it to be torn a few days afterwards; that its stipulations must be fulfilled: that Mehemet Ali must yield to our terms, and not we to his. Count Bresson admitted the force of the argument, and said, that a mode presented itself by which the *amour-propre* of the Four Powers might be saved, as well as that of France. It was this, that Mehemet Ali should accept the Convention of July without stipulation, and in its complete integrity, on condition that the Sultan should, as a boon, give up to Ibrahim Pasha for life the Pashalics of Damascus, Aleppo, and Tripoli. Mehemet Ali would then at once yield to the Porte, the fleet, Candia, Adana, and the Holy Cities. By this arrangement, said the Count, the Treaty is executed, the honour of the Four Powers is preserved, and France has the satisfaction of having obtained for the Pasha better terms than would otherwise have been granted to him. I told the Count, that I knew not how this proposal would be considered by Her Majesty's Government. The Count said, that this affair once terminated, the union between our respective countries would be stronger than ever.

No. 174.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 1.)

My Lord, *Paris, September* 28, 1840.

THE accounts which have lately been received here from Egypt and Syria, are confused and contradictory. M. Thiers assured me on Saturday morning, that his last despatches from M. Cochelet were of the 6th; they stated that the Consuls of the Four Powers had not removed from Alexandria. Private letters of the 7th have reached Paris, mentioning that Colonel Hodges had embarked on board the "Cyclops," but that the Consular flag at his house had not been taken down.

I had to-day some conversation with M. Désages, the Directeur des Affaires Etrangères, respecting the report of Count Walewski and M. Cochelet having obtained from Mehemet Ali the retractation of his consent to the conditions of peace proposed by Rifat Bey. The following is the account M. Désages gave me of the circumstances which gave rise to that report.

Mehemet Ali having refused to listen to the advice conveyed to him from the French Government by M. Périer, had, after being made acquainted with the conditions of peace settled by the Treaty of the 15th July, applied to M. Cochelet for the mediation of France. Subsequently to this application, Mehemet Ali told Rifat Bey, that he accepted the hereditary Government of Egypt, and that, with respect to the other territories he possessed, he trusted to the magnanimity of the Sultan. This last phrase, M. Désages denominated an oriental style of speaking, and said it meant nothing at all; but it was interpreted in a literal sense by the French Agents; and when Mehemet Ali sent to request them to come to him, they, affronted at his having taken so important a determination without any communication with them, after he had asked for the mediation of the French Government, declined in the first instance going to him; but when persuaded to do so, they found that he merely meant that he would negotiate directly and separately with the Turkish Government; and he expressed his resolution not to give up any part of the possessions which he held by the Treaty of Kutaya.

M. Walewski and M. Cochelet then represented to the Pasha, the impossibility of obtaining the acquiescence of the Sultan and of his Allies to so unreasonable a proposition; and after more than one conference, they extorted from him his consent to give up Adana and Candia; he for a long time having resisted this last cession, on the plea that the island, if given up by him, must fall into the possession of the Greeks.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 175

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 2.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, September* 10, 1840.

WE received on the 7th the accounts of what has taken place at Alexandria between Mehemet Ali, Rifat Bey, and the Consuls of the Four Powers. Your Lordship has all this matter before you, and I have only to state that Rechid Pasha understands the reply of Mehemet Ali to be a refusal. His Excellency sent his private Secretary, Nedim Effendi, to me this morning, to make known the contents of a copy of a letter from Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier, the letter itself not having been sent from Alexandria. The contents are a mere repetition of the old story, —application for the possession of all Syria, and boastings of services rendered to the Sublime Porte, and the often-repeated declarations of undeviating loyalty and devotion of Mehemet Ali to the Sultan.

Nedim talked of affairs, and told me Rechid Pasha desired to depose Mehemet Ali. I desired him to assure Rechid Pasha that I thought the measure not only advisable but necessary, and that I was in correspondence with my Colleagues on the subject.

Last night I had a long conversation with the Internuncio, and after examining the question with me, his Excellency seemed to concur in my view of the necessity for depriving Mehemet Ali of his post of Governor of Egypt: and his Excellency had the goodness to undertake to communicate with our Colleagues this day, if I would write a Note to his Excellency stating my opinion, and referring to the conversation we had then been engaged in. I have done so this day, and will report the result if I learn it in time for the estafette.

I observed to the Internuncio, (and I had previously held similar language to M. de Titow and Count Königsmarck,) that unless Mehemet Ali be deprived of the post he holds by the authority of the Sultan, there must be incongruity and confusion in the state of affairs. Mehemet Ali, being the legal Governor of Egypt, has the right to issue orders to the Egyptians, who, on their part, have no right to examine into the tendency of those orders, and they may be, and will be, directed against the Sultan's authority, so that the authority of the Sultan is to be em-

ployed against the authority of the Sultan, and the obedience of the subject is to be called for to support disobedience to that Power which they (the subjects) are ordered to obey.

The deposition of Mehemet Ali is necessary to place a blockade upon its proper footing. It will be something worse than absurd for the Sultan to order a blockade of his own port, that port being continued by the Sultan under the government of the man whose conduct is the reason for establishing the blockade. And there may possibly arise cases of difficulty with foreign nations from the strange nature and novelty of the blockade.

The Convention provides for the present suppression by force of the transporting by sea, troops and military stores from Egypt into Syria, and that work has been performed. Mehemet Ali, in Egypt, has no longer anything to fear from the Allies, and may rest quiet there, exempt from the pressure of a blockade which would probably ruin him. The Sultan alone can order a blockade, and I have shown that he cannot order one consistently with common sense or with his own dignity, unless he shall depose Mehemet Ali.

There are other and various reasons why the deposition should take place, and one very powerful, which is, the vast importance attached by the Turkish nation to a solemn act of the sort done by the Sultan. This was shown the other day in the case of the deposition of the Pashas of Syria, which was held to be almost a decision of that question, because people are accustomed to believe that such a formal exercise of the Sultan's power implies a confidence on his part in his possession of the means as well as the right to execute the law.

The refusal of Mehemet Ali to accept the Convention is not expressed in words alone. His acts have declared it, for he has not delivered the fleet to the Sultan's envoy ; he has not given orders to restore Syria, both having been made in the Convention nominatively conditions to be observed by Mehemet Ali within the period of time therein specified.

The Turks will in a very few days have 10,000 regular troops ready to be sent to reinforce the 5,600 men already gone to Cyprus. The bubble of Mehemet Ali's threats to march Ibrahim's army to the gates of Constantinople has burst; and it is evident that Ibrahim and Solyman have enough to do to maintain themselves in security in Syria.

The Porte ought to take away the chance upon which Mehemet Ali relies for his escape from his present peril. The Porte has nothing to fear, and it is not exposed any longer even to a threat of attack ; and there is no sort of domestic danger, for all people have either sided with it, or have abandoned in despair the active support of Mehemet Ali. But this state of domestic affairs may be altered if the Porte exhibits signs of fear, and this is another motive for the immediate deposition of Mehemet Ali.

The only thing like a doubt that I have heard stated as to the measure of deposing Mehemet Ali, is founded upon the concluding line of Section VII. in the Acte Séparé, where it is said, "The Sultan shall consider himself *libre* to act so and so, and to 'suivre en conséquence telle marche ultérieure que ses propres intérêts et les conseils de ses Alliés pourront lui suggérer.'"

Some persons thought that, by this last sentence, the Sultan is bound uot to act, unless after having obtained the approbation of his Allies. To me it appears that such a construction is equivalent to refusing to the Sultan all right to act in any thing, or in any way, that he may think necessary for his interests, except after having obtained the advice of his Allies upon every particular case. My interpretation of the paragraph in the Acte Séparé is, that the Allies mean to state the fact of their being the advisers of the Sultan, for the purpose of aiding him in acting in conformity with the spirit and letter of the Convention, and of forwarding those interests for the sake of which that Treaty was made, namely, the interests of the Sultan, as being the means for maintaining other great interests of the Contracting Powers. The object of the Convention is the reduction of a power usurped by Mehemet Ali, which has been found to be incompatible with the interests of the Sultan and of his Allies. The Convention suggested a mode of arriving at the desired end: that mode

has been rejected by Mehemet Ali, and the consequences attached by the Convention to the rejection of it have been incurred by Mehemet Ali. Would it not be a wrong interpretation of the Convention to say that it contains in itself a provision to prevent the execution of that which it prescribes should be done? and is it reasonable to believe that a Convention, framed expressly for the support of the legal and known authority of the Sultan, should also contain a provision to take from the Sultan the exercise of one of the most important attributes of sovereign authority, that is, to deprive him of the power of deposing a rebel Governor, and of placing a loyal subject in possession of the legal power attached to such post?

No. 176.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 2.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September* 10, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of the translation of the Firman appointing Emir Bechir El-Kasim, Prince of the Druses, in case his uncle, the present Emir Bechir, should refuse to return to his allegiance to the Sultan.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 176.

Firman appointing Emir Bechir El-Kasim Prince of the Druses.

(Traduit de l'Arabe.)

NOUS adressons ce Commandement Impérial qui doit avoir son effet dans tous les pays lointains ou prochains, à un parent de l'Emir Béchir, à celui que nous nommons à présent Prince de la Montagne des Druses; c'est-à-dire, au très-illustre et très-glorieux Emir Béchir El-Kasim, puisse sa gloire se perpétuer! ainsi qu'aux Cheikhs des tribus des Druses les plus distinguées parmi les notables du pays, puisse leur obéissance augmenter! et nous ordonnons que dès qu'il sera reçu, l'on sache ce qui suit:

Il était du devoir de l'Emir Béchir, d'après les ordres qu'il avait reçus, de se montrer toujours sujet fidèle, soumis à notre Majesté Impériale son Auguste Bienfaiteur et Maître; d'obéir à nos ordres; de s'efforcer de faire ce qui est conforme à nos désirs; de s'empresser de protéger les habitans et les tribus que nous lui avions confiées; d'employer tous ses moyens et toute sa sagesse pour les protéger et les garantir de toute vexation; tels étaient ses devoirs comme sujet.

Il nous est pourtant parvenu que l'Emir Béchir a manqué à toutes ces conditions essentielles, et qu'il persiste à se conformer aux désirs de Méhémet Ali et à ceux de ses employés; à agir d'après leurs conseils et leurs instructions; et à tenir une conduite qui n'est pas telle que nous l'attendions de sa part.

Vous, Prince, agissant avec cette fidélité et cet excellent jugement qui vous caractérisent, vous avez montré votre dévouement envers notre Personne Impériale, dévouement qui mérite une récompense; vous avez prouvé votre obeissance, et vous savez ce que vous nous devez comme notre sujet. Aussi notre Sublime Porte est-elle sûre que si vous étiez nommé Prince des Druses, vous donneriez de nouvelles preuves de soumission à nos ordres, et un nouvel essor à la fidélité, à la loyauté et au zèle qui sont innés en vous. C'est pourquoi nous avons ordonné la destitution d'Emir Béchir, et vous avons nommé et nommons Prince des tribus Druses; et le présent Commandement Impérial est conséquemment émané de notre Chancellerie Impériale.

Aussitôt donc que vous aurez reçu ce noble diplôme, vous le porterez, en le publiant, à la connaissance de tous ceux qu'il faut; et puis, vous remplirez les devoirs de votre poste en agissant avec votre fidélité accoutumée, et en gérant les affaires qui sont de votre ressort avec sagesse et équité, et d'une manière conforme aux vœux et aux intérêts de notre Majesté Impériale.

Parmi vos autres devoirs, vous avez à protéger la population et les tribus Druses sur lesquelles notre sollicitude souveraine veille sans cesse; à les mettre sur leurs gardes contre toute opposition à l'exercice de nos droits légitimes sur la Nation et l'Empire, et contre tout ce qui serait incompatible avec les devoirs de la soumission et du dévouement qu'elles doivent à la Sublime Porte; et à les empêcher de devenir les partisans de Méhémet Ali et des siens. Enfin, il faut que vous mettiez tous vos soins et que vous travaillez jour et nuit à faire ce que notre Sublime Porte attend de votre sagacité et de votre fidélité, et à mériter la continuation de la faveur qui vient de vous être conférée.

Et vous Cheikhs des Druses! lorsque vous saurez que nous avons nommé l'Emir Béchir El-Kasim, Prince des Druses, il faudra, ainsi que votre devoir l'exige, que vous vous unissiez à lui de cœur et d'âme pour exécuter nos volontés, et que vous vous conformiez au présent firman en maintenant nos droits légitimes.

Qu'on ne voie parmi vous aucun procédé contraire a notre volonté souveraine, ni attentatoire à notre autorité dans nos Etats héréditaires.

Donné le seizième jour du mois de Réjeb, l'an mil deux cent cinquante-six. (2 Septembre, 1840.)

(Translation.)

Firman appointing Emir Bechir El-Kasim Prince of the Druses.

WE address this Imperial command, which must take effect in all countries far and near, to a relation of the Emir Bechir, to him whom we now appoint Prince of the Mountain of the Druses; that is to say, to the most illustrious and most glorious Emir Bechir El-Kasim, may his glory be perpetual! as well as to the Sheiks of the tribes of the Druses, the most distinguished among the chief men of the country, may their obedience increase! and we command that, as soon as it shall be received, the following shall be made known:—

It was the duty of the Emir Bechir, according to the orders which he had received, to show himself always a faithful subject, submissive to our Imperial Majesty his august benefactor and master; to obey our commands; to endeavour to do that which was in conformity with our desires; to show a readiness to protect the inhabitants and the tribes which we had committed to his charge; to use all his means and all his wisdom to protect them, and to secure them from all oppression; these were his duties as a subject.

It has, however, come to our knowledge that the Emir Bechir has failed in all these essential points, and that he persists in complying with the desires of Mehemet Ali and with those of his agents; in acting according to their advice and instructions; and in pursuing a line of conduct which is not such as we expected on his part.

You, Prince, acting with that fidelity and that excellent judgment which characterise you, have shown your devotion to our Imperial person, devotion which deserves a reward; you have evinced your obedience, and you know what your duty to us as our subject is. Therefore our Sublime Porte is sure that, if you were appointed Prince of the Druses, you would give fresh proofs of your submission to our commands, and a fresh impulse to the fidelity, loyalty, and zeal, which are innate in you. It is on this account that we have decreed the deposition of the Emir Bechir, and that we have appointed and do appoint you Prince of the tribes of the Druses: and this Imperial command has consequently been issued from our Imperial chancery.

As soon, then, as you have received this noble commission, you will

make it known, by publishing it to allwhom it may concern; and after that, you will discharge the duties of your post by acting with your accustomed fidelity, and by managing the affairs which are under your controul with wisdom and equity, and in accordance with the wishes and interests of our Imperial Majesty.

Amongst your other duties, you have to protect the population and the tribes of the Druses, over which our sovereign solicitude watches unceasingly; to put them on their guard against any opposition to the exercise of our legitimate rights over the nation and the empire, and against everything which would be incompatible with the duty of submission and devotion which they owe to the Sublime Porte; and to prevent them from becoming the partisans of Mehemet Ali and his family. Finally, you must use all your endeavours, and labour night and day, to do that which our Sublime Porte expects from your penetration and fidelity, and to deserve a continuance of the favour which has now been conferred upon you.

And you, Sheiks of the Druses! when you know that we have appointed the Emir Bechir El-Kasim, Prince of the Druses, you must, as your duty requires of you, join with him heart and soul in carrying out our wishes, and comply with this firman by maintaining our legitimate rights.

Commit no act contrary to our Sovereign will, or against our authority in our hereditary States.

Given the sixteenth day of the month of Rejeb, in the year one thousand two hundred and fifty-six. (September 2, 1840.)

No. 177.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 2.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September* 12, 1840.

MR. ALISON was released yesterday from quarantine, and immediately resumed his duty at this embassy.

He reported to me two facts which I desired him to put in writing, and have the honour to inclose. The first shows that Mehemet Ali is fully aware of his own inability to resist, and that he regrets his rejection of the terms offered him by the Sultan; and at the same time it accounts for that act by exhibiting a trait of the habitual system by which he has hitherto prospered.

The second is the record of facts calculated to render justice to the feelings of some people who had previously been supposed to sacrifice the national interest to private gain.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 177.

Mr. Alison to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) *Therapia, September* 12, 1840.

CONFORMABLY to your Lordship's desire, I beg to transcribe notes of the opinions expressed to me by several persons at Alexandria.

One of the wealthiest and most esteemed persons in Alexandria, said to me, "Although I have enjoyed the protection of the Pasha for upwards of twenty-five years, I would rather witness his downfall than that the European Powers should in any way back out of this question after the decisive tone they have assumed in it. Europeans would lose all consideration in the East, and their name would be for ever connected in it with the shameful defeat of their policy by a Pasha."

The same feeling was expressed by several English merchants.

I one day asked Rifat Bey during the second term of the Convention, what he thought of the state of the affair? "My first impression," replied he, "is, that the Pasha would gladly fall back upon his position during the first term, so as to enable him to secure Egypt and Acre on the conditions of the Convention. What confirms me the more in this opinion," continued he, "is the unblushing effrontery with which Sami Bey accused me of having assumed a tone calculated to delude the Pasha into the forfeiture of Acre. My reply to this unjust imputation affords the only instance in which I ever exceeded the bounds of calmness during the proceedings. I can only ascribe Sami Bey's ungenerous message to their vexation at having been their own dupes, for they have ever obstinately persisted in the belief that I was secretly empowered to make some concession in the event of the Pasha's continuing to resist firmly to the last.

"My second impression is, that the Pasha and the people about him would consent to make great sacrifices rather than that hostilites should commence."

No. 178.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 2.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, September* 14, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inclose notes in original and in translation, which I this day received from the Sublime Porte.

The Representatives of the Four Powers have unanimously supported the Porte in these measures, being convinced, after the most mature consideration of the state of affairs, that there was no other line to take that would not have left the greatest possible advantages in the hands of Mehemet Ali, and allowed scope for the operation of the French policy. We also were satisfied that half measures would induce those to adhere to Mehemet Ali, who would probably abandon him when they should see that the Porte was in earnest, and was really supported by the Four Great Powers, and that France could not produce any effect upon them by her attempts to intimidate.

It is intended to send the notification of Mehemet Ali's deposition, and of the blockade, in a steamer, to the officer commanding the British ships of war before Alexandria, and to request him to send them to the Pasha under a flag of truce, or in such other way as he may think proper. I will write to him to that effect, and the steamer will be sent off on the 16th or 17th instant.

I will acquaint the Admiral with these measures.

The period fixed for the commencement of the blockade, namely, that when the ships of war shall be stationed before the Ports, was determined, after consultation with those who are supposed to be best fitted to give advice.

The declaration made by the Porte has been purposely couched in such words as to avoid giving occasion for questioning its legal form.

I was doubtful on the subject of the recall of the Consuls, lest it should be an inconvenience or hurt to the merchants; but the consideration of other points weighed strongly with my Colleagues in favour of the recall, and I could not refuse to consent to the formal demand made by the Porte. I am of opinion that my Colleagues are right in the views they take of the political face of this matter. It was thought right to direct the Consuls to come to Constantinople.

I shall send by the steamer instructions to Colonel Hodges, which will be drawn up in concert with my Colleagues, who will send similar to their Consuls.

It has been considered necessary to include Syria in the Sultan's declaration of blockade, because it might not be possible, without that authority, to prevent even British ships from carrying supplies to the Egyptians. It might perhaps be difficult to blockade the whole extent

proposed with perfect efficacy. But it is supposed the important ports can be effectually blockaded by the means in the Admiral's hands, and that it will not much matter if minor points be disregarded.

Inclosure 1 in No. 178.

Note from the Sublime Porte to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Traduction.)

MEHEMET ALI n'ayant pas accepté les propositions pacifiques qui lui ont été faites dans les deux termes fixés par la Convention, il est devenu nécessaire de le destituer du gouvernement d'Egypte, et conformément à cette même Convention d'employer des mesures coërcitives. Il a été établi également, toujours d'après le sens de la Convention, que les Quatre Cours co-opéreraient aux dites mesures, à l'exécution desquelles on va procéder.

Comme il n'est pas convenable que pendant la guerre, les Consuls des Quatre Cours à Alexandrie restent à leurs postes, nous pensons que les circonstances exigent qu'ils soient rappelés. En priant qu'on veuille bien prendre à ce sujet les dispositions nécessaires, nous adressons la présente Note Officielle à votre Excellence ainsi que nous le faisons envers les Missions d'Autriche, de Prusse, et de Russie.

Nous offrons à votre Excellence l'expression, etc.

18 *Réjeb*, 1256.—14 *Septembre*, 1840.

(Translation.)

Note from the Sublime Porte to Viscount Ponsonby.

MEHEMET ALI not having accepted the pacific proposals which have been made to him, within the two periods fixed by the Convention, it has become necessary to deprive him of the Government of Egypt, and to employ measures of coercion in conformity with that same Convention. It has equally been settled, always in accordance with the meaning of the Convention, that the Four Courts should co-operate in the said measures, which are about to be carried into execution.

As it is not fitting that the Consuls of the Four Powers at Alexandria should remain at their posts during the war, we think that circumstances demand their recall. In requesting that the necessary steps may be taken in this matter, we address the present Official Note to your Excellency, as we do in like manner to the Missions of Austria, Prussia, and Russia.

We offer to your Excellence the expression, &c.

Rejeb 18, 1256.—*September* 14, 1840.

Inclosure 2 in No. 178.

Note from the Sublime Porte to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Traduction.)

MEHEMET ALI n'ayant pas accepté les conditions qui lui ont été offertes d'après l'Acte Séparé du Traité d'Alliance conclu à Londres, Sa Hautesse a résolu d'employer des mesures coërcitives pour la défense de ses droits incontestables. Elle a daigné ordonner que Méhémet Ali Pacha soit destitué de son poste de Gouverneur d'Egypte, et, comme préliminaire des hostilités, il a été décidé de soumettre tous les ports et échelles d'Egypte et de la Syrie à un blocus très-rigoureux. Par conséquent, nous prions votre Excellence de vouloir bien s'entendre avec son Excel-

lence M. l'Internonce, pour que les Amiraux d'Angleterre et d'Autriche dans la Mer Blanche reçoivent l'ordre de prêter une assistance efficace aux vaisseaux Ottomans chargés d'effectuer le dit blocus. Dans ce but nous avons remis une Note Officielle à son Excellence M. l'Internonce, et nous remettons la présente, qui est identique avec celle-là, à votre Excellence, en lui renouvelant l'assurance de notre considération.

18 *Réjeb*, 1256.—14 *Septembre*, 1840.

(Translation.)

Note from the Sublime Porte to Viscount Ponsonby.

MEHEMET ALI not having accepted the conditions which have been offered to him according to the Separate Act of the Treaty of Alliance concluded at London, His Highness has resolved to employ coercive measures for the defence of his incontestable rights. He has been pleased to order that Mehemet Ali Pasha should be deprived of his post of Governor of Egypt, and as a preliminary to hostilities, it has been decided to subject all the ports and harbours of Egypt and Syria to a very strict blockade. We consequently request your Excellency to have the goodness to come to an understanding with his Excellency the Internuncio, in order that the English and Austrian Admirals in the Archipelago may be ordered to afford effectual aid to the Ottoman vessels charged with carrying into effect the said blockade. With this object we have transmitted an Official Note to his Excellency the Internuncio, and we deliver the present Note, which is identical with it, to your Excellency, renewing to you the assurance of our consideration.

Rejeb 18, 1256.—*September* 14, 1840.

No. 179.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 2.)

(Extract.) *Vienna, September* 25, 1840.

I INCLOSE an extract from Count Königsmarck's Report, by which your Lordship will see that the Porte has left a door open for the renomination of Mehemet Ali to the Pashalic of Egypt.

Inclosure in No. 179.

Count Königsmarck to his Government.

(Extract.)

1. QU'EN réponse à la dernière lettre de Méhémet Ali (jointe en traduction au postscriptum de mon très-humble rapport No. 57), le Grand Vizir lui annoncerait sa déposition comme Gouverneur d'Egypte.

2. Que cette déposition sera portée à la connaissance du public de la manière dont il est d'usage d'annoncer la destitution de tout autre Pacha; qu'on ne nommera pas un nouveau Gouverneur d'Egypte afin d'avoir plus de facilité pour la réintégration de Méhémet Ali si l'avenir le demandait; que Izzet Méhémet Pacha (mentionné dans mon très-humble Rapport No. 57) recevra le titre de Séraskier de Syrie et sera chargé de pourvoir provisoirement à l'administration de l'Egypte.

(Translation.)

Count Königsmarck to his Government.

1. THAT in answer to the last letter from Mehemet Ali, (of which a Translation was annexed to my most humble report No. 57,) the Grand Vizier should announce to him his deposition as Governor of Egypt.

2. That this deposition shall be made known to the public in the manner in which it is usual to announce the deposition of any other Pasha; that a new Governor of Egypt shall not be named, in order that there may be greater facility for restoring Mehemet Ali, if future circumstances should require it; that Izzet Pasha (mentioned in my most humble Report No. 57,) shall receive the title of Seraskier of Syria, and shall be directed to carry on provisionally the Government of Egypt.

No. 180.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 2, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government have received accounts from Constantinople, stating, that it was the intention of the Sultan to publish an Edict depriving Mehemet Ali of the government of Egypt, in consequence of his having refused the second as well as the first offer made to him. But Her Majesty's Government look upon this measure as a means of coercion employed by the Sultan, in order to obtain the acquiescence of Mehemet Ali in the terms proposed to him; and it does not appear to Her Majesty's Government that this Edict prejudges the arrangement which the Sultan might be disposed to make in Mehemet Ali's favour, if the Pasha should at an early moment withdraw his refusal, and accept the conditions of the Treaty.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 181.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 4.)

My Lord, *Paris, October* 2, 1840.

I WENT this morning at an early hour to Auteuil. I found the Cabinet Council already assembled, and I had an interview with M. Thiers of only a few minutes.

I regretted, I said, to have disturbed him during the sitting of the Council, as I had no communication of any importance to make to him, the object of my visit being to inquire whether any more detailed account from Beyrout and from Alexandria, than that which appeared in the "Moniteur" of this morning, had reached his hands? M. Thiers answered, that he had no other account than the telegraphic despatch. He spoke of the event announced in the despatch as of very grave importance, but said, that in his ministerial capacity, he was not authorised or prepared to say anything to me upon the subject.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 182.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 5, 1840.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 28th ultimo, containing the substance of a conversation which your Excellency held with M. Désages, the Directeur des Affaires Etrangeres, respecting the report that Count Walewski and M. Cochelet had obtained from Mehemet Ali the retractation of his consent to the conditions of peace proposed by Rifat Bey; and I have to make to your Excellency the following observations upon certain points in M. Désages' statements, upon which that gentleman appears to be imperfectly or incorrectly informed.

With respect to the allusion made by M. Désages to "the Treaty of Kutaya," I have to state, that there was no such thing as a Treaty concluded or signed at Kutaya. The manner in which the differences between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali were on that occasion settled, was, that the Porte published a firman on the 15th of April, 1833, by which Mehemet Ali, and his son Ibrahim, were reinstated in all the Governments which they had before possessed, with the addition of those of Syria and of the towns of Aleppo and Damascus; and, subsequently, another firman was published, conferring upon Ibrahim Pasha the Government of Adana.

With respect, moreover, to the merit which the French Agents take to themselves, for having, as M. Désages represents, prevailed upon Mehemet Ali to agree to give up Candia, your Excellency will see, by former communications from Colonel Campbell, Colonel Hodges, and Lord Ponsonby, that Mehemet Ali has for a long time past professed his willingness to evacuate that island, no doubt because he has been conscious that while the Allies have the command of the sea, he has no power to retain it.

Copies of the communications above referred to, were transmitted to your Excellency in my despatches of the 22nd of November, 1839, of the 18th of February, 1840, and of the 4th of August last; but, for more convenient reference, I transmit to your Excellency, as marked in the margin*, extracts from the communications in question.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 183.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 5, 1840.

M. GUIZOT called upon me yesterday, and read to me a despatch from M. de Pontois, from Constantinople, of the 15th of September, and the French papers containing the telegraphic report of accounts from Beyrout of the 11th of September, through Alexandria, and of the 20th, through Malta.

Before he began to read these papers, he said, that he was not come to make to me any communication from his Government, nor to ask me on their behalf for any explanations, but that he simply wished to let me know the accounts which had reached Paris, and to make thereupon some observations of his own.

M. de Pontois stated in his despatch, among other things, that Mehemet Ali had been removed from his office, and Izzet Pasha had been appointed Pasha of Egypt in his stead; that the Sultan had declared a

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* See Part I, Inclosure 4 in No. 376; No. 487. Part II, No. 38.

blockade of the coasts of Egypt and Syria; that Baron Lieven had arrived at Constantinople, for the purpose of tracing out an encampment at Nicomedia for a Russian Army; and that Rechid Pasha had told M. de Pontois, that in a short time there would be assembled an army of 60,000 Turks in the neighbourhood of Constantinople.

I informed M. Guizot, that some of these statements were erroneous; that Mehemet Ali had indeed been removed from his post of Governor of Egypt, but that no successor had been appointed in his room; and that the post had been intentionally left vacant, in order to keep a door open for an arrangement with Mehemet Ali, if he should retract his refusals, and submit to the terms of the Treaty; that consequently Izzet Pasha, who has been appointed Governor of the Pashalic of Acre, has been ordered to take charge provisionally of the temporary administration of Egypt. But I said, that as for the present, Izzet Pasha would be able to go neither to Acre nor to Egypt the whole of this arrangement seemed to me to be a declaration of right, and a means of moral coercion against Mehemet Ali, rather than a real or practical measure. I assured M. Guizot that M. de Pontois was quite mistaken as to the object of Baron Lieven's mission; that the Baron, no doubt, was sent to Constantinople to make the proper arrangements for the timely arrival of a Russian force in the Bosphorus, if the advance of Ibrahim should require the Allies to give effect to the stipulations of the Third Article of the Treaty of July; but that it is a Turkish and not a Russian force that is, or is to be, encamped at Nicomedia; that the presence of 60,000 Turks at Constantinople would probably render the aid of a foreign land force unnecessary, in any case, for the defence of Constantinople; and that what has been going on in Syria, seems to place entirely out of the question an advance of Ibrahim to the north.

M. Guizot then came to the news from Syria, the bombardment of Beyrout, and the landing of the Turkish, British, and Austrian troops. He said, that nothing of this kind was mentioned in the Treaty, (a copy of which he had brought with him,) and that the French Government little expected, that at the very moment when Mehemet Ali had shown such a disposition to concede and negotiate, measures of such severity should so suddenly and abruptly be taken; that this had produced a great and painful sensation at Paris; that the French Cabinet had met once to consider what, under the circumstances, it would be proper for them to do; but that no decision having been come to, they were to meet again; that this was a very serious matter, and he could not say what it might lead to.

I said, in reply, that certainly there was no mention in the Treaty of any specific measures, except the cutting off of the communication by sea between Egypt and Syria; but that by the Treaty the Four Powers undertook to re-establish the Sultan's authority in Syria, and of course, therefore, they are justified in employing whatever means may be necessary to accomplish that purpose; that Mehemet Ali, instead of accepting the conditions offered him, had endeavoured to negotiate, but that the Treaty does not contemplate negotiations with Mehemet Ali, but submission on his part; and it contains distinct and specific warning of the several degrees of penalty which he would incur, by refusing the several gradations of terms to be offered to him; that the Treaty declared, that if he refused the second, as well as the first, offer, the Sultan would be free to withdraw his promise of the hereditary government of Egypt, "and would be at liberty to follow such course as his own interests and the counsels of his Allies might suggest." I said, that in spite of this warning, Mehemet had refused the second offer, and the Sultan had exercised his undoubted right as a Sovereign, to dispossess Mehemet Ali of his Government, being moved thereunto by his own view of his own interest, and by the advice of the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople; that the principal reason which had led the Porte and the Four Representatives to think this measure expedient was, that it would deprive Mehemet Ali of all legal authority over those who are under him, and would thus prevent him from using against the Sultan an authority delegated to him by the Sultan.

I said, that as to the operations at Beyrout, the British Government had received no accounts from Syria of so late a date as the period when these things were said to have happened, but that I was very glad indeed to hear such good news, and thought that these events would relieve all parties, except Mehemet Ali, from their embarrassments. I reminded M. Guizot, that he had repeatedly said to me, when talking of the undertaking in which we have engaged in the Levant, that if we did the thing quickly all would be well; but that if the matter lingered, and was not soon brought to a successful termination, new and unforeseen questions might arise, and serious difficulties might be created, productive of embarrassment between France and the Four Powers. I said, that we had therefore only followed the advice of the French Government, in endeavouring to do the thing quickly; but that difficult things cannot be done quickly, without vigorous actions.

I remarked, moreover, that the operations which seemed to have taken place, were not of such a nature as to excite the slightest jealousy or alarm on the part of France; that there had been no prolonged occupation of Turkish territory by a large body of European troops; though I begged to be understood as by no means saying, that in case of need such a measure might not be resorted to; that the landing had been effected chiefly by Turkish troops, in the name, and under the flag, of the Sultan; and that if, as was stated, a few hundred British and Austrian marines had landed also, they came there as a subsidiary and auxiliary force, in the same manner in which the British marines had been employed at Bilbao and at St. Sebastian.

M. Guizot did not dwell further on this point, but said, that we should now see whether the Syrians are really as adverse as they have been represented to be to the rule of Mehemet Ali; because if these accounts were true, which he had no doubt they were, nothing now remained to prevent the Syrians from joining the Sultan's standard. I said, that the result would soon clear up this matter.

I then said, that I hoped he would urge his Government to take no precipitate step upon this matter; that there is nothing in these events which ought not to have been foreseen; which the Treaty does not justify; or which the French Government has any right to complain of; and M. Guizot promised me that he would write as I had suggested.

I think it proper to lose no time in informing your Excellency of the substance of this conversation, in order that you may hold similar language to M. Thiers; and that you may earnestly dissuade him from any hasty step, which you may have reason to think the French Government inclined to take.

I send your Excellency a copy of an evening newspaper which contains the latest and most detailed accounts which have been received from the Levant. You will see from those accounts, that the success of the Allies had been complete, as far as their operations had proceeded; and what is of great importance, that the Syrians were joining the Sultan's standard by thousands, and that desertion had already begun among the troops of Mehemet Ali. These operations, in fact, seem to be decisive as to the probable issue of the contest; and, at all events, they prove the futility of Mehemet Ali's demand to be allowed to retain the government of the whole of Syria for his life.

Sir Robert Stopford will have been joined by the "Cambridge," the "Rodney," and "Vanguard," soon after the date of these accounts; and those ships carried out a reinforcement of Marines, and a fresh supply of military stores.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 184.

Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 5.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, September* 26, 1840.

WITH reference to my despatch of September 18, in which I reported that Count Nesselrode expected to receive a communication from the French Ambassador on the Turkish Question, I have the honour to inform your Lordship, that M. de Barante told me, a few days ago, that he was instructed, in the event of Count Nesselrode touching upon the subject, to speak of the conciliatory language of M. Walewski at Alexandria, and of the disposition of the French Government to arrive at some satisfactory arrangement with Mehemet Ali. M. de Barante gave me the impression that he was charged with a sort of offer of French mediation; and I told the Vice-Chancellor the opinion I entertained.

Whatever may have been M. de Barante's instructions, they have failed. The French Ambassador has called on Count Nesselrode, and spoken on M. Walewski's mission; and Count Nesselrode assured me, yesterday, that their conversation was without result; and that had any proposal been made, he should have referred the French Ambassador to London, as the seat of the Conference.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) J. A. D. BLOOMFIELD.

No. 185.

Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 5.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, September* 26, 1840.

COUNT NESSELRODE has received despatches from Constantinople of the 13th, and from Alexandria of the 5th instant, which he has sent me to read at the moment of despatching the messenger. His Excellency forwards copies of them to Baron Brunnow, by this opportunity, for your Lordship's perusal.

No. 186.

Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

My Lords, *Foreign Office, October* 6, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordships that it appears by a despatch, dated the 14th of September, from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, that the Sublime Porte has notified to all the Foreign Missions at Constantinople, that the Porte has established a blockade of the Echelles of Egypt and Syria. The Turkish Government have also requested that Her Majesty's squadron may be directed to co-operate with that of the Sultan in enforcing this blockade.

With reference to the above-mentioned communication from the Porte, I have to request your Lordships to remind Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, without loss of time, that British ships of war cannot enforce the commercial blockade of the ports of Egypt and Syria, nor interfere with, nor turn back merchant vessels of any country, except those of Turkey and Egypt, which may wish to enter or depart from Turkish or Egyptian ports. The British squadron will, however, of course, continue to cut off the military communication between Egypt and Syria, and to prevent the Egyptian ships of war from coming out of the harbour of Alexandria.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 187.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 6, 1840.

HER Majesty's Government have been informed, that some time in the early part of September, Prince Metternich conveyed, through an intermediate channel, to the French Government, the opinions contained in the paper which I herewith inclose to your Excellency, but Her Majesty's Government have not learnt what the French Government did thereupon. I have, therefore, to instruct your Excellency to take an opportunity of casually adverting in conversation with M. Thiers, to the opinions so expressed by Prince Metternich, and of asking him whether he has done anything in consequence thereof?

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

Inclosure in No. 187.

Substance of a Communication stated to have been made by Prince Metternich to the French Government.

SI j'étais le Ministre Français voici la position que je choisirais:

Après les éclaircissemens qui m'auraient été donnés, et après avoir pris connaissance du texte de la Convention du 15 Juillet, je déclarerais:

1°. Que la France proclame aujourd'hui comme elle n'a cessé de le faire jusqu'ici, son adhésion au principe qui sert de base à la Convention.

2°. Que la France ne saurait en faire autant en ce qui concerne les mesures coërcitives dont l'exécution a commencé; non que la France ait l'intention de séparer les moyens du but, mais parcequ'elle ne saurait voir dans les moyens adoptés ceux qui peuvent conduire au but avec sûreté.

3°. Qu'en conséquence, la France ne saurait s'associer à l'emploi des mesures coërcitives, mais qu'elle restera fidèle au principe de soutenir l'Empire Ottoman et le trône du Sultan.

4°. Que dans le cas où l'évènement constaterait l'inefficacité des moyens coërcitifs, et où par conséquent il résulterait de leur emploi des dangers pour la Porte Ottomane, la France se déclarera prête à prendre en considération, avec la Porte et les autres Puissances, les moyens les plus propres de secourir l'Empire Ottoman, et à mettre les moyens à exécution selon les circonstances du moment.

(Translation.)

Substance of a Communication stated to have been made by Prince Metternich to the French Government.

IF I was the French Minister, this is the position which I should choose:

After the explanations which had been given to me, and after having taken cognizance of the text of the Convention of the 15th of July, I would declare:

1st. That France announces now, as she hitherto has not ceased to announce, her adhesion to the principle which serves as a basis to the Convention.

2ndly. That France is unable to do as much with regard to the measures of coercion, the execution of which has commenced; not that France intends to separate the means from the end, but because she

cannot see in the means adopted those which can attain the object with safety.

3rdly. That, consequently, France cannot take a part in the employment of coercive measures, but that she will remain faithful to the principle of supporting the Ottoman Empire and the Sultan's throne.

4thly. That in the case of events proving the inefficacy of the measures of coercion, and that, consequently, dangers might result to the Ottoman Porte from their employment, France will declare herself ready to take into consideration, together with the Porte and the other Powers, the most fitting means for assisting the Ottoman Empire, and to carry those means into execution according to the circumstances of the moment.

No. 188.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 6.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, September* 2, 1840.

I WAITED on Mehemet Ali on the 29th, at 4 o'clock P.M., and told him that I had just returned from seeing Admiral Stopford, who intended coming to Alexandria on Monday forenoon, and that he would be glad to wait upon His Highness. I therefore requested to be informed when it would be his convenience that I should present his Excellency.

The Pasha replied, "That he had sent Omer Bey that morning to inquire after the Admiral's health, and that Sir Robert Stopford had told Omer Bey that he had already arranged with me for his landing on the 31st of August, and that he had expressed to me his wish to pay his respects to the Viceroy."

Mehemet Ali added, "I shall be very happy to see the Admiral at this hour on Monday next (4 o'clock P.M.)"

The Pasha then alluded by implication to his own position; but as I replied directly to his observations, he said, "You may possibly take Syria from me, but you, as a soldier, must know that Egypt is safe, and that you can never tear it away. You can do nothing this year, and I promise you that we shall have a war in March that will fully occupy the Powers of Europe. However, it is useless for you and I to talk more on such subjects; and let me beg of you to tell your Colleagues, when they again call on me, to state simply the objects of the visit, and to be satisfied with the answer I give, for I am determined to abstain from discussion with any of you." I then took my leave.

On the appointed day, Admiral Sir Robert Stopford and Admiral Baron Bandeira, together with the principal officers of the allied squadrons, paid a visit of ceremony to Mehemet Ali, by whom they were received with perfect courtesy. Towards the conclusion of the interview, Admiral Stopford expressed some wish to see the Pasha again, in order to converse with him on questions of public interest. The Pasha explained to me his desire to be excused from what must be an unpleasant and useless debate. At the same time he invited the two Admirals along with the Austrian Consul-General and myself to dine with him next day; but a painful indisposition of His Highness has prevented the intended entertainment.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 189.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 6.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, September 4, 1840.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that a few days since, Count Medem, Russian Consul-General, had an interview with Mehemet Ali, in order to communicate to him a despatch of Count Nesselrode, announcing that the Convention of the 15th of July had been ratified, and tendering to the Pasha the advice to submit in time.

The Pasha said, "The counsel given by your Court is the same which you and your Colleagues have already given. I do not doubt that war is resolved against me; Mehemet Ali has become a wicked man in the eyes of your Courts; you reproach me with many things."

Count Medem observed to the Pasha, that he abstained now from discussing the question, because I had told him the day before that the Pasha declined all such argument.

The Pasha pursued, "The conditions imposed are dishonourable to me, and I will never submit. After eight years of labour in Syria I will not yield to such humiliation." Count Medem answered, that the proposed conditions could not have the effect the Pasha supposed: that the Allied Courts had come to a decision compatible at once with the tranquillity of the East, the dignity of the Sultan, and the Pasha's honour; that the Convention besides affords a perfect guarantee for the future security of His Highness and his family in the possessions accorded to them.

Mehemet Ali rejoined "Very well; but it is quite useless to discuss such subjects. The other day I made overtures for an arrangement, you at first accepted, then refused them."

Count Medem then said, that the Consuls-General could never have accepted the Pasha's proposal, since no authority to do anything of that nature existed with them, but that they had given the recommendation to manifest his return to submission by sending back the Sultan's fleet and evacuating Syria.

The Pasha ended the conversation by these words, "Let us say no more of the matter. I will never send back the fleet until the affairs now pending are settled."

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 190.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 6.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, September 6, 1840.*

YESTERDAY morning his Excellency Rifat Bey, together with the Consuls-General of the Four Powers parties to the Convention of the 15th of July, waited on Mehemet Ali in order to receive his final reply to the demands of the Sublime Porte. The Pasha being confined to his room by a painful indisposition, gave his official answer through the medium of his Minister, Sami Bey.

The details of our interview are contained in the Minute I have the honour to inclose, and of which the original was yesterday forwarded to his Excellency Viscount Ponsonby, at Constantinople. The hasty departure of his Excellency Rifat Bey, and the consequent want of his signature, prevent my forwarding to your Lordship a duplicate instead of a copy.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

Inclosure in No. 190.

Minute of the interview which took place on the 5th September, between Sami Bey and Rifat Bey, accompanied by the Consuls-General of the Four Powers.

ARRIVÉS au Palais du Vice-Roi, nous trouvâmes dans la salle d'audience Sami Bey, Secrétaire Intime de son Altesse, et son Excellence Boghos Bey, qui nous annoncèrent que le Pacha était retenu dans ses appartemens intérieurs par suite d'une grave indisposition et de la prescription de ses médecins. Sur la demande de son Excellence Rifat Bey, si Sami Bey était autorisé à nous donner la réponse officielle pour laquelle nous étions réunis, ce dernier répondit qu'il était spécialement chargé par Son Altesse de nous communiquer en son nom sa résolution finale. Après avoir reconnu de concert avec les Quatre Consuls le mandat de Sami Bey, son Excellence Rifat Bey répondit, "Nous sommes venus à l'expiration du terme de vingt jours, pour demander quelle est la décision que Son Altesse a prise à l'égard des stipulations de la seconde alternative de la Convention."

Sami Bey répliqua, "Eu égard aux décisions des Quatre Grandes Puissances et aux ordres de son bienfaiteur le Sultan, le Pacha avait accepté, avant l'expiration du second terme, l'hérédité de l'Egypte, et aujourd'hui je vous confirme officiellement cette résolution. Quant à la Syrie, sa non-acceptation n'étant pas un refus, son Altesse désire, vu ses nombreux services rendus à l'Empire Ottoman, soumettre à ce sujet une demande, tant à son Souverain légitime qu'aux Quatre Grandes Puissances, et se flatte que son Excellence Rifat Bey ainsi que MM. les Consuls des Quatre Puissances voudront bien la communiquer à leurs Cours respectives."

Rifat Bey reprit, "Vous savez déjà que nous ne pouvons être guidés que par la lettre du Traité, et que nous ne sommes pas autorisés à accueillir une acceptation conditionelle, et qui ne serait pas accompagnée de la remise de la flotte Ottomane entre les mains d'Ibrahim Bey, et des ordres pour l'évacuation de la Syrie et des autres provinces rentrées sous la domination immédiate de la Porte. Nous devons regarder une pareille acceptation comme un refus." "Mais," ajoutèrent les Consuls, "si son Altesse voulait accompagner ses propositions du renvoi de l'Escadre et de l'expédition des ordres susmentionnés, nous nous empresserions de les appuyer auprès de nos Cours respectives." "Cependant," reprit Sami Bey, "son Altesse regarde ses propositions comme une acceptation."

"Quant à nous, nous ne pouvons, d'après la lettre de la Convention, l'envisager que comme un refus formel, et par conséquent la Sublime Porte se réserve de prendre, de concert avec ses Alliés, telle résolution ultérieure à l'égard de l'Egypte que ses intérêts lui dicteront."

Sami Bey ayant alors remis à son Excellence Rifat Bey, la lettre contenant la réponse et les propositions du Vice-Roi, et l'objet principal de la visite étant terminé, les Consuls-Généraux demandèrent à Sami Bey, si le Vice-Roi laissait subsister l'invitation qu'il leur avait faite de quitter Alexandrie? "Son Altesse considérant ses propositions comme une acceptation," reprit Sami Bey, "et non comme un refus, elle ne croyait plus se trouver dans un état d'hostilité avec les Quatre Puissances, et elle ne voit par conséquent aucun inconvénient à ce que les Consuls restassent ici."

"Mais quant à nous, nous regardons votre proposition comme une non-acceptation, et nous vous demandons si, malgré cela, Son Altesse nous garantit l'inviolabilité de nos personnes et de nos pavillons et la sécurité pour nos nationaux?"

"Cela s'entend," répondit Sami Bey, "il ne peut y avoir aucun doute là-dessus."

(Signé) RIFAT.
G. LLOYD HODGES.
A. LAURIN.
E. WAGNER.
A. MEDEM.

Alexandrie, ce 5 Septembre, 1840.

(Translation.)

Minute of the interview which took place on the 5th September, between Sami Bey and Rifat Bey, accompanied by the Consuls-General of the Four Powers.

UPON arriving at the palace of the Viceroy we found in the hall of audience Sami Bey, Private Secretary of His Highness, and his Excellency Boghos Bey, who informed us that the Pasha was confined to his inner rooms by order of his physicians, in consequence of a severe illness. Upon his Excellency Rifat Bey asking whether Sami Bey was authorized to give us the official answer for which we had met together, the latter replied that he was specially charged by His Highness to communicate to us in his name, his final determination. After having inspected, in concert with the Four Consuls, the authority of Sami Bey, his Excellency Rifat Bey replied, "We are come, at the expiration of the period of twenty days, to ask what is the decision to which His Highness has come, with regard to the stipulations of the second alternative of the Convention."

Sami Bey replied, "Before the expiration of the second period the Pasha had accepted the inheritance of Egypt, out of deference to the decisions of the Four Great Powers, and to the orders of his benefactor the Sultan, and I now confirm to you officially this resolution. With regard to Syria, his non-acceptance not being a refusal, His Highness, considering his numerous services to the Ottoman Empire, is desirous of submitting a request on this subject as well to his lawful Sovereign as to the Four Great Powers, and he flatters himself that his Excellency Rifat Bey, as well as the Consuls of the Four Powers, will have the goodness to communicate it to their respective Courts."

Rifat Bey rejoined, "You are already aware that we can only be guided by the letter of the Treaty, and that we are not authorized to receive a conditional acceptance, which shall not be accompanied by the delivery of the Ottoman fleet into the hands of Ibrahim Bey, and by orders for the evacuation of Syria and of the other provinces restored to the direct government of the Porte. We must look upon such an acceptance as a refusal." "But," added the Consuls, "if His Highness would accompany his proposals by sending back the fleet and by transmitting the orders above mentioned, we would hasten to submit them to our respective Courts." "His Highness however," replied Sami Bey, "considers his propositions as an acceptance."

"For our part we can only look upon them, according to the letter of the Convention, as a formal refusal, and the Sublime Porte consequently reserves to itself to take, in concert with its Allies, such further resolution with regard to Egypt as its interests shall point out to it."

Sami Bey having then delivered to his Excellency Rifat Bey the letter containing the reply and the propositions of the Viceroy, and the principal object of the visit being at an end, the Consuls-General asked Sami Bey whether the Viceroy considered the invitation which he had given to them to quit Alexandria, as still in force? "His Highness," replied Sami Bey, "considering his propositions as an acceptance and not as a refusal, does not consider himself any longer in a state of hostility with the Four Powers, and he therefore sees no inconvenience in the Consuls remaining here."

"But for our part we consider your proposition as a non-acceptance, and we ask you whether, notwithstanding that, His Highness guarantees to us the inviolability of our persons and our flags, and security for our countrymen?"

"That is understood," replied Sami Bey, "there can be no doubt thereupon."

(Signed) RIFAT.
G. LLOYD HODGES.
A. LAURIN.
E. WAGNER.
A. MEDEM.

Alexandria, September 5, 1840.

No. 191.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 6.)

(Extract.) *Alexandria, September* 6, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that this morning the British and Austrian Admirals, with their squadrons, left Alexandria for Beyrout.

The "Asia," "Implacable," and "Daphne," have been left behind, for the protection of British subjects and property.

It has been arranged that I should, to-morrow, follow the Admirals in the "Cyclops" steamer.

No. 192.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 6.)

(Extract.) *Alexandria, September* 15, 1840.

THE detailed official accounts that I have sent your Lordship since your instructions accompanying the Convention of the 15th July, will acquaint you accurately of what has been passing at Alexandria.

Sir Robert Stopford left me on the 5th of this month, and sailed for Syria on the following day. It was decided between the Admiral and myself, that I should go to Beyrout the following day, and he left the "Cyclops" steamer at my disposal for that purpose. The "Hydra" arrived the morning of the day I was to leave, bringing the unofficial intelligence that the Consuls were recalled; and that a Vizier was actually named to replace Mehemet Ali. This intelligence, decided me to abandon my project of going to Beyrout, and I accordingly despatched the "Cyclops" to join the Admiral. We have, however, remained without any accounts from him up to this date; and I know not whether the news brought by the Captain of the "Hydra" be true or not.

Mehemet Ali has been seriously ill. Though a little better, he continues very weak, and requires aid to be raised from his couch. Many well-informed persons assure me that Ibrahim Pasha would be satisfied with the hereditary right of Egypt, guaranteed to him by the Four Contracting Powers, but that, as a matter of courtesy and deference to France, he would require that Power to be a party to the guarantee. Should Mehemet Ali, however, recover, which it is probable he will, I very much doubt that he will ever relinquish his hold of Syria, so long as he is able to retain it. His ambition is excessive, and your Lordship may rely that he will use all his efforts and resources to do mischief, and if possible, so retard and complicate affairs, as to cause a general war in Europe, which he boasts is sure to take place in March next. France is now encouraging him, and replenishes his coffers. But he is too shrewd to place an entire reliance on her assurances. The great display of force that the Pasha is now making, is at the express desire of France, and I told the French Consul-General so two days ago.

I experience much satisfaction in assuring your Lordship that the Consuls-General of the other Three Powers co-operate with me in every respect.

When my departure from Egypt shall be directed, or shall become necessary through events, I purpose retiring with my Colleagues on board one of Her Majesty's ships now off this port.

No. 193.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 6.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, September 20, 1840.*

YESTERDAY arrived off this port the steamer "Oriental," bearing Her Majesty's mails for this place and for India. I had already given to the resident Agent of the Honourable East India Company and to the senior officer commanding the naval force off this coast all the information in my power as to the state of our political relations with this country.

In consequence, however, of instructions given by Admiral Sir John Louis to the officer who came from Malta charged with the Indian mails, and for the sake of facilitating an important public service, I felt obliged to assume the duty of ordering those mails to land. Before doing so, I deemed it expedient to see Mehemet Ali Pasha, from whom I hoped to elicit the promise for their security during their passage through Egypt.

I accordingly called on Mehemet Ali this morning at 7 o'clock, I found him seated in his divan. By himself and by those about him I was received in the most cold and almost repulsive manner. I was evidently a very unwelcome visitor. After a few inquiries as to the Pasha's health, I said that the arrival of the Indian mails at Suez was already telegraphed. The Pasha observed very carelessly that he had not known so much. I added that the Indian mails from England and Malta had also reached Alexandria, and I expressed my hope that they would not be molested in this country. The Pasha made no reply, but moved his head slightly. I continued to say that I trusted I should obtain the assurance of His Highness for their safety. Mehemet Ali replied, "I have no assurances to give you." At this I expressed some surprize and concern, and the Pasha went on to say, "The Powers, calling themselves civilized, have adopted measures which perhaps may force me to imitate their example." I said that I did not well understand his meaning. He continued, "Others have no faith with me; their declarations are not to be depended upon." I told him that if his allusion was to Great Britain, I could not accept the remark. The Pasha, with one of the sardonic laughs not unusual to him, replied, "You may take it, or leave it; but my remark is in the mouth of every one." I said, "Perhaps of every one in Alexandria." The Pasha averted his head, and with an impatient toss of his hand, rejoined, "Of every one—of every one."

On this I informed the Pasha that his answers would decide me to prevent the mails from landing. The expression of this resolution evidently had its effect, the cause of which I was soon able to ascertain. It consisted in there being French mails on board, which, as I knew from the French Consul-General, were anxiously expected by the Pasha's friends. After the exchange of a few more uneasy expressions, I again put the question whether the mails might pass or not. Mehemet Ali reflected a few seconds, and then, making a swinging-forward gesture of his hand, he replied, "Let them proceed." On my asking distinctly whether they would be safe in their passage, the Pasha said, "Yes, for this time only."

On my observing that from the Pasha's tone I considered it unavailing to enter into general political conversation, the Pasha made an abrupt reply, to the effect that I had already had my answer.

In the course of our conversation, the answers of Mehemet Ali were short, cold, and harsh, without being precisely uncourteous. He received every remark which did not absolutely require notice with perfect silence, or at most with a slight wave of the hand.

The tone of Mehemet Ali was tranquil but severe. One could only trace anything like excitement in his occasionally pulling through his fingers tufts of his white beard, and taking with a little violence frequent and very large pinches of snuff. His demeanour was that of a man profoundly incensed, and who has resolved on some energetic course.

As I left the Divan I was followed by one of the Pasha's officers, who obtained my assurance that the French mail would be immediately landed; and he communicated the Pasha's desire that the "Ariadne" Coal Depôt,

now in this harbour, might be removed to the rear of the Egyptian squadron, a wish with which I promised to comply.

Thus your Lordship will perceive that Mehemet has declared himself on the subject of the overland communication with India; and that it is now impossible for the future to risk the passage of the Government mails through Egypt. I consequently trust that your Lordship will make the communications and arrangements you may judge requisite to meet so important a difficulty. By the present post I shall forward the proper information for the guidance of his Excellency the Governor of Bombay.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

Inclosure in No. 193.

Colonel Hodges to Sir James Carnac, Bart.

Sir, *Alexandria, August* 20, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency, that the "Oriental" steam-packet, charged with the mails for India, reached this port yesterday, and brought instructions from Admiral Sir John Louis not to land those mails, except with my authority. It thus became of importance to elicit from Mehemet Ali a promise for their safe passage through Egypt.

With such an object, I visited the Pasha at 7 o'clock this morning. At first he refused to give me any engagement. I then said that such being the case, I would direct that the mails should not be disembarked. On this the Pasha reflected, and at last said that they might proceed "for this time only."

The motive of this concession was known to me. It chanced that a French mail, very anxiously expected by the Pasha's friends, was on board the "Oriental;" and to this fortunate accident we owe the permission which has now been granted.

From what passed this morning, it has become certain that the Indian mails for the future cannot be risked in Egypt. Besides this, there are in town consistent, and, I believe, correct rumours that British and Turkish forces have effected a landing near Beyrout, and that blood has been shed.

I, therefore, request your Excellency to make such communications and arrangements as you may deem requisite, in order to meet so serious a difficulty.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 194.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 6.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, September* 22, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship two military states; the first of the Pasha's forces in and about Alexandria, on the 14th instant, and the second an account of the troops recently arrived or employed prior to the 15th instant.

Both these documents may somewhat exaggerate numbers, as is usually the case in all armies; but I should observe, that computations simultaneously made at the Russian Consulate-General, carry the amount of the existing force at Alexandria to 42,000 men.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

Inclosure 1 in No. 194.

State of the Military Force at Alexandria, September 14, 1840.

		Men.
	Egyptian Marines	12,000
	Men of the Arsenal	3,500
1	Regiment of Hamid Bey Infantry	2,500
	Zappatori	2,500
	National Guard	6,000
	Irregular Turkish Artillery	1,000
1	Regiment of Artillery (60 guns)	4,000
2	Regiments of Cavalry	1,000
2	Regiments of the Hedjaz Army	6,000
		38,500
1	Regiment of Cavalry expected	600
		39,100
	Turkish Marines	7,000
	Respectable Inhabitants, available as an Irregular Force for the defence of Alexandria	6,000
1	Regiment of National Guards, available	2,000
	Bedouins of the Delta, who can be raised immediately for a defensive operation	10,000
	Total	65,100

Inclosure 2 in No. 194.

Account of Troops recently arrived at Alexandria, and of those employed prior to the 15th of September, 1840.

20th Regiment of Infantry from the Hedjaz.
3rd „ Cavalry from Upper Egypt.
4th „ „ „

10,000 Bedouins of this neighbourhood have been sent to Syria.
10,000 Bedouins are to be raised in Saïd.
5,000 Troops are expected from Nubia and from Soodan, of which number 2,000 form the deficit of two regiments of Infantry; the remaining 3,000 are composed of Irregular Troops, Turks, Bedouins, Arabs, Arnaouts, &c , &c.

13th Regiment of Cavalry on its way to Alexandria.

No. 195.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 6.)

(Extract.) *Alexandria, September* 22, 1840.

ON the 19th instant arrived off this port the "Oriental" steamer, bearing the mails for India.

The precautionary measures I adopted on that occasion are fully detailed in my despatch of the 20th of September.

Your Lordship will there perceive that, in an interview with the Pasha, His Highness told me explicitly that the Indian mails "might pass unmolested for that time only."

In order to prevent the chance of mistaking the Pasha's meaning, I was accompanied by my private secretary, who, immediately on our return

to my residence, made copious minutes of the conversation which had just taken place.

Yesterday I obtained information that on the same day of the 20th instant, the Pasha had been visited by Captain Lyons, Agent for the Honourable the East India Company's Service, and that he had received the Pasha's assurance that, not only should the mails pass in perfect safety on the present occasion, but that they should continue to do so as long as he himself had authority in Egypt.

Inclosure 1 in No. 195.

Colonel Hodges to Captain Lyons.

Sir, *Alexandria, September* 21, 1840.

I HAVE just received information that the Pasha yesterday made to you a communication to the effect, that the East India mails would be secure in their passage through Egypt, not only on the present occasion, but so long as he himself remained in this country.

Such an assurance being totally at variance with one given me the same morning by the Pasha, who said that "the India mails might pass for this time only," I shall feel obliged by your informing me, at your earliest convenience, whether the report of Count Medem is correct, in order that I may make the necessary intimation to Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

Inclosure 2 in No. 195.

Captain Lyons to Colonel Hodges.

Sir, *Alexandria, September* 22, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inform you, in reply to your letter received at 7 last evening, that the Pasha informed me he had no intention whatever of preventing the passage of the mails through Egypt in future; and as a proof that no such intention was in contemplation by His Highness with respect to the present mails, the mail from India, a double mail, had already nearly reached Atfe, on its passage down the Nile, at the hour you had the conversation with the Pasha on the subject,—8 in the morning of the 20th.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) THOMAS LYONS.

No. 196.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 6.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, September* 22, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to transmit, for your Lordship's information, the copy of instructions I have just received from his Excellency Viscount Ponsonby, in a despatch of the 16th instant.

I have also been informed by Captain Fisher, commanding Her Majesty's naval forces off this port, that he has on board a despatch to Mehemet Ali, which contains the deposition of that Pasha.

Having consulted with my Colleagues, we have concluded not to leave this place until the important State document mentioned by Captain Fisher has been safely delivered to its address. We shall then embark on board of Her Majesty's ship "Asia," and after some short delay shall probably proceed in an Austrian steamer, first is Beyrout,

for the sake of conferring with Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, and afterwards to Constantinople, where I shall wait your Lordship's further instructions.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

Inclosure in No. 196.

Viscount Ponsonby to Colonel Hodges.

Sir, *Therapia, September* 16, 1840.

IN consequence of the position in which Mehemet Ali has placed himself, by his rejection of the offers made to him by the Sultan, the Sublime Porte has thought fit to notify to all the Foreign Missions at Constantinople the deposition of Mehemet Ali from his post as Pasha of Egypt, and also the establishment of a blockade by the Sublime Porte, of the échelles of Egypt and Syria. His Highness has also made known to the Representatives of the Powers parties to the Convention of the 15th of July, 1840, his desire that the alliance there contracted should be manifested by the recall of the Consuls-General of those Powers from Alexandria. In consequence of that desire, and moved also by other considerations, my Colleagues of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and myself, have determined to comply with the demand. I have, therefore, to instruct you to leave Alexandria after the reception of this despatch, and to proceed at your convenience to Constantinople, or to such other place as you may think proper for the service of Her Majesty, considered under the new state of affairs which has terminated your duty of communication with Mehemet Ali.

With relation to the commercial and other personal interests of Her Majesty's subjects, which have been confided to your protection, your judgment and knowledge of their situation will direct you in adopting the best measures for placing them in the greatest security possible to be attained.

With respect to the Consular Agents of the British Government in the various parts of Egypt and Syria, you will leave them to follow the instructions with which I have furnished Her Majesty's Consul at Beyrout, under date the 6th of September, and of which I transmitted a copy to you at Alexandria.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 197.

Colonel Hodges to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 6.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, September* 22, 1840.

IN consequence of the instructions of his Excellency Viscount Ponsonby, I have deliberated how I might ensure to my countrymen the greatest degree of security during my absence; I have, therefore, placed them, until further orders, under the protection of the Consul-General of His Majesty the King of the Netherlands. This public officer is a man of high respectability, and has accepted the important charge I have just confided to him.

I have now the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, copies of all the despatches I have addressed to various individuals, in consequence of the instructions I have received for my removal from this country.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

Inclosure 1 in No. 197.

Colonel Hodges to Mr. Consul Larking.

Sir, *Alexandria, September* 22, 1840.

I HAVE just received the instructions of his Excellency Viscount Ponsonby to suspend my functions as Consul-General, and to embark on board one of Her Majesty's ships anchored off this port.

Yourself and the other Consular officers resident in Egypt will remain at your posts, but you will strike your flags, and await further orders.

You will please to communicate the purport of this despatch to the Consular officers under your jurisdiction.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

Inclosure 2 in No. 197.

Colonel Hodges to Mr. Consul Larking.

Sir, *Alexandria, September* 22, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I have just received from his Excellency Viscount Ponsonby a despatch containing the instructions made known to you in my previous despatch of this date. His Excellency also apprizes me that the Sublime Porte has thought fit to notify to all the Missions at Constantinople the deposal of Mehemet Ali from his post as Pasha of Egypt, and also the establishment of a blockade of the échelles of Egypt and Syria.

It has been arranged that British subjects in Egypt shall remain provisionally under the protection of a Power long united by ties of alliance and friendship with the British Crown.

The Consul-General of His Majesty the King of the Netherlands has undertaken to superintend the interests and safety of those who remain. You will give him every practicable assistance in the execution of the important task he has assumed.

I request you to furnish the necessary information and directions to all Consular officers and others under your jurisdiction.

You will also please to assemble the British merchants and residents of Alexandria, to whom you will make known the substance of this communication.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

Inclosure 3 in No. 197.

Colonel Hodges to Captain Anderson.

Sir, *Alexandria, September* 22, 1840.

I HAVE to request that you will remove the "Ariadne" coal depôt, under your command, from her present position to the rear of the Egyptian squadron.

You will please to make the arrangements you deem most advantageous respecting the moorings of that ship.

So soon as you shall have changed her position, you will remove with your crew and the national colours on board Her Majesty's ship "Asia," where you will await further orders.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) G. LLOYD HODGES.

No. 198.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 7.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 16, 1840.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a Notification, dated the 15th instant, which I have made to Her Majesty's Consul-General for advertising Her Majesty's subjects in these parts, of the establishment by the Sublime Porte, of a blockade of the ports of Egypt and Syria, to take place when ships of war are assembled before the ports to be blockaded; and further, that the Sultan requested the aid of Her Majesty's naval forces, and those of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Austria, for carrying the blockade into effect, to which demand the Austrian Internuncio and myself had given our consent.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 198.

Viscount Ponsonby to Mr. Consul-General Cartwright.

Sir, *Therapia, September 15, 1840.*

HIS Excellency Rechid Pasha, Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs, has notified to me that the Sublime Porte has ordered the blockade of the ports of Egypt and of Syria, and that the blockade will be enforced as soon as the ships of war shall be assembled before the ports to be blockaded; and that His Imperial Majesty the Sultan has requested the aid of the naval forces of Her Majesty and of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Austria to carry into execution the above-mentioned blockade. I have now to inform you that his Excellency the Austrian Internuncio and myself have given our consent to the demand, and to request you to take the usual means of publication to make the communication I have now the honour to make to you, known to Her Majesty's subjects in these parts who are interested in the matter.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 199.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 7.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, September 17, 1840.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a letter I wrote to the French Ambassador, and his Excellency's reply upon the subject of the blockade.

Inclosure 1 in No. 199.

Viscount Ponsonby to M. de Pontois.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, *Therapia, September 16, 1840.*

I TAKE the liberty to acquaint your Excellency, as Ambassador of a Sovereign closely united in friendship with the Queen I have the honour to serve, that His Majesty the Sultan having requested the aid of the naval forces of Her Majesty, they will be employed under the authority of the Sultan in carrying into effect the blockade of the ports of Egypt and Syria, which have been declared in blockade by the Sublime Porte. I venture to trouble your

Excellency with this communication, in order to prevent, as far as may be in my power, the occurrence of any inconvenience to French commercial interests that might arise from want of information of the facts.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 199.

M. de Pontois to Viscount Ponsonby.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, *Thérapia, le* 17 *Septembre*, 1840.

J'AI l'honneur d'accuser réception à votre Excellence, de la lettre qu'elle a bien voulu m'écrire, en date d'hier, pour me donner connaissance de la part que les forces navales de Sa Majesté Britannique vont être appelées à prendre à l'exécution du blocus des ports d'Egypte et de Syrie ordonné par le Sultan.

En vous priant d'agréer mes remercimens de cette communication officieuse, je crois devoir, M. l'Ambassadeur, vous prévenir de l'impossibilité où je me trouve d'en faire l'usage indiqué dans votre lettre. J'aurai, en effet, l'honneur de vous faire observer, sans entrer dans l'examen du côté politique de la mesure dont il s'agit, et des objections qu'elle peut soulever sous ce rapport, qu'un blocus ne saurait, en principe, avoir d'existence légale et devenir obligatoire pour le commerce étranger qu'après l'expiration des délais qui doivent, conformément à l'usage et aux règles du Droit des Gens, suivre la notification officielle et régulière de cette mesure.

Je prie votre Excellence d'agréer, &c.,
(Signé) E. DE PONTOIS.

(Translation.)

M. de Pontois to Viscount Ponsonby.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, *Therapia, September* 17, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the letter which your Excellency had the goodness to write to me yesterday, for the purpose of making me acquainted with the share which the naval forces of Her Britannic Majesty will be called upon to take, in carrying into effect the blockade of the ports of Egypt and Syria declared by the Sultan.

In requesting you to accept my thanks for this friendly communication, I think it right, M. l'Ambassadeur, to inform you that it is impossible for me to make use of it in the manner pointed out in your letter. I will, indeed, have the honour to observe to you, without entering into an examination of the political side of the measure in question, and of the objections which may be raised against it in this respect, that a blockade cannot, in principle, have a legal existence, and become obligatory upon foreign commerce until after the expiration of the delay which ought, in conformity with custom and with the Rules of the Law of Nations, to follow the official and regular notification of that measure.

I request your Excellency to accept, &c.,
(Signed) E. DE PONTOIS.

No. 200.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 7.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September* 17, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inclose reports relating to Syria, which the Internuncio was so good as to allow me to copy.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 200.

Circular addressed by Solyman Pasha to the Consuls of Foreign Powers residing at Beyrout.

M. le Consul, *Beyrout, le 27 Djémazi-ul-Akhir*, 1256.

J'AI l'honneur de vous faire savoir que son Altesse Méhémet Ali a refusé les conditions de l'arrangement que le Sultan lui propose d'accorder avec les Cours de la Grande Bretagne, d'Autriche, de Prusse, et de Russie, lesquelles conditions lui ont été communiquées par son Excellence Rifat Bey, Envoyé de Sa Hautesse, conjointement avec MM. les Consuls-Généraux des Quatre Puissances sus-mentionnées.

Son Altesse Méhémet Ali a répondu à cette communication, que ce qu'il avait conquis par les armes, les armes seules pourraient le lui enlever.

(Signé) *Le Major-Général des Armées,*
LE GENERAL SOLYMAN.

(Translation.)

Circular addressed by Solyman Pasha to the Consuls of Foreign Powers residing at Beyrout.

M. le Consul, *Beyrout, Djémazi-ul-Akhir* 27, 1256

I HAVE the honour to inform you, that His Highness Mehemet Ali has refused the conditions of the arrangement which the Sultan proposes to grant to him, in conjunction with the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, which conditions were communicated to him by his Excellency Rifat Bey, Envoy from His Highness, conjointly with the Consuls-General of the Four Powers above-mentioned.

His Highness Mehemet Ali replied to that communication, that what he had conquered by force of arms, arms alone could take from him.

(Signed) *The Major-General of the Armies,*
GENERAL SOLYMAN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 200.

Military Orders issued by Solyman Pasha.

Ordre du Jour.

Etat-Major Général des Armées Egyptiennes.

Mardi, le 27 Djémazi-ul-Akhir, 1256.

LA côte de Syrie, depuis la hauteur de Khanyannés jusqu'à la limite au nord de Tarsous, est en état de siège. En conséquence, l'Autorité Militaire aura à connaître des délits et crimes commis par les gens du pays ou étrangers, quels qu'ils soient; elle sera chargée de l'administration des rentrées et impôts, ainsi que des travaux de défense; et les officiers civils du Génie et ceux de l'Artillerie et du Génie de l'Armée active et sédentaire passent sous cette Autorité.

Connaissance du présent ordre sera donnée à tous les Commandans civils et militaires des provinces, ainsi qu'à MM. les Consuls des différentes Puissances vu ce qui concerne les étrangers.

(Signé) *Le Major-Général des Armées,*
SOLYMAN.

(Translation.)

Military Orders issued by Solyman Pasha.

ORDER OF THE DAY.

Head Quarters of the Egyptian Armies,
Tuesday, Djémazi-ul-Akhir 27, 1256.

THE coast of Syria, from the heights of Khanyannés to the frontier north of Tarsus, is in a state of siege. Consequently, the military authorities will have to take cognizance of the crimes and offences committed by the people of the country or foreigners, whatever they may be; they will be charged with the administration of the revenue and taxes, as well as with the works of defence; and the officers of the Civil Engineers, and those of the artillery, and of the engineers of the army, both stationary and in activity, are amenable to those authorities.

This order shall be communicated to all the Civil and Military Commanders of the Provinces, as well as to the Consuls of the different Powers, in so far as it concerns foreigners.

(Signed) *The Major-General of the Armies,*
SOLYMAN.

ORDRE DU JOUR.

ARTICLE 1.

TOUT individu né dans le pays, ou étranger, quel qu'il soit, qui introduira en Syrie des écrits ou proclamations tendant à fomenter la désobéissance ou la révolte, sera puni de mort.

ART. 2.

Tout individu né dans le pays, ou étranger, quel qu'il soit, qui distribuera des écrits ou proclamations tendant à fomenter la désobéissance et la révolte, sera puni de mort.

ART. 3.

Tout individu né dans le pays, ou étranger, quel qu'il soit, porteur ou récéleur d'un ou plusieurs écrits ou proclamations tendant à fomenter la désobéissance et la révolte, sera puni d'une peine de cinq à vingt ans de fers.

ART. 4.

Sera réputé récéleur d'écrits ou proclamations subversifs, tout individu qui, après l'expiration de dix jours à compter du jour où le dit ordre aura été publié dans son village, dans sa ville, ou dans son district, n'aura pas remis à l'autorité locale tous écrits ou proclamations répandus par les instigateurs à la révolte et existant chez lui ou sur lui

ART. 5.

Tout individu né dans le pays, ou étranger, quel qu'il soit, qui introduira ou distribuera en Syrie des armes, des munitions de guerre, ou provisions de bouche, sans l'avis et l'approbation de l'autorité locale, sera puni de mort.

ART. 6.

Tout individu né dans le pays, ou étranger, quel qu'il soit, prévenu et convaincu d'espionage sera puni de mort.

ART. 7.

Tout individu né dans le pays, ou étranger, quel qu'il soit, qui excitera par ses paroles, par ses écrits, ou au moyen de l'argent, les habitans à la révolte, sera puni de mort.

ART. 8.

Il n'y a rien à changer dans la composition des Conseils de guerre.

ART. 9.

Les jugemens à mort et aux galères ne pourront être exécutés sans avoir eu l'approbation du Major-Général commandant l'Armée des côtes.

ART. 10.

Il sera donné connaissance des présens ordres à MM. les Consuls des différentes Puissances vu ce qui concerne les étrangers.

(Signé) *Le Major-Général des Armées,*
SOLYMAN.

Mardi, le 27 *Djémazi-ul-Akhir,* 1256.

(Translation.)

ORDER OF THE DAY.

ARTICLE 1.

EVERY individual, whether native or foreigner, whoever he may be, who shall introduce into Syria, writings or proclamations tending to foment disobedience or revolt, shall be punished with death.

ART. 2.

Every individual, whether native or foreigner, whoever he may be, who shall distribute writings or proclamations tending to foment disobedience and revolt, shall be punished with death.

ART. 3.

Every individual, whether native or foreigner, whoever he may be, the bearer or harbourer of one or more writings or proclamations tending to foment disobedience and revolt, shall be condemned to irons, for a period of from five or twenty years.

ART. 4.

Every individual shall be looked upon as a harbourer of revolutionary writings or Proclamations, who, at the expiration of ten days from the day on which the said order shall have been published in his village, his town, or in his district, shall not have delivered to the local authorities all writings or proclamations distributed by the encouragers of revolt, and found in his house, or upon his person.

ART. 5.

Every individual, whether native or foreigner, whoever he may be, who shall introduce into or distribute in Syria, arms, warlike stores, or provisions, without the knowledge and approbation of the local authorities, shall be punished with death.

ART. 6.

Every individual, whether native or foreigner, whoever he may be, accused and convicted of acting as a spy, shall be punished with death.

ART. 7.

Every individual, whether native or foreigner, whoever he may be, who shall, by his language, by his writings, or by means of money, excite the inhabitants to revolt, shall be punished with death.

ART. 8.

No change is to be made in the Composition of the Councils of War.

ART. 9.

The sentences to death and to the galleys shall not be carried into execution without having received the approval of the Major-General commanding the Army of the Coast.

ART. 10.

These orders shall be communicated to the Consuls of the different Powers, in so far as they concern foreigners.

(Signed) *The Major-General of the Armies,*
SOLYMAN.

Tuesday, Djemazi-ul-Akhir 27, 1256.

Inclosure 3 in No. 200.

The Austrian Consul at Beyrout to Solyman Pasha.

Monsieur le Général, *Beyrout, le* 28 *Août*, 1840.

J'AI reçu hier la lettre que vous m'avez faitl'honneur de m'adresser sous la date du 27 Djémazi-ul-Akhir, pour m'informer que son Altesse Méhémet Ali a refusé les propositions qui lui ont été faites par le Sultan et communiquées par son Envoyé, conjointement à MM. les Consuls-Généraux des Quatre Grandes Puissances Alliées. Annexés à la lettre de votre Excellence j'ai trouvé deux

ordres du jour de la susdite date, portant la déclaration de la mise en état de siège de toute la côte de Syrie, ainsi que les dispositions quant à la connaissance des délits et crimes qui seraient commis même par les étrangers quels qu'ils soient, et aux peines décrêtées. Comme ces arrêtés sont contraires aux Capitulations existantes entre le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale Royale Apostolique et la Sublime Porte, touchant l'article de la procédure et des jugemens des délits et crimes qui seraient commis par les sujets Autrichiens, je déclare protester, comme dès ce moment je proteste, contre toute infraction qui serait faite au sens des dites Capitulations.

Je saisis, &c.,
(Signé) PIERRE LAURELLA.

(Translation.)

The Austrian Consul at Beyrout to Solyman Pasha.

General, *Beyrout, August* 28, 1840.

I RECEIVED yesterday the letter dated the 27th Djemazi-ul-Akhir, which you have done me the honour to address to me, to inform me that His Highness Mehemet Ali has refused the propositions which have been made to him by the Sultan, and communicated by his Envoy in conjunction with the Consuls-General of the Four Great Allied Powers. I have found, inclosed in your letter, two orders of the day, of the above date, declaring the whole coast of Syria to be placed in a state of siege, and containing regulations with regard to the discovery of offences and crimes which may be committed by strangers, whoever they may be, and the punishments to be inflicted. As these regulations are contrary to the existing Capitulations between the Government of His Imperial, Royal, and Apostolic Majesty, and the Sublime Porte, having reference to the question of the trial and judgment of offences and crimes which may be committed by Austrian subjects, I protest, as I do from henceforward protest, against any infringement which may be made of the meaning of the said Capitulations.

I avail myself, &c.,
(Signed) PIERRE LAURELLA.

Inclosure 4 in No. 200.

M. de Laurin to the Baron de Stürmer.

Monsieur le Baron, *Alexandrie, le 7 Septembre*, 1840.

UN cutter Russe vient d'arriver de Beyrout avec des dépêches de la part des Consuls en Syrie. Celles des nôtres sont de Damas du 27, et de Beyrout du 29 Août dernier.

Les premières portent, que Damas jouit d'une apparente tranquillité; que le Gouvernement continue à répandre des nouvelles sur l'appui moral et matériel que la France est prête à donner à Méhémet Ali, et surtout que les Chrétiens cherchent à s'emparer de la Syrie, non pas pour y restaurer la domination du Sultan, mais bien pour y établir la leur. Que, cependant, tout cela ne répond que très-faiblement aux vues du Gouvernement, et que l'on n'a pas pu encore parvenir à décourager les insurgés de la Montagne de Tripoli, qui continuent à se défendre sous les ordres de l'Emir Hangiar.

Les rapports de Beyrout confirment la désertion de la majeure partie des Naplousiens, qui étaient fort peu satisfaits de la manière dont Osman Pacha les traitait, et impatiens de retourner chez eux pour reprendre les travaux d'agriculture auxquels Abd-el-Hadi les avait soustraits, en leur promettant l'expulsion des Maronites et un riche butin en récompense, et qui, au lieu de leur être décerné, l'a été aux autres troupes, et aux Albanais.

M. le Consul rapporte, comme un on dit, que Ibrahim Pacha a retenu en ôtage un des fils de l'Emir Béchir, et qu'il l'a envoyé à St. Jean d'Acre. Ce

qu'il y a de plus saillant, c'est la déclaration de la côte de la Syrie depuis Khanyannés (frontière du désert d'Egypte) jusqu'à la frontière de la Caramanie Ottomane, en état de siège, et la sanction des peines à infliger aux contrevenans à la police d'un tel état.

J'ai déjà eu l'honneur de faire mention de cette déclaration faite par Solyman Pacha dans mon rapport du 5 du courant; il ne me reste que de soumettre à votre Excellence copie des Actes publiés à cette occasion par le susdit Major-Général ainsi que de la protestation que les Consuls ont interjetée contre les arrêts en question, et que notre Consul à Beyrout m'a envoyés joints à son rapport du 29 Août dernier.

Je n'ai rien appris sur les opérations du Commodore Napier. Il a reçu dernièrement des renforts considérables, et l'Amiral Stopford s'est rendu hier lui-même à Beyrout.

Les communications par mer sont interrompues à un tel point que Méhémet Ali comprend l'impossibilité d'y faire parvenir la moindre chose par cette voie. Du reste, les nouvelles sur l'état de la Syrie sont tellement contradictoires, que les Anglais envoient Mr. Hodges à Beyrout pour recueillir les renseignemens les plus précis sur les lieux et en dresser un rapport à ses supérieurs.

Quant à Méhémet Ali, il ne cesse de dire que l'état de la Syrie est satisfaisant; mais les mesures qu'il prend pour tenir cette province en obéissance prouvent qu'il n'y croit pas lui-même.

Agréez, etc.,
(Signé) LAURIN.

(Translation.)

M. de Laurin to the Baron de Stürmer.

Monsieur le Baron, *Alexandria, September* 7, 1840.

A RUSSIAN cutter has just arrived from Beyrout with despatches from the Consuls in Syria. Those from our Consuls are dated the 27th of August from Damascus, and the 29th of August from Beyrout.

The former state that Damascus enjoys apparent tranquillity; that the Government continues to spread reports of the moral and physical support which France is ready to give to Mehemet Ali; and above all, that the Christians seek to become masters of Syria, not in order to re-establish the rule of the Sultan, but to establish their own therein. That, notwithstanding, all this very insufficiently answers the views of the Government, and that it has not yet been possible to put down the insurgents of the Mountain of Tripoli, who continue to defend themselves under the orders of the Emir Hangiar.

The reports from Beyrout confirm the desertion of the greater part of the Naplousians, who were very ill-satisfied at the manner in which Osman Pasha treated them, and impatient to return home to resume the agricultural labours from which they had been taken away by Abd-el-Hadi, who promised them the expulsion of the Maronites and a rich booty as a recompense, and which, instead of being bestowed upon them, has been given to the other troops and the Albanians.

The Consul mentions as a report, that Ibrahim Pasha has kept one of the sons of the Emir Bechir as a hostage, and that he has sent him to St. Jean d'Acre. That which is most prominent is the declaration that the coast of Syria from Khanyannes (the frontier of the Egyptian Desert) to the frontier of Turkish Caramania, is placed in a state of siege, and the enactment of the punishments to be inflicted on those who should contravene the police regulations of such a state of things.

I have already had the honour to mention this declaration made by Solyman Pasha in my letter of the 5th instant, and it only remains for me to submit to your Excellency a copy of the regulations, published by the above-mentioned Major-General on this occasion, as well as the protest which the Consuls have made against the decrees in question, and which our Consul at Beyrout sent me inclosed in his letter of the 29th of August last.

I have heard nothing as to the operations of Commodore Napier. He had recently received considerable reinforcements, and Admiral Stopford went himself yesterday to Beyrout.

The communication by sea is so much obstructed that Mehemet Ali feels the impossibility of conveying anything thither by that means. The intelligence, moreover, of the state of Syria is so contradictory, that the English are sending Colonel Hodges to Beyrout, to obtain the most precise information on the spot, and to make a report thereof to his superiors.

As for Mehemet Ali, he does not cease to say that the state of Syria is satisfactory; but the measures which he takes to maintain that province in obedience, prove that he does not believe it himself.

Receive, &c.,
(Signed) LAURIN.

No. 201.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 7.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 17, 1840.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a letter from the Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali Pasha, announcing his deposal from his post, &c., &c.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 201.

The Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali.

J'AI pris connaissance de la lettre que Votre Altesse m'a envoyée par le retour de mon Moustéchar, son Excellence Rifat Bey. Tout comme vous n'avez pas adhéré aux propositions du premier délai qui vous avaient été faites d'après la Convention conclue entre la Sublime Porte et les Quatre Cours Alliées, vous avez de même refusé d'accepter les propositions du second délai. Or, comme dans de pareilles affaires officielles et publiques, le fond de la chose ne saurait être changé par des subterfuges et par des faux-fuyans, et comme on ne peut pas sortir du cercle tracé par la dite Convention, Sa Hautesse le Sultan vient par une Ordonnance Impériale de décharger Votre Altesse aussi des fonctions de Gouverneur d'Egypte.

Quant à la lettre de change de 500 bourses que vous avez remise à son Excellence le Moustéchar, comme l'acceptation de cet argent ne s'accorderait ni avec sa mission officielle, ni avec les réglemens établis de la Sublime Porte, je ne puis que vous renvoyer ci-jointe la traite en question.

C'est à cette fin que la présente lettre, &c.

(Signé) RAOUF.

18 *Réjeb*, 1256.

(Translation.)

The Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali.

I HAVE taken cognizance of the letter which your Highness sent me by the return of my Mousteshar, his Excellency Rifat Bey. In the same manner as you did not adhere to the propositions of the first period which had been made

to you under the Convention concluded between the Sublime Porte and the Four Allied Courts, you have also refused to accede to the propositions of the second period. Now, as in such official and public business, the substance of the matter cannot be changed by subterfuges and tricks, and as the circle traced by the said Convention cannot be passed, His Highness the Sultan has been pleased, by an Imperial Ordinance, also to dismiss Your Highness from the functions of Governor of Egypt.

With regard to the bill for 500 purses which you delivered to his Excellency the Mousteshar, since the acceptance of this money would be consistent neither with his official mission, nor with the established rules of the Porte, I have only to return to you the draft in question.

For this purpose the present letter, &c.,

(Signed) RAOUF.

Rejeb 18, 1256.

No. 202.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 7.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September* 17, 1840.

I INCLOSE copy of my despatch to Colonel Hodges, recalling him from Alexandria.

Your Lordship has been informed of the demand made by the Sublime Porte for the recall of the Four Consuls-General.

My despatch to Colonel Hodges was written in concurrence with my Colleagues, who have each written to their several Consuls-General to the same effect.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 202.

Viscount Ponsonby to Colonel Hodges.

[See Inclosure in No. 196, p. 253.]

No. 203.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 7.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, September* 17, 1840.

RECHID PASHA asked my Colleagues and me for letters of introduction to the Consuls in Candia for two Agents the Porte wished to send there to open a communication with the Pasha Governor of the Island; and his Excellency asked me to get the Admiral to send the Agents in a ship of war.

The Internuncio gave a letter as desired. I gave a letter for Mr. Consul Ongley, telling him that the bearers desired to be introduced to the Pasha, which I wished might be done if it could be effected without danger to the Agent's person, and adding, that he would tell Mr. Ongley the nature of his business.

I also wrote to the Admiral, informing him of the Pasha's desire to have these Agents sent in an English vessel to Candia.

No. 204.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October 7.*)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 17, 1840.*

I INCLOSE copy of my letter to Admiral Stopford, acquainting him that the Sublime Porte declared the échelles of Egypt and Syria to be in a state of blockade.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 204.

Viscount Ponsonby to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.

Sir, *Therapia, September 17, 1840.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your information, copy of an official Note from the Sublime Porte, containing the declaration of a blockade of the échelles of Egypt and Syria.

I have further to acquaint you, that the Sublime Porte having demanded the aid of the naval forces of Her Majesty, and of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Austria, his Excellency the Austrian Internuncio and myself have consented to the demand of the Sublime Porte.

The period fixed by the Sublime Porte for the legal commencement of the blockade is the time when the ships to be employed in the blockade shall be actually before the place to be blockaded.

The blockade has been notified by the Sublime Porte to the Foreign Missions; and I have made known to the French Ambassador, that the naval forces of Her Majesty and of the Emperor of Austria would be employed as allies of the Sultan, and under the authority, and in the name of the Sultan, to aid in carrying the blockade into execution.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 205.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October 7.*)

(Extract.) *Therapia, September 20, 1840.*

I INCLOSE copy of a Note from the French Ambassador to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, which I have just received from the Porte.

M. de Pontois seems to me to have made a confusion between a blockade declared against a Foreign Power, and one directed against a portion of the territories of the Sovereign who declares it. In the first case, there are many things necessary to be done, which I presume are not in the second. A Sovereign has clearly a right, in case of the rebellion of a city or a port, to cut off at once all communication with that city which might, in his opinion, tend to give succour or force to the rebels who hold possession of it, and the same must be predicable of provinces. The Sublime Porte has several times acted in this way, the last time being in the case of Samos, three or four years ago.

I do not think it necessary to enter into an argument on this point, which appears to be clear.

Inclosure in No. 205.

M. de Pontois to Rechid Pasha.

Thérapia, le 17 *Septembre*, 1840.

L'AMBASSADEUR de France vient de recevoir la Note officielle que lui a adressée la Sublime Porte pour lui donner connaissance de la détermination qu'elle a cru devoir prendre de bloquer les ports et échelles de l'Egypte et de la Syrie.

Il va s'empresser de transmettre cette Note à son Gouvernement, en regrettant de ne pouvoir lui faire connaître également le caractère précis de la mesure qui vient d'être adoptée, les principes de droit maritime qui régleront son exécution, et les effets qu'elle aura pour le commerce étranger.

L'Ambassadeur de France, sans entrer pour le moment dans l'examen du côté politique de la mesure dont il s'agit, et des objections qu'elle peut soulever sous ce rapport, croit de son devoir de faire observer, dès à présent, à la Sublime Porte, qu'un blocus ne saurait en principe avoir d'existence légale, et devenir obligatoire pour le commerce et les sujets des Puissances Etrangères, qu'après l'accomplissement des formalités, et l'expiration des délais prescrits par les Droits des Gens et par l'usage.

(Signé) E. DE PONTOIS.

(Translation.)

M. de Pontois to Rechid Pasha.

Therapia, September 17, 1840.

THE Ambassador of France has just received the Official Note which the Sublime Porte has addressed to him to inform him of the determination which it has thought fit to adopt of blockading the ports and stations of Egypt and of Syria.

He will hasten to transmit this Note to his Government, regretting that he is unable equally to communicate to it the precise character of the measure which has been adopted, the principles of maritime law which will regulate its execution, and the effects which it will have for foreign commerce.

The Ambassador of France, without entering at present into an examination of the political character of the measure in question, and of the objections which in this respect it may give rise to, thinks it his duty to observe, even now, to the Sublime Porte, that a blockade cannot in principle have a legal existence, and became obligatory upon the commerce and subjects of Foreign Powers, until after the accomplishment of the formalities and the expiration of the delays prescribed by the law of nations and by custom.

(Signed) E. DE PONTOIS.

No. 206.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 7.)

My Lord, *Vienna, September* 30, 1840.

PRINCE METTERNICH has sent instructions to the Internuncio, prohibiting him from concurring in any proposition which shall not be within the limits of the Convention of July, and directing him, in case any such proposition should be made, to refer to his Court for orders.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 207.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 7.)

(Extract.) *Paris, October* 5, 1840.

THE state of things here has an appearance very menacing to the internal tranquillity of the country, and to the general peace of the world. Her Majesty's Government, under the conviction that France has no just cause for war, and that a contest against the other Four Great Powers of Europe would be disastrous to France, is perhaps disinclined to believe that the French Government will engage in such a contest. If a sense of justice, if prudential motives were to guide the councils of the country, the conclusion would be well founded; but the opinions of the reflecting portion of the community have but little weight among a people sensibly alive to any appearances of a disregard of their influence and importance in the affairs of Europe; who have a confidence and belief in their superiority over other countries; and whose idol has always been military glory. All these feelings have been flattered to the highest pitch by the press, since the conclusion of the Quintuple Treaty of last July. The press of Paris and of the departments, the ministerial, the legitimist, the republican, and the Napoleon newspapers, have all joined to persuade the people that the July Treaty was an affront to France, which its Government was bound to resent; and they have so well succeeded in exciting the public feeling, that I cannot indulge the hope that if the hostilities against Mehemet Ali be not brought to a speedy termination by the Pasha's submission to the Treaty of July, or by some arrangement that can bring France again into the Councils of Europe in the settlement of the Eastern Question, the current of popular opinion will be stemmed, and peace preserved. If the voice of the people be decidedly expressed in favour of the assertion by France of her claim to be consulted on the terms of peace between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, and of assisting the Pasha, should such claim be rejected by the Allied Powers, the Government must yield.

I doubt whether M. Thiers could, under present circumstances, under the present excitement which he has himself contributed to create, continue Minister, pursuing a pacific policy, and passively waiting the result of the hostile measures adopted against Mehemet Ali; for how could he justify before the Chambers the enormous expenditure which on his own responsibility, and without the sanction of the Representatives of the people, had been incurred, and apparently for no object.

The question of convoking the Chambers was, I understand, yesterday deliberated upon in the Cabinet Council. The opinions of the members of it differed, it is said, not in regard to the convocation of the Chambers, but as to the measures which should be adopted in the mean time. According to report, various propositions, such as sending the fleet with troops on board, to Alexandria, or occupying other points of military importance, were discussed, but no decision taken. But if M. Thiers will remain at the head of affairs only on the condition of the Chambers being immediately convoked, the acceptance of his resignation on that ground would be so unpopular, that I doubt if another Ministry could be found who would undertake the direction of affairs in this difficult and dangerous crisis.

The intelligence which has been lately received of the vigorous co-operation of Her Majesty's naval forces with the Turkish troops on the coast of Syria, has rekindled the warlike vehemence of the press, and I must also say has given additional animation to M. Thiers' conversation with me. I was at Auteuil on Saturday evening. He said that this cruel destruction of the prosperous commercial town of Beyrout was undertaken before the Sultan had given any answer to the propositions of the Pasha, which, at the suggestion, and under the influence of France, he had made to the Sultan; and that the bombardment, at the same time that it was an act of positive violence against the Pasha, was one of moral violence against France. He said that France had given ample proof of its disinterestedness as well as patience. There are, however, limits to the warlike measures of the Allied Powers, the transgression of which France would

not tolerate; and he then said, with some emphasis, that no French Government, be it what it might, could refrain from resisting the expulsion of Mehemet Ali from Egypt.

I have endeavoured in this despatch to put your Lordship in possession of the grounds on which I think war by no means improbable. I need not add what satisfaction it would be to me, to find that I am mistaken.

No. 208.

Viscount Palmerston to Barons Neumann, Schleinitz, and Brunnow.

Foreign Office, October 8, 1840.

THE Undersigned, in conformity with what was settled between himself, Baron Brunnow, Baron Schleinitz, and Baron Neumann, in a Conference held between them on Saturday last, the 3rd instant, has the honour to transmit to Baron Neumann / Schleinitz / Brunnow a copy of a Memorandum* which Prince Metternich forwarded to the Undersigned from Königswart on the 31st of August last, containing a statement of the opinion entertained at that time by Prince Metternich, of the course which it would be advisable for the French Government to adopt with reference to the Turco-Egyptian Question, in the then existing state of affairs; and the Undersigned has the honour to state to Baron Neumann / Schleinitz / Brunnow that it appears to Her Majesty's Government, that it would be expedient that the Four Powers should propose or suggest to the French Government such a course as is sketched out in this Memorandum. The Undersigned, therefore, requests Baron Neumann / Schleinitz / Brunnow to have the goodness to inform him whether he is willing and authorized, on the part of the Austrian / Prussian / Russian Government, to concur in making such a suggestion to the Government of France.

The Undersigned has, &c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 209.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 8, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatch of October 5, reporting the menacing aspect of public affairs at Paris with regard to the internal tranquillity of France, and to the general peace of the world.

With reference to the observations made to you by M. Thiers upon the Eastern Question, I have to instruct your Excellency, if M. Thiers should again advert to the objections which any French Government would oppose to the expulsion of Mehemet Ali from Egypt, to remark, in a friendly manner, that as Egypt is a province of the Turkish Empire, and as Mehemet Ali is a subject of the Sultan holding his authority in Egypt entirely by delegation from the Sultan, it is not easy to see upon what ground France, or any other Power, could be entitled to say that the Sultan should not exercise towards Mehemet Ali the right which belongs to every Sovereign as against a subject, to remove him from his post, if he is disobedient and rebellious; and it would surely not be consistent that a Power which, like France, has repeatedly proclaimed its determination to maintain the integrity of the Turkish Empire, and to uphold the independence of the Sultan's throne, should give armed assistance to a rebellious subject of the Sultan, in order to enable that subject to set his Sovereign's authority at defiance, and to retain forcible possession of a large province of that Sovereign's

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* See Inclosure in No. 187. p. 243.

empire; and your Excellency will, moreover, observe, that for France to do so, would be inconsistent with the positive and explicit declaration contained in M. Guizot's Note of the 18th of September. But your Excellency will say that, according to all appearance, this is a barren discussion of an abstract question, because it may reasonably be expected that when Mehemet Ali finds that the Syrians have generally risen against him, and have declared for the Sultan, and when, consequently, he can have no hope of retaining Syria, he will make his peace with the Sultan, and will not render it necessary for the Sultan to proceed to extremities against him in regard to Egypt.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 210.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 8, 1840.

WITH reference to the Note addressed to me by M. Guizot on the 18th of September, of which a copy was transmitted to Mr. Bulwer on the 22nd of September, and of which a further copy is inclosed in this despatch, I have to call your Excellency's attention to that passage in the Note above-mentioned, in which M. Guizot disclaims for his Government either the character of an armed champion for any person, or the intention of compromising, for the sake merely of the interests of the Pasha of Egypt, the peace and interests of France; and I have to instruct your Excellency to make use of this declaration of M. Guizot in any discussion which you may have with the French Government as to the course which France may pursue with reference to Eastern Affairs.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 211.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, October* 8, 1840.

WE hear that two things are under consideration—first, what is now called an Anconade; secondly, some declaration as to what France will, and what she will not permit.

Now, as to the first, it would be an act of unprovoked and unjustifiable aggression.

The Five Powers, France included, have declared their determination to maintain the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire.

Four out of the five are labouring to carry their principles into practice.

The fifth, for reasons of her own, declines being a party to the execution, and *therefore*, because the other four are acting up to her own principles, she is to seize possession of a portion of the territory of the very Sovereign whom she has pledged herself to support. Such a proceeding would be so inconsistent with every principle which governs, or ought to govern, the intercourse between man and man, or between nation and nation, that we cannot believe that the French Government will do a thing which would cast an indelible stain upon the honour of the Crown. Such an act of lawless violence must lead to serious consequences, and surely there is no need of creating fresh subjects of angry feeling between the two countries.

Then, as to a declaration; if France makes us a friendly communication tending to lead to an amicable discussion of the present state of affairs, we shall receive it, and deal with it in the spirit in which it is made; but

if France haughtily tells the Four Powers that she will permit them to do certain things in aid of the Sultan, but will not permit them to do other things, it is manifest that such a communication can only tend to make all reconciliation impossible. If the things she forbids are things the Four Powers mean to do, we shall do them all the same, and then France must attack us, and take the consequences. If the things so forbidden are things we do not mean to do, her interdiction might possibly be met by replies, in which defiance would answer threat, and when once we begin a war of words, we shall not be very far off from a war of blows. The French must recollect that our Parliament and their own Chambers will watch with all the keenness of national jealousy every word written by either side; and that, on the one hand, a menace made and not executed, or, on the other hand, a menace received, and not cast back with disdain, would be the overthrow of the Ministers by whom national honour should thus have been degraded.

No. 212.

Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 10, 1840.

I HAVE to instruct you to remain with Sir Robert Stopford, unless when you may have occasion to go to Constantinople to confer with Lord Ponsonby.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 213.

M. Thiers to M. Guizot.—(Communicated by M. Guizot, October 10.)

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Paris, le* 8 *Octobre,* 1840.

LA grave question qui préoccupe aujourd'hui le monde vient de prendre une face toute nouvelle depuis la réponse que la Porte a faite aux concessions du Vice-Roi d'Egypte. Méhémet Ali, en répondant aux sommations du Sultan, a déclaré qu'il se soumettait aux volontés de son Auguste Maître, qu'il acceptait la possession héréditaire de l'Egypte, et qu'il s'en remettait pour le reste des territoires qu'il occupait actuellement à la magnanimité du Sultan. Nous avons fait connaître au Cabinet Anglais ce qu'il fallait entendre par cette manière de s'exprimer; et bien que Méhémet Ali ne voulut pas déclarer immédiatement toutes les concessions auxquelles il avait été disposé par les vives instances de la France, nous avons pris sur nous de les faire connaître, et nous avons annoncé, que Méhémet Ali se résignerait au besoin à accepter la possession de l'Egypte héréditaire, et de la Syrie viagère, en abandonnant immédiatement Candie, Adana, et les Villes Saintes. Nous ajouterons, que si la Porte avait adhéré à cet arrangement, nous aurions consenti à le garantir de concert avec les Puissances qui s'occupent de régler le sort de l'Empire Ottoman.

Tous les esprits éclairés ont été frappés de la loyauté de la France, qui, bien que tenant une conduite séparée, ne cessait pas d'exercer son influence au profit d'une solution modérée et pacifique de la Question d'Orient. Ils ont aussi été frappés de la sagesse avec laquelle le Vice-Roi écoutait les conseils de la prudence et de la modération.

En réponse à de telles concessions, la Porte, soit qu'elle ait agi spontanément, soit qu'elle ait agi par des conseils irréfléchis, reçus sur les lieux mêmes, la Porte, avant de pouvoir en référer à ses Alliés, a répondu à la déférence du Vice-Roi par un Acte de déchéance. Une telle conduite, aussi exorbitante qu'inattendue, excède même l'esprit du Traité du 15 Juillet, et dépasse les conséquences les plus extrêmes qu'on pouvait en

tirer. Ce traité que la France ne saurait invoquer, car elle n'y adhère point, mais qu'elle rappelle pour montrer la rapidité avec laquelle on est entraîné déjà à des conséquences dangereuses, ce traité, dans le cas d'un refus absolu du Vice-Roi sur tous les points, laissait à la Porte la faculté de retirer ses premières offres, et d'en agir alors comme elle l'entendrait, suivant ses intérêts et les conseils de ses Alliés ; mais il supposait deux choses: un refus absolu et péremptoire sur tous les points de la part du Vice-Roi, et le recours aux conseils des Quatre Puissances. Or, rien de tout cela n'a eu lieu. Le Vice-Roi n'a point fait de refus absolu, et la Porte ne s'est pas même donné le tems de concerter une réponse avec ses Alliés. Elle a répondu à des concessions inespérées par la déchéance! Les Quatre Puissances ne sauraient approuver une telle conduite ; et nous savons, en effet, que plusieurs d'entre elles l'ont déjà désapprouvée. Lord Palmerston nous a fait déclarer, qu'il ne fallait voir en cela qu'une mesure comminatoire sans conséquence effective et nécessaire. Monsieur le Comte Appony, s'entretenant avec moi sur ce sujet, m'a annoncé la même opinion de la part de son Cabinet. Nous prenons acte volontiers de cette sage manifestation, et nous en prenons aussi occasion d'exprimer à cet égard les intentions de la France.

La France a déclaré qu'elle consacrerait tous ses moyens au maintien de la Paix et de l'équilibre Européen. C'est le cas d'expliquer clairement ce qu'elle a entendu par cette déclaration. En acceptant avec une religieuse fidélité l'état de l'Europe tel qu'il résultait des traités, la France a entendu que pendant la paix générale qui dure heureusement depuis 1815, cet état ne fut point changé, ni au profit, ni au détriment, d'aucune des Puissances existantes. C'est dans cette pensée qu'elle s'est toujours prononcée pour le maintien de l'Empire Ottoman. La race Turque, par ses qualités nationales, méritait assurément pour elle-même le respect de son indépendance ; mais les plus chers intérêts de l'Europe se rattachaient aussi à l'existence de l'Empire Turc. Cet Empire, en succombant, ne pouvait servir qu'à augmenter les Etats voisins, aux dépens de l'équilibre général ; sa chûte aurait entraîné un tel changement dans la proportion actuelle des Grandes Puissances, que la face du monde en aurait été changée. La France, et toutes les Puissances avec elle, l'ont tellement senti, qu'elles se sont loyalement engagées à maintenir l'Empire Ottoman, quels que fussent leurs intérêts respectifs relativement à sa chûte, ou à son maintien.

Mais l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman s'étend des bords de la Mer Noire à ceux de la Mer Rouge. Il importe autant de garantir l'indépendance de l'Egypte et de la Syrie, que l'indépendance du Bosphore et des Dardanelles.

Un Prince vassal a réussi à créer une administration ferme dans deux provinces, que, depuis longtemps, les Sultans de Constantinople n'avaient pu gouverner. Ce Prince vassal, s'il n'a pas fait régner dans les provinces qu'il régit l'humanité de la civilisation Européenne, que peut-être ne comportent pas encore les mœurs des pays qu'il administre, y a fait prévaloir plus d'ordre, de régularité, que dans aucune partie de l'Empire Turc. Il a su y créer une force publique, une Armée, une Marine; il a relevé l'orgueil du peuple Ottoman, et lui a rendu un peu de cette confiance en lui-même, qui est indispensable pour qu'il puisse défendre son indépendance. Ce Prince vassal est devenu, suivant nous, partie essentielle et nécessaire de l'Empire Ottoman ; s'il était détruit, l'Empire n'acquerrait pas aujourd'hui les moyens qui lui ont manqué autrefois pour gouverner la Syrie et l'Egypte ; et il perdrait un vassal qui fait maintenant l'une de ses principales forces ; il aurait des Pachas insoumis envers leurs maîtres, et dépendant de toutes les influences étrangères : en un mot, une partie de l'intégrité de l'Empire Turc serait compromise, et, avec une partie de cette intégrité, une partie de l'équilibre générale. Dans l'opinion de la France, le Vice-Roi d'Egypte, par les provinces qu'il administre, par les mers sur lesquelles s'exerce son action, est nécessaire pour assurer les proportions actuellement existantes entre les divers Etats du monde.

Dans cette conviction, la France, aussi désintéressée dans la Question d'Orient que les Quatre Puissances qui ont signé le Protocole du 17

Septembre, se croit obligée de déclarer, que la déchéance du Vice-Roi mise à exécution serait à ses yeux une atteinte à l'équilibre général. On a pu livrer aux chances de la guerre actuellement engagée la question des limites qui doivent séparer en Syrie les possessions du Sultan et du Vice-Roi d'Egypte ; mais la France ne saurait abandonner à de telles chances l'existence de Méhémet Ali comme Prince vassal de l'Empire. Quelle que soit la limite territoriale qui les séparera par suite des événemens de la guerre, leur double existence est nécessaire à l'Europe ; et la France ne saurait admettre la suppression de l'un, ou de l'autre. Disposée à prendre part à tout arrangement acceptable qui aurait pour base la double garantie de l'existence du Sultan et du Vice-Roi d'Egypte, elle se borne en ce moment à déclarer, que, pour sa part, elle ne pourrait consentir à la mise à exécution de l'acte de déchéance prononcé à Constantinople.

Du reste, les manifestations spontanées de plusieurs des Puissances signataires du Traité du 15 Juillet nous prouvent qu'en cela nous entendons l'équilibre Européen comme elles-mêmes, et qu'en ce point nous ne les trouverons pas en désaccord avec nous. Nous regretterions ce désaccord que nous ne prévoyons pas, mais nous ne saurions nous départir de cette manière d'entendre et d'assurer le maintien de l'équilibre général.

La France espère qu'on appréciera en Europe le motif qui l'a fait sortir du silence. On peut compter sur son amour de la paix, sentiment constant chez elle, malgré les procédés dont elle a cru avoir à se plaindre. On peut compter sur son désintéressement ; car on ne saurait même la soupçonner d'aspirer en Orient à des acquisitions de territoire. Mais elle aspire à maintenir l'équilibre Européen. Ce soin est remis à toutes les Grandes Puissances. Son maintien doit être leur gloire et leur principale ambition.

(Signé) A. THIERS.

(Translation.)

M. Thiers to M. Guizot.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Paris, October* 8, 1840.

THE important question which at present occupies the attention of the world has assumed an entirely new aspect since the reply made by the Porte to the concessions of the Viceroy of Egypt. Mehemet Ali, in replying to the summons of the Sultan, has declared that he submitted to the will of his August Master, that he accepted the hereditary possession of Egypt, and that, with regard to the remainder of the territories which he actually occupied, he threw himself upon the magnanimity of the Sultan. We have made known to the English Cabinet what was to be understood by this manner of expressing himself ; and although Mehemet Ali did not choose to declare at once all the concessions which he had been induced by the urgent solicitation of France to make, we took upon ourselves to make them known ; and we announced that Mehemet Ali would, in case of necessity, be content to accept the hereditary possession of Egypt, and the possession of Syria for life, giving up immediately Candia, Adana, and the Holy Cities. We will add that, if the Porte had acceded to that arrangement, we would have consented to guarantee it in concert with the Powers who are engaged in settling the fate of the Ottoman Empire.

All enlightened minds have been struck with the good faith of France, who, although holding a separate course of conduct, never ceased to use her influence in behalf of a moderate and pacific solution of the Eastern Question. They have also been struck with the wisdom with which the Viceroy listened to the counsels of prudence and moderation.

In return for such concessions, the Porte, whether it acted from its own impulse, or under the guidance of rash counsels received on the spot,

the Porte, before it was possible to refer the subject to its Allies, replied to the Viceroy's submission by an Act of deprivation. Such a course, as extravagant as it was unexpected, exceeds even the spirit of the Treaty of July 15, and goes beyond the most extreme conclusions which could be deduced from it. That Treaty, to which France cannot appeal, for she is no party to it, but to which she refers for the purpose of showing with what rapidity one is already hurried on to dangerous consequences; that Treaty, in the event of the Viceroy's absolute refusal on all points, left to the Porte the power of withdrawing its first proposals, and of then taking such course as it might think fit, in accordance with its interests and the counsels of its Allies; but the Treaty assumed two contingencies; an absolute and peremptory refusal on all points on the part of the Viceroy, and a reference to the counsels of the Four Powers. Now, nothing whatever of this kind has taken place. The Viceroy has given no absolute refusal; and the Porte has not even allowed itself time to concert an answer with its Allies. It has replied to unhoped for concessions by deprivation! The Four Powers could not approve of such a course; and we know, in fact, that several of them have already disapproved of it. Lord Palmerston has caused it to be declared to us that it could bear no other meaning than that of being a measure of menace, without any real and necessary consequence. Count Appony, in conversing with me upon this subject, announced to me on the part of his Cabinet the same opinion. We willingly take note of this wise manifestation, and, from this circumstance we also take occasion to express the intentions of France in this respect.

France has declared that she would devote all her means to the maintenance of peace and of the balance of power in Europe. This is the occasion for her to explain clearly what was her meaning in this declaration. In accepting with a religious sincerity the state of Europe as settled by Treaties, it was the understanding of France, that during the general peace which has happily subsisted since 1815, this state should not undergo any change, either to the advantage or disadvantage of any one of the existing Powers. It is with this idea that she has always declared herself in favour of the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish people, by their national character, assuredly deserved on their own account that their independence should be respected; but the dearest interests of Europe were also involved in the existence of the Turkish Empire. The destruction of that Empire could only serve to aggrandize the neighbouring States, at the expence of the general balance of power; its downfall would have produced such a change in the actual proportions of the Great Powers to each other, that the face of the world would thereby have been changed. France, and all the Powers with her, have been so sensible of this, that they have honestly pledged themselves to one another to maintain the Ottoman Empire, be their respective interests, with regard to its fall or to its maintenance, what they may.

But the integrity of the Ottoman Empire extends from the shores of the Black Sea to those of the Red Sea. It is as essential to secure the independence of Egypt and of Syria, as the independence of the Bosphorus and of the Dardanelles.

A vassal Prince has succeeded in establishing a firm administration in two provinces which for a long time the Sultans of Constantinople had been unable to govern. This vassal Prince, if he has not introduced into the provinces which he rules, the mildness of European civilization, which perhaps is not yet congenial to the manners of the countries under his administration, has at least caused more order and regularity to prevail there than exists in any other part of the Turkish Empire. He has known how to create there a public force, an army, a navy; he has roused the pride of the Ottoman people, and has restored to them a little of that confidence in themselves, which is indispensably necessary to enable them to protect their independence. This vassal Prince has become, in our opinion, an essential and necessary part of the Ottoman Empire; if he were destroyed, the Empire would not at the present day acquire the means which have been wanting to it in former times to enable it to govern Syria and Egypt; and it would lose a vassal who at present forms one of

its chief forces; it would have Pashas insubordinate towards their masters, and subject to every kind of foreign influence: in a word, a portion of the integrity of the Turkish Empire would be compromised, and, with a portion of that integrity, a portion of the general balance of power. In the opinion of France, the Viceroy of Egypt, from the provinces which he governs, from the seas over which his influence extends, is necessary to secure the proportions actually existing between the different States of the world.

Impressed with this conviction, France, equally disinterested, with respect to the Eastern Question, as the Four Powers who signed the Protocol of the 17th of September, considers herself called upon to declare, that the deprivation of the Viceroy, if actually carried into execution, would in her eyes be a blow to the general balance of power. The question respecting the limits which should separate in Syria the possessions of the Sultan and those of the Viceroy of Egypt, might be left to the chances of the war actually begun; but France could not abandon to such chances the existence of Mehemet Ali as a vassal Prince of the Empire. Whatever may be the territorial limit which, in consequence of the events of the war, shall ultimately separate them, their twofold existence is necessary to Europe; and France cannot allow the suppression of either one or the other. Disposed as she is to be a party to any acceptable arrangement, founded on the twofold guarantee of the existence of the Sultan and of the Viceroy of Egypt, she confines herself at present to declaring, that, for her part, she could not consent to the Act of deprivation decreed at Constantinople, being carried into execution.

Moreover, the voluntary manifestations made by several of the Powers who signed the Treaty of the 15th of July, prove to us that in this respect we entertain the same opinion as to the balance of power in Europe as they do, and that in this point we shall not find them at variance with us. We should regret such a variance, which we do not anticipate, but we could not swerve from this manner of understanding and of securing the maintenance of the general balance of power.

France hopes that Europe will appreciate the motive which has caused her to break silence. Her love of peace may be relied upon; it is a sentiment which constantly animates her, notwithstanding the proceedings of which she has thought she had reason to complain. Her disinterestedness may be relied upon; for she cannot even be suspected of aspiring at territorial acquisitions in the East. But she does aspire at maintaining the balance of power in Europe. The care of preserving it devolves upon all the Great Powers. Its maintenance ought to be their glory and their chief ambition.

(Signed) A. THIERS.

No. 214.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 11.)

My Lord, *Paris, October* 8, 1840.

I HEARD on Tuesday last, that the Cabinet Council had been on that day deliberating on the subject of the Firman which the Sultan had issued by the advice of the Representatives of the Allied Powers at Constantinople, and by which Mehemet Ali was removed from the post of Governor of Egypt. The Ministers, I was told, were unanimous in deciding that a Note should be addressed to Her Majesty's Government, remonstrating against the execution of this measure, but there had been a difference of opinion in the Council as to the terms of the Note. A majority of the Ministers were in favour of a declaration that the French Government would consider the execution of the Firman as a *casus belli*, whilst four out of the nine who constitute the Cabinet maintain the expediency of the French Government communicating its sentiments in a more vague and less offensive manner. I had not had the

opportunity of seeing M. Thiers since the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of October 2, in which you state the view taken of this measure by Her Majesty's Government, and considering that it was very important that the French Government should know the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, I made a point of seeing M. Thiers as soon as possible, and I communicated to him your Lordship's despatch.

I found that M. Guizot's report of his conversation with your Lordship on this matter had been received that evening by M. Thiers, and although I cannot say that he was pleased with the tenour of your language on the general Turco-Egyptian Question, he did not deny that the explanation you gave to M. Guizot, and that which you had written to me, of your view of the intention with which the Firman was issued by the Sultan, was calculated to diminish the apprehensions of the French Government as to the possible consequences of that measure, and I learnt on the following day that he determined to moderate the tone of the despatch which he proposed writing to the French Ambassador.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 215.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 11.)

(Extract.) *Paris, October* 9, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy of a despatch * which has been addressed by the President of the French Council to the French Ambassador in London, to be communicated to your Lordship. This despatch is the result of the deliberations of the Cabinet Council in regard to the Sultan's Firman, by which Mehemet Ali is deposed from the Government of Egypt. M. Thiers, in stating to me yesterday his intention to send me in the course of the day a copy of this despatch, expressed his hope that it might lead to an understanding between France and the other Great Powers of Europe on the Eastern Question.

It appears by the despatch of which the inclosed is a copy, that France is willing to leave to the chances of the war actually going on in Syria, the question of limits between the possessions of the Sultan and his vassal in that country; and the existence of Mehemet Ali as Governor of Egypt is the only point which France will not abandon to such chances. I see here no retractation of the principle of the Treaty of the 15th of July required, nor anything in this declaration inconsistent with the plan which Lord Beauvale represents in his despatch of the 30th of August, as being that which Prince Metternich proposes for effecting a reunion of the Four Powers with France in the arrangement of this question.

No. 216.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 12.)

My Lord, *Paris, October* 9, 1840.

I HAVE not seen M. Thiers since I received yesterday your despatch of October 6, but I learn from my Austrian Colleague, that M. Thiers has not done anything in consequence of the opinions expressed by Prince Metternich in the paper therein inclosed. The other plan proposed by Prince Metternich, and to which Lord Beauvale refers at the end of his despatch of August 30, was discussed in a conversation between Count Appony and M. Thiers; and it seems that to the general principle of that plan for the reunion of France to the Four Powers, in arranging the settlement of the

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* See No. 213, page 270.

Turco-Egyptian Question, the French Minister did not object, but he asked for some further explanations respecting it, and the consideration of the plan has not been renewed.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 217.

M. Thiers to M. Guizot.—(Communicated by M. Guizot, October 12.)

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Paris, le* 3 *Octobre*, 1840.

VOUS avez eu connaissance de la dépêche que Lord Palmerston a écrite à M. Bulwer, pour expliquer la conduite du Gouvernement Britannique dans l'importante négociation qui s'est terminée par le Traité du 15 Juillet. Cette dépêche, dont je me plais à reconnaître que le ton est parfaitement convenable et modéré, contient cependant des assertions et des raisonnemens qu'il est impossible au Gouvernement du Roi de laisser établir. Sans doute, pour ne pas aggraver une situation déjà si menaçante, il vaudrait mieux laisser le passé dans l'oubli, et ne pas revenir sur des contestations trop souvent renouvelées; mais, outre que Lord Palmerston aurait droit de trouver mauvais que sa communication restât sans réponse, il importe de représenter, dans sa vérité, la conduite respective de chaque Cour, pendant cette négociation. La dépêche de Lord Palmerston, communiquée à toutes les légations sous la forme d'exemplaires imprimés, est déjà devenue publique. Il était donc indispensable d'y faire une réponse. Celle que je vous envoie et dont je souhaite que le Cabinet Britannique ne croie pas avoir à se plaindre, donnera aux faits qui se sont passés entre les divers Cabinets le sens véritable qu'ils nous semblent avoir. Vous voudrez bien en laisser copie au Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique.

Si j'ai bien saisi l'ensemble de l'exposé présenté par Lord Palmerston, on pourrait le résumer comme il suit :

"La Grande Bretagne, complètement désintéressée dans la Question d'Orient, n'a poursuivi qu'un seul but; c'est l'indépendance et l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman. C'est ce but qu'elle a proposé à toutes les Cours, qu'elles ont toutes adopté, qu'elles ont toutes poursuivi, la France comme les autres. Dans ce but, il fallait réduire à de moindres proportions les prétentions démesurées du Vice-Roi d'Egypte, il fallait éloigner le plus possible du Taurus les possessions et les armées de cet ambitieux vassal. Ce qu'il y avait de mieux, c'était de mettre le Désert entre le Sultan et le Pacha, c'était de réduire Méhémet Ali à l'Egypte, et de rendre la Syrie au Sultan Abdoul Medjid. Le désert de Syrie aurait alors servi de barrière entre les deux Etats, et rassuré l'Empire Ottoman, et l'Europe, intéressée au salut de cet Empire, contre l'ambition de la famille Egyptienne.

"C'est toujours là ce que l'Angleterre a proclamé à toutes les époques de la négociation. La France, par la Note Collective signée à Constantinople, le 27 Juillet, 1839, par une circulaire adressée le 17 du même mois à toutes les Cours, la France avait semblé adhérer au principe commun, en proclamant d'une manière aussi absolue que les autres Cabinets, l'indépendance et l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman.

"Cependant elle s'est ensuite éloignée de ce principe, en demandant, au profit du Vice-Roi, un démembrement de l'Empire, incompatible avec son existence. Dans le désir de s'assurer le concours de la France, les Quatre Cabinets, Signataires du Traité du 15 Juillet, ont fait auprès d'elle des instances réitérées pour l'amener à leurs vues. Ils lui ont même fait des sacrifices considérables, car ils ont ajouté à l'Egypte, héréditairement concédée, le Pachalic d'Acre, moins la place de ce nom; et ensuite ils ont consenti à y joindre la place elle-même; mais tous ces sacrifices sont demeurés inutiles; la France a persisté à s'éloigner du principe que les Cinq Cabinets avaient cru devoir proclamer en commun.

"Les autres Cours n'ont pas pu la suivre dans cette voie. Quelque désir qu'elles éprouvassent de s'assurer son concours, elles ont dû enfin se séparer

d'elle, et signer un Acte qui ne doit pas la surprendre, car elle avait été plus d'une fois avertie que si on ne parvenait pas à s'entendre, il faudrait bien finir par résoudre à quatre la question qu'on ne pouvait résoudre à cinq. Quatre Cabinets étant d'accord sur une question de la plus haute importance, ne pouvaient pas indéfiniment accorder à un cinquième le sacrifice de leurs vues et de leurs intentions parfaitement désintéressées. En effet, Lord Palmerston avait soigneusement répété à l'Ambassadeur de France, que la proposition contenue depuis dans le Traité du 15 Juillet, était son *ultimatum*, et que cette proposition refusée, il n'en ferait plus d'autre. Il a bien fallu passer outre, et ne pas laisser périr l'Empire Ottoman par de trop longues hésitations. Les Quatre Cours ne sauraient être accusées d'avoir voulu offenser la France en cette occasion.

" D'ailleurs, en agissant ainsi, les Quatre Cabinets se rappelaient que la France avait, au mois de Septembre 1839, par l'organe de son Ambassadeur à Londres, proposé un plan d'arrangement fondé, à peu de choses près, sur les mêmes bases que le Traité du 15 Juillet; que plus tard, en combattant le projet présenté par l'Angleterre, elle avait reconnu que, sauf la difficulté et le danger des moyens d'exécution, il serait incontestablement préférable à tout autre; qu'enfin, en toute occasion, elle avait manifesté l'intention de ne mettre aucun obstacle à ces moyens d'exécution. Ils devaient donc penser que si, pour des considérations particulières, elle refusait de se joindre à eux pour contraindre Méhémet Ali par la force, elle ne mettrait du moins aucun obstacle à leurs efforts, que même elle les seconderait par l'emploi de son influence morale à Alexandrie. Les Quatre Cabinets espèrent encore que, lorsque le Traité du 15 Juillet aura reçu son accomplissement, la France se joindra de nouveau à eux pour assurer d'une manière définitive le maintien de l'Empire Ottoman."

Telle est, si je ne me trompe, l'analyse exacte et rigoureuse de l'exposé que Lord Palmerston et les Quatre Cours en général ne cessent de faire des négociations auxquelles a donné lieu la Question Turco-Egyptienne.

D'après cet exposé, la France aurait été inconséquente;

Elle aurait voulu, et ne voudrait plus, l'intégrité et l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman;

Les Quatre Cours auraient fait des sacrifices réitérés à ses vues;

Elles auraient fini par lui présenter un *ultimatum* fondé sur une ancienne proposition de son propre Ambassadeur;

Elles n'auraient passé outre qu'après cet *ultimatum* refusé;

Elles auraient droit d'être surprises de la manière dont la France a accueilli le Traité du 15 Juillet, car, d'après ses propres déclarations, on aurait dû s'attendre qu'elle donnerait à ce Traité plus qu'une adhésion passive, et au moins son influence morale.

Le récit exact des faits répondra complètement à cette manière de présenter les négociations.

Lorsque la Porte, mal conseillée, renouvela ses hostilités contre le Vice-Roi, et perdit à la fois son armée de terre et sa flotte, lorsqu'à toutes ces pertes se joignit la mort du Sultan Mahmoud, quelle fut la crainte de l'Angleterre et de la France, alors toutes les deux parfaitement unies? Leur crainte fut de voir Ibrahim, victorieux, franchir le Taurus, menacer Constantinople, et amener à l'instant même les Russes dans la Capitale de l'Empire Ottoman. Tout ce qu'il y a en Europe d'esprits éclairés s'associa à cette inquiétude.

Quelles furent à ce sujet les propositions de Lord Palmerston? Une première fois, en son nom personnel, une seconde fois, au nom de son Cabinet, il proposa à la France de réunir deux flottes, l'une Anglaise, l'autre Française, de les diriger vers les côtes de la Syrie, d'adresser une sommation aux deux parties belligérantes afin de les obliger à suspendre les hostilités; d'appuyer cette sommation par les moyens maritimes; puis, de réunir les deux flottes, et de demander à la Porte l'entrée des Dardanelles, ou même de forcer ce célèbre passage, si la lutte entre le Pacha et le Sultan avait amené les Russes à Constantinople.

Ce que l'Angleterre, et, avec elle, tous les politiques prévoyans, entendaient alors par l'intégrité et l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman, c'était donc de le préserver de la protection exclusive des armées Russes; et, pour prévenir le cas de cette protection, d'empêcher le Vice-Roi de marcher sur Constantinople.

La France entra pleinement dans cette pensée. Elle employa son influence

auprès de Méhémet Ali et de son fils pour arrêter l'Armée Egyptienne victorieuse ; elle y réussit ; et, pour parer au danger plus sérieux de voir les armées Russes à Constantinople, elle pensa qu'avant de forcer les Dardanelles, il convenait de demander à la Porte son consentement à l'entrée des deux flottes, dans le cas où un corps de troupes Russes aurait franchi le Bosphore.

L'Angleterre accéda à ces propositions, et les deux Cabinets furent parfaitement d'accord. Les mots d'indépendance et d'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman ne signifiaient pas alors, on ne saurait trop le faire remarquer, qu'on enlèverait à Méhémet Ali telle ou telle partie des territoires qu'il occupait, mais qu'on l'empêcherait de marcher sur la Capitale de l'Empire, et d'attirer par la présence des soldats Egyptiens la présence des soldats Russes.

Le Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique, s'entretenant à ce sujet avec M. de Bourqueney, le 25 Mai et le 20 Juin, reconnaissait qu'il y avait en France et en Angleterre une opinion en faveur de la famille Egyptienne ; qu'en France cette opinion était beaucoup plus générale ; que, par suite, le Gouvernement Français devait être beaucoup plus favorable que le Gouvernement Anglais à Méhémet Ali ; que c'était là sans doute une difficulté de la situation ; mais que c'était une considération secondaire ; qu'une considération supérieure devait dominer toutes les autres : c'était le besoin de sauver l'Empire Ottoman d'une protection exclusive, et tôt ou tard mortelle pour lui, si la France et l'Angleterre ne s'entendaient pas.

La France partageait ces idées. Sa politique tendait conséquemment à un double but, celui d'arrêter le Vice-Roi, lorsque, de vassal puissant mais soumis, il passerait au rôle de vassal insoumis et menaçant le trône de son Maître ; et de substituer, à la protection exclusive d'une Puissance, celle des Cinq Puissances prépondérantes en Europe.

C'est dans ces vues qu'elle signa en commun la Note du 27 Juillet, Note tendant à placer la protection des Cinq Cours entre le Sultan vaincu et le Pacha victorieux ; c'est dans ce sens qu'elle adressa, le 17 Juillet, une circulaire à toutes les Cours, pour provoquer une profession commune de respect pour l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman. C'est dans ces vues qu'elle proposa la première d'associer l'Autriche, la Prusse, et la Russie elle-même, à toutes les résolutions relatives à la Question Turco-Egyptienne.

Lord Palmerston se rappellera sans doute qu'il était moins disposé que la France à provoquer ce concours général des Cinq Puissances ; et le Cabinet Français ne peut que se souvenir avec un vif regret, en comparant le temps d'alors au temps d'aujourd'hui, que c'était sur la France surtout que le Cabinet Anglais croyait pouvoir compter pour assurer le salut de l'Empire Turc.

Personne n'était disposé à croire alors que l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman consistât dans la limite qui séparerait en Syrie les possessions du Sultan et du Vice-Roi. Tout le monde la faisait consister dans un double fait : empêcher Ibrahim de menacer la Capitale, et dispenser les Russes de la secourir. La France partageait, avec tous les Cabinets, cette croyance à laquelle elle est restée fidèle.

L'Autriche et la Prusse adhérèrent aux vues de la France et de l'Angleterre. La Cour de Russie refusa de prendre part aux conférences qui devaient se tenir à Vienne dans le but de généraliser le protectorat Européen à l'égard du Sultan. Elle approuvait peu l'empressement des Puissances d'Occident à se mêler de la Question d'Orient. "L'Empereur," disait M. de Nesselrode, dans une dépêche écrite le 6 Août, 1839, à M. de Médem, et communiquée officiellement au Gouvernement Français, "l'Empereur ne désespère nullement du salut de la Porte, pourvu que les Puissances de l'Europe sachent respecter son repos, et que, par une agitation intempestive, elles ne finissent par l'ébranler, tout en voulant le raffermir." La Cour de Russie jugeait donc peu convenable de s'interposer entre le Sultan et le Pacha, croyait qu'il suffisait d'empêcher le Vice-Roi de menacer Constantinople, et semblait regarder un arrangement direct comme la ressource la plus convenable à cette situation. "Du reste," disait encore M. de Nesselrode à l'Ambassadeur de France, au commencement d'Août, 1839, "un peu plus, un peu moins de Syrie, donné ou ôté au Pacha, nous touche peu. Notre seule condition, c'est que la Porte soit libre dans le consentement qu'elle donnera."

A cette époque donc, les Quatre Cours, depuis Signataires du Traité du 15 Juillet, les Quatre Cours n'étaient pas, comme on voudrait le faire croire

aujourd'hui, unies de vues, en présence de la France seule dissidente, et empêchant tout accord par ses refus perpétuels.

Le danger s'était éloigné depuis qu'Ibrahim avait suspendu sa marche victorieuse. Les deux parties belligérantes étaient en présence : le Pacha tout puissant, le Sultan vaincu et sans ressources ; mais immobiles tous les deux, grâce à l'intervention de la France. Le Cabinet Britannique proposa d'arracher la flotte Turque des mains de Méhémet Ali. La France s'y refusa, craignant de provoquer de nouvelles hostilités. Alors commença le funeste dissentiment qui a séparé la France de l'Angleterre, et qu'il faut à jamais regretter, dans l'intérêt de la paix et de la civilisation du monde.

Les mauvaises dispositions du Cabinet Britannique contre le Vice-Roi d'Egypte éclatèrent avec beaucoup de vivacité : la France chercha à les tempérer. Le Cabinet Britannique sur les représentations de la France, appréciant le danger d'un acte de vive force, renonça à recouvrer la flotte Turque par des moyens violens ; cette proposition n'eut point de suite.

Il était devenu nécessaire de s'expliquer enfin pour savoir de quelle manière se viderait la question territoriale entre le Sultan et le Vice-Roi. Le dissentiment entre les vues de la France et de l'Angleterre éclata plus vivement. Lord Palmerston déclara, qu'à ses yeux, le Vice-Roi devait recevoir l'Egypte héréditairement, mais que, pour prix de cette hérédité, il devait abandonner immédiatement les Villes Saintes, l'île de Candie, le district d'Adana, et la Syrie toute entière. Toutefois il modifia un peu ses premières vues, et consentit à joindre à la possession héréditaire de l'Egypte, la possession héréditaire aussi du Pachalic d'Acre moins la place d'Acre.

La France n'admit point ces propositions. Elle jugea que le Vice-Roi, vainqueur du Sultan à Nézib, sans avoir été l'agresseur, ayant de plus consenti à s'arrêter, quand il pouvait fondre sur l'Empire et renverser le trône du Sultan, méritait plus de ménagemens. Elle pensa que, de la part des Puissances qui l'avaient engagé, en 1833, à accepter les conditions de Kutahia, il y aurait peu d'équité à lui imposer des conditions beaucoup plus rigoureuses, alors qu'il n'avait rien fait pour perdre le bénéfice de cette transaction. Elle crut qu'en lui enlevant les Villes Saintes, l'île de Candie, le district d'Adana, position offensive, et qui, restituée à la Porte, lui rendait toute sécurité, on devait lui assurer la possession héréditaire de l'Egypte et de la Syrie. La victoire de Nézib, gagnée sans agression de sa part, aurait pu seule lui valoir l'hérédité de ses possessions depuis le Nil jusqu'au Taurus. Mais en tenant la victoire de Nézib pour non avenue, en fesant acheter à Méhémet Ali l'hérédité au prix d'une partie de ses possessions actuelles, il y avait du moins rigoureuse justice à ne pas lui enlever plus que Candie, Adana, et les Villes Saintes. D'ailleurs la France demandait par quels moyens on prétendait réduire Mehémet Ali? Sans doute les Cabinets Européens étaient forts contre lui, lorsqu'il voulait menacer Constantinople ; dans ce cas, des flottes dans la Mer de Marmara suffisaient pour l'arrêter. Mais pour lui ôter la Syrie, quels moyens avait-on? Des moyens peu efficaces, comme un blocus ; peu légitimes, comme des provocations à l'insurrection ; très-dangereux, très-contraires au but proposé, comme une armée Russe! La France proposa donc, en Septembre, 1839, d'adjuger au Vice-Roi l'hérédité de l'Egypte et l'hérédité de la Syrie. Jamais à aucune époque de la négociation, la France n'a proposé autre chose, excepté dans ces derniers tems, lorsqu'elle a conseillé au Vice-Roi de se contenter de la possession viagère de la Syrie. J'ai examiné les dépêches antérieures à mon administration, et je n'y ai vu nulle part que le Général Sébastiani ait été autorisé à proposer la délimitation contenue dans le Traité du 15 Juillet, ou qu'il ait spontanément pris sur lui de la proposer. Je lui ai demandé à lui-même quels étaient ses souvenirs à cet égard, et il m'a affirmé qu'il n'avait fait aucune proposition de ce genre. La France donc proposa en 1839 l'attribution au Vice-Roi de l'hérédité de l'Egypte et de l'hérédité de la Syrie. Elle fut malheureusement en dissentiment complet avec l'Angleterre.

Ce dissentiment, à jamais regrettable, fut bientôt connu de l'Europe entière. Tout-à-coup, et comme par enchantement, il fit cesser les divergences qui avaient séparé les Quatre Cours, et amena entre elles un subit accord.

L'Autriche, qui d'abord avait donné une pleine adhésion à nos propositions, qui, sur le point de notifier cette adhésion à Londres, n'avait, nous disait-elle, suspendu cette notification que pour nous donner le tems de nous mettre d'accord avec l'Angleterre, l'Autriche commença à dire, qu'entre la France et l'Angle-

terre, elle se prononcerait pour celle des Deux Cours qui accorderait la plus grande étendue de territoire au Sultan. Il est vrai qu'alors elle protestait encore contre la pensée de recourir à des moyens coërcitifs, dont elle était la première à proclamer le danger. La Prusse adopta le sentiment de l'Autriche. La Russie envoya à Londres M. de Brunnow, en Septembre, 1839, pour faire ses propositions. La Russie, qui naguère repoussait comme peu convenable l'idée d'une intervention Européenne entre le Sultan et le Vice-Roi, et ne semblait voir de ressource que dans un arrangement direct, la Russie adhérait maintenant à tous les arrangemens territoriaux qu'il plairait à l'Angleterre d'adopter, et demandait, qu'en cas de reprise des hostilités, on la laissât, au nom des Cinq Cours, couvrir Constantinople avec une armée, tandis que les flottes Anglaise et Française bloqueraient la Syrie.

Ces propositions réalisaient justement la combinaison que l'Angleterre avait jusque là regardée comme la plus dangereuse pour l'Empire Ottoman,—la protection d'une armée Russe; combinaison redoutable, non par la possibilité qu'une armée Russe pût être tentée de rester définitivement à Constantinople, mais uniquement parceque la Russie, ajoutant ainsi au fait de 1833, un second fait exactement semblable, aurait créé en sa faveur l'autorité des précédens. Ces propositions ne furent point accueillies. M. de Brunnow quitta Londres, et y revint en Janvier, 1840, avec des propositions nouvelles. Elles différaient des premières en ce qu'elles accordaient à la France et à l'Angleterre la faculté d'introduire chacune trois vaisseaux dans une partie limitée de la Mer de Marmara, pendant que les troupes Russes occuperaient Constantinople.

La négociation s'est arrêtée là pendant plusieurs mois, depuis le mois de Février jusqu'à celui de Juillet, 1840. Dans cette intervalle un nouveau Ministère et un nouvel Ambassadeur ont été chargés des affaires de la France. Le Cabinet Français a toujours répété qu'il ne croyait pas juste de retrancher la Syrie du nombre des possessions Egyptiennes; que, s'il était possible que le Vice-Roi y consentît, la France ne pouvait être, pour le Vice-Roi, plus ambitieuse que lui-même; mais que, s'il fallait lui arracher la Syrie par la force, le Gouvernement du Roi ne voyait, pour y réussir, que des moyens, ou inefficaces, ou dangereux; et que, dans ce cas, il s'isolerait des autres Cours et tiendrait une conduite tout-à-fait séparée.

Pendant que le Cabinet Français tenait ce langage à Londres avec franchise et persévérance, l'Ambassadeur Français à Constantinople ne cherchait pas à négocier un arrangement direct entre le Sultan et le Vice-Roi; il ne donnait pas, ainsi que semble le croire Lord Palmerston sans l'affirmer, il ne donnait pas le premier l'exemple de la séparation. Jamais notre Représentant à Constantinople n'a tenu la conduite qu'on lui prête; jamais les instructions du Gouvernement du Roi ne lui ont prescrit une pareille marche. Sans doute la France n'a cessé de travailler à un rapprochement entre le Sultan et le Vice-Roi, à les disposer l'un et l'autre à de raisonnables concessions, à faciliter ainsi la tâche délicate dont l'Europe s'était imposé l'accomplissement; mais nous avons constamment recommandé, tant à M. le Comte Pontois qu'à M. Cochelet, d'éviter avec le plus grand soin tout ce qui eût pu être considéré comme une tentative de mettre à l'écart les autres Puissances, et ils ont été scrupuleusement fidèles à cette recommandation.

L'Angleterre avait à choisir entre la Russie lui offrant l'abandon du Vice-Roi, à condition de faire adopter les propositions de M. de Brunnow, c'est-à-dire, l'exécution consentie par l'Europe du Traité d'Unkiar Skélessi, et la France ne demandant qu'une négociation équitable et modérée entre le Sultan et Méhémet Ali, une négociation qui prévînt de nouvelles hostilités, et, à la suite de ces hostilités, le cas le plus dangereux pour l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman,—la protection directe et matérielle d'un seul Etat puissant.

Avant de faire son choix définitif entre la Russie et la France, le Cabinet de Londres ne nous a pas fait les offres réitérées dont on parle, pour nous amener à ses vues. Ses efforts se sont bornés à une seule proposition. En 1839, on accordait au Vice-Roi la possession héréditaire de l'Egypte et du Pachalic d'Acre, moins la citadelle; en 1840, Lord Palmerston nous proposa de lui accorder le Pachalic d'Acre, avec la citadelle de plus, mais avec l'hérédité du moins. Assurément c'était là retrancher de la première offre plus qu'on y ajoutait, et on ne pouvait pas dire que ce fût une proposition nouvelle ni surtout plus avantageuse.

Mais cette proposition si peu digne du titre de proposition nouvelle, car

elle ne contenait aucun avantage nouveau, n'avait en rien le caractère d'un *ultimatum*. Elle ne nous fut nullement présentée ainsi. Nous étions si loin de la considérer sous cet aspect, que sur une insinuation de MM. de Bülow et de Neumann, nous concevions l'espérance d'obtenir pour le Vice-Roi la possession viagère de toute la Syrie, jointe à la possession héréditaire de l'Egypte. Sur l'affirmation de MM. de Bülow et de Neumann, que cette proposition, si elle était faite, serait la dernière concession de Lord Palmerston, nous envoyâmes M. Eugène Périer à Alexandrie pour disposer le Vice-Roi à consentir à un arrangement qui nous semblait le dernier possible. Ce n'était pas, comme le dit Lord Palmerston, faire dépendre la négociation de la volonté d'un Pacha d'Egypte, mais disposer les volontés contraires et les amener à un arrangement amiable qui prévînt le cruel spectacle donné aujourd'hui au monde.

La France avait quelque droit de penser qu'une si longue négociation ne se terminerait pas sans une dernière explication; que la grande et utile alliance qui, depuis dix ans, la liait à l'Angleterre, ne se dissoudrait pas sans un dernier effort de rapprochement. Les insinuations qui lui avaient été faites, et qui tendaient à faire croire que peut-être on accorderait la possession viagère de la Syrie au Vice-Roi, devaient l'entretenir dans cette espérance. Tout-à-coup, le 17 Juillet, Lord Palmerston appelle au Foreign Office l'Ambassadeur de France, et lui apprend qu'un Traité est signé depuis l'avant veille; il le lui apprend sans même lui donner connaissance du texte de ce Traité. Le Cabinet Français a dû en être surpris. Il n'ignorait pas sans doute que les Trois Cours du Continent avaient adhéré aux vues de l'Angleterre; que, par conséquent, un arrangement des Quatre Cours sans la France était possible; mais il ne devait pas croire que cet arrangement aurait lieu sans qu'on l'en eût préalablement averti, et que l'Alliance Française serait aussi promptement sacrifiée.

L'offre que le Vice-Roi a faite, en Juin, au Sultan, de restituer la flotte Turque, et dont on a craint de voir sortir un arrangement direct secrètement proposé par nous; la possibilité qui s'est offerte à cette époque d'insurger la Syrie; paraissent être les deux motifs qui ont fait succéder à une longue inertie dans le Cabinet Anglais une résolution aussi soudaine. Si le Cabinet Britannique avait voulu avoir avec nous une dernière et franche explication, le Cabinet Français aurait pu lui démontrer que l'offre de renvoyer la flotte n'était pas une combinaison de la France pour amener un arrangement direct, car elle n'a connu cette offre qu'après qu'elle a été faite; peut-être aussi aurait-il pu lui persuader que le soulèvement de la Syrie était un moyen peu digne et peu sûr.

Tels sont les faits dont la France affirme la vérité avec la sincérité et la loyauté qui conviennent à une grande nation.

Il en résulte évidemment:—

1°. Que l'indépendance et l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman ont été entendus, au début de la négociation, comme la France les entend aujourd'hui, non pas comme une limite territoriale plus ou moins avantageuse entre le Sultan et le Vice-Roi; mais comme une garantie des Cinq Cours contre une marche offensive de Méhémet Ali, et contre la protection exclusive d'une seule des Cinq Puissances.

2°. Que la France, loin de modifier ses opinions en présence des Quatre Cours toujours unies de vues, d'intentions, et de langage, a toujours au contraire entendu la Question Turco-Egyptienne d'une seule manière, tandis qu'elle a vu les Quatre Cours d'abord en désaccord, s'unir ensuite dans l'idée de sacrifier le Vice-Roi, et l'Angleterre, satisfaite de ce sacrifice, se rapprocher des trois autres, et former une union, il est vrai, très-persévérante aujourd'hui dans ses vues, très-soudaine, très-inquiétante dans ses résolutions.

3°. Qu'on n'a pas fait à la France de sacrifices réitérés pour l'attirer au projet des Quatre Cours, puisqu'on s'est borné à lui offrir, en 1839, de joindre à l'Egypte le Pachalic d'Acre, sans la place d'Acre, mais avec l'hérédité de ce Pachalic, et à lui offrir en 1840, le Pachalic d'Acre avec la place, mais sans l'hérédité.

4°. Qu'elle n'a pas été avertie, comme on le dit, que les Quatre Cours allaient passer outre si elle n'adhérait pas à leurs vues; que, tout au contraire, elle avait quelques raisons de s'attendre à de nouvelles propositions, quand, à la nouvelle du départ de Sami Bey pour Constantinople et de l'insurrection de Syrie, on a soudainement signé, sans l'en prévenir, le Traité du 15 Juillet, dont on ne lui a donné connaissance que lorsqu'il était déjà signé, et communication que deux mois plus tard.

5°. Enfin qu'on n'a pas droit de compter sur son adhésion passive à l'exécution de ce Traité, puisque, si elle a surtout insisté sur la difficulté des moyens d'exécution, elle n'a toutefois jamais professé, pour le but, pas plus que pour les moyens, une indifférence qui permît de conclure qu'elle n'interviendrait en aucun cas dans ce qui se passerait en Orient; que, bien loin de là, elle a toujours déclaré qu'elle s'isolerait des Quatre autres Puissances, si certaines résolutions étaient adoptées; que jamais aucun de ses agens n'a été autorisé à dire une parole de laquelle on pût conclure que cet isolement serait l'inaction; et qu'elle a toujours entendu, comme elle entend encore, se réserver à cet égard sa pleine liberté.

Le Cabinet Français ne reviendrait point sur de telles contestations si la Note de Lord Palmerston ne lui en faisait un devoir rigoureux. Mais il est prêt à les mettre tout-à-fait en oubli, pour traiter le fond des choses, et attirer l'attention du Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique sur le côté vraiment grave de la situation.

L'existence de l'Empire Turc est en péril; l'Angleterre s'en préoccupe et elle a raison; toutes les Puissances amies de la paix doivent s'en préoccuper aussi; mais comment faut-il s'y prendre pour raffermir cet Empire? Lorsque les Sultans de Constantinople, n'ayant plus la force de régir les vastes provinces qui dépendaient d'eux, ont vu la Moldavie, la Valachie, et plus récemment, la Grèce, s'échapper insensiblement de leurs mains, comment s'y est-on pris? A-t-on, par une décision Européenne appuyée sur des troupes Russes et des flottes Anglaises, cherché à restituer aux Sultans des sujets qui leur échappaient? Assurément non. On n'a pas essayé l'impossible. On ne leur a pas rendu la possession et l'administration directe des provinces qui se détachaient de l'Empire. On ne leur a laissé qu'une suzeraineté presque nominale sur la Valachie et la Moldavie. On les a tout-à-fait dépossédés de la Grèce. Est-ce par esprit d'injustice? Non certainement. Mais l'empire des faits, plus fort que les résolutions des Cabinets, a empêché de restituer à la Porte, soit la suzeraineté directe de la Moldavie et de la Valachie, soit l'administration même indirecte de la Grèce; et la Porte n'a eu de repos que depuis que ce sacrifice a été franchement opéré. Quelle vue a dirigé les Cabinets dans ces sacrifices? C'est de rendre indépendantes, c'est de soustraire à l'ambition de tous les Etats voisins, les portions de l'Empire Turc qui s'en séparaient. Ne pouvant refaire un grand tout, on a voulu que les parties détachées restassent des Etats indépendans de tous les Empires environnans.

Un fait semblable vient de se produire depuis quelques années relativement à l'Egypte et la Syrie: l'Egypte a-t-elle jamais été véritablement sous l'Empire des Sultans? Personne ne le pense; et personne ne croirait aujourd'hui pouvoir la faire gouverner directement de Constantinople. On en juge apparemment ainsi, puisque les Quatre Cours décernent à Méhémet Ali l'hérédité de l'Egypte, en réservant toutefois la suzeraineté au Sultan. Elles-mêmes, en cela, entendent comme la France l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman; elles se bornent à vouloir lui conserver tout ce qu'il pourra retenir sous son autorité. Elles veulent autant que possible un lien de vassalage entre l'Empire et ses parties détachées. Elles veulent en un mot tout ce que veut la France. Les Quatre Cours, en attribuant au Vassal heureux qui a su gouverner l'Egypte l'hérédité de cette province, lui attribuent encore le Pachalic d'Acre; mais elles lui refusent les trois autres Pachalics de Damas, d'Alep, de Tripoli: elles appellent cela sauver l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman! Ainsi, l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman est sauvée même quand on en détache l'Egypte et le Pachalic d'Acre, mais elle est détruite si on détache de plus, Tripoli, Damas, et Alep! Nous le disons franchement, une telle thèse ne saurait se soutenir gravement devant l'Europe.

Evidemment, il ne saurait y avoir, pour donner ou retirer ces Pachalics à Méhémet Ali, que des raisons d'équité et de politique. Le Vice-Roi d'Egypte a fondé un Etat vassal avec génie et avec suite. Il a su gouverner l'Egypte, et même la Syrie, que jamais les Sultans n'avaient pu gouverner. Les Musulmans, depuis longtems humiliés dans leur juste fierté, voient en lui un Prince glorieux qui leur rend le sentiment de leur force. Pourquoi affaiblir ce vassal utile, qui, une fois séparé par une frontière bien choisie des Etats de son maître, deviendra pour lui le plus précieux des auxiliaires? Il a aidé le Sultan dans sa lutte contre la Grèce; pourquoi ne l'aiderait-il pas dans sa lutte contre des voisins d'une religion hostile à la sienne? Son intérêt répond de lui, à défaut

de sa fidélité. Quand Constantinople sera menacée, Alexandrie sera en péril. Méhémet Ali le sait bien, et prouve tous les jours qu'il le comprend parfaitement.

Il faut, pour garder l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman depuis Constantinople jusqu'à Alexandrie, il faut à la fois le Sultan et le Pacha d'Egypte, celui-ci soumis à celui-là par un lien de vassalage. Le Taurus est la ligne de séparation indiquée entre eux. Mais on veut ôter au Pacha d'Egypte les clefs du Taurus; soit; qu'on les rende à la Porte, et, pour cela, qu'on retire le district d'Adana à Méhémet Ali. On veut lui ôter aussi la clef de l'Archipel; qu'on lui refuse Candie: il y consent. La France, qui n'avait pas promis son influence morale au Traité du 15 Juillet, mais qui la doit toute entière à la paix, a conseillé ces sacrifices à Méhémet Ali; et il les a faits. Mais, en vérité, pour lui ôter encore deux ou trois Pachalics, et les donner, non au Sultan, mais à l'anarchie; pour assurer ce singulier triomphe de l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman, déjà privé de la Grèce, de l'Egypte, du Pachalic d'Acre; appeler sur cette intégrité le seul danger sérieux qui la menace, celui que l'Angleterre trouvait si sérieux l'année dernière, que pour le prévenir elle proposait de forcer les Dardanelles, c'est là une manière bien singulière de pourvoir à ces grands intérêts!

Admettons cependant, pour un moment, que les vues du Cabinet Britannique soient mieux entendues que celles du Cabinet Français; l'alliance de la France ne valait-elle pas mieux, pour l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman et pour la paix du monde, que telle ou telle délimitation en Syrie?

On ne s'alarmerait pas tant sur l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman, si on ne craignait de grands bouleversemens de territoire dans le monde, si on ne craignait la guerre, qui seule rend ces bouleversemens possibles. Or, pour les prévenir, quelle était la combinaison la plus efficace? N'était-ce pas l'alliance de la France et de l'Angleterre? Depuis Cadiz jusqu'aux bords de l'Oder et du Danube, demandez-le aux peuples. Demandez-leur ce qu'ils pensent à cet égard, et ils répondront que c'est cette alliance qui depuis dix ans a sauvé la paix et l'indépendance des Etats, sans nuire à la liberté des nations.

On dit que cette alliance n'est pas rompue, qu'elle renaîtrait après le but atteint par le Traité du 15 Juillet. Quand on aura poursuivi à quatre, sans nous, et malgré nous, un but en soi mauvais, que du moins nous avons cru et déclaré tel, quand on l'aura poursuivi par une alliance trop semblable à ces coalitions qui ont depuis cinquante ans ensanglanté l'Europe, croire qu'on trouvera la France sans défiance, sans ressentiment d'une telle offense, c'est se faire de sa fierté nationale une idée qu'elle n'a jamais donnée au monde.

On a donc sacrifié gratuitement, pour un résultat secondaire, une alliance qui a maintenu l'indépendance et l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman beaucoup plus sûrement que ne le fera le Traité du 15 Juillet.

On dira que la France pouvait aussi faire la même réflexion, et qu'elle pouvait, si la question des limites en Syrie lui paraissait secondaire, se rendre aux vues de l'Angleterre, et acheter par ce sacrifice le maintien de l'alliance.

A cela il y a une réponse fort simple. La France, une fois d'accord sur le but avec ses Alliés, aurait fait, non pas de ces sacrifices essentiels qu'aucune nation ne doit à une autre, mais celui de sa manière de voir sur certaines questions de limites. Elle vient de le prouver par les concessions qu'elle a demandées et obtenues du Vice-Roi. Mais on ne lui a pas laissé le choix. On lui a fait part d'une nouvelle alliance, quand déjà elle était conclue. Dès-lors elle a dû s'isoler. Elle l'a fait, mais elle ne l'a fait qu'alors. Depuis, toujours fidèle à sa politique pacifique, elle n'a cessé de conseiller au Vice-Roi d'Egypte la plus parfaite modération. Bien qu'armée et libre de son action, elle fera tous ses efforts pour éviter au monde des douleurs et des catastrophes. Sauf les sacrifices qui coûteraient à son honneur, elle fera tous ceux qu'elle pourra pour maintenir la paix; et si aujourd'hui elle tient ce langage au Cabinet Britannique, c'est moins pour se plaindre que pour prouver la loyauté de sa politique, non-seulement à la Grande Bretagne, mais au monde, dont aucun Etat aujourd'hui, quelque puissant qu'il soit, ne saurait mépriser l'opinion. Le Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique a voulu prouver son bon droit: le Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté le Roi des Français doit aussi à son Roi et à son Pays, de prouver la conséquence, la loyauté de la politique Française, dans la grave Question d'Orient.

Agréez, &c.,

(Signé) A. THIERS.

P.S. 8 *Octobre.*—Pendant que j'écrivais cette dépêche, M. l'Ambassadeur, de déplorables événemens sont venus ajouter encore à la gravité de la situation. Aux démarches conciliantes du Vice-Roi d'Egypte, on a répondu par les plus violentes hostilités. La Porte, cédant à de funestes conseils, a prononcé sa déchéance. Il ne s'agit plus seulement de restreindre la puissance de Méhémet Ali; on veut le faire disparaître de la face du monde politique.

Si c'étaient là les intentions sérieuses des Puissances unies par le Traité du 15 Juillet, s'il fallait voir dans ce qui vient de se passer, autre chose que l'entraînement presque involontaire d'une situation fausse dont on n'a pas su prévoir les conséquences, en vérité il y aurait à désespérer du rétablissement de l'harmonie entre les Grandes Puissances. En conséquence, je crois devoir ajouter à la présente communication la Note ci-jointe*.

(Translation.)

M. Thiers to M. Guizot.—(*Communicated by M. Guizot, October* 12.)

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Paris, October* 3, 1840.

YOU have been made acquainted with the despatch which Lord Palmerston wrote to Mr. Bulwer to explain the conduct of the British Government in the important negotiation which was terminated by the Treaty of the 15th of July. This despatch, the tone of which I am glad to admit is perfectly proper and moderate, contains, however, assertions and reasonings which it is impossible for the Government of the King to allow to be set up. It would no doubt be better, in order not to aggravate a state of things already so menacing, to forget the past, and not to revert to controversies too often renewed; but, besides that Lord Palmerston would have reason to be dissatisfied that his communication remained unanswered, it is of importance to represent in its true light the respective conduct of each Court during this negotiation. The despatch of Lord Palmerston, communicated to all the Missions in the form of a printed copy, has already become public. It was, therefore, indispensable to return an answer to it. The one which I now send to you, and of which I hope the British Government may not think it has to complain, will give to the circumstances which have occurred between the several Cabinets, the real meaning which they appear to us to have. You will have the goodness to leave a copy of it with the Secretary of State of Her Britannic Majesty.

If I have rightly understood the general import of the statement made by Lord Palmerston, it may be summed up as follows:—

"Great Britain, perfectly disinterested in the Eastern Question, has pursued but one object; that is, the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. It is this object which she has proposed to all the Courts, which all have adopted, which all have pursued, France as well as the others. For the attainment of this object, it was necessary to reduce to smaller proportions the immoderate pretensions of the Viceroy of Egypt, it was necessary to remove as far as possible from the Taurus, the possessions and the armies of this ambitious vassal. The best thing to be done was to place the Desert between the Sultan and the Pasha, to confine Mehemet Ali to Egypt, and to restore Syria to the Sultan Abdul Medjid. The Desert of Syria would then have served as a barrier between the two States, and would have re-assured the Ottoman Empire, and Europe, interested in the safety of that Empire, against the ambition of the Egyptian family.

"This is what England has declared at every period of the negotiation. France, by the Collective Note signed at Constantinople on the 27th of July, 1839, by a circular addressed on the 17th of the same month to all the Courts, had appeared to adhere to the common principle, by declaring, in as decided a manner as the other Cabinets, the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

"Afterwards, however, she departed from this principle, by demanding, for the advantage of the Viceroy, a dismemberment of the Empire incompatible with its existence. With the desire of obtaining the con-

* See No. 213, page 270.

currence of France, the Four Cabinets, parties to the Treaty of the 15th of July, made repeated appeals to her in order to bring her to their views. They even made to her considerable sacrifices, for they added to Egypt, granted hereditarily, the Pashalic of Acre with the exception of the fortress of that name; and afterwards they consented to add thereto the fortress itself; but all these sacrifices were fruitless; France persisted in departing from the principle which the Five Cabinets had thought it right to proclaim in common.

"The other Courts were unable to follow her in this course. Whatever desire they might have felt to obtain her concurrence, they were at length compelled to separate themselves from her, and to sign an Act at which she ought not to be surprised, because she had been more than once warned that if an understanding should not be arrived at, it would be necessary to end by solving by four, the question which could not be solved by five. Four Cabinets being agreed upon a question of the highest importance, could not indefinitely make to a fifth the sacrifice of their perfectly disinterested views and intentions. Indeed, Lord Palmerston had studiously repeated to the Ambassador of France, that the proposition afterwards contained in the Treaty of the 15th of July, was his *ultimatum*, and that if this proposition were rejected, he would not make another. It was quite necessary to proceed and not to leave the Ottoman Empire to perish through too long hesitation. The Four Courts could not be accused of having intended to offend France on this occasion.

"Moreover, in acting thus, the Four Cabinets remembered that France had in the month of September, 1839, through the channel of her Ambassador in London, proposed a plan of arrangement, founded, with very little difference, upon the same basis as the Treaty of the 15th of July; that at a later period, in opposing the plan presented by England, she had acknowledged that with the exception of the difficulty and danger attending the means of execution, it would be incontestably preferable to any other; that, lastly, on every occasion she had manifested the intention of not opposing any obstacle to those means of execution. They were therefore justified in believing that if, on account of private considerations, she refused to unite with them to constrain Mehemet Ali by force, she would at least not oppose any obstacle to their efforts, that she would even assist them by the employment of her moral influence at Alexandria. The Four Cabinets still hope, that when the Treaty of the 15th of July shall have been accomplished, France will unite with them anew to secure in a definitive manner the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire."

Such, if I mistake not, is the exact and impartial analysis of the statement which Lord Palmerston and the Four Courts in general do not cease to make, respecting the negotiations to which the Turco-Egyptian Question has given rise.

According to this statement France has been inconsistent;

She has desired, and desires no longer, the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire;

The Four Courts have made repeated sacrifices to her views;

They have ended by presenting to her an *ultimatum*, founded upon an old proposition of her own Ambassador;

They have not proceeded further until this *ultimatum* was rejected;

They have reason to be surprised at the manner in which France received the Treaty of the 15th of July; because from her own declarations they were led to expect, that she would give more than a passive adhesion, and at least her moral influence, to this Treaty.

An exact narrative of facts will afford a complete answer to this manner of representing the negotiations.

When the Porte, ill-advised, renewed its hostilities with the Viceroy, and lost at the same time its army and its fleet; when to all these losses was added the death of the Sultan Mahmoud, what was the apprehension of England and of France, both then perfectly united? Their apprehension was that of seeing Ibrahim, victorious, cross the Taurus, threaten Constantinople, and bring, at the same instant, the Russians into the

capital of the Ottoman Empire. In this apprehension every enlightened individual in Europe participated.

What were the propositions of Lord Palmerston upon this subject? The first time in his own name, the second time in the name of his Cabinet, he proposed to France to unite two fleets—one English, the other French; to cause them to proceed towards the coast of Syria; to address a summons to the two belligerent parties; with a view to compel them to suspend hostilities; to support this summons by naval means; then to join the two fleets, and to demand from the Porte admittance into the Dardanelles, or even to force that celebrated passage, if the struggle between the Pasha and the Sultan should have brought the Russians to Constantinople.

What, therefore, England, and with her every politician of foresight, then understood by the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, was, to preserve that Empire from the exclusive protection of Russian armies, and, in order to prevent the case arising for such protection, to prevent the Viceroy from marching upon Constantinople.

France entered fully into this idea: she employed her influence with Mehemet Ali and his son to stop the victorious Egyptian army; in this she succeeded; and, in order to ward off the more serious danger of seeing the Russian armies at Constantinople, she conceived that, before forcing the Dardanelles, it would be right to demand from the Porte its consent to the entry of the two fleets, in the event of a body of Russian troops having traversed the Bosphorus.

England acceded to these propositions, and the two Cabinets were perfectly agreed. The words independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire did not then mean, and we cannot point this out too strongly, that Mehemet Ali should be deprived of this or that portion of the territories which he occupied, but that he should be prevented from marching upon the capital of the Empire, and by the presence of Egyptian troops attracting the presence of Russian troops.

In conversing upon this subject with M. de Bourqueney on the 25th of May, and the 20th of June, Her Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State acknowledged, that there existed in France and in England an opinion in favour of the Egyptian family; that in France this opinion was much more general; that the French Government therefore must naturally be much more inclined to Mehemet Ali than the English Government; that here was, doubtless, a difficulty of the position; but this was a consideration of secondary importance; that a higher consideration ought to predominate over all others, to wit, the necessity of saving the Ottoman Empire from an exclusive protection, which sooner or later would be fatal to it, if France and England did not come to an understanding.

France participated in these ideas. Her policy was therefore directed to a twofold end; that of checking the Viceroy, if, from being a powerful but submissive vassal, he should proceed to play the part of an insubordinate vassal threatening the throne of his master, and of substituting for the exclusive protection of one Power, that of the Five preponderating Powers of Europe.

It is with these views that she joined in signing the Note of the 27th of July, a Note tending to place the protection of the Five Courts between the defeated Sultan and the victorious Pasha; it was with this idea that, on the 17th of July, she addressed a circular to all the Courts in order to elicit a common profession of respect for the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. With these views it was that she originated the proposal of uniting Austria, Prussia, and Russia herself, in all the resolutions relating to the Turco-Egyptian Question.

Lord Palmerston will, no doubt, recollect that he was less disposed than France to call for this general concurrence of the Five Powers; and the French Cabinet cannot remember without lively regret, in comparing that period with the present time, that the English Cabinet then believed that it could depend on France, beyond all others, for ensuring the safety of the Turkish Empire.

No one was then disposed to think that the integrity of the Ottoman Empire depended on the boundary which might separate the possessions of the Sultan and the Viceroy in Syria. All held that it reposed on a twofold

condition; on preventing Ibrahim from threatening the capital, and on exempting the Russians from coming to its succour. France shared this belief with all the Cabinets, and to this she has remained faithful.

Austria and Prussia adhered to the views of France and England. The Court of Russia refused to join in the Conferences which were to be held at Vienna with the view of making this European protectorate with regard to the Sultan a matter of general concern. She little approved of the eagerness shown by the Western Powers to interfere in the Eastern Question. "The Emperor," said M. de Nesselrode, in a despatch addressed on the 6th of August, 1839, to M. de Médem, and communicated officially to the French Government; "the Emperor by no means despairs of the safety of the Porte, provided the European Powers respect its tranquillity, and do not, by an ill-timed agitation, end in shaking it, while desiring to uphold it." The Court of Russia, therefore, deemed it but little fitting to interpose itself between the Sultan and the Pasha, thought that it would be sufficient to prevent the Viceroy from threatening Constantinople, and seemed to consider a direct arrangement as the most suitable resource in that state of things. "For the rest," said M. de Nesselrode again to the Ambassador of France in the beginning of August, 1839, "it is of small import to us, whether a little more, or a little less, be given to or taken from the Pasha in Syria. Our only condition is, that the Porte be left at liberty, in the consent it may give."

At this period, then, the Four Powers who afterwards signed the Treaty of the 15th of July, were not, as it is now wished to have it believed, united in their views, in the face of France alone dissenting and precluding all agreement by her perpetual refusals.

The danger was removed after Ibrahim had suspended his victorious march. The two belligerent parties were in presence; the Pasha all powerful, the Sultan beaten and without resources; yet both motionless, thanks to the intervention of France. The British Cabinet proposed to wrest the Turkish fleet from the hands of Mehemet Ali. This France refused, fearing to excite fresh hostilities. Then began the fatal difference of opinion which has separated France from England, and which, for the interests of peace and the civilization of the world, must for ever be lamented.

The ill-will which the British Cabinet bore to the Viceroy of Egypt broke out with great vivacity: France sought to moderate it. Upon the representations of France, the British Cabinet, appreciating the danger of an act of violence, renounced the idea of recovering the Turkish fleet by forcible means; that proposal was not followed up.

A mutual explanation had at last become necessary in order to know in what manner the territorial question between the Sultan and the Viceroy could be settled. The difference between the views of France and England became more clearly manifest. Lord Palmerston declared, that according to his view, the Viceroy ought to receive Egypt in hereditary possession, but that, in consideration of this hereditary right, he ought at once to yield up the Holy Cities, the Island of Candia, the district of Adana, and the whole of Syria. Nevertheless, he slightly modified his original views, and consented to attach to the hereditary possession of Egypt, the possession, also hereditary, of the Pashalic of Acre without the fortress of Acre.

France did not agree to these propositions. She held that the Viceroy who had conquered the Sultan at the Battle of Nezib, without having been the aggressor, who had moreover consented to stay his march when he might have fallen upon the Empire, and overturned the Sultan's throne, deserved more consideration. She thought that the Powers which had engaged him to accept in 1833 the conditions of Kutaya, would show but little equity in imposing upon him conditions far more rigorous, at a time when he had done nothing to forfeit the benefit of that arrangement. She thought, that in taking from him the Holy Cities, the Island of Candia, the district of Adana, an offensive position which, when restored to the Porte, afforded it complete security, they ought to secure to the Pasha the hereditary possession of Egypt and Syria. The victory

of Nezib, won without aggression on his part, might alone have entitled him to hereditary right in his possessions from the Nile to the Taurus. But while the victory of Nezib was viewed as a thing which had never happened, while Mehemet Ali was made to purchase hereditary right at the cost of a portion of his actual possessions, strict justice at least enjoined that he should not be deprived of more than Candia, Adana, and the Holy Cities. Besides, France demanded by what means it was proposed to reduce Mehemet Ali. Doubtless, the European Cabinets were powerful against him when he intended to threaten Constantinople; in that case, the fleets in the Sea of Marmora were sufficient to stop him. But what means had they of wresting Syria from him? Means of little efficacy, such as a blockade; of questionable justice, such as incitements to revolt; means very perilous, and contrary to the end proposed, such as a Russian army. France proposed then, in September 1839, to adjudge the hereditary possession of Egypt and the hereditary possession of Syria to the Viceroy. At no period of the negotiation has France proposed anything else, till recently, when she has counselled the Viceroy to content himself with the possession of Syria for life. I have examined the despatches anterior to my administration, and nowhere have I seen in them that General Sébastiani was ever authorised to propose the scheme of boundaries contained in the Treaty of July the 15th, or that he spontaneously took upon himself the responsibility of proposing it. I have asked him what his own recollections were with respect to this, and he has assured me that he never made any proposition of the kind. France proposed therefore in 1839, that the hereditary possession of Egypt and the hereditary possession of Syria should be granted to the Viceroy. Unhappily, her opinion was quite at variance with that of England.

This difference of opinion, to be for ever deplored, was soon known to the whole of Europe. All at once, and as if by magic, it caused the divergence which had separated the Four Courts to cease, and brought about a sudden union among them.

Austria, who had at first given in a full adhesion to our propositions; who, when on the point of notifying this adhesion at London, had only, she told us, suspended this notification in order to give us time to come to an agreement with England; Austria began to say that between France and England, she would declare herself in favour of that of the Two Courts, which should grant the greater extent of territory to the Sultan. It is true that she still protested against the idea of having recourse to measures of coercion, of which she was the first to proclaim the danger. Prussia adopted the opinion of Austria. Russia sent M. de Brunnow to London in September 1839, to make her propositions. Russia, who had lately repelled as little suitable the idea of an European intervention between the Sultan and the Viceroy, and appeared to see no other resource but a direct arrangement; Russia now adhered to all the territorial arrangements which England might please to adopt, and demanded, that in the event of hostilities recommencing, she might be permitted, in the name of the Five Courts, to cover Constantinople with an army, while the English and French fleets should blockade Syria.

These propositions exactly realized the combination which England had hitherto regarded as the most dangerous for the Ottoman Empire,—the protection of a Russian army;—a combination to be dreaded, not because a Russian army might possibly be tempted to remain definitively at Constantinople, but solely because Russia, adding thus to the event of 1833 another event precisely similar, would have created in her favour the authority of precedents. These propositions were not accepted; M. de Brunnow left London, and returned to it in January, 1840, with new propositions. These differed from the first, inasmuch as they granted to France and England the power of introducing each three ships of the line into a limited part of the sea of Marmora, while the Russian troops should occupy Constantinople.

At this point, the negotiation remained stationary for several months; from the month of February to that of July, 1840. In this interval, a new Ministry and a new Ambassador were entrusted with the affairs of France. The French Cabinet has always repeated, that it thought it

unjust to strike Syria off from the number of Egyptian possessions; that if it were possible that the Viceroy should consent to this, France could not be more ambitious for the Viceroy than himself; but if it were found necessary to wrest Syria from him by force, the Government of the King did not perceive, for the attainment of this object, any other means than those which were inefficacious or dangerous, and that in that case it would separate itself from the other Courts, and pursue a course of conduct entirely distinct.

While the French Cabinet was holding this language at London with candour and perseverance, the French Ambassador at Constantinople was not seeking to negotiate a direct arrangement between the Sultan and the Viceroy; he was not the first, as Lord Palmerston seems to think, without affirming it, he was not the first to set the example of separation. Our Representative at Constantinople has never pursued the conduct which is ascribed to him; the instructions of the Government of the King have never prescribed to him such a course. Doubtless, France has never ceased labouring to effect a reconciliation between the Sultan and the Viceroy, to dispose both parties to reasonable concessions, to facilitate in this manner the delicate task which Europe has taken on itself to fulfil; but we have constantly recommended both Count Pontois and M. Cochelet to avoid, with the greatest care, everything which could be considered as an attempt to set aside the other Powers; and to this recommendation they have remained scrupulously faithful.

England had to choose between Russia, offering it to abandon the Viceroy on condition that M. de Brunnow's propositions should be adopted; that is, that the execution of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi should be acquiesced in by Europe; and France, merely demanding a just and temperate negotiation between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali—a negotiation which might prevent new hostilities, and, in the event of such hostilities, the most dangerous contingency for the integrity of the Ottoman Empire,—the direct and physical protection of a single powerful State.

Before making its final choice between Russia and France, the Cabinet of London did not make us the reiterated offers which are spoken of, in order to bring us over to its views. Its efforts were confined to a single proposition. In 1839, the hereditary possession of Egypt, and the Pashalic of Acre, without the fortress, were granted to the Viceroy; in 1840, Lord Palmerston proposed to us to grant him the Pashalic of Acre, with the fortress besides, but without the hereditary right in them. Assuredly, that was cutting off from the first offer more than was added to it; this could not be called a new proposition, much less a more advantageous one.

But this proposition, so little worthy of the title of a new proposition, for it involved no new advantage, had in no respect the character of an ultimatum. It was not at all presented to us in that light. So far were we from viewing it as such, that on a hint from MM. de Bülow and de Neumann, we conceived the hope of procuring for the Viceroy the possession of all Syria, during his life, combined with the hereditary possession of Egypt. Upon the affirmation of MM. de Bülow and de Neumann, that this proposition, if made, would be Lord Palmerston's last concession, we despatched M. Eugène Périer to Alexandria, with a view to predispose the Viceroy to close with an arrangement which seemed to us the last one possible. This was not, as Lord Palmerston says, to make the negotiation depend on the will of a Pasha of Egypt, but it was to influence opposing desires, and to lead them on to an amicable settlement, which would have prevented the disastrous spectacle which is now presented to the world.

France had some right to think, that so long a negotiation would not end without a final explanation; that the great and useful alliance which for ten years had linked her to England, would not be dissolved without a last effort towards an accommodation. The hints which had been given her, and which led to the belief, that the possession of Syria during his lifetime might perhaps be granted to the Viceroy, naturally confirmed her in this expectation. All at once, on the 17th of July,

Lord Palmerston summons the French Ambassador to the Foreign Office, and informs him that a Treaty had been signed two days before; he tells him this, without even imparting to him the text of the Treaty in question. The French Cabinet could not but be surprised at this. Doubtless it was not ignorant that the three Continental Courts had adhered to the views of England, and that in consequence of this, an arrangement on the part of the Four Powers without France was possible; but it could have no idea that this arrangement would take place without its having been previously apprized of the fact, and that the French Alliance would be so readily sacrificed.

The offer of restoring the Turkish fleet, which the Viceroy made in June to the Sultan, from which, it was feared, a direct arrangement, secretly proposed by us, might arise; the possibility which at that time presented itself of raising Syria in revolt; seem to be the two motives which caused such a sudden resolution to succeed the long inactivity of the British Cabinet. If the British Cabinet had desired to have a final and candid explanation with us, the French Cabinet might have been able to demonstrate to it, that the offer of restoring the fleet was not a combination on the part of France to bring about a direct arrangement, for she never knew of this offer till after it had been made; and perchance it might also have been able to persuade the British Cabinet, that to raise Syria in revolt was an unworthy expedient, and one little to be relied on.

Such are the facts which France affirms to be true, with the sincerity and good faith which become a great nation.

From these it evidently results:—

1. That the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire were, at the outset of the negotiation, interpreted as France interprets them now, not in the sense of a territorial limitation, more or less advantageous between the Sultan and Viceroy; but as a guarantee given by the Five Powers against a hostile march on the part of Mehemet Ali, and against the exclusive protection of a single one among the Five Powers.

2. That France, far from modifying her opinions before the Four Courts always united in their views, their intentions, and their language, has, on the contrary, ever construed the Turco-Egyptian Question in one way only; while she has seen the Four Powers at first at variance, then uniting in the idea of sacrificing the Viceroy, and England, contented with this sacrifice, drawing closer to the three others and forming an alliance, very persevering now, it is true, in its views, very precipitate, very disquieting in its resolutions.

3. That reiterated sacrifices were not made to France, in order to draw it into the plan of the Four Courts, since they confined themselves to offering, in 1839, to join to Egypt the Pashalic of Acre without the fortress of Acre, but with hereditary right in this Pashalic, and to offering him in 1840, the Pashalic of Acre with the fortress, but without hereditary right.

4. That she was not previously apprized, as is asserted, that the Four Powers would proceed, if she did not adhere to their views; that, on the contrary, she had some reasons for expecting new propositions, when, on the news of Sami Bey's departure for Constantinople and of the insurrection of Syria, without letting her know beforehand, the Treaty of July was suddenly signed; of which she was not informed till after it was signed, and which was not communicated to her till two months later.

5. In fine, that there is no ground for counting upon her passive adhesion to the execution of this Treaty, since, though she may have chiefly insisted upon the difficulty of the means of execution, she has never professed, for the end any more than for the means, an indifference which could authorize the conclusion, that she would in no case interfere in what might come to pass in the East; that, very far from that, she has ever declared that she would isolate herself from the other Four Powers, in case certain resolutions were adopted; that no one of her agents has at any time been empowered to say one word which could lead to the conclusion that this isolation would be inaction; and that she has always meant, as she still means, to reserve her full liberty in this respect.

The French Cabinet would not revert to such subjects of dispute, if Lord Palmerston's Note had not made it a matter of strict duty for it to do so; but it is ready to bury them entirely in oblivion in order to go at once to the root of matters, and to call the attention of Her Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State to the really momentous side of the case.

The existence of the Turkish Empire is in peril; England is anxious about it, and she is in the right; all the Powers who are friends to peace should be likewise anxious: but how to set about consolidating this Empire? When the Sultans of Constantinople, having no longer sufficient strength to govern the vast provinces which owed them obedience, beheld Moldavia, Wallachia, and, more recently, Greece, slipping insensibly from their grasp, what course was then taken? Was it, then, attempted by a European decision, backed by Russian troops and English fleets, to restore to the Sultans subjects who were escaping from them? Assuredly not. Impossibilities were not attempted. The possession and direct administration of the provinces which were detaching themselves from the Empire, were not given back to them. A sovereignty, almost nominal, over Wallachia and Moldavia, was alone left to them. They were entirely dispossessed of Greece. Is this through a spirit of injustice? Certainly not. But the force of circumstances, mightier than the resolutions of Cabinets, precluded the restitution to the Porte, both of the direct sovereignty of Moldavia and Wallachia, and of the administration, even indirect, of Greece; and the Porte had no rest until this sacrifice was freely effected. What view directed the Cabinets in these sacrifices? That of rendering independent, of withdrawing from the ambition of all neighbouring States, the portions of the Turkish Empire which were separating themselves from it. Unable to reconstruct one great whole, they desired that the detached parts should remain as States independent of all the surrounding Empires.

A similar event has been coming about for some years past with respect to Egypt and Syria. Was Egypt ever really under the dominion of the Sultans? No one thinks it was, and no one would believe it to be now possible to cause it to be governed directly from Constantinople. This opinion apparently prevails, since the Four Courts are adjudging to Mehemet Ali an hereditary right in Egypt, though reserving its sovereignty to the Sultan. In this, they construe the integrity of the Ottoman Empire as France does; they confine themselves to desiring to preserve for it all that it can retain under its authority. They desire, as far as possible, a bond of vassalage between the Empire and its detached parts. In a word, they desire all that France desires. The Four Powers, in granting to the successful vassal who has been able to govern Egypt, hereditary right in that province, grant him, besides, the Pashalic of Acre, but they refuse him the three other Pashalics of Damascus, Aleppo, and Tripoli; and they call that preserving the integrity of the Ottoman Empire! The integrity of the Ottoman Empire is then preserved, even if Egypt and the Pashalic of Acre is detached from it, but destroyed, if, in addition to these, Tripoli, Damascus, and Aleppo are detached. We plainly assert that such a proposition cannot be gravely maintained in the face of Europe.

There can evidently be no other reasons for giving these Pashalics to, or taking them from, Mehemet Ali, than those of justice or policy. The Viceroy of Egypt has founded a dependent State with genius and success. He has been able to govern Egypt, and even Syria, which the Sultans could never govern. The Mahommedans, long humbled in their just pride, behold in him an illustrious Prince, who restores to them the consciousness of their strength. Why weaken this useful vassal, who, once separated from the States of his Master by a well-chosen frontier, would become for him the most valuable of auxiliaries? He aided the Sultan in his struggle against Greece; why should he not aid him in his struggle against neighbours of a religion hostile to his own? His interest will be surety for him, failing his fidelity. When Constantinople shall be threatened, Alexandria will be in peril. Mehemet Ali knows this well, and proves every day that he perfectly understands it.

In order to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire from Con-

stantinople to Alexandria, the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt are both required, the latter subjected to the former by the bond of vassalage. The Taurus is the appointed line of separation between them. But it is desired to take from the Pasha of Egypt the keys of the Taurus; be it so; let them be restored to the Porte, and with this view let the district of Adana be withdrawn from Mehemet Ali. It is also desired to take from him the key of the Archipelago. Let Candia be refused to him: he consents to this. France, who had not promised her moral influence to the Treaty of the 15th of July, but who owes the whole of it to peace, counselled Mehemet Ali to make these sacrifices; and he made them. But, verily, that for the sake of taking from him two or three more Pashalics, and giving them over not to the Sultan, but to anarchy; that for the sake of ensuring this singular triumph of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, already stripped of Greece, of Egypt, of the Pashalic of Acre, there should be brought upon that integrity the only serious danger which threatens it, one which England thought so serious last year, that to provide against it she proposed to force the Dardanelles, is a very singular mode of providing for these great interests.

Let us admit however, for a moment, that the views of the British Cabinet are better conceived than those of the French Cabinet; was not the alliance of France of greater consequence as regards the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the peace of the world, than this or that line of demarcation in Syria?

There would not be so much alarm for the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, if great changes of territory in the world were not feared, if war was not feared, which alone makes those changes possible. Now what combination was most fitted to prevent them? Was it not the alliance of France and England? Ask every people from Cadiz to the banks of the Oder and of the Danube. Ask them what they think on this head, and they will answer, that it is this alliance which for ten years past has preserved the peace and independence of States, without prejudice to the liberty of Nations.

It is said that this alliance is not broken, that it might revive after the object of the Treaty of the 15th of July should be attained. To expect that when without us, and in spite of us, Four Powers shall have pursued together an object bad in itself, which, at least, we have believed and declared to be so, and pursued it by an alliance too nearly resembling those coalitions which within the last fifty years have covered Europe with blood, France will after this be found without distrust, without resentment for such an insult, is to form a notion which she has never given occasion to the world to entertain, of her national pride.

An alliance, then, which has maintained the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire far more firmly than the Treaty of the 15th of July will ever do it, has been sacrificed gratuitously for a secondary object.

It will be said that France might also make the same reflection, and that she might, if the question of boundaries in Syria appeared to her one of secondary importance, give way to the views of England, and by this sacrifice purchase the maintenance of the alliance.

To this there is a very simple answer. France, once agreed with her allies as to the object proposed, would have made, not indeed those essential sacrifices which no nation owes to another, but that of the view she took on certain questions of boundary. This she has just proved by the concessions which she has demanded and obtained from the Viceroy. But no choice has been left her. She was informed of a new alliance when it was already concluded. From that moment, it became her to isolate herself. She did so, but did it not till then. Since that time, ever true to her pacific policy, she has not ceased to recommend the most perfect moderation to the Viceroy of Egypt. Though armed, and unfettered as to her action, she will make every effort to spare the world from sufferings and catastrophes. For the maintenance of peace she will make all the sacrifices she can, those excepted which would trench upon her honour; and if she is now holding this language to the British Cabinet, it is less with a view to complain, than to prove the

honesty of her policy, not to Great Britain alone, but to the world, whose opinion no State, however powerful it may be, can at the present time despise. Her Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State has endeavoured to prove the justice of his case; the Secretary of State of His Majesty the King of the French owes it also to his King and to his country, to prove the consistency, the honesty, of the policy of France in the important question of the East.

(Signed) A. THIERS.

P.S. *October* 8.—While I was writing this despatch, M. l'Ambassadeur, deplorable events have occurred to make the posture of affairs still more serious. The conciliating advances of the Viceroy have been answered by the most violent hostilities. The Porte, yielding to disastrous counsels, has pronounced his deprivation. It is no longer, merely, a question of curbing the power of Mehemet Ali; it is wished to obliterate him from the face of the political world.

If these were the serious intentions of the Powers united by the Treaty of the 15th of July, if in what has just come to pass it were possible to see anything but the almost involuntary result of a false position, the consequences of which it was impossible to foresee, there would in truth be reason to despair of the restoration of harmony among the Great Powers. I consequently think it my duty to add to the present communication the annexed Note*.

No. 218.

Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 12.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, October* 2, 1840.

COUNT NESSELRODE told me that the squadron—nine sail of the line and six frigates—is ready for active service; that all the preparations in the Black Sea were made, and that they were only waiting for the moment to arrive when they can give proof of their readiness to co-operate efficiently for the fulfilment of all the engagements which they had contracted.

No. 219.

Baron Schleinitz to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 12.)

3, *Lower Berkeley Street, October* 9, 1840.

LE Soussigné, Chargé d'Affaires de Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse, a eu l'honneur de recevoir la Note en date d'hier par laquelle son Excellence Monsieur le Vicomte Palmerston, Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique pour les Affaires Etrangères, en se référant à une conférence qui a eu lieu entre son Excellence et les Barons de Neumann, de Brunnow, et le Soussigné, a eu la bonté de transmettre au Soussigné un Mémorandum communiqué par M. le Prince de Metternich à M. le Vicomte Palmerston sous la date du 31 Août dernier, et où se trouve consignée la ligne de conduite que d'après l'opinion entretenue à la dite époque par M. le Prince Chancelier, le Cabinet des Tuileries devrait adopter par rapport à la Question Turco-Egyptienne dans l'état des choses alors existant.

En même tems, M. le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat, en prévenant le Soussigné que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique est d'avis qu'il serait utile de proposer ou de suggérer de la part des Quatre Puissances au Gouvernement Français, une ligne de conduite telle qu'elle a été tracée dans le dit Mémorandum, a bien voulu exprimer le désir d'être informé si le Soussigné est prêt et autorisé à concourir dans une démarche à faire dans ce sens auprès du Gouvernement Français?

En réponse à cette obligeante communication, le Soussigné a l'honneur de déclarer comme il l'a déjà fait verbalement dans la Conférence susmen-

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* See No. 213, page 270.

tionnée, que la proposition dont il s'agit n'étant pas prévue par ses instructions, il ne saurait qu'en référer à sa Cour et attendre les ordres dont Sa Majesté le Roi jugera à propos de le faire munir sur cet objet.

En conséquence, le Soussigné s'est empressé de porter le contenu de la Note de M. le Vicomte Palmerston à la connaissance de son Gouvernement, et il ne manquera pas de faire part en son tems, à M. le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat, de la résolution à laquelle le Cabinet du Roi son auguste Maître se sera arrêté à cet égard.

Le Soussigné saisit, &c.,

(Signé) SCHLEINITZ.

(Translation.)

Baron Schleinitz to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 12.)

3, *Lower Berkeley Street, October* 9, 1840.

THE Undersigned, Chargé d'Affaires of His Majesty the King of Prussia, has had the honour to receive the Note of yesterday's date, in which his Excellency Viscount Palmerston, Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, with reference to a Conference which had taken place between his Excellency, Barons de Neumann and Brunnow, and the Undersigned, has had the goodness to transmit to the Undersigned a Memorandum communicated by Prince Metternich to Viscount Palmerston, dated the 31st of August last, in which the line of conduct is laid down, which, according to the opinion entertained at the said period by the Prince Chancellor, the Cabinet of the Tuileries should adopt with regard to the Turco-Egyptian Question, in the then existing state of affairs.

At the same time the Principal Secretary of State, in informing the Undersigned that Her Britannic Majesty's Government are of opinion that it might be useful to propose or suggest to the French Government, on the part of the Four Powers, a line of conduct similar to that which had been traced in the said Memorandum, has had the goodness to express a wish to be informed if the Undersigned is ready and authorized to concur in a step to be taken in this sense towards the French Government.

In reply to this obliging communication, the Undersigned has the honour to state, as he has already done verbally at the above-mentioned Conference, that the proposition in question not having been foreseen in his instructions, he can only refer it to his Court, and await the orders which His Majesty the King shall judge fit to give to him on the subject.

Consequently, the Undersigned has hastened to bring the Note of Viscount Palmerston to the knowledge of his Government, and he will not fail to communicate in due time to the Principal Secretary of State the resolution which the Cabinet of the King his August Master shall have taken with respect to it.

The Undersigned seizes, &c.,

(Signed) SCHLEINITZ.

No. 220.

Baron Brunnow to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 13.)

Londres, ce 12 *Octobre,* 1840.

LE Soussigné, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, en réponse à la Note que son Excellence Monsieur le Vicomte Palmerston, Principal Secrétaire d'Etat au Département des Affaires Etrangères, a bien voulu lui adresser sous la date du 8 Octobre, croit devoir consigner par écrit les motifs qu'il a déjà eu l'honneur de lui exposer de vive voix, et qui ne lui ont

point permis de se joindre à la démarche à laquelle la Note susmentionée se réfère.

Le Soussigné ne s'est pas cru autorisé à concourir à cette démarche, parcequ'il aurait dépassé ses pouvoirs en s'adressant à un Gouvernement auprès duquel il n'est point accrédité, et en entrant avec lui en explication sur l'objet d'une transaction à laquelle ce Gouvernement est resté étranger.

De plus, pénétré des justes égards qu'il doit au Cabinet de Tuileries, le Soussigné ne se serait pas cru en droit de lui suggérer de proclamer son adhésion au but de la Convention du $\frac{3}{15}$ Juillet, au moment où cette transaction rencontre en France une opposition, non motivée sans doute, mais de jour en jour plus forte et plus prononcée.

Il croirait en outre se mettre en contradiction ouverte avec l'évidence des faits, s'il proposait aujourd'hui au Gouvernement Français de faire allusion à l'inefficacité des mesures coërcitives, et s'il choisissait pour cela précisément le moment où ces mesures ont déjà produit en Syrie un résultat positif, et où le Sultan, à l'aide de ses Alliés, redouble d'efforts pour donner à ces moyens d'action toute l'efficacité nécessaire.

Le Soussigné aurait cru manquer enfin à ses propres convictions, s'il avait suggéré au Gouvernement Français d'admettre la possibilité qu'il résultât de l'emploi de ces moyens un danger quelconque pour l'Empire Ottoman, tandisque le Sultan lui-même invoque et réclame avec instance l'exécution de ces mesures, qu'il regarde comme le moyen le plus sûr pour rétablir le repos de son Empire et pour assurer son indépendance.

Telles sont les considérations qui n'ont point permis au Soussigné de se joindre à la démarche proposée.

Déférant néanmoins aux désirs que son Excellence M. le Vicomte Palmerston a bien voulu lui témoigner dans la réunion du 3 Octobre, le Soussigné s'est empressé déjà de porter à la connaissance du Cabinet Impérial l'objet de la communication à laquelle la Note du 8 Octobre se réfère, en sollicitant à cet égard les ordres de Sa Majesté l'Empereur.

Le Soussigné saisit, &c.

(Signé) BRUNNOW.

(Translation.)

Baron Brunnow to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 13.)

London, October 12, 1840.

THE Undersigned, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, in reply to the Note which his Excellency Viscount Palmerston, Principal Secretary of State for the Foreign Department, was good enough to address to him on the 8th of October, thinks it right to commit to writing the reasons which he has already had the honour to explain to him by word of mouth, and which have not permitted him to join in the measure to which the above-mentioned Note refers.

The Undersigned did not think himself authorized to concur in that measure, because he would have exceeded his powers by addressing a Government to which he is not accredited, and by entering into explanations with it upon the subject of a transaction to which that Government has remained a stranger.

Moreover, impressed with the duè respect which he owes to the Cabinet of the Tuileries, the Undersigned would not have thought himself justified in suggesting to it to proclaim its adherence to the object of the Convention of the $\frac{3}{15}$ July, at a moment when that Act meets with an opposition in France, groundless without doubt, but daily stronger and more decided.

He would, besides, consider that he acted in open contradiction to the evidence of facts, if he now proposed to the French Government to allude to the inefficacy of coercive measures, and if he chose for this pur-

pose the precise moment when those measures have already produced a positive result in Syria, and when the Sultan, with the aid of his Allies, redoubles his efforts to give all the necessary effect to those means of action.

The Undersigned would, in short, have not acted in accordance with his own conviction, if he had suggested to the French Government to admit of the possibility that any danger to the Ottoman Empire might result from the employment of those means; whilst the Sultan himself earnestly invokes and claims the execution of those measures, which he considers as the most certain method of re-establishing tranquillity in his Empire and of securing its independence.

These are the considerations which have not permitted the Undersigned to unite in the proposed measure.

Nevertheless, yielding to the desire which his Excellency Viscount Palmerston expressed to him at the meeting of the 3rd October, the Undersigned has not failed already to make the Imperial Cabinet acquainted with the object of the communication to which the Note of the 8th October refers, requesting, at the same time, instructions from His Majesty the Emperor upon this subject.

The Undersigned avails himself, &c.

(Signed) BRUNNOW.

No. 221.

Baron Neumann to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 13.)

My Lord, *Londres, le* 12 *Octobre,* 1840.

J'AI reçu la Note que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser hier, par laquelle elle me dit, relativement à ce qui a été convenu entre vous, my Lord, le Baron de Brunnow, le Baron de Schleinitz, et moi, le 3 de ce mois, par rapport à une démarche commune à faire auprès du Gouvernement Français, laquelle serait basée sur un Mémorandum que le Prince de Metternich vous a envoyé le 31 Août, de Königswart, renfermant l'exposé d'une opinion émise à cette époque par son Altesse concernant l'attitude qu'il serait désirable que le Gouvernement Français adoptât à l'égard de la Question Turco-Egyptienne, dans l'état présent des affaires, que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique pense qu'il serait utile que les Quatre Puissances proposassent ou suggérassent au Gouvernement Français la marche tracée dans le dit Mémorandum, et me demande si je suis autorisé de la part de mon Gouvernement à concourir avec celui de Sa Majesté Britannique et mes Collègues à faire une pareille suggestion au Gouvernement Français?

Dans l'entrevue que nous eûmes chez votre Excellence le 3 de ce mois, et où nous examinâmes l'opportunité d'une pareille démarche, basée sur le Mémorandum de son Altesse M. le Prince de Metternich, nous déclarâmes, que, tout en reconnaissant son utilité, nous ne pouvions nous y associer sans l'avoir préalablement soumise à l'approbation de nos Cours respectives; et pour mieux préciser les vœux du Cabinet Britannique relativement à cette démarche, nous vous priâmes, my Lord, de vouloir bien nous remettre un Mémorandum qui les renfermerait.

J'ai déjà informé ma Cour de l'objet de notre Conférence du 3 de ce mois, et je m'empresserai à lui transmettre la Note que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser à cet effet.

Veuillez, &c.,

(Signé) NEUMANN.

(Translation.)

Baron Neumann to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 13.)

My Lord, *London, October* 12, 1840.

I HAVE received the Note whichyour Excellency did me the honour to address to me yesterday, in which you inform me, with reference to what was agreed upon between your Lordship, Baron Brunnow, Baron Schleinitz, and myself, on the 3rd of this month, respecting a step to be taken in common towards the French Government, which should be based upon a Memorandum which Prince Metternich sent to you on the 31st August, from Königswart, containing the statement of an opinion put forth at that period by His Highness, concerning the attitude which it would be desirable that the French Government should assume with regard to the Turco-Egyptian Question, in the present state of affairs, that Her Britannic Majesty's Government think that it would be useful that the Four Powers should propose or suggest to the French Government the line traced in the said Memorandum, and in which you ask me if I am authorized by my Government to concur with that of Her Britannic Majesty, and with my Colleagues, in making such a suggestion to the French Government?

In the interview which we had with your Excellency on the 3rd of this month, and at which we discussed the seasonableness for such a step, based upon the Memorandum of His Highness Prince Metternich, we declared, that, while acknowledging its utility, we could not lend ourselves to it without having previously submitted it for the approval of our respective Courts; and in order the better to define the wishes of the British Cabinet with reference to that step, we begged you, my Lord, to have the goodness to give us a Memorandum which should contain them.

I have already acquainted my Court with the object of our Conference of the 3rd of this month, and I shall lose no time in transmitting to it the Note which your Excellency has done me the honour to address to me upon this subject.

Accept, &c.,
(Signed) NEUMANN.

No. 222.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 13, 1840.

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency the "London Gazette" of this day, announcing that your Excellency had received from the Porte a notification of the blockade of the ports of Egypt and Syria.

I have at the same time to instruct your Excellency to impress upon the Porte the necessity of maintaining the blockade in question by an adequate force.

With reference, however, to your Excellency's letter to Sir Robert Stopford of the 17th of September, inclosed in your despatch of that day, stating that you and the Internuncio had consented to the demand of the Porte for the aid of the British and Austrian naval forces in carrying the blockade into execution, I have to call your Excellency's attention to my despatch to Earl Granville, of the 14th of August, of which a copy was transmitted to you on the same day, in which you will perceive it stated,

that "as a commercial blockade is a purely belligerent right, the Four Powers cannot exercise that right of blockade against Mehemet Ali."

Upon the receipt, therefore, of your Excellency's first despatches respecting this blockade, I addressed a letter to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, of which a copy is enclosed, requesting that Sir Robert Stopford might be reminded that Her Majesty's ships of war cannot enforce the commercial blockade of the ports of Egypt and Syria, nor interfere with, or turn back, merchant vessels of any country except those of Turkey and Egypt, which may wish to enter, or depart from, Turkish or Egyptian ports.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 223.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 15.)

(Extract.) *Paris, October* 12, 1840.

I HAVE been informed that Admiral Hugon's fleet has been recalled to Toulon for the purpose of being employed, together with the ships at present stationed on the coasts of France, in an expedition against one or more of the Balearic islands: that it is the intention of this Government, when the expedition has sailed, to apprize the Spanish Government of its destination; stating that, as war with England appears imminent, and as Spain is not strong enough to protect those islands, a French fleet is sent there to protect them, the French Government pledging its honour to restore them at the peace, or on the certainty that peace will be maintained.

No. 224.

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Aston.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, October* 15, 1840.

I HAVE to acquaint you, that Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris has been informed that Admiral Hugon's fleet has been recalled to Toulon, for the purpose of being employed, together with the ships at present stationed on the French coasts, in an expedition against one or more of the Balearic islands. Lord Granville has also been informed, that the French Government intends, when the proposed expedition sails, to apprize the Spanish Government of its destination, stating, that as war with England appears imminent, and as Spain is not strong enough to protect the Balearic islands, a French fleet is sent there to protect them; and that the French Government will pledge its honour to restore the islands either at the end of the war, or so soon as it shall be certain that there will be no war.

I have to instruct you to put the Spanish Government on their guard against such an attack upon the Balearic islands.

No. 225.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 15.)

My Lord, *Paris, October* 12, 1840.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 9th of October.

I had an interview with M. Thiers this morning. I learnt from him that he had on Thursday last sent to M. Guizot the despatch, of which I forwarded to your Lordship a copy by a messenger on Friday morning, and that M. Guizot had communicated it to you the day before yesterday, making a slight alteration in that paragraph of it which related to your Lordship's view of the deposition of Mehemet Ali. On my inquiring from him whether you had made any observation on the despatch, he answered that the letter he had received from M. Guizot was quite insignificant (" insignifiante").

M. Thiers did not advert to the objections which the French Government would oppose to the expulsion of Mehemet Ali from Egypt, and I therefore did not feel myself called upon to avail myself of arguments on that topic contained in your Lordship's despatch of October 8. I gave him, however, to understand, that the rumours which had prevailed at the beginning of last week, of the intention of the French Government to make a declaration of a *casus belli*, had not escaped your attention; but as they had proved unfounded, it was unnecessary for me to state to him any observations which you had written to me thereupon.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 226.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 16.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, September* 23, 1840.

LIEUTENANT LYNCH, who commands the steamers on the Euphrates, arrived here the other day on his way to London; and knowing him to be particularly well informed of all Arabian matters, I asked him the number of troops employed by Mehemet Ali in that country, in order to clear up the strong doubts I had as to the amount of force stated to be obtained by the recall of Kourschid Pasha to Egypt. I inclose the statement made by Lieutenant Lynch in writing. Your Lordship will recollect that the accounts from Egypt, of the military power of the Pasha, rated the Arabian army at many thousand men; some saying 10,000, others even more, and none making it less than seven. Lieutenant Lynch's account is indubitably correct, for he took pains to inform himself on the point, and had the best means to do so; it is also corroborated by Mr. Alison's report, that he could never learn whilst in Egypt that more than a few hundred men of the Arabian army had actually reached Cairo.

Inclosure in No. 226.

Memorandum by Lieutenant Lynch.

Constantinople, September 20, 1840.

THE force under Kourschid Pasha in central Arabia, lately withdrawn to Cairo, or on its way to that city, had been latterly not above 2,500 men of all arms, regular and irregular. A large portion of this

force has been dispersed, and much mortality among the regular Infantry which it contained. I am quite sure that 1,000 effective men (regulars) cannot have been obtained from it at Cairo.

(Signed) H. BLOSSE LYNCH.

No. 227.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 16.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September* 23, 1840.

I INCLOSE copy of the communication made by the Sublime Porte on the subject of the blockade, and which will be officially sent to-morrow to the Foreign Missions. I received it from Rechid Pasha certified, so that your Lordship may consider it as official. I will, however, send the more formal document by the messenger.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 227.

Notification of the Blockade by the Sublime Porte.

LA Sublime Porte ayant été informée du désir qui a été manifesté de connaître avec précision, et de manière à éviter toute contestation, le jour où devra commencer le blocus des ports et des échelles de l'Egypte et de la Syrie mentionné dans sa notification du 18 du présent mois de Réjeb (14 Septembre), fait savoir ici qu'on fixe l'époque de la mise en vigueur de ce blocus au 18 du prochain mois de Chaban (13 Octobre), c'est-à-dire, à un mois de terme à partir de la date de la précédente notification.

(Translation.)

Notification of the Blockade by the Sublime Porte.

THE Sublime Porte, having been informed of the desire which has been shown to know precisely, and in such a way as to obviate all discussion, the day on which the blockade of the ports and stations of Egypt and of Syria mentioned in its notification of the 18th of the present month of Rejeb, (September 14,) should commence, notifies hereby that the time for putting in force this blockade shall be fixed for the 18th of the ensuing month of Chaban, (October 13,) that is to say, one month from the date of the previous notification.

No. 228.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 16.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, September* 26, 1840.

YESTERDAY I received a letter from Mr. Wood, dated 30th August, and I sent to Rechid Pasha early this morning extracts from it, by M. Etienne Pisani. I have the honour to inclose M. Pisani's report to me.

I hope your Lordship will approve of the nomination I ventured to make of Mr. Wood, to be Vice-Consul at Beyrout.

I beg leave to inclose copy of my letter to Mr. Consul Moore.

Inclosure 1 in No. 228.

M. Etienne Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) *Thérapia, le 26 Septembre*, 1840.

CONFORMEMENT à vos instructions, je me suis rendu ce matin chez Réchid Pacha pour lui communiquer la lettre de Mr. Wood, et l'engager à accélérer l'envoi des troupes en Syrie.

(Translation.)

M. Etienne Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) *Therapia, September* 26, 1840.

IN conformity with your instructions, I went this morning to Rechid Pasha, to communicate to him Mr. Wood's letter, and to urge him to hasten the departure of the troops for Syria.

Inclosure 2 in No. 228.

Viscount Ponsonby to Mr. Consul Moore.

Sir, *Therapia, September* 25, 1840.

I HAVE to instruct you to appoint Richard Wood, Esq., Vice-Consul for your Consular district; I inclose a firman from the Sublime Porte, authorizing him to enjoy the privileges and perform the duties of that post. And I have further to request and enjoin you to notify his appointment to the Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's squadron, and to Colonel Sir Charles Smith.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 229.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 16.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, September* 27, 1840.

THE Phœnix arrived here yesterday about four o'clock, and brought me despatches from the Admiral, and letters from General Jochmus, Captain Walker, and Mr. Wood, copies of which I have the honour to inclose.

I immediately sent Mr. Alison with instructions to propose certain measures to Rechid Pasha; and your Lordship will see in that gentleman's report, which I inclose, that the measures I proposed have been adopted by the Ministers, and are ordered to be carried into execution.

Money will be sent, provisions and ammunition, &c., &c. There are three steamers, and the Ottoman Government hopes to have a fourth hired from the Austrian Company, and all will be despatched about the 30th instant, with 3,000 men. The "Seri-Pervas" steamer will also be employed (as she returned this day) in carrying men.

Tahir Bey, and some other officers, will be attached to General Jochmus, whom the Porte has appointed Chef d'Etat-Major to Izzet Pasha.

The Porte has also agreed to ratify all the terms granted by our Agents in Syria to the officers and men who will return to their duty and join the Sultan.

The Steamer "Phœnix" brought Sir Charles Smith, who has been

extremely ill. I have not yet seen him, but I am happy to say he is much better than he was. The "Phœnix" is forced to stay here till the 30th, or till the 1st October, on account of the derangement of the machinery.

Inclosure 1 in No. 229.

Mr. Wood to Viscount Ponsonby.

Turkish Camp,
(Extract.) *Mount Lebanon, September* 13, 1840.

I HAD the honour to receive your Lordship's letter of the 2nd, accompanying the Sultan's Firman to Emir Bechir El-Kasim, and a parcel containing an Arabic version of the Convention, to be distributed amongst the people, delivered to me by General Jochmus, who arrived on the 8th. On the 10th of September, a feigned demonstration was made of landing near Beyrout, which drew out in the environs of the town the Egyptian forces to the number of about 10,000 men, when a brisk fire of shells was opened upon them from the fleet, which was continued throughout the day. I cannot state the precise number of men killed, yet it must have been great. It is, however, known, that many superior officers were killed. After this diversion, part of the fleet having on board the Turkish troops, sailed for Djounie, where we landed without opposition, and pos sessed ourselves of the heights of Zouk Michael, extending our right flank four miles towards Beyrout, by which we possessed ourselves of the strong pass of the Dog River. On the following day a flag of truce was sent by the Admiral to Solyman Pasha, to deliver up the town. His insolent reply provoked Sir R. Stopford and the Austrian Admiral to fire on the town. The castles were immediately destroyed; the fire from so many ships of the line, anchored close to the place, was terrific, and I availed myself of the impression that it was calculated to produce on the mountaineers within view of it, to march up to Gazir with 200 Turks and 100 Marines, to the small town of Gazir, on the first declivities of Lebanon (where I resided formerly), to free the inhabitants from the presence of the troops of the Emir Bechir, which I did as soon as I took possession of its outskirts. It was very gratifying to see the gratitude of the poor people who came to meet us. Nothing could keep them away; they intermingled with and broke our ranks, offering prayers to the Almighty for our success. The enthusiasm which they evinced, induced me at once to arm them, and send them after the Emir's troops, whom they dispersed in an hour or two. The small force I had with me, rendered it imprudent to penetrate further into the mountains, and the next morning I returned, after having perfectly succeeded in creating a great sensation, and opening the road for the mountaineers to come to the camp to receive their arms, which they have done in great numbers from the province of Kesrowan. The Sheik of Gazir took some troops on the following day, and ascended the mountains in different directions to open the communication between the camp and the villages. They have not as yet returned, a sign of the success they have met with, and the little opposition the Prince's troops are inclined to offer to his advance.

Yesterday, three ships of war and the Marines, and armed peasantry, were sent to invest the small town of Djebail, to the north of our position. This place has a garrison of Albanians; they were driven out of the fort which they occupied, immediately; and they were surrounded at the same time in a manner to preclude the possibility of their escaping; we expect the garrison brought in hourly prisoners of war, with a large sum of money, which was sent from Aleppo to Ibrahim Pasha.

The Egyptians are but nominally in possession of Beyrout, that is, they possess it, because we have not a sufficient number of troops to occupy it ourselves, and carry on our other operations at the same time along the coast of Syria, with a view to arm the mountaineers; but

Captain Walker landed in the town yesterday, and hoisted the Sultan's flag, whilst the Austrians did the same at the lazaretto, and took 250 of the Turkish troops that went to Alexandria, and were transferred afterwards to this place. I hear, also, that the town is abandoned, and the troops are encamped behind it, beyond the range of our guns; the fleet is bombarding it at this moment. The position we occupy at present is naturally strong, but has been rendered doubly so by the throwing up of works defended by twelve pieces of cannon; and I do not think it possible that the Egyptians can bring any cannon against it, as the road through which they will have to pass to attack us, is very steep and rugged.

The Egyptians are within three hours of our advanced posts, headed by Ibrahim Pasha, and we naturally expect an engagement to-morrow. They were about 10,000 strong; but I feel confident that by landing 1,000 of our sailors to support the 1,500 marines that are already on shore, we shall beat them back, even should the Turkish troops give way, which, from the spirit that reigns among them, I do not anticipate in the least.

I have been distributing as widely as possible the printed Arabic version of the Convention, which your Lordship sent me with other papers, which I have a pleasure in stating have had a wonderful effect.

The mountaineers come down freely to take their arms, and, indeed, I am obliged to send many away to prevent disorder and confusion, so anxious are they to have them: but I do not consider it prudent to give them away indiscriminately without first establishing some regulations which will enable us to have a body of them (not less than 10,000) at our disposal, that is, forming part of our camp, since Selim Pasha and Captain Walker have consented to provision them from the stores we captured, and which we have given up to them with the condition that the Porte will pay the proportion at the close of the war.

Selim Pasha displays great zeal in all that regards his duties,—and shows no inclination to return to his old master, Mehemet Ali. He begs your Lordship will suggest to the Porte the necessity of sending more troops with provisions and money.

He cannot write himself, as he is busy watching the movements of the enemy, but requests the contents of the present letter may be communicated to his superiors. I give him all the assistance I can, by writing to the Sheiks in his name, by issuing proclamations, and by furnishing him with every kind of information regarding the country and people. I even visit at night the outposts with him until midnight, to give him confidence, and to interpret for the English officers. I am anxious to give Ibrahim Pasha sufficient occupation in Syria to prevent his advance, and therefore render superfluous the presence of any foreign force at Constantinople. There is not the slightest chance of Ibrahim's advancing in the present moment, if ever. I will write in an official form as soon as I have time, when I will transmit some official documents throwing more light on the occurrence in Syria.

P.S.—I have taken upon myself to send a special Tatar with the news of our first successes,—namely, the destruction of Beyrout, the landing of our forces, the arming of the mountaineers, and the capture of Djebail, all of which we have accomplished in three days; for I feel confident the news will give pleasure to your Lordship, to the Porte, and to Her Majesty's Government.

Inclosure 2 in No. 229.

Mr. Consul Moore to Viscount Ponsonby.

Her Majesty's Ship "Powerful,"
Djounie Bay, September 16, 1840.

My Lord,

I AM this moment honoured with your Excellency's despatch of the 6th of September, inclosing a list of Pashas who have been appointed by the Sublime Porte to be Governors of the Provinces of Syria; and I am to observe, that whatever communication I may have with the late Governor of the province in which I reside is to be such as I may have with a person who might be illegally in possession of authority, the lawful Governor of my district being the Pasha appointed to that post by the Sublime Porte.

I am also directed to send a copy of your Lordship's letter to all the British Consuls with whom I can communicate, in order that they may consider it as an instruction to govern the conduct of all of them within their respective districts.

I beg to acquaint your Excellency with the arrival at Beyrout of Admiral Sir R. Stopford, and of the Turkish expedition under the command of Admiral Walker, on the 8th instant. I retired from Beyrout on the night of the 7th instant, and the bombardment of that town by the ships of Her Majesty's fleet commenced on the 9th.

The firing was kept up at intervals for three successive days, when the place was evacuated, and the Turkish flag hoisted on one of the batteries. According to information received from deserters, the effect of the fire on the town was tremendous. They state that about 1,000 men were killed by the shot and shells, whose bodies were left in the streets when the troops retired. The forts are destroyed, and considerable damage has been done to the town, which is not yet occupied by the Turkish forces. The Egyptian camp is close to the walls outside, and the town is commanded by eminences on every side.

Nothing can exceed the enthusiasm of the inhabitants of Lebanon in favour of the Sultan. The peasants daily flock to the camp in crowds for arms, and about 4,000 stand have already been distributed amongst them. Yesterday the Emir Abdallah (nephew of Emir Bechir), Governor of the Province of Kesrowan, accompanied by two of his sons, arrived at the Turkish camp at Djounie, a naturally strong position, about four hours from Beyrout, now in a state of complete defence.

The Turkish troops have advanced to the village of Gazir, two hours distant up Lebanon, and, wherever they appear, are received with open arms, the women even meeting them with water and refreshments.

Notwithstanding the efforts made by the Egyptians to prevent the peasantry from joining the camp, they still flock in. Ibrahim Pasha, with about 6,000 men, is this morning four leagues off, having the Balbec road open to him.

I have just had accounts from Caiffa, that the Naplousians are waiting with the utmost impatience the arrival of arms, in order to declare openly for the Sultan.

The Emir Bechir still remains apparently attached to the Egyptian cause, but to-day his decision is expected in reply to a final summons to return to his allegiance to the Sultan. I am not without hopes he will see the wisdom of complying therewith.

All communication with the interior is interrupted; and I have had no accounts from Damascus for the last eight days, when all was quiet. Public attention there was directed to this quarter; and little doubt can be entertained that the events which are now occurring in this neighbourhood will have the effect of raising that city in the Sultan's favour. Such I feel persuaded will also be the case at Aleppo and elsewhere.

I beg to offer my apologies to your Excellency for the extreme haste in which I write; I fear to be too late for this opportunity.

There is really nothing to desire as far as the feeling of the inhabit-

ants of Lebanon, indeed of Syria generally, is concerned, who are unanimously in favour of the Sultan.

The French are doing all they can to regain their lost influence in Lebanon, but without effect.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) N. MOORE.

P.S.—Commodore Napier, finding I am writing to your Lordship, begs me to say that it is of the utmost importance that more troops should be sent; in this opinion I beg to say that I entirely agree, it is also that of all the military men here. Both the Turks and Egyptians daily desert. Two days ago the whole post from the lazaretto, about sixty men (with two officers), with their arms and ammunition, came over, and several Turks have swum off to the ships.

Inclosure 3 in No. 229.

Admiral Sir Robert Stopford to Viscount Ponsonby.

"Princess Charlotte," Djounie,
(Extract.) *September* 17, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letters of the 2nd and 6th instant, and have now to acquaint you that the expedition has thus far succeeded. The Turkish troops, 5,300 in number, and the whole marines of the squadron (above 1,300), having landed at this place on the 10th instant, under the direction of Commodore Napier, on a point previously selected by him and Lieutenant Aldrich of the Royal Engineers, supported by a part of the squadron; while the army under Solyman Pasha, which was in arms ready to oppose a landing at Beyrout, were kept in check by the fire opened upon them by the rest of the squadron. They were expelled their camp on the land side of the town, and the road from thence to our position being commanded by the fire of the Austrian frigate "Guerrière," and corvette "Lipsia," and Her Majesty's sloop "Zebra," all anchored in St. George's Bay, and protecting that point.

No attack has yet been made upon our works, which are strengthening every day by the most indefatigable exertions, and may now be said to be in a tolerable state of defence, where neither cavalry nor artillery can be brought against them.

About 5,000 mountaineers have come in and have received arms with due caution. The Emir Abdallah El-Kasim, with about 200 followers, arrived yesterday, and more of his people are following.

Partial desertions begin to take place from the Albanian corps of Ibrahim's army; but it is difficult to surmount the precautions taken to prevent it, though I understand there is a similar disposition throughout that corps.

At an attack upon the fort of Djebail, on the 14th, we suffered some loss in killed and wounded, which I lament, but the place was ultimately evacuated, and it is now with the Sultan.

Yesterday the mountaineers, about 250 in number, volunteered to take the fortress of Batroun, about ten miles along the coast towards Tripoli, if supported by the "Carysfort" and "Cyclops," which was accordingly attacked and speedily carried under the fire of these ships, followed up by the mountaineers, one of whom only was wounded.

I have detached the "Castor," "Pique," and a Turkish frigate, to make a demonstration at Caiffa, Tyre and Sidon, in order to give countenance and encouragement to the people of the country, and am now despatching the "Benbow" and "Zebra" to Tripoli, the inhabitants of which, I am given to understand, are well-disposed towards the Sultan.

I have sincerely to lament that the severe illness of Colonel Sir

Charles Smith has entirely prevented him from taking any active part in the operations on shore, as well as from entering into any details.

As there is no appearance of any immediate amendment, he has offered his services to go to your Lordship, and give his opinion with respect to our further proceedings.

Inclosure 4 in No. 229.

Captain Walker to Viscount Ponsonby.

Ottoman ship of war "Mookaddimié,"
Djounie, September 19, 1840.

(Extract.)

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the Turkish forces under my command arrived at Beyrout at noon, on the 9th instant. On approaching the town, the Egyptian troops under the command of Soliman Pasha, were drawn up on the point to the westward, ready to repel any attempt that might be made. One of the British steamers at this time opened her fire on the enemy, and thus hostilities commenced.

It had been previously arranged between Commodore Napier and myself, to effect a landing at Djounie, a strong position, about ten miles north-east of Beyrout; and with the concurrence of the British and Austrian Admirals, who had just arrived from Alexandria, the troops from the Turkish transports and the Marines of the British squadron were removed in the evening to the English steamers. On the following morning we proceeded with the troops and a small British squadron, and made a feint off the point to the westward; this stratagem succeeded in drawing the troops out of the town, and enabled the ships to open a galling fire, with loss to the enemy of a great number of men. During the time the ships were firing, we proceeded to Djounie, and effected a landing of all the troops, Marines and Artillery, without the slightest opposition.

On the 11th a flag of truce was despatched to Solyman Pasha to summon him in the name of the Sultan to surrender the town, but as he returned an evasive answer, the English Admiral ordered the destruction of the castles and forts to the right and left of the town.

The ships have taken up good positions, and command the whole of the coast from Beyrout to Jabbel, having two ships of the line off Alexandria, and ships are now on their way to bombard Sidon and Tripoli.

Our position, Djounie, is good; works were immediately thrown up, and are now considered of sufficient strength to resist any attack of the enemy. We have upwards of 400 men from the enemy, who have deserted; they continue daily to augment our ranks, and only wait an opportunity of testifying their allegiance to the Sultan. Many thousands of mountaineers have thrown off the yoke of Mehemet Ali, and willingly receive arms for the defence of the Turkish Empire; the distribution amounting already to upwards of 8,000.

During the recent bombardment of Beyrout, the loss to the enemy is estimated at several hundred, but it is impossible to obtain any very accurate account.

On the 12th, a small squadron under the command of Captain Martin of Her Majesty's ship "Carysfort," "Dido," and "Cyclops" steamer, bombarded the town of Djebail. After a cannonade of some hours, a force, consisting of 200 mountaineers and 200 English Marines, under the command of Captain Austin of the "Cyclops" and Robinson of the Marines, landed to take possession of the town; and in effecting this, I regret to inform your Lordship, that we sustained a loss of five killed and nineteen wounded. We are now in possession of the place, which is held entirely by the mountaineers.

Ibrahim Pasha arrived at Beyrout on the 11th, and is supposed to be now with the troops on the heights, about four hours' march from our position. Emir Abdallah, grandson of the Prince and Governor of the

district of Kesrowan, has embraced the cause of the Sultan, who, it is hoped, will contribute materially to our assistance.

I conceive our position to be strong, and might be retained. Permit me to impress upon your Lordship, the necessity of immediate reinforcements and supplies of every description, without which, I feel, we cannot ensure the success so sanguinely anticipated.

Inclosure 5 in No. 229.

General Jochmus to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) *Heights of Djounie, September* 19, 1840.

MEHEMET PASHA has just arrived and will take the command. Sir Charles Smith has been unwell and goes to Constantinople.

I have read to Commodore Napier and Mr. Wood the letter I write to you to-day, and they fully agree with me in every point; we want money, more men, provisions, and plenty of ammunition.

P.S.—6 o'clock, P.M. Caiffa is taken by some of the ships. Let the Turkish Government send us ample means, and the Commodore says he will do as he did in Portugal, and I am sure he will.

Inclosure 6 in No. 229.

Mr. Wood to Viscount Ponsonby.

Turkish Camp, Mount Lebanon,

(Extract.) *September* 19, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your Lordship's letter of the 6th instant, by the Austrian steamer, the instructions contained in which I will punctually follow.

The steamer has returned to Cyprus to bring the Pashas; and the moment they arrive I will put myself in communication with them, and give them all the assistance in my power, both to circulate the Sultan's Proclamation, and to open a correspondence with the most powerful and influential persons in the different towns and districts to which they are appointed.

I feel confident their nomination will greatly encourage the Syrians, inasmuch as it will prove to them that the Sultan and his Allies are determined to carry through the provisions of the Convention.

The Syrians have no doubt now that France will not go to war with the Four Great Powers for the sake of Mehemet Ali; nevertheless, there are French emissaries in the mountains; and I know from good authority that the Maronites have been appealed to by them; but only as late as the 14th instant, the principal clergy of the province of Kesrowan came to the camp, and were presented to his Excellency Selim Pasha, who received them well, and urged them to exhort the people to take up arms in their defence. As a proof of their submission, and as an encouragement to the people, they illuminated the same evening all the convents and churches. The consequence has been the distribution of about 5,000 stand of arms in Kesrowan and the district of Djebail.

On the 15th instant I received a letter from the Emir Abdallah, apprizing me of his intention to join the Turkish camp. I immediately went to meet him, and conducted him to a tent, where I presented him to Sir R. Stopford, to Captain Walker, as the Sultan's Admiral, and to Selim Pasha, whom I advised to confirm the Emir in his government of Kesrowan immediately, which he did by decorating him with a military order. He is one of the Emir Bechir's nephews, and his return to his allegiance to the Sultan has had an excellent effect.

Although the enemy is closing on every side, I scarcely believe they

will venture to attack us in our present strong position. Ibrahim Pasha, with Emir Halil, are endeavouring to enter the province of Kesrowan in our rear, with the object of intimidating the mountaineers who have taken up arms, by burning their villages, and destroying their property, unless, according to Ibrahim's proclamation, they deliver them up or join him against us.

I have not heard of the effect of this proclamation, but I received intelligence yesterday that they had engaged the Egyptian advance guard, and had driven them back in the morning, but were themselves obliged to retreat to their own position by superior force towards the evening.

The number of arms distributed in the province of Kesrowan and the district of Djebail amount to about 5,000; but as the peasantry are extremely poor, they cannot absent themselves long from their families; and we are therefore deprived of their services. I have proposed in consequence that a body of not less than 2,000 should be formed into an auxiliary corps attached to the Turkish army, and should receive a pay of two piastres a-day, with half an oke of biscuit, the first month paid in advance, which will enable their families to subsist during their absence.

The Emir Bechir pays his men two and a half per diem. Selim Pasha is anxious to carry the proposal into effect, and I feel confident that such an arrangement will be attended with good result. Emir Abdallah fully concurs in it; and three Sheiks have been already appointed to head those men, who are to march in three columns, by three different routes, and endeavour to drive back the Egyptians from this part of Mount Lebanon.

Mehemet Ali has established in Syria the "Ferdeh," or Capitation Tax, which is levied in no other part of the Turkish dominions.

As an inducement to the Syrians not to join us, he has promised to forego this obnoxious tax for three years; and, in order to counteract the effect that this promise may have, I shall propose to the Pashas newly appointed, to remit this tax altogether, by which the Sultan will gain many partisans without any sacrifice, for the levying of the Ferdeh is contrary to the provisions of the Hatti Sheriff, as well as the promise made to the mountaineers that their ancient rights and privileges should be restored.

The Egyptian Government levy many other arbitrary and illegal imposts; and if the Porte could be induced to name at once the taxes that it would impose, and remit all the others, which it will be obliged to do sooner or later, I doubt not but that this timely concession will have a most beneficial effect in the country, and will withdraw from Mehemet Ali even those who are most attached to him.

I am afraid from the conduct of the old Emir Bechir, that he does not intend to abandon the cause of Mehemet Ali. But I have not yet despaired of succeeding, and am still making use of all the means in my power to induce him to return to his allegiance. Yesterday he sent for a copy of the Vizirial letter, which I forwarded to him. In the interval, however, I put myself in communication with Emir Bechir El-Kasim, who has sent to tell me that he is ready to join us with 10,000 men the moment the roads are opened. I am waiting the return of my messenger, when I will endeavour to procure the means from the Admiral of going to the south, and arm the mountaineers in the rear of the Egyptian army. By this measure I hope they will be forced to retire beyond the mountains, leaving us in possession of the sea-coast.

Batroun has been taken, and the people armed, and are to march to Tripoli to assist us in our operations there. Means have also been taken to arm the Naplousians, and all the mountaineers to the south of St. John of Acre as far as Jaffa. There are but very few troops now in Beyrout, which would have been in our possession long since had we troops to occupy and maintain it.

I continue to enjoy the entire confidence of Selim Pasha; he is full of zeal, and very anxious for the success of the expedition.

I am happy in being able to state that I have this instant received

intelligence of the success of the mountaineers against Ibrahim Pasha, whom they drove back half an hour. So long as they harass his flanks he will never be able to advance; and I am to proceed myself to-night to the south, to arm the people, in which undertaking should I be successful, he will be cut off from his supplies, and obliged to fall back on Balbec.

The extensive desertion of the Egyptians is a proof of the discontent that reigns in Ibrahim's army.

Inclosure 7 in No. 229.

General Jochmus to Viscount Ponsonby.

Camp of the Heights of Djounie,
(Extract.) *September* 19, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inform you, that the fleet of Admiral Stopford and the forces under Rear-Admiral Walker, together with the troops under Selim Pasha, began hostilities before Beyrout on the 9th instant, by firing some shells on the troops near the town. On the 10th September, at 1 o'clock, P.M., the Turkish troops and the British marines effected a landing at the Killsu (ten miles), and at the village of Djounie (thirteen and a half miles) north of Beyrout. On the 11th of September, a position was taken up on difficult heights,—the right on the Killsu, and the left on Djounie,—the whole of the troops being eight battalions of Turks, —total, 5,000 men, rank and file, and 1,500 marines, being disposed in a semicircle, offering three excellent and very strong positions.

Solyman Pasha had made his disposition against an attack to the south of Beyrout, and the troops landed, consequently, without opposition at Killsu and Djounie. A communication was immediately established with some of the Mountaineer Chiefs; and up to this day 5,000 to 6,000 muskets have been distributed, principally through the means of Sheik Francis, and Abdallah Emir, a nephew of Emir Bechir.

Two small forts north of this camp have also surrendered; and, according to Admiral Walker's returns, he is now rationing 400 Egyptians, or Albanian deserters and troops surrendered. Ever since the 10th of September, Ibrahim Pasha has been manœuvring against this corps. On that day he was fifteen hours east-south-east from Beyrout; on the 12th September, he was at Hannes, four hours from our extreme left, but having reconnoitred it, and found it equally unattackable from the new position taken up by this force, in consequence of his movements, Ibrahim Pasha withdrew to Merouba, two hours from Gatigos, due east, being thus to-day six hours from our position. Some skirmishes have taken place between the newly-armed mountaineers and the advanced guard of Ibrahim, in which the latter always fought to disadvantage. Sheik Francis was, on two occasions, supported by a battalion of regular Turkish Infantry, who advanced several hours into the interior of the country. The forces with Ibrahim Pasha in person are reported to consist of about—

4,000 Egyptian Infantry,
1,200 Albanians,
2,500 Egyptians under Ottiman Pasha, come from Balbec.

7,700

Besides there were about 7,000 men, of which 4,000 Cairo militia, under Solyman Pasha, at and near Beyrout.

The loss of the latter division, since the opening of the campaign, is said to have been 1,000 men killed and wounded by the fire of the ships before Beyrout. From all information that I can collect, Ibrahim Pasha seems for the present to have abandoned all idea of marching on Constantinople. Himself and his principal officers are all in the neighbourhood; and several corps from the northern parts of Syria have been moved in a southerly direction.

All reports agree, that the following distribution may be considered as tolerably correct:—

	September 19, 1840.
With Ibrahim Pasha at Merouba -	7,700 Men.
With Solyman Pasha at Beyrout -	7,000 „
At Balbec, a regiment of Turks forced into the service - - - -	3,000 „
At Acre and Saida - - -	12,000 „
At Tripoli - - - -	4,000 „
In small forts on the coast, about -	1,300 „
	35,000 „

If the whole effective army of Ibrahim in Syria, from the Egyptian frontiers to Adana, is estimated at 60,000, I believe that the mark is tolerably correct, my estimate from various sources being—

Twenty-five regiments of Infantry at 2,000 each, effective	50,000
Eleven regiments of Cavalry, 1,200 each - -	13,200
Albanians and Artillery, &c., &c. - - -	6,800
	70,000
Deduct non-combatants, sick, &c. -	10,000
	60,000

Taking from this amount of 60,000 the above 35,000, there remain 25,000, from which garrisons must be furnished to a great many places not in the above list, besides the garrisons of the lines of the Taurus.

For the present, Ibrahim cannot think of moving on towards Asia Minor and Constantinople; and this march becomes the less possible, as the season is advancing, and the Taurus will be covered with snow.

The troops of the Sultan, which hitherto covered Constantinople against such a movement, become therefore disposable and ought to reinforce us here. In order to render the insurrection against Mehemet Ali more general and formidable, we must be able to advance deeper into the mountains, as the Emir Bechir and Ibrahim, by occupying the passes in a semicircle round us, prevent the peasants in many parts from joining us.

By the desire of the Commodore Napier I have taken, with Selim Pasha's consent, the command of the seven battalions.

Inclosure 8 in No. 229.

General Jochmus to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) *Camp of Djounie, September* 20, 1840.

ONE of the Mountaineer Chiefs has just come over to us with 300 men to receive arms, and we are sending 200 stand of arms more to Damour this moment (three miles south of Beyrout).

The "Cyclops" is to protect the operation and the mountaineers who come to receive them.

The public spirit is much in our favour in this part of the country. We have excellent information of all the movements of the enemy; and our armed mountaineers begin to hover on their flanks and rear, attacking small parties, convoys, &c., whilst we send ammunition, provisions, &c., with escorts of four or five men, two and three hours into the country.

We must organize a Guerilla warfare, which will destroy Ibrahim's corps, if he once suffers a defeat in these mountains, which I hope he will, if he attacks us; but he, as well as his troops, seemed to be

cowed, since the heavy loss of men from the fire of the ships at Beyrout: for, although we know he has with him 7,700 men, and that 7,000 are in Beyrout, yet with this superiority of force he has not ventured to attack us.

He also begins to lose his hold on the mind of the country people. They had been forced, under pain of death, to leave the villages occupied by us; but they now begin to return in great numbers,—men and women, —and a regular fair is opened in one of the villages. Our soldiers behave very well, and do not rob or annoy the peasantry. There are no desertions; but our wants for further success, are strong reinforcements of troops, and money, provisions, and ammunition.

Commodore Napier, who read my letters of to-day and yesterday, begs to say, that the opinions therein expressed are also his own, but that he has no time to-day to write to your Lordship.

Inclosure 9 in No. 229.

Mr. Alison to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) *Therapia, September* 27, 1840.

IN pursuance of your Lordship's instructions, I went to Rechid Pasha's last night, and communicated to him the letters from the squadron, &c., containing the account of the proceedings subsequent to the commencement of hostilities on the 9th instant. The Pasha evinced the most unbounded delight at what had been done. Ali Effendi and myself were occupied for upwards of three hours in preparing translations to be laid before the Council to-day.

Rechid Pasha pledged himself to make every possible exertion for carrying into immediate execution, all the measures suggested by your Excellency, and those proposed in the several letters communicated to him. Three thousand troops, with provisions and ammunition, will be thus forthwith embarked in steamers, to reinforce the corps at Djounie, and others will follow in sailing vessels; every exertion is to be made to raise and send a supply of money. General Jochmus is to receive the appointment of Chief of the Staff; and Tahir Bey, with several other officers, are to be sent out to him. Instructions are to be sent to Djounie, by which the Porte engages to pay up the arrears of the Albanian and Egyptian troops and officers who come over to the Sultan: the officers are to retain their rank in the Sultan's army.

I saw Rechid Pasha again early this morning. Ahmed Fethi and Saib Pashas, the Ministers of Commerce and Finance, came in, and were overjoyed on learning the news from Syria. The measures proposed met with their fullest approbation, and the execution of them was largely discussed.

No. 230.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 15, 1840.

HER Majesty's Government having taken into consideration the Act by which the Sultan deprived Mehemet Ali of the Pashalic of Egypt; the bearings of that Act upon the present state of pending questions, and the course which it may be expedient to take thereupon, have invited the Representatives of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, at this Court, to submit to their respective Governments, that, undoubtedly, there is much force in the reasons which, according to your Excellency's reports, induced the Sultan to take this step, and that while, on the one hand, this measure in no degree prevents the Sultan from reinstating Mehemet Ali, if he should speedily make his submission to his Sovereign, on the other hand, it may operate as a powerful instrument of moral

coercion upon Mehemet Ali, by making him aware, that if the contest between him and his Sovereign should be prolonged, and if the issue of that contest should be unfavourable to him, he might lose all, by his too obstinate resistance.

That in this view, and in order to make the recent exercise of the sovereign authority of the Sultan useful towards effecting an early and satisfactory settlement of pending questions, it is the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, that it would be expedient that the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople should be instructed to proceed to the Turkish Minister, and to state to him that their respective Governments, in pursuance of the stipulations of the 7th Article of the Separate Act annexed to the Treaty of 15th of July, beg strongly to recommend to the Sultan, that if Mehemet Ali should at an early period make his submission to the Sultan, and should agree to restore the Turkish fleet, and to withdraw his troops from the whole of Syria, from Adana, Candia, and the Holy Cities, the Sultan should not only reinstate Mehemet Ali as Pasha of Egypt, but should also give him an hereditary tenure in that Pashalic, according to the conditions specified in the Treaty of July, but liable, of course, to forfeiture by any infraction of those conditions on the part of Mehemet Ali or his successors.

Her Majesty's Government have reason to hope that this suggestion will meet the concurrence of the Governments of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, and your Excellency will accordingly take the steps pointed out in this despatch, as soon as your Colleagues shall have received corresponding instructions.

If the Sultan should, as Her Majesty's Government cannot doubt, consent to act upon this advice when tendered to him by his Four Allies, it would be expedient that he should take immediate steps for making his gracious intentions, in this respect, known to Mehemet Ali; and your Excellency and Sir Robert Stopford should afford the Turkish Government any facilities which it may require for this purpose.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 231.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 17, 1840.

I HEREWITH transmit to your Excellency, to be communicated for the information of the French Government, a copy of a despatch which I addressed on the 15th instant to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople; and I have to instruct your Excellency at the same time to say, that Her Majesty's Government cannot make to the Government of France this communication upon the affairs of Turkey, without again expressing the regret which they feel, that France is not a party to the alliance which has been formed in support of the Sultan; and without saying how glad Her Majesty's Government would be if circumstances should enable France again to take her proper and natural place in an alliance which has for its only object the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire as an essential element in the general balance of power.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 232.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 17, 1840.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that I approve of your having appointed Mr. Wood to be Vice-Consul at Beyrout, as reported in your despatch of September 26.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 233.

Mr. Consul Larking to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 17.)

My Lord, *Alexandria, September* 16, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship that Colonel Hodges took his departure from hence on the 23rd instant.

On the evening of the same day, Mehemet Ali summoned a Council of War, at which it was resolved to send to sea eighteen line-of-battle ships and eight heavy frigates.

The necessary orders having been given, the greatest activity prevailed in the arsenal in equipping these vessels, and supplying them with water.

M. Cochelet, the French Consul-General, on hearing this, went immediately to Mehemet Ali, and having pointed out the danger which would attend such a course, succeeded in persuading him from persevering in his design; the equipping of the vessels nevertheless continues.

All communication by letter, between Her Majesty's ships off this port and the land, being interdicted, I found means of conveying a verbal message with the details of the above circumstance to Captain Fisher, of Her Majesty's ship "Asia," which I have every reason to believe he received.

Mehemet Ali, finding that great discontent prevails amongst the officers of the Turkish fleet, has taken up shipping with the view of sending them to Constantinople. He merely detains Ahmed Pasha, Deli Mustapha Pasha, and two other officers implicated in the defection of the fleet.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) JOHN W. LARKING.

No. 234.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 18.)

My Lord, *Paris, October* 15, 1840.

IN my interview this morning with M. Thiers, he said that much as he desired to preserve peace, he was not very sanguine as to the possibility of avoiding war; your Lordship seemed not to wish to allow to France any voice in the settlement of the Eastern Question.

The Chambers were about to meet, and to them he should leave the responsibility of taking a decision. He should be happy to be relieved from the painful duties of his situation, if he were considered as any obstacle to peace.

I told him that which is my sincere opinion, that if, being Minister, he chose to be pacific, I had no doubt the Chamber of Deputies would be ready to pursue a pacific policy; but that, if he excited them to war, they very probably might support him in going to war, and that he could not, therefore, divest himself of the responsibility of deciding this important question.

He then told me, that if negotiations were entered into between the French Government and the other Powers, which afforded a prospect of their terminating satisfactorily, he should ask of the Chambers only their sanction of the expence which had been hitherto incurred in putting the country into a state of defence, and then adjourn the Chamber for two months; that if no such negotiation were on foot, he should adjourn the Chamber after having obtained from it sufficient supplies for a still further increase of the army and for the putting into activity the National Guards; that a considerable portion of the army in Africa would be recalled; that several armies would be assembled on the frontiers, and ready to act.

This language was evidently intended to persuade me that war is inevitable, if the Four Powers decline to enter into negotiation with France relative to the conditions of peace between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, and refuse to make concessions to obtain the concurrence of the French Government in a pacific arrangement. That efforts will, as I have before written to your Lordship, be

made in other quarters to avoid war, I have no doubt; but I have my apprehension that those efforts, if opposed by M. Thiers, may not prevail. M. Thiers himself, however, if he can find a plausible ground for justifying before the Chamber the great expences he has incurred, in warlike preparations, without going to war, will, perhaps, be glad to escape the responsibility of involving his country in the dangers of a war with all the Great Powers of Europe, notwithstanding his assertions of the immense military means which France can bring into action.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 235.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 20, 1840.

IN reply to your despatch of the 15th instant, reporting the substance of a conversation which your Excellency has held with M. Thiers, relative to the course which he intends to pursue with reference to the Affairs of Turkey, I have to instruct your Excellency to remind M. Thiers, that nothing can be more unjust than to say that England has wished not to allow France any share in the settlement of the Turkish Question. On the contrary, England has made great efforts to induce France to take a share in the settlement of that question, and has even consented to considerable sacrifices of opinion, in order to obtain the concurrence of France. But as long as France insists that the question shall be settled only in her own way, against the opinion of all the other Powers, and in opposition to the engagements which the Four Powers have contracted with the Sultan, by the Treaty of the 15th of July, it is surely France that excludes herself from the settlement, and not the other Powers that exclude her.

Your Excellency, furthermore, will put it to M. Thiers, whether, if he were in the situation of the Four Powers, he would allow menaces of aggressive and unprovoked war, such as he threw out in the conversation reported in your Excellency's despatch abovementioned, to force him from a course which he had publicly and formally pledged himself by Treaty to pursue.

Her Majesty's Government are persuaded that M. Thiers would do no such thing; but, on the contrary, would oppose a determined resistance to any such aggression: and why should M. Thiers suppose that the Four Powers would act differently in this respect, from what France would do under similar circumstances; or that they should feel less regard than France would, for the obligations of a Treaty?

It must surely be manifest, that Europe being composed of States, several of which are nearly equal to each other in power and resources, no one of those States can expect to dictate to all the rest, or can require that her will and opinion shall be law; and, yet, the expectation of France, that her particular view of the Turkish Question shall be adopted as the basis of settlement, and that the views of all the other Powers shall be abandoned in deference to her wishes, does amount to a pretension of this kind.

But if the Four Powers, knowing the difference of opinion which existed in June and July last, between them and France, thought it nevertheless incumbent upon them, with reference to the general interests of Europe, and for the maintenance of the balance of power, to conclude the Treaty of the 15th of July, nothing, surely, has happened since that Treaty was concluded, which can be calculated to shake their confidence in the justness of their own opinions; nor can the continued existence of a difference of opinion between themselves and the French Government, however much and sincerely that difference may be regretted by them, afford them a sufficient reason for retracing steps taken by them deliberately and upon full consideration.

M. Thiers cannot but see, that the threatening armaments which France, without any apparent cause, has already made, have increased, instead of diminishing, the difficulties to be solved; and if the course indicated by

M. Thiers should be pursued, and if still more extensive armaments should be made by France, it will be impossible that Europe should not believe, that whatever may be the reason put forward as an excuse for such armaments, the real intentions and designs of France are similar to those which, during the Republic and the Empire, arrayed Europe in combined resistance to her aggressions; and thence will follow a conviction that it will be necessary to meet these designs by the same combination of defensive means which were then employed to protect the liberties of Europe.

Animated, as Her Majesty's Government is, by the sincerest love of peace, and anxious as it feels, to cultivate the most friendly relations with France, not only because it wishes well to France, but also because it knows that a good understanding between France and England affords a strong security for the peace of Europe, such a state of things, as that which I have just described, would be viewed by Her Majesty's Government with the deepest sorrow.

But Her Majesty's Government still cherishes the hope that better counsels will prevail at Paris, and that a more peaceful spirit will direct the policy of France; and Her Majesty's Government cannot abandon the hope that M. Thiers and his Colleagues will, upon reflection, see, that there is more honour to be acquired by maintaining peace, than by involving Europe, unjustly and without provocation, in the calamities of a general war.

Your Excellency will read this despatch to M. Thiers, and will give him a copy of it.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 236.

Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 20.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, October* 10, 1840.

YOUR Lordship's despatches to the 29th of September were delivered to me by the messenger Barnard, on the 8th instant.

According to the instructions, I have communicated your Lordship's despatch of September 28, to Count Nesselrode, and requested his Excellency to convey the thanks of Her Majesty's Government to the Emperor of Russia, for the arrangement which His Majesty has made for placing a squadron in readiness to co-operate if necessary with the British fleet in the Mediterranean.

I have the honour to inform your Lordship that this squadron is now at Revel.

No. 237.

Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 20.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, October* 10, 1840.

AT my last interview with Count Nesselrode, his Excellency told me, that owing to the serious turn the Eastern Question had taken, he had thought it advisable to address a Circular to the Russian Legations in Europe, transmitting to them a copy of the Convention of the 15th of July. He said this had almost become an imperative duty, in consequence of the endeavours of France at some of the Courts of Germany, particularly at Stutgardt and Munich, to destroy the confidence of those Powers in the objects of the alliance.

Count Nesselrode gave me a copy of this circular, which I have the honour to inclose herewith, and told me that it would be despatched to the different Courts this day.

Inclosure in No. 237.

Circular addressed by Count Nesselrode to the Russian Legations in Europe.

Monsieur, *St. Pétersbourg, le* $\frac{26 \text{ Septembre}}{8 \text{ Octobre}}$, 1840.

LES ratifications de la Convention du $\frac{3}{15}$ Juillet viennent d'être échangées à Londres entre la Porte Ottomane, la Grande Bretagne, l'Autriche, la Prusse, et la Russie.

Je me hâte en conséquence de vous en transmettre une copie, en vous priant, Monsieur, de vouloir bien en donner communication officielle au Gouvernement auprès duquel vous vous trouvez accrédité.

Les Puissances signataires attendaient avec impatience qu'il leur fut permis de faire connaître à l'Europe cette transaction importante, pour fixer l'opinion générale au sujet de sa teneur réelle, et pour rectifier les idées erronées ou incomplètes auxquelles elle a pu donner lieu. Il suffira pour cela d'une lecture attentive de l'Acte même et des pièces qui en font partie. En le concluant, les Puissances n'ont eu d'autre but que celui qu'elles s'étaient proposé dès l'origine, c'est-à-dire, d'assurer sur une forte base le maintien, sous la dynastie actuelle, de l'intégrité et de l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman. En offrant, pour atteindre ce but salutaire, leurs secours à la Sublime Porte, elles n'ont fait que remplir l'engagement qu'elles avaient pris envers elle par la Note Collective que leurs Représentans à Constantinople lui avaient adressée le 27 Juillet de l'année dernière, au moment où le Sultan, pressé par un vassal rebelle et réduit à ses propres ressources, était sur le point de céder par une nécessité impérieuse, aux exigences du vainqueur. Détourner la Porte Ottomane d'accepter par un arrangement direct avec le Pacha d'Egypte, les conditions qui lui étaient imposées à cette époque, c'était, de la part des Puissances, contracter vis-à-vis d'elle une obligation d'honneur de lui procurer, par leur intervention, des conditions plus avantageuses. La conscience de cette obligation a dicté aux Cours signataires les stipulations relatives à toute la partie territoriale de l'arrangement, et déterminé les limites qu'elles ont cru devoir assigner à la Puissance héréditaire et viagère du Pacha. Le respect le plus scrupuleux pour l'indépendance du Sultan, pour ses droits de souveraineté, ressort d'une manière évidente de la lettre et de l'esprit du Traité. En effet, c'est au Sultan qu'appartient l'initiative des propositions à faire au Vice-Roi d'Egypte. C'est à la réquisition du Sultan que sont prises les mesures de force ayant pour but d'en amener l'adoption. Si les événemens devaient appeler les forces de terre et de mer des Alliés au secours de Constantinople, et qu'il fallût mettre les deux détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore à l'abri d'une agression, c'est encore à l'invitation du Sultan que cette résolution serait prise ; c'est avec son autorisation expresse, qu'il serait temporairement dérogé au principe, en vertu duquel l'entrée de ces deux détroits a été de tous tems fermée aux vaisseaux de guerre des Puissances étrangères ; et il est bien entendu que cette exception temporaire, accordée aux seules Puissances dont la Porte aurait réclamé l'appui, ne saurait en rien, sur ce point, altérer ses droits permanens. A cette partie de la transaction, se rattache en outre, en ce qui concerne en particulier la Russie, une considération importante. Dans le cas où la co-opération des Puissances serait jugée nécessaire pour mettre Constantinople à l'abri d'une agression, il est établi que c'est en commun que cette co-opération sera concertée. Le fait seul d'un pareil concert réduira à leur juste valeur les imputations malveillantes qui attribuaient à la Russie l'intention de vouloir s'arroger exclusivement la protection de la capitale de l'Empire Ottoman.

Tels sont les principaux traits qui caractérisent la Convention que j'ai aujourd'hui l'honneur de vous communiquer. Une parfaite unanimité a présidé aux vues des Cabinets qui en ont posé les bases ; un égal accord les anime dans la ferme détermination qu'ils ont prise d'en poursuivre l'exécution.

Pour assurer à cette exécution un nouveau gage de promptitude et de solidité, ils auraient vivement désiré obtenir l'appui et le concours du Gouvernement Français. Ce désir n'a cessé de les guider depuis l'ouverture des négociations qui ont précédé le Traité, et ce sont les efforts qu'ils ont fait dans ce but, qui en ont si longtems reculé le terme. Mais le Cabinet des Tuileries n'ayant pu tomber d'accord avec eux sur le principe des mesures coërcitives, mesures

que de leur côté ils regardaient comme indispensable de prévoir, pour amener la soumission de Méhémet Ali, ils se sont vu, non sans un regret profond, dans la nécessité de renoncer à une co-opération si désirable. Néanmoins, comme le Gouvernement Français, tout en objectant contre les moyens, s'est constamment déclaré d'accord avec les Quatre autres Cours sur le but qu'elles se proposaient d'atteindre, elles se flattent que la position qu'il a choisie dans la Question d'Orient, ne fera point tort à sa solution finale. Elles se croient d'autant plus fondées à l'espérer, que le désintéressement complet qui a servi de base à la Convention du $\frac{3}{15}$ Juillet, est de nature à enlever aux Gouvernemens qui n'en font point partie, tout motif d'opposition ou même d'inquiétude; qu'en accordant leur assistance au Sultan, elles n'ont eu en vue seulement que le maintien de la paix en Europe; qu'elles ne recherchent pour elles-mêmes, dans les résultats de cette Convention, aucun avantage particulier, aucun agrandissement de territoire, aucune influence exclusive; et qu'elles se sont donné à ce sujet tous les gages qu'on pouvait attendre de leur loyauté.

Veuillez, Monsieur, en communiquant le Traité au Gouvernement . . . . . lui faire part en même tems des considérations que je viens d'exposer ici. Nous nous flattons qu'il voudra bien les envisager sous le même point de vue que nous, et ne point refuser son approbation à une transaction qui, dans la pensée de ceux qui l'ont conclue, n'a d'autre but que le maintien de l'autorité légitime et le rétablissement de la paix du Levant, d'où dépend celle de l'Europe entière. Le suffrage des autres Cabinets constituerait en ce moment aux yeux des Puissances signataires de la Convention, un appui moral important. Il servirait à accélérer l'effet salutaire de leur action, et ajouterait une garantie puissante à toutes celles que leur union offre à la tranquillité du monde.

(Translation.)

Circular addressed by Count Nesselrode to the Russian Legations in Europe.

Sir, *St. Petersburgh*, $\frac{\text{September}}{\text{October 8}}$, 1840.

THE ratifications of the Convention of the $\frac{3}{15}$ July have just been exchanged at London between the Ottoman Porte, Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia.

I hasten in consequence to send you a copy of it, requesting you, Sir, to have the goodness to communicate it officially to the Government to which you are accredited.

The Powers who signed the Convention have waited with impatience for its being allowable to them to communicate this important transaction to Europe, in order to settle the general opinion on the subject of its real purport, and to rectify the erroneous or incomplete ideas for which it may have given occasion. An attentive perusal of the Act itself, and of the documents annexed to it, will be sufficient for this. In concluding it, the Powers have had no other object than that which they had proposed to themselves from the beginning, that is to say, to secure on a strong basis the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire under the existing dynasty. In offering, for the attainment of this salutary object, their assistance to the Sublime Porte, they have only fulfilled the engagements which they had taken towards it, by the Collective Note which their Representatives at Constantinople addressed to it on the 27th of July last year, at the moment when the Sultan, pressed by a rebellious vassal and reduced to his own resources, was on the point of yielding from imperious necessity to the exactions of the conqueror. To prevent the Ottoman Porte from accepting, by a direct arrangement with the Pasha of Egypt, the conditions which were imposed upon it at that time, was on the part of the Powers to contract with the Ottoman Porte an obligation of honour to procure for it, by their intervention, more advantageous conditions. The consciousness of this obligation has dictated to the Signing Courts the stipulations relative to the whole territorial part of the arrangement, and determined the limits which they have thought it necessary to assign to the hereditary power of the Pasha and to his power for life. The most scrupulous respect for the independence of the Sultan, for his rights of Sovereignty, is clearly shown by the letter and spirit of the Treaty. In fact it is to the Sultan that belongs the initiative of the

propositions to be made to the Viceroy of Egypt. It is on the requisition of the Sultan that the measures of force have been adopted, having for their object to bring about his acceptance of them. If the events should call the land and sea forces of the Allies to the succour of Constantinople, and if it should be necessary to place the two Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus in security against an attack, it is still at the invitation of the Sultan that this resolution would be taken; it is with his express authorization, that the principle would for a time be departed from, in virtue whereof the entrance of those two Straits has at all times been closed to the vessels of war of foreign Powers; and it is well understood that this temporary exception, granted to the Powers alone, whose assistance the Porte would have required, can in no wise alter its permanent rights in this respect. To this part of the arrangement, an important consideration is moreover attached in respect to what especially concerns Russia. In case the co-operation of the Powers should be judged necessary to place Constantinople in security against an attack, it is laid down that this co-operation shall be concerted in common. The single fact of such a concert will reduce to their just value the malevolent insinuations which assigned to Russia the intention of arrogating to herself exclusively the protection of the Capital of the Ottoman Empire.

Such are the principal features which characterize the Convention which I have the honour to communicate to you to-day. Perfect unanimity has prevailed in the views of the Cabinets who have laid down the basis of it; a like agreement animates them in the firm resolution which they have taken to follow up its execution.

In order to ensure for this execution, a fresh pledge of promptitude and solidity, they would strongly have desired to obtain the support and the concurrence of the French Government. This desire has not ceased to guide them since the commencement of the negotiations which preceded the Treaty, and it is the efforts which they have made with this object, that have so long retarded the conclusion thereof. But the Cabinet of the Tuileries not having been able to come to an agreement with them, upon the principle of coercive measures, which measures they, on their part, looked upon it as indispensable to anticipate in order to bring about the submission of Mehemet Ali, they have seen themselves, not without deep regret, under the necessity of renouncing so desirable a co-operation. Nevertheless, as the French Government, at the same time that it objects to the means, has constantly declared itself to be agreed with the four other Courts as to the end which they proposed to themselves to attain, they flatter themselves that the position which it has chosen in the Eastern Question will not prejudice its final solution. They conceive themselves to be the more warranted in hoping this, since the entire disinterestedness which has formed the basis of the Convention of July $\frac{3}{15}$ is calculated to deprive all Governments who are not parties to it, of any ground of opposition, or even of uneasiness; since, in granting their assistance to the Sultan, they have only had in view the maintenance of peace in Europe; since they seek not for themselves, in the results of this Convention, any peculiar advantage, any territorial aggrandizement, any exclusive influence; and since they have given to each other, on this matter, all the pledges which could be looked for from their good faith.

Have the goodness, Sir, on communicating this Treaty to the Government of . . . . . , to make known to it, at the same time, the considerations which I have just now explained. We flatter ourselves that it will be pleased to look upon them in the same light that we do, and that it will not withhold its approbation from an agreement which, in the estimation of those who have concluded it, has no other object than the maintenance of legitimate authority, and the restoration of the peace of the Levant, on which that of the whole of Europe depends. The approbation of the other Cabinets would at the present time constitute, in the opinion of the Powers who signed the Convention, an important moral support. It would serve to accelerate the salutary effect of their action, and would add a powerful guarantee to all those which their union offers for the tranquillity of the world.

No. 238.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 21.)

My Lord, *Paris, October* 19, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches to the 17th of October, which reached my hands this evening.

I shall lose no time in communicating to M. Thiers your Lordship's despatch to Lord Ponsonby of the 15th ultimo, relative to the Edict by which the Sultan removed Mehemet Ali from the Government of Egypt.

M. Thiers, when I saw him on Saturday last, again expressed his conviction that Her Majesty's fleet on the coast of Syria, and the Turkish troops which had taken a position on shore, would fail in their endeavours to expel the Egyptian army from the interior of the country; he said that his last reports from Alexandria, of the 3rd, stated positively that the mountaineers of Lebanon were not in insurrection.

I have heard that the accounts received by the French Government vary very much from one day to another in regard to the feelings and state of Mehemet Ali. He appears, it is said, at one moment determined in his language, and confident of success: at another suffering in his health, depressed, and complaining of the French Government not affording the assistance which it had led him to expect.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 239.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 23.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, September* 29, 1840.

IN compliance with the demands from Syria for succour, which have been reported to your Lordship in a preceding despatch, the Sublime Porte has ordered 10,000 troops for Syria, and 5,000 will leave this in steamers in three or four days, and the rest will follow without delay.

Ammunition, provisions, tents, &c., &c., will be sent in the quantity Sir Charles Smith shall desire.

The Porte has named Salami Effendi to be Mousteshar to Izzet Pasha, that is, a Commissary-General.

The Porte sends at the same time with Salami Effendi in the steamers, 15,000*l.* in cash.

The Porte has engaged to pay all arrears due by the Egyptian Government to such officers and soldiers of Mehemet Ali's army as shall return to their duty to the Sultan.

The Porte has given the rank of Ferik to General Jochmus, who is to be Chef d'Etat-Major to Izzet Pasha, but he is to be entirely under the orders of Sir Charles Smith.

Yesterday evening the Chief Ministers, being together, repeated to his Excellency the Internuncio the engagement previously made with me that Sir Charles Smith is to have the entire direction of the Ottoman troops. The Internuncio was so good as to bring this matter forward again, in order to prevent any possible mistake. The Ministers, at the same time, offered to give Sir Charles rank in the Ottoman army, and the Internuncio took the trouble of informing me of it. I was of opinion that as the Porte cannot give Sir Charles the rank of Pasha of three tails, and as it cannot recall Izzet Pasha at present, it would be wrong for Sir Charles Smith to hold military rank in the Ottoman army, which must be inferior to the rank of Izzet Pasha, and thereby become subject to the Pasha's authority, instead of being, as he will be, if he remains only a British officer, authorized to command the Pasha. Baron Stürmer agreed with me on this point, and Sir Charles Smith has also concurred in it.

Sir Charles tells me he shall have need of some four or five British

officers. I have undertaken to ask your Lordship to get them sent out as soon as possible; there is no doubt of the necessity for such assistance to Sir Charles Smith.

The Porte has appointed Tahir Bey and Selim Bey to accompany Sir Charles.

The Internuncio was desirous, and of course I willingly complied with his wishes, that I should propose to Sir Charles to allow a young Austrian officer, a Baron Dumont, to act as a volunteer under Sir Charles Smith's command. This officer is nearly connected with some of the chief officers of the Austrian army. Sir Charles approves of it.

Sir Charles wants a Dragoman, and I have, therefore, directed Mr. Wood to act in that capacity with Sir Charles. I think Mr. Wood may be extremely useful.

Sir Charles has been waited upon by Tanir Bey and Selim Bey by order of the Porte, to learn from him what his wishes may be upon every matter connected with the service.

The Porte will officially engage to make a remission of taxes in Syria, upon the principle stated in Mr. Wood's letter, already before your Lordship. I have particular pleasure in stating that this wise measure was brought forward again by his Excellency the Internuncio at his late interview with the Ottoman Ministers, and was again ratified and ordered to be carried immediately into effect by a public Act.

I beg leave to state to your Lordship that the cause which we are zealously employed in supporting, is most essentially indebted to the active and able exertions of the Internuncio.

The Porte has been pleased to appoint Mr. Wood to be its agent for purposes mentioned in the inclosed document.

Inclosure in No. 239.

The Grand Vizier to Mr. Richard Wood.

(Translation.)

THE Ministers of the Sublime Porte have been made acquainted with the zeal and activity which you have displayed in promoting the interests of the Porte in that quarter (Syria), which is so much in accordance with your character of a faithful agent of its sincere ally the British Government, which has always afforded it its best services under the most important circumstances. Your perfect knowledge of the state of the affairs in that country, and your recent appointment to the Consulate of Beyrout, makes us hope that you will still continue to exert yourself for the regulation and settlement of the actual affairs of the Porte in that quarter; and the present document is therefore sent to you, authorizing you on the part of the Sublime Porte to do so henceforward.

We address you in the confidence that you will still continue to exert the same zeal and ability for the performance of this object.

(Signed) RAOUF.

Shaban 3, 1256 (*September* 29, 1840).

No. 240.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 21.)

(Extract.) *September* 30, 1840.

I SEND you a translation of the Imperial Order from the Sultan, constitu ing Sir Charles Smith the virtual Commander of the troops in Syria.

Inclosure in No. 240.

Imperial Firman appointing Sir Charles Smith Commander of the Troops in Syria.

(Translation.)

ABDUL MEDJID KHAN, &c. &c. &c.

To my Vizier Izzet Mehemet Pasha, Valee of Acre and Dependencies; to the Ferik Selim Pasha; to the Miriliva Caled Pasha; and to all the Mirilivas and other Officers of my Imperial Army.

On being made acquainted with this Imperial Order, be it known unto you, that Sir Charles Smith, the most illustrious among the noble followers of the Messiah, and the most distinguished among the officers of Great Britain, may his rank never decrease! now with the Royal Army in Syria, being a man of the most eminent abilities and distinguished military reputation, it is most necessary and advantageous that ye should act, under all circumstances, according to his opinion and judgment.

You, therefore, the above extolled Seraskier, Ferik, and others, shall act in all matters relating to military movements, and in all the necessary measures relating to the Imperial Army, according to the opinion and judgment of Sir Charles Smith, and you shall not deviate from the path of his instruction, but you shall exert yourselves to the utmost for the performance of your duties, with unanimity, courage, zeal, and attention. As you will be held responsible for the commission of any action contrary to the advice and opinion of Sir Charles Smith, it is my Royal Will that ye should conform to it with the strictest attention in the performance of your duties: wherefore is the present Imperial Order issued as a warning unto you.

On becoming acquainted, therefore, with the same, you shall, in all matters relating to the Army, and most especially in those relating to military movements, act conformably to the advice and judgment of Sir Charles Smith; and in rendering yourselves worthy of the continuation of my royal favour by your zeal, unanimity, and valour in the performance of your duties, beware of acting contrary thereto in contravention of this express Imperial Order.

Conform you, therefore, scrupulously to all that is above written, and give due credence to the Imperial Cypher.

Beginning of the month of Shaban, 1256 (September 30, 1840).

No. 241.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 21.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, October* 4, 1840.

Mr. HAY arrived here last night and brought despatches and letters from Admiral Sir Robert Stopford and General Jochmus, of which I have the honour to inclose copies.

Sir Charles Smith left Constantinople yesterday evening in the "Phœnix."

On the 2nd, a Turkish steamer left this harbour for Beyrout, having 600 troops on board, and money and other things, for the supply of the wants of the Army.

The Porte will despatch more troops without delay, to the amount that may be required, in steamers and transports.

It appears, from the account of Mr. Hay, that the Turkish troops have shown the best possible disposition and great courage in Syria; that the desertion from the Egyptian Chiefs is great; that the people of the country are everywhere hostile to these Chiefs, and where arms have been distributed, are using them with energy against the Egyptians; that Solyman Pasha is cut off by them from supplies, and likely to be reduced to great extremities; that the Army of Ibrahim is harassed severely; that his soldiers

are dismayed; and that his officers as well as men have deserted him in large numbers.

I have desired Mr. Hay to draw up a report, which I will inclose.

With relation to Egypt, Mr. Hay says that Mehemet Ali is ill, and unable to get out of bed without assistance; that there is universal disaffection there to his government and his person amongst his troops. Mehemet Ali seems to be supported by nobody except by the merchants, and chiefly by English merchants.

It appears that a French steamer left the coast of Syria when it was evident that the town of Saida must be taken by the Turkish, Austrian, and English combined forces; and the French Government, therefore, will probably have news before your Lordship, of the bad state of Egyptian affairs in that country, and may try some new proposition to induce the Allies to give terms to Mehemet Ali that will save him from disaster.

Mr. Hay says the Austrians have acted with the greatest courage and zeal; that our own Marines have shown their wonted courage and devotion; that the ships of war have given proof of the skill of their officers and crews; and the steamers have contributed in the highest degree to the successes that have been obtained, and their officers and men distinguished themselves by their ability, courage, and activity. It appears that all Her Majesty's officers and men have acted in the most meritorious manner: a handful of brave and intelligent men can do great things. They will probably be the deliverers of a multitude from the greatest misery to which tyranny can condemn a people.

Inclosure 1 in No. 241.

Admiral Sir Robert Stopford to Viscount Ponsonby.

(Extract.) "*Princess Charlotte*," *Djounie, September 26*, 1840.

REFERRING to my letter of the 17th instant, by Colonel Sir C. Smith, I take the opportunity of the Austrian steamer "Fernando I°.," just arrived from Alexandria, and bringing Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General, Lieutenant-Colonel Hodges, and the Consuls of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, to acquaint your Lordship that we are continuing to pursue the most active and energetic measures which our means enable us to do, in aid of the faithful subjects of the Porte against the forces of Mehemet Ali.

The ships of the squadron have been spread along the coast from Caiffa to Latakia, and are now extended to Alexandretta, where I have ordered Captain Stewart, of the "Benbow," to put himself in communication with Mr. Hays, the Vice-Consul, and give all the encouragement to the people of the country, and all the protection in his power to the Consul and British Consul, as well as to those of our Allies who may require it.

An attempt was made to bombard the fort and camp at Tripoli, but the distance was found too great to produce the desired effect from the sea; the place was garrisoned by about 6,000 Infantry, 300 Cavalry, and ten or twelve field-pieces: too great a force to allow the country people to come for arms at that spot, and the "Benbow" moved to the northward towards Latakia; since which I have had no report.

On the other extremity at Caiffa, the "Castor" had all the success that could be expected against the place. The Ottoman flag was planted on the walls; about 500 troops, who defended them, were put to flight, and eight guns on the ramparts spiked, their carriages burnt, and two 13-inch mortars taken off and put on board the Ottoman frigate "Dewan," which did her part well in this gallant enterprize.

With all this, the Emirs and people of Naplouse, though said to be well disposed, are afraid to expose themselves without a stronger security of a protecting force, being so near the centre of the Egyptian power at Acre.

I have sent Lieutenant Aldrich, of the Engineers, with Rear-Admiral Walker, to make a military inspection of Tsour, for a point of security and shelter for the Turkish troops, on the setting in of bad weather; and Commodore

Napier is now on an expedition with troops for expelling the Egyptians from Sidon, and clearing a way for the mountaineers to descend for arms.

Our camp is more and more protected, and no immediate attack seems threatened. Ibrahim Pasha, with 9,000 troops, is said to be about nine hours off; Solyman in Beyrout, his force supposed 1,300. This town might be soon taken, but cannot be kept possession of with a small force, having a long line of front against commanding heights, which cannot be secured till the country people obtain complete possession of the passes leading to Balbec.

An advanced camp of about 400 or 500, was observed on the brow of a hill over our station, which was gallantly attacked and carried the day before yesterday, by General Jochmus and the Turks, with the loss of two killed and one officer wounded. Commodore Napier, who witnessed this affair, says the Turks behaved with great spirit and bravery. About 300 of the defeated army came over in the evening with their arms and accoutrements.

Our English arms, 12,500, are almost all distributed, and at the different points a great rush is made for more.

There seems to be a kind of prestige about Izzet's name among the country people; and yesterday there arrived here, with the parade of 100 horsemen, seven principal Sheiks of the family Hamadi of Mutualis, from the plain of Anti-Lebanon, ten hours distance eastward; they command all the inhabitants of that place of the same religion.

I trust the Sultan has authorized the payment of arrears to deserters, having put my name to the Pasha's proclamation to that effect.

I have received your Lordship's communication of the blockade, and given the necessary orders accordingly; but as the Porte has notified this to be *très-rigoureux*, your Lordship will be so good as to inform me whether ships of war as well as merchantmen are intended to be included in it.

27th.—I have just received a despatch from Commodore Napier, acquainting me that he took Sidon yesterday by storm, and made prisoners of all the garrison, between 1,500 and 2,000 men. This has not been done without some loss, but I have not yet ascertained the particulars.

The peninsula of Tsour was taken possession of by Captain Collier's little squadron, after the affair of Caiffa; and I have received Lieutenant Aldrich's report as to its fitness for the purpose in view, of securing the Turkish troops during the absence of the shipping, a copy of which I transmit herewith.

I am just now informed that Ibrahim had left his camp with half his army; and sixty sergeants and seventy privates have deserted and joined Izzet Pasha at head-quarters here.

2 P.M.—Another message has been sent me by the Pasha, that he has good information Ibrahim marched to the right of our post with 7,000 men, meditating an attack in the night, for which we shall take all possible care to be prepared.

It is gratifying to me to have received from the officers conducting the enterprizes, the highest encomiums on the spirit and bravery manifested by the officers and men, Austrian, Turkish, and English, who have all gallantly distinguished themselves on every occasion.

Inclosure 2 in No. 241.

Lieutenant Aldrich to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.

(Extract.) *Tsour, September* 26, 1840.

AGREEABLY to your Excellency's orders contained in your letters to me of the 24th and 25th instant, I have the honour to report to you, that I consider Tsour does not afford sufficient shelter as a winter cantonment for the Turkish Army of 6,000 men.

Inclosure 3 in No. 241.

General Jochmus to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.

General Staff of the Army of Lebanon,
Camp of Djounie, September 26, 1840,
12 *o'clock,* A.M.

Sir,

IN the absence of Commodore Napier, and by his orders, I have the honour of informing your Excellency, that, according to the reports from the country people received in the course of yesterday, Ibrahim Pasha had ordered means of transport to be collected in the villages round Merouba and Guatashos. To-day this news is confirmed from the head-quarters of Sheik Francis, who, with 2,000 armed mountaineers, observes Ibrahim Pasha in front of Raifun and Feitroun, (the Pasha's head-quarters being at Merouba); and he adds, that Ibrahim has given orders to all his partizans in that part of the country to prepare to quit.

The Turkish troops with the Pasha, are deserting in strong numbers, and small detachments are sent into head-quarters continually.

Emir Massoud, who commanded the advanced guard of Ibrahim Pasha, being the force opposed to us on the height of Ardali, on the 24th instant, has withdrawn to Tubeddin, six hours from Ardali. His force consisted of—

Four companies of regular Infantry	-	400 Men.
Albanians	-	200 „
Druses under Emir Massoud, grandson of Emir Bechir	-	400 „
Total	-	1,000 „

The four companies are all taken prisoners; the Albanians fled with Emir Massoud, and the Druses dispersed to their houses. On the 25th instant, neither my piquets, nor the armed detachments of peasantry, could find any enemy at three hours distance from Ardali. The consequence is, that the mountaineers are coming in from the warlike province of Kata in great numbers. There are in this moment distributing 400 stand of Turkish arms to the people of that district, principally to men of Beckfuja, which place was the focus of insurrection some months ago; 1,000 stand of arms were distributed on the 24th and 25th instant.

The principal object of Ibrahim Pasha in keeping his advanced guard at Ardali was, to prevent the communication of this camp with Beckfuja, and to keep up his own communications with Beyrout.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) A. JOCHMUS.

Inclosure 4 in No. 241.

General Jochmus to Viscount Ponsonby.

Camp of Djounie, September 26, 1840,
8 *o'clock,* P.M.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency, that on the 23rd at night, five battalions of Turkish troops, one battalion of Royal Marines, and two companies of Austrian troops, were left to cover the camp of Djounie.

The remaining forces of this army, consisting of four battalions of Turkish Infantry, one battalion of Royal Marines, and two detachments of Austrian Rocketeers, were formed in the upper position of this camp, with the view to attack at day-break of the 24th, the advanced guard of Ibrahim Pasha of 1,000 men, under Emir Massoud, entrenched at Ardali in a very strong mountainous position, in order to maintain the Pasha's communication from his head-quarters of Merouba with Beyrout.

After a fatiguing march of five hours over very precipitous ground, and having forded the Killsu River, Commodore Napier, commanding the whole of

the above force, menaced the enemy's position in front with the battalion of Marines and a Turkish battalion, whilst he ordered me, with the remaining third battalion of Selim Pasha's division, to turn the enemy's right flank; which movement I executed without delay, succeeding, by the rapidity of the movement, in cutting off the enemy's retreat to the Pasha's head-quarters, and thus making 400 prisoners, and dispersing the remaining force by 11 A.M.

Our troops bivouacked on the field of battle, and in the neighbouring villages, on the 25th and 26th of September.

At night-fall of the Saturday, the troops had returned to our camp, with the exception of one battalion, which remained on the left bank of the Killsu, in order to maintain the now open communication of Djounie with the mountaineers of the province of Kata.

This successful affair is the more important, as it is the first victory of the Turks over the Egyptians for many years past. The loss of life is small.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) A. JOCHMUS.

P.S.—I beg also to inclose my appointment as Chief of the Staff of the land forces in Syria.

Inclosure 5 in No. 241.

Commodore Napier to General Jochmus.

Head-Quarters of the Army of Lebanon,
Djounie, September 26, 1840.

AGREEABLY to orders from Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, G.C.B., Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Forces by land and sea, on the Coast of Syria, General Jochmus is appointed Chief of the Staff of the Army of Lebanon.

(Signed) CHARLES NAPIER,
Commodore.

Inclosure 6 in No. 241.

Mr. Hay to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Therapia, October* 4, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I left Alexandria on the 23rd of September, in company with the Consuls of the Four Powers.

The greatest discontent prevailed among the troops and inhabitants in and about Alexandria. Great regret was clearly manifested by them at a report which Mehemet Ali had promulgated, of the failure of the combined forces on the coast of Syria, and of the defeat of the British Marines, a large body of whom he stated were marching prisoners overland for Alexandria.

A proof of the disaffection and total want of discipline of the National Guard, a body amounting to about 6,000 men, was manifested a few days previous to our departure, in the great square of Alexandria, where they had been assembled for parade. On their dismissal by their Chief, they commenced a volley of firing, accompanied with cries which were reported to me to be in these words: "Shame on the English who, after their promises to free us from our bondage and misery, now abandon us." On the officers attempting to put a stop to the tumult, I observed some of the soldiers even threaten to use their bayonets against them.

Mehemet Ali, it would seem, has endeavoured to impress on the minds of the inhabitants of the Interior, that should hostilities take place, it will be a war against the Christians, to whom the Sultan is compelled to yield; and that Egypt and Syria will become a prey to the Christians.

The appearance of a Turkish vessel of war off Alexandria will tend greatly to disprove this assertion.

The Pasha is reported to be in a bad state of health—so much so that he was unable to move from his couch without the assistance of two men.

On the morning of the 26th instant we met a squadron consisting of a British ship of the line and brig, an Austrian frigate, a Turkish corvette, and two British steamers, on their way to bombard Saida.

About 9 A.M., we passed Beyrout; a British ship of the line and a French corvette were lying off the town. The walls and towers appeared to be nearly razed to the ground. Two ships of the line lay off the River Killsu to cut off any troops that might be sent to reinforce Solyman Pasha. We arrived at Djounie Bay about 12 o'clock A.M.

I went on shore, and visited the camp; every measure would appear to have been taken to make good their position.

The troops of the combined force were in the highest spirits, and all seemed confident of success, even if attacked by superior numbers.

Large bodies of mountaineers were flocking in from the country around, some of whom belonged to tribes dwelling three days' journey from the camp. There was a great demand for arms: 19,000 have already been distributed. The British muskets were much sought for.

On conversing with these mountaineers, they expressed their confidence that Ibrahim Pasha would soon be driven out of Syria, or else his whole force would be destroyed or taken prisoners. The mountaineers have hardly had time to form, yet much has already been done by their assistance, consequently further and greater aid in their co-operation may be expected.

Emir Bechir was said by them to be playing a false part; his deposition was looked forward to with great hopes. It was expected that the Druses and Mutualis, on hearing of the state of affairs, would soon come over.

The Turkish, Austrian, and British troops have all displayed the greatest courage in every encounter with the Egyptians.

Deserters from Ibrahim and Osman Pasha were hourly coming into the camp.

On the morning of the 27th, the "Hydra" came in with 500 Egyptian prisoners on board, and bringing intelligence of the capture of Saida, and of its garrison, consisting of 2,000 troops, who, on the bombardment, were prevented making their escape by shells being thrown on the inland side of the town from our vessels. Tyre and Caiffa have also been taken possession of; in the latter place, provisions for the garrison, consisting of 500 men, for four months, were found, ammunition also in a considerable quantity. The possession of these towns will open to the mountaineers a free communication all along the coast. Solyman Pasha, in Beyrout, is now completely hemmed in on all sides.

In the course of the day, the "Cyclops" and "Stromboli" came in, bringing the remainder of the prisoners, and 2,000 stand of arms. The "Stromboli" had just arrived in time from England to land the 350 Marines she had on board to assist in the assault of Saida. A corvette is stationed off Gebaly, and is landing arms.

Izzet Pasha is stated to be unwell, and up to the present moment has not, I understand, been in active operation.

In the evening of the 27th it was reported that Ibrahim Pasha intended to attack the camp that night with 6,000 troops; but the truth of such a hazardous undertaking was much doubted. Should the attack not be made, I understand that a body of Turkish troops and a battalion of Marines would be sent to attack Osman Pasha, who had about 2,000 troops in a fort or monastery, some seven hours' march from the camp. Of the success of this expedition all seemed to be confident.

About 9, A. M., we left Djounie Bay in the Austrian steamer, and reached Cyprus next day. Reports had arrived there that a check had been experienced by our troops.

On the 1st instant we touched at Rhodes. On the 2nd we met the Turkish steamer "Tahir Al Bahary," with 500 troops for Syria. We communicated to the Commander, Captain Ford, the news from Syria.

I beg your Lordship to pardon the haste with which this report is written.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

No. 242.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 21.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October* 4, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, the copy of a despatch which I have addressed to General Jochmus, communicating his appointment by the Porte to the rank of Ferik, on the conditions therein mentioned.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 242.

Viscount Ponsonby to General Jochmus.

Sir, *Therapia, September* 30, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, at my solicitation, has been graciously pleased to confer upon you the rank of Ferik in the Ottoman Army, and that this rank is given upon the condition of your obeying the orders of Colonel Sir Charles Smith. I have sent copy of this letter to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 243.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 24.)

My Lord, *Paris, October* 22, 1840.

ON Tuesday last the President of the Council and the Minister of the Interior submitted to the King the project of the Speech which they proposed that His Majesty should deliver to the Chambers at the opening of the Session, on Wednesday next.

The King is said to have objected to two parts of this project; the one regarding the necessity of a further augmentation of the army by calling out the contingent for 1840, and the other expressing the same opinion as is expressed in the despatch of M. Thiers to M. Guizot, of the 8th of October, relative to Mehemet Ali being maintained in the government of Egypt, as an element of the general balance of Europe.

Those objections of the King were, yesterday morning, considered at a meeting of the Cabinet Council; and, in the evening, the Council assembled at St. Cloud, when the Ministers expressed to His Majesty the necessity of their tendering their resignations if His Majesty persevered in omitting those parts of the speech to which he had made objection.

The King, in consequence, sent this day for Marshal Soult; and I understand that the Marshal has undertaken to form a Ministry. He accepts the office of Minister of War, with the Presidency of the Council. A telegraphic despatch has been sent to M. Guizot, offering him the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and the other offices will be filled by the former Colleagues of the Marshal in the Ministry of the 12th of May.

The vehemence of the press against this change of Ministers will create a very great excitement in Paris; and apprehension is felt of its leading to a disturbance of the general peace. It is impossible to form a conjecture as to the support the new Ministry will obtain in the Chamber of Deputies.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 244.

Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 26.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, October 17, 1840.*

M. DE LIEBERMANN, the Prussian Minister, called on me a few days ago, and read a despatch from M. de Schleinitz, dated London, October 2, which had been forwarded to him by his Government.

This despatch contained a report of an interview which your Lordship had had with the Representatives of the Three Powers, upon the subject of making a collective overture to the French Government, based, to a certain degree, on the proposals contained in Prince Metternich's letter to the King of the Belgians, of the 2nd of September.

M. de Schleinitz says that his reply to your Lordship was of exactly the same tenor as that of Baron Neumann, and conveyed the mere expression of his inability to act without instructions.

I called yesterday on the Vice-Chancellor, and the first question he asked was, if I had brought him the Memorandum which your Lordship had intended drawing up for communication to the Three Powers.

I replied that I had not received it, and proceeded to inquire whether the proposal, of which I had indirectly heard, was likely to be favourably received by the Imperial Government?

His Excellency said that he could not give any opinion on the subject at present; that when the Memorandum arrived, he would take the question into consideration.

I am confident that Count Nesselrode is disposed to make any fair concession of opinion on this point, with the view of preventing an European war.

In speaking of Prince Metternich's letter, Count Nesselrode said, that circumstances had now assumed an aspect very different from that which existed when his Highness wrote it, and that many modifications must be introduced.

Count Nesselrode read me a letter from Baron Brunnow, detailing your Lordship's last interview with M. Guizot. This report coincides entirely with your Lordship's despatch of October 5, to Earl Granville.

No. 245.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 26.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, October 7, 1840.*

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you that Salami Bey sails this night in "l'Etoile Polaire," Russian steamer, for Beyrout. He takes with him two millions and a-half of piastres. This sum is in addition to the 15,000*l.* mentioned before. I have written to Sir Charles Smith to notify the fact to him, and to tell him the money is to be expended under his (Sir Charles Smith's) controul.

The "Talbot" frigate will take troops to Beyrout. The Porte will send 15,000 men: they are good troops.

The spirit of the Turkish soldiers has been shown in Syria: they will follow when they have confidence in those who lead them.

No. 246.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 26.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 7, 1840.*

COUNT WALEWSKI paid a visit yesterday to Rechid Pasha to take leave. He said, that France had engaged Mehemet Ali to restore to the Sublime Porte, the district of Adana, the Isle of Candia, and the Holy Cities; that

Mehemet Ali had shown himself ready to comply with those wishes of France, and was even ready to desist from his demand of the hereditary Government of Syria; and therefore France was under a tacit engagement to act, if these intentions were opposed; and that there were in France very warlike dispositions; that great preparations were making there, great armaments, &c.; that Mehemet Ali is old and will live only a few years; that the Porte will therefore have but little to give to him, or to his children, in granting the administration for life of some districts in Syria; and, finally, that France is much disposed to be of use to Turkey; and that it was exactly for that end M. Thiers had ordered him (Count Walewski) to hold this language to the Pasha. Rechid answered, that the Sublime Porte would not, and could not, deviate from the Convention of the 15th of July.

The foregoing is taken from a report made by Baron H. Testa to the Internuncio, which his Excellency communicated to me.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 247.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 26.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 7, 1840.*

I HAVE received from his Excellency the Internuncio the following information: That whilst Baron Testa was with Rechid Pasha yesterday, a letter was brought him, written by Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier, and which arrived by the French packet the day before yesterday, the 5th instant, and which is dated the last days of September. The Pasha allowed M. Testa to read the letter.

Mehemet Ali therein announces, that France having remained neuter, he had asked for her mediation, and that France had well received his request. This communication is preceded and followed by every sort of protestation of zeal and devotion to the interests of the country and religion. The Pasha intends to send a copy of this letter to the Four Representatives.

Count Walewski had an interview subsequently with the Pasha, and he said nothing of the above-mentioned letter.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 248.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 26.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 7, 1840.*

IN compliance with the desire of the Sublime Porte, and in concurrence with my Colleagues, I have recalled Colonel Hodges to Constantinople, and requested him to come here with the other Consuls of the Three Allied Powers. I inclose copy of my letter to the Colonel.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 248.

Viscount Ponsonby to Colonel Hodges.

Sir, *Therapia, October 4, 1840.*

I HAVE to inform you that the Representatives of the Four Powers, acting in correspondence with the declared wishes of the Sublime Porte, have resolved to recall the Consuls-General (lately resident in Egypt) from Syria, and

to require them to come to Constantinople. I have, therefore, to instruct you to leave Syria without delay, and also to inform you that the Russian Minister has sent the "Polar Star," a Russian steamer, to Beyrout, to bring Count Medem, and has been so good as to offer a passage in that vessel for your accommodation.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 249.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 26.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 7, 1840.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose extract from the Syrian journal of a gentleman employed in the Turkish service, and a man of sense. This extract contains matter not mentioned in other reports, and states facts worth being submitted to your Lordship's attention.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 249.

Extract from Journal.

Sunday, 27th, 6 A.M.

CAPTAIN WALKER came on board to see me. He had been down to inspect Tyre, to see if it could be made quarters for the army in winter, and on his arrival there, on board the "Hydra," he found the "Kaywam" and the two English frigates had already taken possession of the place, and found in it four months' provisions of corn, &c. These three vessels had also attacked Caiffa, and although within sight of the whole garrison of Acre, and about 1,500 troops, its own garrison, who had evacuated the place on the approach of the squadron, they took all the brass guns and the mortars, and about a thousand stand of arms and cartouches, accoutrements, &c., blew up the citadel, and then leaving the place, had gone to Tyre, which had also been evacuated on their approach. Captain Walker, finding matters in this condition, and having ascertained, together with Lieutenant Aldrich, Royal Engineers, that Tyre was too small for winter quarters, immediately returned towards Djounie Bay to report and to send some merchant vessels down to carry off the corn and other provisions. On his way back, the "Hydra" fell in with the squadron sent to attack Saida, and immediately joined it. Another steam-vessel, the "Stromboli," on her passage direct from England, with 350 Marines on board to join the fleet, happening to fall in with this squadron, received orders to join it, so that instead of two, four large steamers attacked the place. Captain Walker headed the Turks in the assault that was given after a breach was made; Napier and Aldrich the English; and the Archduke the Austrians. The assault was made in three places, under the fire of the ships; and to prevent the garrison from running away, the steamers kept sending bombs away beyond the town, and so kept them in; the Egyptian troops fought well from the houses, but were turned out, and driven back to the barracks; where, at last, they were obliged to lay down their arms about sunset; the number was estimated to be about 2,000, of which 500 were immediately embarked on board the "Hydra," and Captains Walker and Aldrich returned with them to Djounie Bay.

I went with Captain Walker to see Sir Robert Stopford.

Leaving Sir Robert, I accompanied Captain Walker to see Izzet Pasha; we found him suffering extremely, and after communicating to him the events which had taken place to the southward, Captain Walker declared it to be his opinion that an attack on Acre would be successful.

No. 250.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received October* 26.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October* 8, 1840.

I HAVE this day received an Official Note from his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, declaring that the Sublime Porte has ordered the Commander of the Turkish squadron charged with the blockade of Alexandria, &c., to subject ships of war to the said blockade, and requesting me to give instructions to the same effect to Her Majesty's Admiral.

A similar communication of the orders given by the Sublime Porte has been made to all the Ministers of the Four Powers, and the same request has been made to the Internuncio, to make the Austrian Admiral acquainted with the order of the Porte.

The Ministers of the Four Powers were previously made acquainted with the intention of the Porte, and had agreed that the Internuncio and myself should comply with the requests of the Sublime Porte.

I inclose copy of my despatch to Admiral Sir R. Stopford, in which I also reply to questions put to me by the Admiral.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 250.

Rechid Pasha to Viscount Ponsonby.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Balta Liman, le* 8 *Octobre,* 1840.

LA Sublime Porte considérant que le blocus des ports et échelles de l'Egypte et de la Syrie n'atteindrait qu'incomplètement son but si les bâtimens de guerre étrangers en étaient exceptés, vient d'enjoindre au commandant de la flotille Ottomane chargée de ce blocus d'y soumettre également les dits bâtimens de guerre.

En informant votre Excellence de cette décision, je la prie de vouloir bien faire parvenir des instructions analogues à Monsieur l'Amiral des forces navales Britanniques.

Recevez, &c.,
(Signé) RECHID.

(Translation.)

Rechid Pasha to Viscount Ponsonby.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Balta Liman, October* 8, 1840.

THE Sublime Porte considering that the blockade of the ports and stations of Egypt and of Syria, would only incompletely attain its objects, if foreign ships of war were exempted from it, has enjoined the commander of the Ottoman squadron charged with enforcing this blockade, to subject to it equally the said vessels of war.

In informing your Excellency of this decision, I request you to have the goodness to transmit corresponding instructions to the Admiral of the British Naval forces.

Receive, &c.,
(Signed) RECHID.

Inclosure 2 in No. 250.

Viscount Ponsonby to Admiral Sir Robert Stopford.

(Extract.) *Therapia, October* 8, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your information, a communication I have just received from the Sublime Porte upon the subject of the blockade.

It appears to me, that the Porte intends to exclude the French steamers, on account of the fact, that they are the means whereby intrigues of a very dangerous nature are kept up in this capital.

The French steamers are ships of war.

The blockade ordered by the Sultan is a strict universal blockade, which puts an end to all intercourse, excepting what may be allowed by international law, or what mitigation may be accorded by the Sultan, in such cases as the Sublime Porte shall judge to be advisable.

No. 251.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 26.)

(Extract.) *Therapia, October* 9, 1840.

THE Sultan has given from his Civil List five millions of piastres; half the sum was sent with Salami Bey to Syria, half is kept in reserve here for the same service.

Ten transports are now leaving the harbour for Beyrout with 8,000 troops and 5,000 muskets. Moretroops will follow and more muskets.

The exertions of the Ottoman Ministers are worthy of all praise.

Your Lordship will be pleased to see the rapidity with which measures have been taken here, and the success which has followed promptitude and vigour in Syria.

It will also be agreeable to your Lordship, to have seen the courageous and energetic conduct of Captain Walker and the Turkish Captain Mustapha Bey, and you will no doubt attach great weight to the opinion of so skilful and able a man as Captain Walker, respecting the great facility with which St. Jean d'Acre may be taken.

We have nothing to fear from Mehemet Ali's power, nothing from Ibrahim, unless all the accounts that reach this place from Syria, are in a high degree erroneous.

No. 252.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 26.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October* 9, 1840.

I INCLOSE copy of a letter from Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier. It came by the last French steamer, and the efforts of the French were renewed on the occasion to induce Rechid Pasha to make an arrangement with Mehemet Ali; Count Walewski urged it. The Pasha replied, that the Porte would not deviate a hair's breadth from the policy it had entered into with the Four Powers. Count Walewski is gone to Alexandria; it is reported M. de Butenval is gone with him.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 252.

Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier.—End of September, 1840.

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre que votre Altesse a bien voulu m'adresser pour m'annoncer qu'on a jugé à propos de me décharger des fonctions de Gouverneur d'Egypte. Puisse le Très-Haut préserver Sa Hautesse notre auguste et clément Souverain de toutes les vicissitudes humaines et garantir ses états de tout malheur et de toute calamité! Sous les auspices de Sa Hautesse et en travaillant nuit et jour, j'ai réussi à acquérir contre les mal-intentionnés des moyens de défense destinés à être employés exclusivement au maintien de l'Empire Ottoman et à la consolidation de la religion et du Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse. En me confiant donc dans le secours et dans la grâce de Dieu et dans l'assistance spirituelle de notre Saint Prophète, je m'apprête à tenir tête aux attaques et outrages que les ennemis se permettent à présent de tous côtés. D'après ceci, mon dévouement et ma religion ne pourraient me permettre de me laisser induire, par les artifices de quelques hommes irréfléchis et trompés par leurs passions, à faciliter à l'ennemi la réussite de ses projets en livrant les forces matérielles de Sa Hautesse qui se trouvent auprès de moi. De l'autre côté, je suis prêt ainsi à faire tous les efforts possibles pour maintenir la paix générale et confirmer mon dévouement à mon Souverain. Par conséquent, j'ai prié le Gouvernement Français qui est resté neutre dans cette affaire, et qui de tout tems a eu en vue le bien-être de la Sublime Porte, d'interposer ses bons offices, et ce Gouvernement s'est montré, avec plaisir, prêt à accueillir ma demande. Je m'abandonne donc à l'espoir que les hommes fidèles et clairvoyans parmi les Ministres de la Sublime Porte approfondiront et apprécieront au juste le résultat final de la conjonction actuelle et travailleront à détourner les dangers présens et à venir; qu'en permettant donc l'intervention amicale du Gouvernement Français, et en ayant la bonté de la faire agréer aussi aux Puissances Alliées, ils me seconderont dans mes efforts pour la durée de la Sublime Porte et le salut de la Nation Musulmane, et arriveront ainsi eux-mêmes au port de salut, tant dans ce monde que dans l'autre. Voici, Altesse, ce que je prends la liberté de vous exposer, d'après mes connaissances et mon faible jugement. Il dépendra d'ailleurs de votre Altesse de prendre telle décision qui lui paraîtra convenable.

(Translation.)

Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier.—End of September, 1840.

I HAVE had the honour to receive the letter which your Highness had the goodness to address to me, to announce to me that it has been thought proper that I should be discharged from the functions of Governor of Egypt. May the Most High preserve His Highness, our August and Merciful Sovereign, from all the vicissitudes of human life, and shield his States from every misfortune and calamity! Under the auspices of His Highness, and by labouring night and day, I have succeeded in acquiring means of defence against ill-intentioned men, which are intended to be exclusively employed for the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, and for the consolidation of the religion and of the Government of His Highness. Putting, therefore, my trust in the help and grace of God, and in the spiritual assistance of our Holy Prophet, I prepare to face all the attacks and outrages which my enemies now allow themselves on all sides. According to this, my devotion and my religion would not allow me to suffer myself to be induced by the artifices of some unreflecting men, deceived by their passions, to facilitate to the enemy the success of his projects, by delivering up the material force of His Highness which is in my possession. On the other hand, I am also ready to use every possible effort to maintain the general peace, and to establish my devotion to my Sovereign. Consequently I have requested the French Government, which has remained neuter in this matter, and which has always had in view the prosperity of the Sublime Porte, to interpose its good offices, and that Government has shown itself, with pleasure, ready to accede

to my request. I indulge then the hope that the faithful and clear-sighted among the Ministers of the Sublime Porte will fathom and justly appreciate the final result of the present conjuncture, and will labour to avert present and future dangers; that by permitting, then, the friendly intervention of the French Government, and by having the goodness to make it also acceptable to the Allied Powers, they will second me in my efforts for the duration of the Sublime Porte, and for the safety of the Mussulman nation, and will thus themselves arrive at the haven of salvation in this world as well as in the other. This, Your Highness, is what I take the liberty of setting forth to you, according to my knowledge and my humble judgment. For the rest, it will depend upon Your Highness to take such decision as may appear to you to be proper.

No. 253.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 27, 1840.

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your Excellency's despatches to the 9th of October.

I have to instruct your Excellency to state to the Porte, that the language of Count Walewski, reported in your despatch of October 7, was only meant to intimidate. France will offer no armed support to Mehemet Ali; because, by so doing, she would place herself in collision with the Four Powers; and neither her army nor her navy are strong enough for such a collision. By sea, France is inferior to England alone; but much more so to England and Russia united. By land, she has not, with all her recent armaments, more than her full peace establishment under arms, and out of that force she is obliged to keep 60,000 men in Algiers; and therefore she has not, and could not, for many months to come, have a disposable force to undertake a war against all Germany and Russia. But the retirement of M. Thiers and his Colleagues from office, is a pledge to Europe that France is not going to make war in defence of Mehemet Ali.

All these considerations, however, ought only to be additional motives with the Porte for making the best use of the time present, and for employing every possible effort to bring the war in Syria to a speedy and successful termination. Her Majesty's Government have learnt with the greatest satisfaction, the exertions which the Porte is making to send to Syria, troops, money, and arms; and I have to signify to you, the full approbation of Her Majesty's Government, of the zeal and ability with which you have urged the Turkish Government to make those exertions.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 254.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 27, 1840.

WITH reference to your despatch of October 8, I have to state to your Excellency, that it is to be presumed, that the blockade will be raised with respect to Syrian ports occupied by the Turkish troops.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 255.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 27, 1840.

WITH reference to your despatch of October 8, respecting the extension to ships of war of the blockade of the ports of Egypt and Syria, established by the Porte, I have to observe to your Excellency, that such extension is, in fact, only giving to the blockade its usual and natural scope; because ships of war are by international law, as much excluded as merchant-ships from blockaded ports.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 256.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 26.)

(Extract.) *Paris, October* 23, 1840.

ON Tuesday last, I read to M. Thiers your Lordship's despatch to Lord Ponsonby, of the 15th October, and delivered a copy of it to his Excellency, accompanied by a Note containing all that your Lordship instructed me to say to the French Minister, at the time that I communicated your despatch.

When I had finished reading these papers, M. Thiers said, that although he was not prepared to give me an official answer to my communation, he would not delay expressing the satisfaction with which he had heard the friendly language of Her Majesty's Government; he wished that he could perceive in the substance of the communication, some approach towards the settlement of the Turco-Egyptian Question, but he did not see how your Lordship's despatch to Lord Ponsonby would advance that object. Mehemet Ali, he said, being in possession of the whole of Syria, with the exception of some insignificant places ("des bicoques") on the coast, could not be expected to submit to the conditions on which alone, according to the suggestion of the Allied Powers to the Porte, the Sultan should reinstate him in his Pashalic. Had his acceptance of the territorial arrangement of the Treaty of July been made the condition of his reinstatement, Mehemet Ali, trusting to the generosity of the Sultan to bestow an additional Pashalic on one of his sons, might perhaps have been induced to agree to it.

No. 257.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 26.)

My Lord, *Paris, October* 23, 1840.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches to the 20th of October. I have not seen M. Thiers since the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of that day, a copy of which you direct me to give him, after reading it to his Excellency.

M. Thiers, however, having resigned his office, and the King having accepted his resignation, he will, as is usual under such circumstances, decline, I imagine, entering with me upon public business, excepting on matters of mere routine, and which could not be deferred without inconvenience.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 258.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, October* 27, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 23rd instant, from which it appears, that your Excellency has not furnished the French Government with a copy of my despatch of the 20th instant.

I have, however, to instruct your Excellency to transmit without delay a copy of that despatch to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 259.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, October* 27, 1840.

M. GUIZOT called on me on Saturday afternoon, before he left London for Paris. He informed me that he had received a summons from the King and from M. Thiers, and that the letter from the King expressed a desire that he should take office. He said, that if a Government could be formed consisting of persons with whom it would suit him to act, and he mentioned particularly Marshal Soult and M. Duchâtel, he should feel it his duty to place his services at the King's disposal; and that one of his great objects in taking office would be, to bring about a good understanding between France and England, not only upon Turkish Affairs, but upon all other questions. He said, however, that Turkish Affairs were the question of the day which pressed the most, and upon which it is of the most importance that the two countries should come to an agreement; but he said, that the English Government must come to the assistance of that of France in this matter, by agreeing to some arrangement consistent with the honour and feelings of all parties.

I said, that Her Majesty's Government are most sincerely anxious to see a good understanding re-established between England and France. And I added, that it did not seem to me to be difficult to arrive at such an understanding between the two Governments, even upon the Turkish Question, which being the practical and most important matter of the day, must be the foundation for everything else; for, I observed, the course of events seems already to have pointed out the means of arrangement. France has said, that there is one thing to which she attaches much importance (why she does so I could not imagine, according to the principles which she has laid down), and that is, that Mehemet Ali should be allowed to continue Governor of Egypt; on the other hand, the Four Powers attach great importance to another thing, and that is, that the Sultan should re-establish his direct authority in the whole of Syria. I said, that these two things seem to be perfectly compatible; that the latter is on the point of being accomplished by the rapid success of the operations of the Allies in Syria; and that the Four Powers have no wish to see Mehemet Ali deprived of Egypt, if by a prompt submission to the Sultan, he should entitle himself to the favour of his Sovereign. Here then, I said, are the elements of an arrangement which the course of events appears to be upon the eve of bringing about.

M. Guizot did not seem, however, disposed to acquiesce entirely in this plan; he said that France and the Four Powers are not, in regard to these matters, upon an equal footing. That France has always been for maintaining the *status quo* of Kutaya; and that the Four Powers were for it also till not long ago, and that it is only of late that they have changed their mind, and thought it necessary to restore Syria to the Sultan. That France cannot be expected to sacrifice her opinions and *amour-propre* merely because the other

Powers have altered their views; and that the Four Powers ought to modify the arrangement of the Treaty, in order to assist the French Government in maintaining peace.

I said, that the Four Powers had felt it necessary to undo the arrangement of Kutaya, because experience had shown that arrangement to be incompatible with the maintenance of peace in the Ottoman Empire. That certainly France and the Four Powers are not upon an equal footing in these matters, though for a different reason from that which he had assigned. For France stands out upon her *amour-propre*, and adheres to opinions merely because she entertained them at a former period. While the Four Powers stand out upon their opinion, because they are convinced that its execution is essential to the peace of Europe, and to the preservation of the balance of power. I said, that regard for *amour-propre* was not a ground upon which the great affairs of Europe could be placed; and that the considerations which influence the Four Powers seemed to me to be the true guide of Governments.

M. Guizot said, that this conversation was merely preliminary, because he could not, till he arrived at Paris, know whether such a Government could be formed as he would like to belong to; but that if he should take office, he would then, from Paris, make his communication to the English Government.

No. 260.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received November* 1.)

(Extract.) *Paris, October* 30, 1840.

THE "Moniteur" of this morning contains the Royal Ordinances which I stated in my despatch of last night to your Lordship, had been signed yesterday by the King.

M. Dufaure and M. Passy, who were members of the Soult Ministry, and who, it was expected, would accept the offices which were on this occasion offered to them by Marshal Soult, have declined to belong to the Administration.

The friends of the new Ministry, notwithstanding, have sanguine hopes that it will obtain a majority in the Chamber of Deputies; and M. Guizot talks with confidence of the strength of the Government. I collected from his conversation, that there is an intention to adjourn the Chamber after the first debates are over, in case any negotiation should be on foot between France and the Four Powers on the affairs of the East. M. Guizot said, that any such negotiation must depend upon the result of the operations of the Allied Powers in Syria, which result must, in the course of three or four weeks, be known. If Mehemet Ali were disposed to yield to the demands of the Sultan, or if the Egyptian army were compelled to evacuate Syria, the question of a pacific arrangement would be much simplified; but if the Turks and their Allies were obliged to abandon the coast of Syria, or if, notwithstanding their continued occupation of it, the Egyptians remained masters of the interior of the country, there would be new phases in the Eastern Question, in which a new negotiation would probably arise. If, in consequence of maritime operations on the coast being found insufficient to obtain the evacuation of Syria by the Egyptians, any idea should be entertained of employing a large European army to effect that object, M. Guizot added, it would be matter of grave consideration with the French Government, what course they might feel themselves under such circumstances compelled to adopt.

No. 261.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.--(*Received November* 1.)

(Extract.) *Paris, October* 30, 1840.

IMMEDIATELY upon the receipt yesterday of your Lordship's despatch of the 27th of October, I transmitted to M. Thiers a copy of your despatch of the 20th ultimo.

P.S.—Since I wrote the above, M. Guizot told me that he had received your Lordship's despatch to me, of the 20th of October, which I transmitted yesterday to the address of M. Thiers; that your Lordship had shown it to him previous to his departure from London, and that as it seemed to have reference chiefly to arguments used by M. Thiers in his conversation with me, he should not write any note or despatch in reply, but that if any parts of it required an answer, the answer would be found in the King's speech at the opening of the session.

No. 262.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 2, 1840.

THE despatch of the 8th October, from M. Thiers to M. Guizot, which was officially communicated to Her Majesty's Government by M. Guizot, on the 10th October, afforded to Her Majesty's Government the liveliest satisfaction by the renewed assurances which it contained, that love of peace is a constant sentiment of the French Government; that Europe may reckon upon the disinterestedness of France, in regard to the affairs of the Levant; that France considers the existence of the Turkish Empire, in its integrity and independence, essential for the dearest interests of Europe, because the fall of that Empire would increase the power of neighbouring States, at the expence of the general equilibrium; and that France will devote all her means to the maintenance of peace, and to the upholding of the balance of power in Europe.

These assurances, indeed, are in strict accordance with all the previous diplomatic communications which Her Majesty's Government has received from that of France during the progress of these negotiations; and they are of high value in the eyes of Her Majesty's Government as pledges, that, notwithstanding some differences of opinion between the Powers of Europe as to particular matters of detail, the general agreement of all the Great Powers upon the fundamental principles which ought to regulate their conduct in these affairs, will prevent any interruption of peace.

The main subject of M. Thiers' despatch is the Edict of the Sultan depriving Mehemet Ali of his Government of Egypt; and my despatches to your Excellency, of the 17th ultimo, and to Lord Ponsonby, of the 15th ultimo, which have been communicated to the French Government, contain so full a statement of the view which has been taken by Her Majesty's Government of that measure, that it is unnecessary for me on the present occasion to add anything further upon that point. But there are some remarks which have suggested themselves to Her Majesty's Government upon some passages of M. Thiers' despatch, which your Excellency is instructed to submit for the consideration of the French Cabinet.

M. Thiers says, that France, in accepting with a religious fidelity the state of Europe, such as it resulted from Treaties (by which it is presumed are meant the Treaties of 1815), has understood that this state should not be changed, either for the benefit *or to the detriment* of any existing Power. In this understanding Her Majesty's Government entirely agrees; and Her Majesty's Government conceives that an arrangement which has for its object to prevent Egypt and Syria from being severed from the Turkish Empire, is

in strict conformity with this understanding, and in accordance both with its letter and with its spirit.

M. Thiers states, that the integrity of the Ottoman Empire embraces the shores of the Black Sea and those of the Red Sea, and that it is as important to maintain the independence of Egypt and Syria as that of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. But Her Majesty's Government presumes that what is meant to be expressed in this passage, is not that the particular portions of the Turkish Empire therein mentioned should be made separately independent, because that would be a dissolution of the Turkish Empire; but that the Sovereign Power which rules the whole of the Turkish Empire, should be able to exert its paramount authority with entire independence of foreign control, as fully and completely on the shore of the Red Sea as on that of the Black Sea; in Egypt and in Syria, as on the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. In this opinion Her Majesty's Government concurs, and the measures which are now in course of execution by the Four Powers, in regard to Syria, appear to Her Majesty's Government to be strictly in furtherance of these views.

So far Her Majesty's Government is glad to find itself concurring in the positions laid down in M. Thiers' despatch; but Her Majesty's Government cannot equally agree in the opinion expressed therein, that the present condition of the Pasha of Egypt is an essential element of the balance of power in Europe.

The whole of M. Thiers' argument on this point seems to rest on the assumption, that the continued existence of Mehemet Ali in his present condition as Pasha of Egypt, is a source of strength to the Sultan, and tends to enable the Sultan the better to defend himself against foreign and domestic danger; because, if it is admitted that Mehemet Ali is a Governor, using against his Sovereign an authority which has been confided to him for the benefit of that Sovereign, and employing in hostility against the Supreme Power of the State, the resources, military, naval, and financial, of an important portion of the Empire itself; if, in short, he is, to use the words of the despatch, "a Pasha disobedient towards his Master, and depending upon all sorts of foreign influences," it is manifest that the continued existence of a subject in such a state of insubordination and enmity towards his Sovereign, must be a source of weakness, and not of strength, to that Sovereign, and must render him less, instead of more, able to defend himself against either foreign or domestic danger, and must therefore, according to the principles of M. Thiers' despatch, impair the balance of power.

But the opinion of the Turkish Government, which may be allowed to be a competent judge on this matter, has for some time been, that the continued existence of Mehemet Ali in his present state of military power, and with his hostile intentions towards the Sultan, is incompatible with the internal peace and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and destructive of the independence of the Sultan as regards his relations with foreign Powers: and, undoubtedly, the experience of the last few years has too fully shown that this opinion is not unfounded.

The extent of the limits within which it may be necessary to confine the delegated authority of Mehemet Ali, in order to make it probable that for the future he may be an obedient instead of a disobedient subject, and may, therefore, become a source of strength, instead of being a cause of weakness to the Ottoman Empire, is a point upon which opinions may differ; and that question it is not requisite for me now to discuss. But Her Majesty's Government conceives that whatever may be the opinions entertained on this point by Foreign Powers, such opinions can only serve to regulate the advice which those Powers may tender to the Sultan, or to determine the extent of the assistance which they may be disposed to afford him; but that it rests with the Sultan, as Sovereign of the Turkish Empire, to decide which of his subjects shall be appointed by him to govern particular portions of his own dominions, and that no Foreign Power has a right to control the Sultan in the discretionary exercise of one of the inherent and essential attributes of independent sovereignty.

The question of principle which I have thus adverted to, may probably not have any practical bearing upon events now in progress, but Her Majesty's

Government has felt anxious that it should not, by silence on this matter, leave its opinions liable to be misunderstood.

Your Excellency will give a copy of this despatch to the Minister fo Foreign Affairs.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.